Saudi gas export plans shine new light on efforts to isolate Iran
By James M. Dorsey
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Saudi plans to become
a major gas exporter within a decade raise questions about what the
real goal of the kingdom’s policy, and by extension that of the United States,
is towards Iran.
Officially both Saudi Arabia and the US, which last year
withdrew from the 2015 international accord that curbs the Islamic republic’s
nuclear program and imposed harsh economic sanctions, are demanding a change of
Iran’s regional and defense policies rather than of its regime.
Yet, statements in recent years by some Saudi leaders and US
officials as well a string of declarations at the recent US-sponsored
Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Stability in the Middle East in
Warsaw by officials of the Trump administration as well as Saudi Arabia, Israel,
the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain suggested that regime change was on their
radar.
President Donald J. Trump’s hard-line national security
advisor John Bolton, a past advocate of regime change and a covert war to
destabilize Iran, concluded an outline on the White House’s official Twitter
account of Washington’s long list of grievances and accusations levelled at
Iranian leaders by addressing supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, directly:
“I don’t think
you’ll have too many more anniversaries,” Mr. Bolton said as Iran
celebrated the 40th anniversary of its Islamic revolution.
The notion that the real goal of Saudi and US policy is
regime change prompted by the sanctions and a destabilization campaign that
would foster unrest among Iran’s ethnic minorities was bolstered by multiple
indicators.
These include statements
of Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman and Mr.
Bolton before he became Mr. Trump’s advisor; a flow
of funds from the kingdom to militant, ultra-conservative
anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian madrassas or religious seminaries that dot the
Iranian border in the troubled Pakistani province of Balochistan; US
and Saudi support for an exile Iranian group that demands regime
change in Tehran; and a string of recent
attacks inside Iran.
With Saudi Arabia, however, announcing that it will invest
US$150 billion to enable it to export three billion cubic metres of gas a year
by 2030, suggests that imminent regime change may not be in the
kingdom’s immediate interest.
Viewed through the lens of the timeline of Saudi Arabia’s
gas plans, the kingdom is likely to benefit more from an Iran that is isolated
and weakened for years to come to give the Saudis the time to get up to speed
on gas rather than an Iran that under a new more accommodating government
returns to the international fold. A potential destabilization campaign that is
low-level and intermittent but not regime threatening would serve that purpose.
It would also extend the window
of opportunity on which Saudi Arabia relies to assert regional leadership.
That window of opportunity exists as long as the obvious regional powers –
Iran, Turkey and Egypt – are in various degrees of disrepair. Punitive economic
sanctions, international isolation and domestic turmoil serve to keep Iran weak
and unable to leverage its assets.
The emergence of Saudi gas plans appears to put Saudi
strategy towards Iran at cross purposes. If Saudi Arabia’s gas-driven interest
is prolonged containment of Iran, operations at the Indian-backed Arabian Sea
port of Chabahar were believed to have given the effort to achieve a change of
Tehran’s regional and defense policy, if not its regime, a sense of urgency.
Pakistani militants reported the flow of Saudi funds to
Baloch madrassas at the time that a government-backed Saudi think-tank, the
International Institute of Iranian Studies, argued in a study that Chabahar, a
mere 70 kilometres up the coast from the Chinese-backed Pakistani port of
Gwadar posed
“a direct threat to the Arab Gulf states” that called for “immediate counter
measures.”
Written by Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor, identified as an
Iranian political researcher, the study warned that Chabahar posed a threat
because it would enable Iran to increase its market share in India for its oil
exports at the expense of Saudi Arabia, raise foreign investment in the Islamic
republic, increase government revenues, and allow Iran to project power in the
Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
Pakistani analysts expect around US$5 billion in Afghan
trade to flow through Chabahar after India in December started handling the
port’s operations. It could also further strain ties with Pakistan that accuses
India of fomenting nationalist unrest in Balochistan. India and Pakistan are on
the brink of a potentially escalating
military conflict over Kashmir.
The perceived threat of Chabahar, however, pales against the
opportunity that Saudi Arabia’s ability to be a major gas exporter would open
up.
In a study
published in 2015, energy scholar Micha’el Tanchum suggested that it
would be gas supplies from Iran and Turkmenistan, two Caspian Sea states,
rather than Saudi oil that would determine which way Eurasia’s future energy
architecture tilts: China, the world’s third largest LNG importer, or Europe.
With 24.6 billion cubic metres potentially available for
annual piped exports beyond its current supply commitments, Iran, unfettered by
sanctions and with no Saudi competition, could emerge as Eurasia’s swing
producer, which would significantly enhance its regional clout.
Iranian
foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s resignation in recent days,
had it been accepted by President Hasan Rouhani, would have amounted to a
victory for hardliners and served the interest of the Saudis and their allies.
“Zarif
went. We are rid of him,” Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu gloated
prematurely on his Farsi-language Twitter account.
The departure of Mr. Zarif, a suave, US-educated moderate
who was Iran’s main negotiator of the nuclear accord, would have enhanced the
quest of Saudi Arabia and its allies even if their timelines for a change of Iranian
policies, if not of the regime, differ.
His continued tenure as foreign minister is likely to
encourage Europe, China and Russia in their efforts to salvage the nuclear deal
but little to change Saudi or US long-term strategy.
Tweeted US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: Zarif “and @HassanRouhani
are just front
men for a corrupt religious mafia. We know @khamenei_ir makes all
final decisions. Our policy is unchanged—the regime must behave like a normal
country and respect its people.”
Dr.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture,
and co-host of the New Books in Middle Eastern Studies podcast.
James is the author of The Turbulent World
of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title and a co-authored
volume, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and
the Middle East and North Africa as well as Shifting
Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa
and recently published China and the Middle
East: Venturing into the Maelstrom
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