Tackling Corruption: Why Saudi Prince Mohammed’s approach raises questions
By James M. Dorsey
Leave aside for a moment questions of due process. Analysis
of Saudi Arabia’s three largest corporate
failures explains why Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s recent
moves look more like a power and asset grab than a credible effort to
eradicate corruption.
Dependency on government contracts was at the core of the bankruptcy
of Saudi
Oger, owned by the family of embattled Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri,
and the near-demise of the Saudi Bin Laden Group.
Granted, the $22 billion downfall
of 70-year old Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi & Brothers Company (AHAB) that took
down two Bahraini banks as well as the Saad Group in one the largest financial
collapses of the 2009 global credit crunch, occurred because of mismanagement, lacking
corporate and financial governance, and allegations of fraud, theft and forgery.
Yet, like the Bin Ladens and the Hariris, a major chunk of
the group’s business was with the government, selling
steel piping to Saudi Aramco, the kingdom’s national oil and natural gas
behemoth. The settlement of the collapse with more than 100 banks was long
viewed as a litmus test for foreign investors.
For Saudi Oger and Bin Laden, the government’s predicament meant
cancellation of projects and failure to pay. The government’s default had a
ripple effect, including the companies’ inability to pay their workers, who in
a country in which protests are banned, took their plight to the streets.
What emerges from the failures is the vulnerability of major
private corporations at a time that government, the dominant economic player, was
forced to diversify, rationalize, and cut costs. The failures also highlighted
the lack of oversight of corporate governance.
Ironically, a raid on the Saudi mansion of the head of the
Saad Group, Kuwaiti billionaire Maan al-Sanea, two weeks before Prince Mohammed’s
arrest of some 200 princes, officials and businessmen on charges of corruption,
set the stage for the purge.
The history of the troubled companies as well as Mr.
Al-Sanea’s detention speak to a system in which beyond private enterprise dependency,
members of the ruling family were rentiers of the state since its founding and
allowed to drink at the trough, and concepts of conflict of interest were non-existent.
Transparency and accountability did not enter the equation
in a country that did not tax companies or individuals except for zakat, a
religious obligation for all Muslims who meet the necessary criteria of wealth.
Instead, the social contract that is now being unilaterally rewritten by Prince
Mohammed involved popular surrender of political rights, adherence to a strict
social code, and acceptance of an absence of transparency and accountability in
exchange for cradle-to-grave welfare.
Despite citizens being asked to increasingly contribute by moves
towards market rates for services and the planned introduction of indirect
taxes like a highway toll,
there is no accountability with billions
of dollars that the inhabitants of Riyadh’s Ritz Carlton Hotel-turned-gilded
prison are being asked to surrender and transfer to a finance ministry account
in exchange for their freedom. What happens to those funds once they have been
transferred remains unclear.
In other words, transparency and accountability do not
figure in Prince Mohammed’s top-down moves. Aides to Prince Mohammed have
asserted that the arrests were the result of almost three years of
investigations. No details of those investigations have been made public nor
have their results been interrogated by a credible and independent judiciary.
The assertion would explain why the government announced the
establishment of a new anti-corruption commission headed by Prince Mohammed only
hours before the purge and why its functions were seemingly primarily defined
as an
arm of law enforcement rather than a vehicle to create an anti-corruption legal
structure that would also govern the commercial relationship between the
government and members of the ruling family. The commission’s powers include
the ability to detain suspects, seize their assets and ban them from travel.
The impression that power and assets rather than
anti-corruption drove Prince Mohammed in his purge is enhanced by the fact that
it appears designed to intimidate and put the kingdom’s elite on notice. There has
been neither a decree nor a process in the country’s Shura or Advisory Council
to draft legislation as well as rules and regulation that would create a legal
anti-corruption infrastructure, govern the way government agencies do business,
and set a template for defining and preventing conflict of interest.
While one could argue that Prince Mohammed needed to set an
example, that effort appears undermined by the fact that the alleged
investigations and arrests have a selective or arbitrary taste to them. Fact of
the matter is that in the permissive environment that was written into the
kingdom’s DNA at founding, few, if any, members of the ruling family are likely
to emerge with flying colours.
All of this, explains with the kingdom’s elite was caught
off guard even though Mr. Al-Sanea’s arrest should have set off alarm bells. Instead,
the ruling family and the business community saw the arrest as a one-off event
in a long-standing financial sage. It also clarifies why the elite grossly
underestimated Prince Mohammed’s brashness and ruthlessness and ignored
his warning
in June that “no one who got involved in a corruption case will
escape, regardless if he was a minister or a prince."
For anti-corruption to be perceived as the main driver of the
purge, Prince Mohammed will have to introduce due process, transparency and
accountability to the process. In theory, that would mean targeting all who potentially
could be under suspicion, an approach that would be tough, if not impossible,
in an environment in which the suspicion of guilt is likely to include many who
were not detained, rather than only some. Instead, Prince Mohammed would be
better advised to focus on structural and institutional change.
Dr.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture,
and co-host of the New Books in
Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title as well
as Comparative
Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North
Africa,
co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and
Politics in the Middle East and North Africa
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