Amid ethnic protests, Iran warns of foreign meddling
By James M. Dorsey
Iran has raised the spectre of a US-Saudi effort to destabilize
the country by exploiting economic grievances against the backdrop of circumstantial
evidence that Washington and Riyadh are playing with scenarios
for stirring unrest among the Islamic republic’s ethnic minorities.
Iran witnessed this weekend minority Azeri
and Iranian Arab protests in soccer stadiums while the country’s
Revolutionary Guards Corps reported clashes
with Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish insurgents.
State-run television warned in a primetime
broadcast that foreign agents could turn legitimate protests
stemming from domestic anger at the government’s mismanagement of the economy
and corruption into “incendiary calls for regime change” by inciting violence
that would provoke a crackdown by security forces and give the United States
fodder to tackle Iran.
“The ordinary protesting worker would be hapless in the face
of such schemes, uncertain how to stop his protest from spiralling into
something bigger, more radical, that he wasn’t calling for,” journalist Azadeh
Moaveni quoted in a
series of tweets the broadcast as saying.
The warning stroked with the Trump administration’s strategy
to escalate the protests that have been continuing for months and generate the
kind of domestic pressure that would force Iran to concede by squeezing it
economically with the imposition of harsh sanctions.
US officials, including President Donald J. Trump’s national
security advisor John Bolton, a
long-time proponent of Iranian regime change, have shied away from
declaring that they were seeking a change of government, but have indicated
that they hoped sanctions would fuel economic discontent.
The Trump administration, after withdrawing in May from the
2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program, this
month targeted Iranian access to US dollars, trade in gold and other precious
metals, and the sale to Iran of auto parts, commercial passenger aircraft,
and related parts and services. A second round of sanctions in November is
scheduled to restrict oil and petrochemical products.
"The pressure on the Iranian economy is significant...
We continue to see demonstrations and riots in cities and towns all around Iran
showing the dissatisfaction the people feel because of the strained
economy." Mr.
Bolton said as the first round of sanctions took effect.
Mr. Bolton insisted that US policy was to put
"unprecedented pressure" on Iran to change its behaviour”, not change
the regime.
The implication of his remarks resembled Israeli attitudes
three decades ago when officials argued that if the Palestine Liberation
Organization were to recognize Israel it would no longer be the PLO but the
PPLO, Part of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
In other words, the kind of policy changes the Trump
administration is demanding, including an end to its ballistic program and
support for regional proxies, by implication would have to involve regime
change.
A string of recent, possibly unrelated incidents involving
Iran’s ethnic minorities coupled with various other events could suggest that
the United States and Saudi Arabia covertly are also playing with separate
plans developed in Washington and Riyadh to destabilize Iran by stirring unrest
among non-Persian segments of the Islamic republic’s population.
Mr. Bolton last year before assuming office drafted
at the request of Mr. Trump’s then strategic advisor, Steve Bannon, a plan
that envisioned US support “for the democratic Iranian opposition,” “Kurdish
national aspirations in Iran, Iraq and Syria,” and assistance for Baloch in the
Pakistani province of Balochistan and Iran’s neighbouring Sistan and
Balochistan province as well as Iranian Arabs in the oil-rich Iranian province
of Khuzestan.
A Saudi think tank, believed to be backed by Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Salman, called in 2017 in a study for
Saudi support for a low-level Baloch insurgency in Iran. Prince Mohammed vowed
around the same time that “we
will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.”
Pakistani
militants have claimed that Saudi Arabia has stepped up funding
of militant madrassas or religious seminaries in Balochistan that allegedly
serve as havens for anti-Iranian fighters.
The head of the State
Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs met in Washington in June with Mustafa
Hijri, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), before
assuming his new post as counsel general in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said last weekend that they had killed
ten militants near the Iranian border with Iraq. “A well-equipped
terrorist group ... intending to infiltrate the country from the border area of
Oshnavieh to foment insecurity and carry out acts of sabotage was ambushed and
at least 10 terrorists were killed in a heavy clash,” the Guards said.
The KDPI has recently stepped
up its attacks in Iranian Kurdistan, killing nine people weeks
before Mr. Hijri’s meeting with Mr. Fagin. Other Kurdish groups have reported
similar attacks. Several Iranian Kurdish groups are discussing ways
to coordinate efforts to confront the Iranian regime.
Similarly, this weekend’s ethnic soccer protests are rooted
in a history of football unrest in the Iranian provinces of East Azerbaijan and
Khuzestan that reflect long-standing economic and environmental grievances but
also at times at least in oil-rich Khuzestan potentially had Saudi fingerprints
on them.
Video clips of Azeri supporters of Tabriz-based Traktor Sazi
FC chanting
‘Death to the Dictator” in Tehran’s Azadi stadium during a match
against Esteghlal FC went viral on social media after a live broadcast on state
television was muted to drown the protest out. A sports commentator blamed the
loss of sound on a network disruption.
A day earlier, Iranian
Arab fans clashed with security forces in a stadium in the Khuzestan
capital of Ahwaz during a match between local team Foolad Khuzestan FC and
Tehran’s Persepolis FC. The fans reportedly shouted slogans reaffirming their
Arab identity.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arabs have a long history of
encouraging Iranian Arab opposition and troubling the minority’s relations with
the government.
Iranian distrust of the country’s Arab minority has been
further fuelled by the fact that the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran or
Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), a controversial exiled opposition group that enjoys
the support of prominent serving and former Western officials, including some
in the Trump administration, has taken credit for a number of the protests in
Khuzestan. The group advocates the violent overthrow of the regime in Tehran.
Two of Mr. Trump’s closest associates, Rudy Giuliani, his
personal lawyer, and former House speaker New Gingrich, attended
in June a gathering in Paris of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq.
In past years, US
participants, including Mr. Bolton, were joined by Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal,
the former head of the kingdom’s intelligence service and past ambassador to
Britain and the United States, who is believed to often echo views that Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman prefers not to voice himself.
“The mullahs must go, the ayatollah must go, and they must
be replaced by a democratic government which Madam Rajavi represents. Freedom
is right around the corner … Next year I want to have this convention in Tehran,”
Mr. Giuliani told this year’s rally, referring to Maryam Rajavi, the leader of
the Mujahedeen who is a cult figure to the group.
Dr.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture,
and co-host of the New Books in Middle Eastern Studies podcast.
James is the author of The Turbulent World
of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title and a co-authored
volume, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and
the Middle East and North Africa as well as Shifting
Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa
and just published China
and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom
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