Saudi engagement in Iraq: The exception that confirms the rule?
By James M. Dorsey
Stepped up Saudi efforts to forge close diplomatic, economic
and cultural ties to Shia-majority Iraq in a bid to counter significant Iranian
influence in the country appear to be paying off. The Saudi initiative
demonstrates the kingdom’s ability to engage rather than exclusively pursue a muscular,
assertive and confrontational policy towards the Islamic republic and its
perceived allies. It raises the question whether it is a one-off or could
become a model for Saudi policy elsewhere in the region.
The kingdom’s recent, far more sophisticated approach to
Iraq is testimony to the fact that its multi-billion dollar, decades-long
support for Sunni Muslim ultra-conservatism that at times involved funding of
both violent and non-violent militants had failed in Iraq. It constitutes
recognition that Saudi Arabia’s absence effectively gave Iran a free reign.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Iraqi charm
offensive amounts to a far more concerted and successful effort than attempts
more than a decade ago by then Saudi King Abdullah to reach
out to Iraqi Shiite leaders, including firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr and involving
the organization of a meeting
in Mecca between Sunni and Shia Iraqi religious leaders. King Abdullah’s efforts did not at the time involve
a crackdown on funding by Saudi sources of a devastating Sunni Muslim
insurgency.
King Abdullah’s initiative notwithstanding, Saudi policy
towards Iraq for more than a decade since Iraq’s Shiite majority emerged from
the shadow of Saddam Hussein’s minority Sunni Muslim rule as a result of the
2003 US invasion was one of non-engagement, sectarianism, and support of the
country’s Sunni minority.
It took the kingdom 11 years to open its first embassy in
post-Saddam Iraq, the kingdom’s first
diplomatic presence in the country since it broke off diplomatic relations in
1990 because of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. Even then, relations got off
to a rocky start with Iraq demanding the replacement
of the kingdom’s first ambassador, Thamer al-Sabhan, after he publicly criticised
Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs and the alleged persecution of Iraqi Sunni
Muslims.
The emergence in 2014 of Iraqi prime minister Haider
al-Abadi, who succeeded Nuri al-Maliki, seen by the Saudis as an Iranian pawn,
coupled with the rise of Prince Mohammed and the Saudi charm offensive in the
wake of the defeat of the Islamic state has produced a remarkable turnaround
that holds out the prospect of the kingdom becoming an influential player in
the reconstruction of war-ravaged Iraq.
Beyond the opening of the embassy, Saudi Arabia is slated to
open a consulate
in Basra as well as in Najaf, widely seen as Shia Islam’s third most holy
city that rivals Iran’s Qom as a centre of Shiite learning. Unconfirmed reports
suggest that Prince
Mohammed may visit Najaf after Iraqi elections scheduled for May 12.
The two countries have reopened
their Arar Border Crossing that was closed for 27 years and restored
commercial air traffic for the first time in more than a quarter of a century.
More than 60 Saudi
companies participated earlier this year in the Baghdad International Fair.
A Saudi
Arabia-Iraq Coordination Council, inaugurated last year aims to strengthen
security ties as well as economic and cultural relations envisions student and
cultural exchanges and Saudi investment in oil and gas, trade, transport,
education, light industry, and agriculture. Saudi Arabia pledged $1.5 billion for Iraqi
reconstruction at a donors’ conference in Kuwait in February.
Saudi Arabia garnered substantial brownie points in February
by playing its first
soccer match in Iraq in almost three decades, boosting Iraqi efforts to persuade
world soccer body FIFA to lift its ban on Iraqi hosting of international
matches. The kingdom subsequently promised to build a 100,000-seat
football stadium in Baghdad.
In shifting gears in Iraq, Prince Mohammed appears to have
broken with decades of Saudi efforts to primarily confront Iran in proxy and
covert wars. It remains, however, unclear to what degree Prince Mohammed’s
policy shift in Iraq is an indication of a broader move away from sectarianism
and support for ultra-conservative militants and towards engagement.
The record is mixed. Saudi
Shiite activists see little positive change and, if anything, assert that
repression in their heartland in the kingdom’s Eastern Province has increased
since Prince Mohammed’s rise.
“Bin Salman is already acting like he’s the king of Saudi
Arabia. He keeps telling the West that he will reform Islam, but he keeps
raiding the homes of Shia and stripping us of any political rights,” one
activist said.
Nonetheless, a Saudi-funded Bangladeshi
plan to build moderate mosques to counter militancy, the kingdom’s relinquishing
of control of the Grand Mosque in Brussels, and the newly found propagation
of tolerance and inter-faith dialogue by the government-controlled
World Muslim League that for decades funded ultra-conservatism globally would
suggest that Saudi money may be invested in attempting to curb the impact of
the kingdom’s decades-long support of ultra-conservatism.
There are, however, also indications that Prince Mohammed is
not averse to funding militants when it suits his geopolitical purpose. Saudi
funds have flowed since his rise in 2015 to militant religious seminaries in
the Pakistani province of Balochistan at a time that the kingdom was drafting
plans to destabilize Iran by exploiting grievances and stirring unrest among
Iran’s ethnic minorities, including the Baloch. Those plans have not left the
drawing board and may never do so, but ultra-conservative militants figure
prominently in them.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the shifting of gears in
Saudi policy towards Iraq as well as other steps that Prince Mohammed has taken
to curb, redirect, and reduce, if not halt, Saudi support for militant
ultra-conservatism is highlighted by the conclusions of a 2002
study of funding of political violence conducted by the New York-based
Council of Foreign Relations.
Coming in the wake of the 9/11 attacks when Saudi funding
and counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States was put under the
magnifying glass, the study suggested that the kingdom’s global support for
ultra-conservatism was woven into its fabric.
“It may well be the case that if Saudi Arabia…were to move
quickly to share sensitive financial information with the United States,
regulate or close down Islamic banks, incarcerate prominent
Saudi citizens or
surrender them to international authorities, audit Islamic charities, and
investigate the hawala system—just a few of the steps that nation would have to
take—it would be putting its current system of governance at significant
political risk,” the study warned.
In many ways, Saudi support for the Iraqi insurgency was a
textbook example of the decades-long,
$100 billion Saudi campaign to confront Iran globally by promoting
ultra-conservatism and sectarianism and in a minority of countries –
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Iraq and Syria – funding violence.
Nawaf
Obaid, a Saudi scholar with close ties to the government, said Saudi
options at the height of the Sunni Muslim insurgency included supplying the
insurgents with the same type of funding, arms and logistical support that Iran
was giving to Shiite armed groups. Another option, he said, was to create new
Sunni brigades to combat the Iranian-backed militias.
“Saudi engagement in Iraq carries great risks -- it could
spark a regional war. So be it: The consequences of inaction are far worse,”
Mr. Obaid said in 2006.
US and Iraqi officials at the time suspected Saudi Arabia of
covertly supporting sectarian Sunni jihadist insurgents opposed to the US military
presence in the country and the rise of a Shia-dominated government. While
there was no evidence of government assistance, the lines between the actions
of private citizens and authorities were and remain often blurred in the
kingdom.
An Iraq Study Group
report in 2006 at the height of the Sunni Muslim insurgency concluded that "funding
for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states."
Without identifying them, Iraqi
officials asserted that funds were also flowing from Saudi charities that
often operated as governmental non-government organizations. They said some of
the funds had been channelled through Saudi clerics who decided who the
beneficiary would be.
Truck
drivers at the time described transporting boxes of cash from Saudi Arabia
that were destined for insurgents. The transports frequently coincided with pilgrimages
to Mecca.
"They sent boxes full of dollars and asked me to
deliver them to certain addresses in Iraq. I know it is being sent to the resistance,
and if I don't take it with me, they will kill me," one driver said. He said
he was instructed to hide the money from authorities at the Iraqi border.
One official said $25 million was sent by a Saudi religious scholar
to a senior Iraqi Sunni cleric who bought Russian Strela shoulder-fired
anti-aircraft missiles on the black market in Romania.
Baath Party loyalists claimed at the time that a US Air
Force F-16 jet that crashed while flying in support of American soldiers
fighting insurgents in Anbar province had been downed by a Strela. The US
military denied the claim.
"We have stockpiles of Strelas and we are going to
surprise them (the Americans)," a spokesman for the party, said.
The Iraqi cleric involved in the purchase of the missiles
was suspected to be Sheikh Harith Sulaiman al-Dhari, a tribal chieftain dubbed "the
Spiritual Leader of the Iraqi Resistance" with a lineage of opposition to
foreign rule dating back to the killing in 1920 of a British colonel by his
father and grandfather. Iraqi authorities issued an arrest
warrant for Mr. Al-Dhari in late 2006, who has since passed away, on
charges of inciting sectarian violence after he visited Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia’s approach to Iraq has come a long way since
the days of the insurgency. The question is whether the kingdom will draw a
lesson from its success in the way it manages its regional rivalry with Iran.
So far, there is little indication that Iraq is more than the exception that
confirms the rule.
Said political analyst Hussein Ibish in a just
published study of Saudi-Iraqi relations: “Iraq is the only major regional
battleground at present in which Saudi Arabia is relying almost entirely on
carrots rather than sticks. Yet, arguably, more has been accomplished by Riyadh
over the past year in Iraq than, for example, in either Yemen or Lebanon… Saudi
Arabia’s outreach in Iraq, particularly in 2017, belies the stereotype of a
rash, reckless, and uncontrolled new major regional actor, showing instead that
Saudi Arabia can be deft and delicate when it wants to. That’s an important
lesson for the rest of the world, but also for Saudi Arabia itself, to ponder.”
Dr.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture,
and co-host of the New Books in
Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title as well
as Comparative
Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North
Africa,
co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and
Politics in the Middle East and North Africa, and
the forthcoming China
and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom
Comments
Post a Comment