Reform of Middle Eastern Militaries: Lessons from Indonesia
No. 092/2013 dated 14 May 2013
Reform of Middle Eastern Militaries:
Lessons from Indonesia
Reform of Middle Eastern Militaries:
Lessons from Indonesia
By James M. Dorsey
Synopsis
The recent commando raid on a prison by
Indonesian special forces provoked
renewed
debate about the need to further reform the military and subject it to civilian
justice
- 15 years after the end of autocratic rule in Jakarta. This illustrates the
difficult
road post-revolt nations in the Middle East and North Africa have to travel.
Commentary
THE RECENT RAID of an Indonesian prison and summary execution of four
inmates by
heavily armed Special Forces commandos has cast the spotlight on the
risk involved in
failing to fully reform the country’s military - 15 years after the end
of autocratic
rule.
The raid and subsequent charging of 11
officers as well as other recent incidents involving
security forces has sparked debate about the
nature and terms of the reform including the
fact that its members are accountable to
military rather than civilian courts. Those courts
have proven to be lenient in sentencing
soldiers accused of murder.
Changing a culture of impunity
Critics blame the incidents on the failure to
reform the internal workings and culture of the
Indonesian armed forces. At the centre of the
Indonesian debate lie questions that are
certain to be raised in Middle Eastern nations
like Egypt where the alleged impartiality
of the armed forces during the 2011 overthrow
of President Hosni Mubarak is under fire.
Recent leaks of the report of a fact-finding
mission established by President Mohamed
Morsi assert that the military killed and
tortured protesters during the revolt - charges
the command of the armed forces has denied.
Human rights groups however accuse the police
and security forces of continuing
to arbitrarily arrest and torture suspects
while militant soccer fans believe these forces,
alongside the military, were responsible for
last year’s death of 74 people in a politically
charged stadium brawl in Port Said.
The experience of countries like Indonesia and
Turkey that have struggled for years with
changing a culture of impunity pervasive
throughout the military and security sector
however highlight issues that go beyond
upholding human rights. The military’s
exemption from full civilian control in
Indonesia and Turkey limited the authority of a state
seeking to establish itself as the catalyst of
democratic rule.
Parallel systems of justice impinged on the
rule of law. Lack of full civilian control in Egypt
fuelled
the continued existence beyond the law of a deep state - a network of
vested
political, military and business interests -
similar to the one in Turkey that took
decades to uproot and threatened political and
economic change demanded by the
European Union. The military’s vested economic
interests distorted economies because
of fiscal concessions and access to inside
information.
The raid by the Indonesian special forces,
known as Kopassus, put the pitfalls of military
and security sector reform back on the front
burner. Kopassus members forced their way on
23 March into the prison in the city of
Yogyakarta and took justice into their own hands by
shooting dead four detainees accused of
stabbing to death a sergeant during a fight in a
bar. Two weeks earlier, scores of soldiers
burnt a police station in South Sumatra and
injured 17 police officers in retaliation for
the shooting of one of theirs. The incidents followed
the imprisonment of three soldiers in Papua in
2011 for torturing two detainees.
Fuelling discontent
The incidents sparked debate on the same
issues confronting post-revolt nations like
Egypt, foremost among which is what reform is needed to adapt the
military and security
forces to a democratic society; also whether
non-transparent military courts are able and
willing to maintain accepted human rights
standards. Human rights groups in Indonesia
are demanding that the military be accountable
to the civilian justice system. Discontent in
Egypt is fuelled by the failure so far to hold
military and law enforcement officials
accountable for the death of at least 900
people since the toppling of Mubarak.
A decade-and-a-half of democracy and free
media enables Indonesia to publicly debate
the effectiveness of past reforms. Restoration
of a measure of political stability and economic
recovery in crisis-riddled Egypt hinges in
part on reform of at least the security sector –
the most despised institution because of its
role in enforcing the Mubarak-era repression.
The Indonesian military responded to the raid
by relieving the military commander of Central
Java of his duty for initially denying that
Special Forces had been involved. By contrast,
Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) warned against efforts to tarnish the
military’s image against a perceived
background of a crackdown on the media.
To be sure, distrust of Morsi’s Muslim
Brotherhood, reinforced by the president’s reliance on
the security forces and the military despite
his increasingly strained relations with
the armed forces, undermines his ability to
push through necessary reforms. Like in
Indonesia where the 11 officers experienced a
wave of support because their victims
were alleged drug traffickers, efforts to
reform the military in Egypt are complicated by a
divided public, part of which believes that
military rule is their country’s only way out of its crisis.
Shared characteristics
The recent incidents in Indonesia nevertheless
underscore the need to address reform
of the military and security sector’s internal
procedures, ethical standards,
education, training and compensation. Such
reforms go far beyond replacing military
commanders as Morsi did last year and this
month’s dismissal by Yemeni President Abd
Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi of senior officers
related to the country’s ousted leader, Al
Abdullah Saleh. Those moves were largely
motivated by Morsi and Al-Hadi’s efforts to
employ the military as tools to stabilise
their grip on power.
The Indonesian and Egyptian military share a
desire to retain their privileges. Admiral
Agus Suhartono, the commander in chief of the
Indonesian military, has rejected calls
that the 11 soldiers be tried by a civilian
rather than a military court. Similarly, Egyptian
Justice Minister Ahmed Mekki insisted in a
meeting with human rights activists earlier
this
year that it was the interior ministry’s internal responsibility to reform its
forces.
One participant in the meeting said on Twitter
that Mekki’s remarks were “far worse’
than anything he had heard from Mubarak’s
justice minister.
Like in Indonesia, the question of military
reform in Egypt is complicated by public
perception of the police and security forces,
who are widely viewed as not only
brutal but also incompetent and corrupt.
Fifteen years of democracy and a vibrant
media in Indonesia have failed to resolve
issues but have made viable a healthy debate
that will likely lead to change in which the
armed forces have no choice but to participate.
However the viability of that debate in
post-revolt Middle Eastern nations has yet to
pass the litmus test.
James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological
University, director of the University of
Würzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture, and the
author of The Turbulent World of Middle
East Soccer blog.
Comments
Post a Comment