Turning Qatar into an Island: Saudi cuts off its nose to spite its face
By James M. Dorsey
There’s a cutting-off-the-nose-to-spite-the face aspect to a
Saudi plan to turn Qatar into an island by digging a 60-kilometre
ocean channel through the two countries’ land border that would accommodate
a nuclear waste heap as well as a military base.
If implemented, the channel would signal the kingdom’s
belief that relations between the world’s only two Wahhabi states will not any
time soon return to the projection of Gulf brotherhood that was the dominant
theme prior to the United Arab Emirates-Saudi-led imposition in June of last
year of a diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar.
It would also suggest that chances are minimal that the
six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that groups Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain
alongside Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE would revert to its role as a
regional integrative body. So do unconfirmed reports that the UAE plans to
follow in the kingdom’s footstep and build a nuclear waste site of its own at
the closest point to its border with Qatar.
UAE Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash appeared to confirm the Saudi plan,
gloating on Twitter that Qatari “silence on the canal project is proof of their
fear and confusion.”
The message that notions of Gulf brotherhood are shallow at best
is one that will be heard not only in Doha, but also in other capitals in the
region. The 200-metre wide, 20-metre deep channel would erase a border that has
been closed since the imposition of the boycott and was unlikely to re-open any
time soon.
Built a kilometre from the Qatari border, the channel would
be able to accommodate merchant and passenger ships of up to 295 metres long
and 33 metres wide, with a maximum draught of 12 metres. Adding insult to
injury, the nuclear waste dump and military base would be on the side of the channel
that touches the Qatari border and would effectively constitute a Saudi outpost
on the newly created island.
The plan, to be funded by private Saudi and Emirati
investors and executed by Egyptian firms that helped broaden the Suez Canal, also
envisions the construction of five hotels, two ports and a free trade zone.
The $750 million project would have the dump ready for when
Saudi Arabia inaugurates
the first two of its 16 planned nuclear reactors in 2027. Saudi Arabia is
reviewing proposals to build the reactors from US, Chinese, French, South
Korean contractors and expects to award the projects in December.
The Saudis’ cutting-off-the-nose-to-spite-the-face aspect
kicks in with the fact that the channel would not only destroy Qatar’s one land
border and create a glaring symbol of regional division rather than
integration.
It would also draw a dividing
line between two interpretations of Wahhabism, an ultra-conservative Sunni
Muslim worldview developed by Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab, an 18th
century preacher, at a time that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has vowed to
return the kingdom to an unidentified moderate form of Islam.
Qatar’s more liberal Wahhabism of the sea contrasts starkly
with the Wahhabism of the land that Prince Mohammed is seeking to reform. The
crown prince made waves last year by lifting a ban on women’s driving, granting
women the right to attend male sporting events in stadiums, and introducing
modern forms of entertainment like, music, cinema and theatre – all long-standing
fixtures of Qatari social life and of the ability to reform while maintaining
autocratic rule.
As a result, the Saudi plan to physically separate the
kingdom from Qatar cuts it off from the most logical model for Prince
Mohammed’s plan to ween the kingdom off adherence to the most restrictive form
of Wahhabism that has shaped Saudi history since the late 18th
century and constituted the legitimizing basis for the creation of the modern
Saudi state.
A traditional Gulf state and a Wahhabi state to boot, Qatari
conservatism was everything but a mirror image of Saudi Arabia’s long-standing
puritan way of life. Qatar did not have a powerful religious establishment like
the one in Saudi Arabia that Prince Mohammed has recently whipped into
subservience, nor did it implement absolute gender segregation.
Non-Muslims can practice their faith in their own houses of
worship and were exempted from bans on alcohol and pork. Qatar became a sponsor
of the arts and hosted the controversial state-owned Al Jazeera television
network that revolutionized the region’s controlled media landscape and became
one of the world’s foremost global English-language broadcasters.
Qatari conservatism is likely what Prince Mohammed would
like to achieve even if that is something he is unlikely to acknowledge. His
initial measures – lifting the ban on women’s driving and attending male
sporting events; rolling back the powers of the Committee for the Promotion of
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice or Mutaween, the religious police; and his
introduction of long forbidden forms of modern entertainment – are in line with
the conservatism of Qatar or for that matter the UAE, even if the Emirates do
not share a Wahhabi heritage.
Qatar’s advantage has been that it projects the ability to
change without completely dumping ultra-conservative religious precepts that
have shaped culture and belief systems. It projects a vision, like the one
Prince Mohammed is pursuing, of a less restrictive and less choking
conservative Wahhabi society that grants individuals opportunities irrespective
of gender.
“I consider myself a good Wahhabi and can still be modern,
understanding Islam in an open way. We take into account the changes in the
world,” Abdelhameed Al Ansari, the then dean of Qatar University’s
College of Sharia, a leader of the paradigm shift, told The Wall Street
Journal in 2002.
Without doubt, Prince Mohammed’s social, economic and
religious reform drive constitutes recognition of changes needed to turn the
kingdom into a cutting-edge 21st century country and ensure the
survival of his family’s autocratic rule.
However, if built, the channel would suggest that
geopolitical supremacy has replaced ultra-conservative, supremacist religious
doctrine as a driver of the king-in-waiting’s policy. It’s a message that
graphically projects division and polarization rather than regional cooperation
and exploitation of synergies.
Dr.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture,
and co-host of the New Books in
Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title as well
as Comparative
Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North
Africa,
co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and
Politics in the Middle East and North Africa, and
the forthcoming China
and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom
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