Moderating Islam: Saudi Prince Mohammed walks on shaky ground
By James M. Dorsey
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has dazzled international
media and public opinion by lifting some restrictions on women’s rights,
holding out hope for the abolishment of others, and a vow to return the kingdom
to a vague form of moderate Islam that many believe is defined by the social
reforms he has already implemented and his curbing of the powers of the country’s
ultra-conservative leadership.
No doubt, Prince Mohammed’s reforms have benefitted women
and created social opportunity with the introduction of modern forms of
entertainment, including the
opening this month of Saudi Arabia’s first cinema as well as concerts, theatre
and dance performances. Similarly, anecdotal evidence testifies to the
popularity of Prince Mohammed’s moves, certainly among urban youth.
Yet, Prince Mohammed’s top-down approach to countering
religious militancy rests on shaky ground. It involves a combination of
rewriting history rather than owning up to responsibility, imposition of his
will on an ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim establishment whose change of heart
in publicly backing him lacks credibility, and suppression of religious and
secular voices who link religious and social change to political reform.
Prince Mohammed has traced
Saudi Arabia’s embrace of ultra-conservatism to 1979, the year that a
popular revolt toppled the Shah and replaced Iran’s monarchy with an Islamic
republic and Saudi zealots took control of the Great Mosque in the holy city of
Mecca.
While there is no doubt that the kingdom responded to the
two events by enhancing the power of the kingdom’s already prevalent
ultra-conservative religious establishment, Prince Mohammed appears to brush
aside Saudi history.
The power of the establishment and the dominance of
Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia dates to 1744 when Mohammed bin Saud, the founder of
the Al Saud dynasty, concluded a power sharing agreement with Islamic scholar Mohammed
bin Abd al-Wahhab that lent Bin Saud the religious legitimacy he needed to
unify and control Arabia’s warring tribes.
Similarly, Saudi global propagation of Sunni Muslim
ultra-conservatism significantly accelerated in the wake of the events of 1979
but predates them by almost two decades.
Prince Mohammed’s uncle, King Faisal, who ruled Saudi Arabia
from 1964 until his assassination in 1975, embodied the export of
ultra-conservatism as a pillar of Saudi diplomacy and soft power. Faisal saw it
as a way to create a network of supporters capable of defending the kingdom’s
strategic and economic interests while simultaneously catering to the outlook
of Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment.
Both the Muslim World League, one of the kingdom’s primary
vehicles for the funding of its global campaign, and the Islamic University of
Medina were founded in the 1960s. The university served as a citadel of
ultra-conservative learning and thought, including the notion that Islamic law
dictates unquestioned obedience to the legitimate ruler.
Prince Mohammed has exploited that view to put the religious
establishment in its place and legitimize
reforms it condemned for decades. In doing so, he not only undermines the
credibility of ultra-conservative scholars but also enhances that of both more
militant ones and those he has either imprisoned or silenced because they
advocated not only social but also democratic reforms
like free and fair elections, release of political prisoners and respect for
human rights.
Prince Mohammed’s assertion that Saudi Arabia propagated
ultra-conservatism as part of countering communism during the Cold War is not
inaccurate but ignores the fact that Saudi Arabia felt threatened by Arab
nationalism, not simply because countries like Egypt and Syria aligned
themselves with the Soviet Union, but also because they questioned the
legitimacy of monarchs. Aligning Saudi Arabia with the West, moreover, ensured
that the United States had a greater stake in the survival of the Al Sauds.
Born 14 years after the events of 1979, Prince Mohammed’s
projection of a kingdom whose liberalism was hijacked by Cold War-inspired
policies and errant Islamic scholars jars with that of Saudis who are
generation older. They recall a process in which post-1979 ultra-conservative
social mores were codified into rules, regulations and laws.
“I was a teenager in the 1970s and grew up in Medina… My
memories of those years…are quite different… Women weren’t driving cars. I
didn’t see a woman drive until I visited my sister and brother-in-law in Tempe,
Ariz., in 1976. The movie theatres we had were makeshift… You would pay 5 or 10
riyals (then approximately $1.50-$2) to the organizer, who would then give a
warning when the religious police approached. To avoid being arrested, a friend
of mine broke his leg jumping off a wall. In the 1970s, the only places on the
Arabian Peninsula where women were working outside the home or school were
Kuwait and Bahrain.” said Jamal
Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi journalist who last year went into
self-imposed exile because he feared arrest.
Prince Mohammed seemed to acknowledge ultra-conservatism’s
long-standing and deep-seated shaping of Saudi culture when he was asked
about abolishing the kingdom’s system of male guardianship that forces women to
get approval of a male relative for most major decisions in their lives. “We
want to move on it and figure out a way to treat this that doesn’t harm
families and doesn’t harm the culture,” Prince Mohammed said.
Mr. Khashoggi traces the formalization of existing social
restrictions on women’s rights not to an edict issued by the religious
establishment but to an attempt by a 19-year-old princess to elope with her
lover. The couple’s drama, ending in public execution in 1977, was described in
‘Death of a Princess,’ a dramatized 1980 British documentary that strained
relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia.
The incident marked the kingdom’s first major effort to use
its financial and energy muscle to thwart freedom of the press beyond its
borders and shape its international image. It also spurred codification of the
suppression of women’s rights.
“The reaction of the government to the princess’s elopement
was swift: The segregation of women became more severe, and no woman could
travel without the consent of a male relative… MBS would like to advance a new
narrative for my country’s recent history, one that absolves the government of
any complicity in the adoption of strict Wahhabi doctrine. That simply isn’t
the case.,” Mr Khashoggi said, referring to Mohammed bin Salman by his initials.
Liberals warned already in the 1970s that the restrictions
would tarnish the kingdom’s image. A celebrated poet and novelist, Ghazi
al-Gosaibi, who served as minister of industry and electricity, urged King
Khalid in a handwritten letter in 1980 to
shy away from banning the projection of women’s images in the media “so we
would not be made an example of rigidity and stagnation in front of the whole
world.”
Mr. Al-Gosaibi’s warning fell on deaf ears then but has been
heard loud and clear by Prince Mohammed. To put his reforms on solid footing,
Prince Mohammed will, however, have to acknowledge and confront his country’s
demons and pursue structural reform, including a revamping of religious
education that currently is limited to shaving off raw ends like hate speech,
and the grooming of a more independent and critical class of Islamic scholars rather
than whitewash his family’s role, whip its former allies into subservience, and
suppress any expression of dissent.
“Strangling
moderate independent Islamic discourse may succeed in silencing democratic
voices within Islam in Saudi Arabia, but it will also create a vacuum for the
less moderate discourse that the state has shown it tolerates,” said Abdullah Alaoudh, a
post-doctoral fellow in Islamic Law and Civilization and the son of Salman
al-Odah, a Saudi scholar imprisoned since September for calling for social as
well as political reform.
Dr.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture,
and co-host of the New Books in
Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title as well
as Comparative
Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North
Africa,
co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and
Politics in the Middle East and North Africa, and
the forthcoming China
and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom
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