Militant soccer fans: Egypt’s Hans Brink plugs the dam against radicalization
Middle East
Perspectives
Militant soccer fans: Egypt’s
Hans Brink plugs
the dam against
radicalization
by James M. Dorsey
Said Moshagheb, a mesmerizingly
charismatic, under‐educated and unemployed leader of a prominent group of
militant, well-organized, and street battle-hardened soccer fans, staged a coup
five years ago against the founders and original leaders of the Ultras White
Knights (UWK), the storied support group of Zamalek SC, one of Egypt’s most
celebrated clubs.
The impact of the takeover is today
increasingly evident on the embattled campuses of Egyptian universities and in
poorer neighborhoods of Egyptian cities, the focal points of protest against
the military coup in 2013 that toppled Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first and only
democratically elected president, and brought general-‐turned-‐president
Abdel Fattah Al-‐Sisi to power.
It is also obvious in the UWK’s most recent
history and that of Mr. Moshagheb personally, both of which are reflections of
a generation that has progressively lost hope and is potentially prone to radicalization.
If anything, their histories serve as warning signs that frustration sparked by
the success of the military and the security forces in rolling back the
achievements of the 2011 popular revolt that forced President Hosni Mubarak to
resign after 30 years in office coupled with Mr. Al-‐Sisi’s even more
repressive policies is fuelling radicalization rather than returning Egypt to
stability and equitable economic growth.
Mr. Moshagheb staged the first phase of his
takeover during a historic match between Zamalek and Tunisia’s Club Africain,
the first encounter between two teams whose supporters months earlier had
played important roles in the toppling of their countries’ leaders.[i]
Emboldened by the fact that he and
thousands of militant fans or ultras for the first time in four years of
pitched battles against security forces in stadia, found the pitch virtually
devoid of police and themselves in control of the stadium, Mr. Moshagheb led an
invasion of the pitch three minutes into stoppage time after the referee
disallowed a Zamalek goal because the scoring player was offside. The violent
invasion left five Tunisian players injured and UWK’s founding leaders in
shock.[ii]
To many of the ultras, the ceding of
control of the stadium symbolized their victory two months earlier as part Mr.
Mubarak’s overthrow. Mr. Moshagheb and his ultras arrived the day of the match
at the Cairo International Stadium braced for another battle with security
forces who had long tried to prevent the fans from bringing their flares, smoke
guns, and often politically-loaded banners into the arena. Police had
repeatedly advised the UWK in the 24 hours prior to the match that they would
be blocked from entering with their paraphernalia that is a staple of ultras
performances worldwide.
Yet, when the ultras got to the stadium the
gates were unmanned and police and security forces were absent but for some 30
unarmed officers dressed in light blue training suits deployed to protect a
small group of visiting Club Africain supporters. Police and security forces,
Egypt’s most brutal and despised institution because of its brutal role as the
strong arm of the repressive Mubarak regime, had opted not to engage in another
clash with what had become one of Egypt’s foremost social movements, in a bid
to avoid further tarnishing of their image. Moreover, a breakdown of law and
order would illustrate the need for a security force that ensures safety and
law and order.[iii]
In effect, Mr. Moshagebh and his followers
walked into the security forces’ trap. Their failure to recognize the strategy
of a security force whose training and experience had taught them little more
than repressive tactics represented a generational shift among the ultras from
a highly politicized leadership to one of disaffected youth whose vision went
little beyond deep-seated hatred of the police and distrust of the state.
To the founders of various groups of ultras
in Egypt, the battle for the stadia in the Mubarak years constituted a struggle
for public space in a country governed by a regime that tolerated no
uncontrolled public spaces. The ultras constituted the only group willing to
not only challenge government control of public space but also to putting their
lives on the line in staking their claim. They derived their title to the
stadium from their analysis of the power structure of the sport that positioned
ultras as the only true supporters of the club as opposed to a corrupt management
that was a pawn of the regime and players who were mercenaries who played for
the highest bidder.
In doing so, the ultras challenged the
Achilles Heel of the regime given that stadia alongside mosques were the two
public spaces that the government could not simply shut down because nothing
evoked the kind of deep-‐seated passion that soccer and religion did. As a
result, the government eager to crush the threat to its authority while wanting
to reap the political benefits of association with one of the most important
things in the lives of Egyptian men, saw little alternative but to fight for
control.
And that was what attracted the likes of
Mr. Moshagebh who was representative of the thousands of young,
under-‐educated and un-‐or under-‐employed men who joined the ranks of the
ultras in the waning years of the Mubarak regime because the fans were the only
organized group that persistently and physically stood up to corrupt and brutal
security forces who made their lives difficult in the stadia as well as in the neighborhoods
where they lived.
An action-‐oriented new generation
Mr. Moshagheb’s pitch invasion symbolized
the side lining of the UWK’s founding leadership who had a far more worked out
ideological concept of who the ultras were and what their role as a movement
was. Mr. Moshagebh finalized his takeover months after the pitch invasion by
brutally pushing out the UWK’s founders, some of whom were attacked and injured
by his knife-‐wielding followers.
“This is a new generation. It’s a
generation that can’t be controlled. They don’t read. They believe in action
and experience. They have balls. When the opportunity arises they will do
something bigger than we ever did,” said one of the group’s founders who has
since distanced himself from the UWK. The founder cautioned against repeating
the mistake of the Mubarak era when policymakers and analysts underestimated
the groundswell of anger and frustration among youth that was bubbling at the
surface.[iv]
To be sure, UWK has issued blistering
statements since some 20 of its members were killed in February in a stampede
outside Cairo’s Air Defence stadium in an area surrounded by military-owned
land and facilities. The stampede was sparked by security forces who corralled
spectators seeking access to the first match for the better part of three years
that was open to the public and used tear gas and birdshot against a crowd that
had no escape route.[v] Similarly, little UWK
action is expected when 16 ultras and alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood
go on trial on April 18 in connection with the stampede.
“Nothing will happen. Standing up to the
regime amounts to suicide. The question is how long that perception will last.
The closing of the stadia shuts down the only release valve. Things will
eventually burst. When and where nobody knows. But the writing is on the wall,”
said a source close to the ultras.[vi]
The UWK has been equally restrained since
the arrest last month of Mr. Moshagebh. He has been kept incommunicado since
his detention on charges of founding an illegal organization. Mr. Moshagebh was
however acquitted in late March in a case in which he was one of eight UWK
members accused of attacking Zamalek president Mortada Mansour with acid that
the ultra say was urine.
Mr. Moshagheb’s case lifts the veil on a
process of radicalization at the fringe of the ultras fuelled by policies of
the Al-Sisi government that are more restrictive and repressive of those of the
toppled Mubarak regime. It also puts into perspective the war being waged
against the UWK by Mr. Mansour, a larger than life figure who has twice failed
to persuade a court to outlaw the ultras as a terrorist organization on the
grounds that the group tried to assassinate him and prides himself on having
requested the police action against fans in February that sparked the stampede.
The case also positions widespread student anti- government protests in the
last two years on university campuses and in popular neighborhoods in which
members of the UWK and Ultras Ahlawy, the support group of Zamalek arch rival
Al-Ahli SC, play a key role.
Sources close to the ultras said Mr.
Moshagebh was suspected by authorities of having been involved in violent
resistance to the Al‐Sisi government. They said the UWK leader had been under
surveillance for some time during which he had been smuggling arms into Cairo
from Sinai, the setting for an armed insurgency that is being fuelled by
neglect of the region by successive governments and a brutal military crackdown.
The sources said that AK‐47s had been found in the homes of friends of Mr.
Moshagebh some two weeks before his arrest.[vii]
Mr. Moshagebh was arrested after he and
another ultra, Hassan Kazarlan, allegedly set fire to a Cairo convention fire.
Sixteen people were injured in the incident. Mr. Kazarlan fled to Turkey after
the arson attack.[viii] He was persuaded to
return to Egypt after security forces detained his father as a hostage and
immediately detained upon his arrival. Sources close to Mr. Kazarlan’s family
said he had told authorities that he had wanted to travel from Turkey to Syria.
They said he provoked security force ire by accusing his interrogators of being
infidels.[ix]
If he had made it to Syria, Mr. Kazarlan
would have followed in the footsteps of Rami Iskanderiya, a former leader of
Ultras Ahlawi in the Mediterranean port city of Alexandria, who joined the
Islamic State, the jihadist group that controls a swath of Syria and Iraq, and
married a Syrian woman in the group’s Syrian stronghold of Raqqa.
Tarek M. Elawady, a lawyer for the UWK,
said Mr. Kazarlan had led security forces to Mr. Moshagebh’s when he revealed
his whereabouts under torture. Mr. Elawady was careful to insist that he
represented the UWK and Mr. Moshagebh only in as far as his legal problems were
related to the ultras.
“Mortada wanted to drive a wedge between
the UWK rank and file and its leaders who may have had political affiliations.
Mortada provoked them to be violent… His actions are part of a government plan
to weaken any youth group that opposes the state… The problem is that Mortada
is playing the security forces’ game. He acts as their agent provocateur,”[x]
Mr. Elawady said, speaking in his office close to the brooding headquarters of
the Mukhabarat, the term broadly used for intelligence and law enforcement that
is surrounded by grimy walls, barbed wire and watch towers that give it a dark
and sinister look.
The targeting of ultras is evident not only
in Mr. Mansour’s campaign as well as the judicial crackdown on militant soccer
fans but also in the military where conscripts are asked after being drafted
whether they are members of an ultras group. Those that respond affirmatively
are singled out. “They were immediately ordered to do 100 push-‐ups during
which an officer shouted at them: ‘You are the lowest creatures. You sacrifice
yourselves for your club, not for your religion or country,’” a source
recounted.[xi]
Sources close to the ultras said Mr.
Moshagebh had wanted (in late January around the fourth anniversary of the
revolt that toppled Mr. Mubarak) to escalate protests in Cairo neighbourhoods
like Matareya, a stronghold of the Brotherhood that was outlawed as a terrorist
organization after the toppling of Mr. Mortada. Some 17 of the 74 Ultras Ahlawy
members killed in 2012 in a politically loaded brawl in the stadium of the Suez
Canal city of Port Said hailed from Matareya, the scene of multiple
anti-‐government protests that is known for its stock piles of illegal arms,
drug dealing and high crime rate.[xii]
Mr. Moshagebh’s alleged failed attempt to
escalate the protests in Matareya into an armed conflict coupled with flash
protests that have largely moved from campuses to neighborhoods on Fridays
after midday prayers because of security force control of universities reflect
efforts by those segments of the ultras with access to a better education to
maintain pressure on the government while preventing mounting frustration and
anger from sparking nihilistic violence.
A glimmer of hope
Leaders of Ultras Nahdawy, a group of
politicized soccer fans that was initially formed by members of the UWK and
Ultras Ahlawy in 2012 to support Mr. Morsi but grew exponentially in the wake
of the brutal ending in August 2013 of a Muslim Brotherhood sit-in on Raba'a
al-Adawiya Square, one of two protest squares, in which security forces killed
more than 600 people, and Students against the Coup, see themselves as forces
trying to provide disaffected youth with a glimmer of hope. Ultras Nahdawy
constitutes a break with the global culture of militant soccer fans that
projects itself as apolitical and exclusively associated with a club.
Nahdawy with some 65,000 followers on
Facebook[xiii]
has defined itself as explicitly political and is not associated with any one
club. It has long been viewed as being affiliated with the Brotherhood. “Many
of us are Islamists. I am a member of the Brotherhood, but that is not why we
supported the Brotherhood. We don’t want to be inside the Brotherhood or the
system. We supported Morsi not because he was a brother but because we wanted a
revolutionary force to be in government. The Brotherhood was the only
revolutionary force that had a candidate and popular support and was part of
the (2011) revolution,” said a leader of the Nahdawy, who asked to be
identified only as Ahmed.[xiv]
A member of an ultras group that played a
key role in the popular revolt on Cairo’s Tahrir Square in 2011 who has since
been expelled from university for organizing anti-‐ government protests and
sentenced twice in absentia to long-‐term incarceration, Ahmed is a fugitive
who moves around Cairo in a protective cocoon, speaks in a low voice to avoid
being overheard, and regularly looks furtively over his shoulder. Like during
the revolt on Tahrir, Ahmed and his fellow ultras form the front-‐line defense
against security forces in protests on campuses and in neighborhoods. Their
ultras-‐rooted tactics of chanting, jumping up and down and using flares and
fireworks are evident in the protests. Some 17 members of Nahdawy that has
branches in most Egyptian universities have been killed in clashes with
security forces in the last two years.
Yusuf Salheen, a 22-year old leader of
Students Against the Coup, a group that was formed in the wake of the Raba'a
al-Adawiya crackdown that has a presence not only in universities but also in
vocational institutions, said some 3,000 students had been arrested in the past
two years, 1,500 of which were still in detention. Mr. Salheen, a student of
Islam at Cairo’s prestigious Al Azhar University, who positions himself as an
Islamist but not a member of the Brotherhood, said that some 2,000 students had
been expelled from university because of their opposition to the Al-Sisi
government. Mr. Salheen successfully defended himself against an effort to
expel him from Al-Azhar. He said university dormitories like stadia were being
shut down to deprive students from using them as a protest rallying point.[xv]
“We are looking for alternative outside the
campus. We have managed to do so in neighbourhoods and smaller universities
that are less controlled. We’re looking at new strategies and options given
that the risk is becoming too high. We are absolutely concerned that if we fail
things will turn violent. Going violent would give the regime the perfect
excuse. We would lose all public empathy. We hope that Egyptians realize that there
are still voices out there that are not giving up and are keeping protests
peaceful despite all that has happened,” Mr. Salheen said.
“We don’t like violence but we are not
weak. Hope keeps us going. We believe that there still are options. We created
options on Tahrir Square. This regime is more brutal but there still are
options. Success for us is our survival and ability to keep trying. The
government wants to provoke us to become violent. Two years later, we are still
active. Politics is about making deals; revolution is putting your life on the
line. We are the generation that staged the revolution. The new generation no
longer cares. Our role is to get the new generation to re-join the revolution.
The government markets itself with promises and the power of the state. We can
promise only one thing: we will stay on the street. To us football is politics,
politics is in everything. That’s why we tackle politics,” Ahmed added.
A catalyst of Islamist change
Steeped in the history of the ultras, the
student movement and the Brotherhood, men like Ahmed and Mr. Salheen see
themselves not only as opponents of what they view as a dictatorial regime but
also of agents of change within the Islamist movement. They base themselves on
the history of a student movement that since the crackdown on the Brotherhood
by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the visionary Egyptian leader who toppled the monarchy
in 1952 and became a symbol of Arab nationalism, was the Brotherhood’s catalyst
for adaptation.
“The Muslim Brotherhood of the early 1970s
was a shell of its former self. Many of the surviving activists, numbering
barely one hundred members, were not even certain that they wanted to resurrect
the organization’s mission upon their release from prison. The real story of
this era revolves around a vibrant youth movement based in Egypt’s colleges and
universities. Even as they rebelled against the tenets of Nasserism, the youth
of this period were the products of its socioeconomic policies, from increased
urbanization to greater access to education. They found in their Islamic
identity a response to the post-‐ 1967 crisis, even as they adopted the modes
of popular contention that had emerged under Nasser. The student movement was
notable for the fluidity it displayed on the ideological level and the dynamism
it exhibited on the organizational front,” said historian Abdullah Al-‐Arian,
author of Answering the Call, Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt, in an
interview with Jadaliyya.[xvi]
“The real story of this era revolves around
a vibrant youth movement based in Egypt’s colleges and universities. Even as
they rebelled against the tenets of Nasserism, the youth of this period were
the products of its socioeconomic policies, from increased urbanization to
greater access to education. They found in their Islamic identity a response to
the post-‐1967 crisis, even as they adopted the modes of popular contention
that had emerged under Nasser. The student movement was notable for the
fluidity it displayed on the ideological level and the dynamism it exhibited on
the organizational front,” Mr. Al-‐ Arian said.
The scholar went on to say that his book
looks “at the parallel developments occurring across the student movement
broadly and internally within the re-emerging Muslim Brotherhood. The book
weaves together a narrative that examines critical moments where these forces
intersected and traces the path taken by the bulk of the student movement’s
leadership as it ultimately ‘graduated’ to take on the Muslim Brotherhood’s
mission and adopt its organizational model. One of the study’s key findings is
that, even as they attempted to reassert the Muslim Brotherhood’s traditional
hierarchical structure, senior figures like Mustafa Mashhur, Kamal
al-‐Sananiri, and Umar al-‐ Tilmisani could not help but adapt their mission
to the changing landscape of Islamic activism.”
For men like Ahmed and Mr. Salheen it’s
less about the Brotherhood and more about aligning Islamists and revolutionary
forces that run the gamut from liberal to conservative, from left to right and
from secular to religious in a united front against autocracy. “It’s not about
Morsi, we have bigger fish to fry than Morsi. Most of us no longer believe in
the slogan in returning Morsi to office. Thousands are suffering. I don’t give
a damn about Morsi. Anything is better than this regime. There are two
approaches, the reformist and the revolutionary one. We have seen dramatic
shifts since 2011. Both Tahrir Square and Sisi’s junta were dramatic twists. I
and many like me believe that another twist is possible even if that will take
time,” Mr. Salheen said.
Repression fuels radicalism
Messrs. Ahmed and Salheen are the first to
admit that they are fighting multiple uphill battles in which the odds are
stacked against them. Their space to maneuver is increasingly being curtailed
while their effort to stem radicalization and keep the momentum of peaceful
protest is being stymied by policies by Mr. Al-‐Sisi, who seeks to project
himself as an effective bulwark against jihadism.
“Unfortunately the idea that Sisi will be
an effective ally against Islamic terrorists is misguided. He has, in fact,
become one of the jihadists’ most effective recruiting tools. The simple truth
is that, since Sisi took power, the frequency of terrorist attacks in Egypt has
soared; there have been more than 700 attacks over 22 months, as opposed to
fewer than 90 in the previous 22 months. Harder to measure is the number of
young people radicalized by Sisi’s repression, but we can assume it is
significant and growing… In this environment, is it surprising that reports
surface regularly about the trend of radicalization of Egyptian youth,
including previously peaceful Islamists? Sisi’s brutal actions speak far louder
than his few words about reforming Islam; to believe that he, or the religious
institutions of his government, can have a positive impact on young people
susceptible to radicalization is beyond wishful thinking. It would be laughable
if it were not dangerous self-‐delusion...” commented scholars Robert Kagan
and Michele Dunne.[xvii]
Radicalization is both a product of the
brutality of an unreformed security force and a military whose brutal tactics
have turned a local Bedouin population into allies of militants influenced by
the Islamic State and other jihadist groups. “In Cairo, the police are idiots.
They have perfected the art of ensuring that people hate them. One is told in
the military that we are the good guys and the police are the bad guys. But in
the Sinai, the military is under siege, it moves in convoys that are focused on
self-‐protection and not being blown up by improvised explosive devices.
Locals no longer wear traditional Bedouin dress and don western clothing to
avoid being detained and harassed by the military who sees the Bedouin as the
enemy. Locals used to inform on the jihadists, they no longer do, they look the
other way. There is no solution. It’s a battle till death,” said a soccer fan
who recently returned from northern Sinai.[xviii]
As a result, uncritical engagement with the
Al-‐Sisi government by the Obama administration and European nations serves to
perpetuate a situation in which men like Ahmed and Mr. Salheen resemble Hans
Brinker, the eight-‐year old fairy tale Dutchmen who stopped a flood by
putting his finger in a hole in the dike. Endorsement of Mr. Al-‐Sisi as a
regional pillar of stability and a bulwark against radicalization amounts to
legitimization of the failure of Egypt’s successive post-‐revolt governments,
both those backed and/or populated by the military as well as that of Mr.
Morsi, that opted to cater to the security forces rather than exploit
opportunities to introduce long-‐overdue reforms that would have been crucial
for democratization and restoring political stability.
In the case of Mr. Morsi, the attempt to
ensure that the security forces would not turn against him backfired. Mr.
Morsi’s interior ministry, under which the security forces resorted, played a
key role in laying the groundwork for his removal from power and the rise of a
state more repressive than that of Mr. Mubarak.
The failure to push for security sector
reform granted the security forces time to regroup and exploit instability,
deteriorating security, and increased political violence to ensure their
immunity to calls for change. Egypt “presents the most egregious example of the
consequences of failing to undertake far-‐reaching security sector reform,”
Carnegie Middle East Center scholar Yezid Sayigh noted in a recent study of the
politics of police reform in the two post-revolt countries.[xix]
“Ministries of interior remain black boxes
with opaque decision-making processes, governed by officer networks that have
resisted meaningful reform, financial transparency, and political oversight.
Until governments reform their security sectors, rather than appease them, the
culture of police impunity will deepen and democratic transition will remain
impossible in Egypt and at risk in Tunisia” Mr. Sayigh said.
The death in February of the 20 UWK members
was but one example of the consequences of the failure to implement security
reform. So was the worst incident in Egyptian sporting history when 74 members
of Ultras Ahlawy died in 2012 in the Port Said stadium. Eye witnesses reported
at the time that scores of unknown men armed with identical batons had been
among those that attacked the Ahli supporters.[xx]
The presence of those men fit the pattern
of senior security officers and governors hiring thugs called baltageyya to
cooperate in violation of the law with security forces. The practice was
expanded in popular neighborhoods where security forces have advised residents
to take the law into their own hands by hiring baltageyya. The approach meant
that criminal groups often replaced the security forces in neighborhoods.
Overall, stepped up brutality by the security forces and their associates has
cost the lives of some 1,400 people since the demise of Mr. Morsi.
The security force strategy is backfiring
not only in its inability to stymie radicalization but also in the fact that
militant soccer fans and students who take to the streets in popular
neighbourhoods often are joined by locals. “Take Alf Maskan,” said an ultra and
student activist. “Alf Maskan is a traditionally conservative, Islamist
neighbourhood. Youth have nothing to look forward to. They are hopeless and
desperate. They join our protests but their conversation often focuses on
admiration for the Islamic State. They are teetering on the edge. We are their
only hope but it’s like grasping for a straw that ultimately is likely to
break.”[xxi]
James M. Dorsey is
a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the University of
Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, a syndicated columnist, and the author of
The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog
[i] James M. Dorsey. 2011.
Zamalek Ultras Disrupt African Soccer Match in Stunning Display of Nihilism,
The
Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, April 3,
http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2011/04/zamalek-‐ ultras-‐disrupt-‐african-‐soccer.html
[ii] Ibid. Dorsey
[iii] Ibid. Dorsey
[iv] Interview with the
author, March 29, 2015.
[v] James M. Dorsey. 2015.
Soccer deaths raise stakes for Egypt’s general-‐turned-‐president Al-‐Sisi,
The
Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, February 9, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg/2015/02/soccer-
deaths-raise-stakes-for-egypts.html
[vi] Interview with the
author, March 29, 2015
[vii] Interviews with the
author, March 28, 29, 30 and 31, 2015.
[viii] Yara Bayoumy, Stephen
Kalin and Ahmed Tolba. 2015. Sixteen injured in fire at Cairo convention
center, Reuters, March 4, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/us-egypt-fire-idUSKBN0M015R20150304
[ix] Interviews with the
author, March 28 and 29, 2015. 10 Interview with the author, March 31, 2015.
[x] Interview with the author,
March 31, 2015.
[xi] Interview with the
author, March 28, 2015
[xii] Interviews with the
author March 28, 29, 30 and 31, 2015
[xiv] Interview with the
author, March 2015.
[xv] Interview with the
author, March 30, 2015.
[xvi] Jadaliyya. 2014. New
Texts Out Now: Abdullah Al-Arian, Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism
in
Sadat’s Egypt, October 1, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/19390/new-texts-out-now_abdullah-al-arian-answering-the-
[xvii] Robert Kagan and
Michele Dunne. 2015. Obama embraces the Nixon Doctrine in Egypt, The
Washington. Post, April 3, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-embraces-the-nixon-doctrine-in-egypt/2015/04/03/597b3be0-d986-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html
[xviii] Interview with the
author, March 31, 2015.
[xix] Yezid Sayegh. 2015.
Missed Opportunity: The Politics of Police Reform in Egypt and Tunisia,
Carnegie Middle East Center, March, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC49_Brief-Yezid-Egypt_Tunisia.pdf
[xx] James M. Dorsey. 2012. Ultra
Violence - How Egypt’s soccer mobs are threatening the revolution, Foreign
Policy, February 2, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg/2012/02/ultra-violence-how-egypts-soccer-mobs.html
[xxi] Interview with the
author, March 31, 2015.
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