Tension in the Gulf: Not just maritime powder kegs
By James M.
Dorsey
A podcast
version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, and Patreon, Podbean and Castbox.
A recent
interview in which Baloch National Movement chairman Khalil Baloch
legitimized recent militant attacks on Iranian, Chinese and Pakistani targets
is remarkable less for what he said and more for the fact that his remarks were
published by a Saudi newspaper.
Speaking to
Riyadh Daily, the English language sister of one of Saudi Arabia’s foremost
newspapers, Al Riyadh, Mr. Baloch’s legitimization in the kingdom’s tightly
controlled media constituted one more suggestion that Saudi Arabia may be
tacitly supporting militants in Balochistan, a troubled Pakistani province that
borders on Iran and is a crown jewel of China’s infrastructure and
energy-driven Belt and Road initiative.
Riyadh Daily
interviewed Mr. Baloch against the backdrop of heightened tensions between the
United States and Iran that many fear could escalate into military conflict,
past indications of Saudi support for religious militants in Balochistan, and
suggestions that countries like the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates are united in their opposition to Iran but differ on what outcome
they want maximum pressure on the Islamic republic to produce.
The
interview followed publication in 2017 by a Riyadh-based think tank with ties
to Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman of a call
by a Baloch nationalist for support for an insurgency in the Baloch-populated
Iranian province that borders Pakistan and is home to the crucial
Indian-backed port of Chabahar on the Arabian Sea.
It also
juxtaposes with Pakistani
anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian militants who operate madrassahs along the
Iranian-Pakistani border reporting stepped up Saudi funding. The monies are
believed to come in part from Saudi nationals of Baloch descent, but the
militants suggest the funding has at least tacit government approval.
Balochistan
has witnessed multiple attacks on its Hazara Shiite minority as well as in May
on a highly
secured luxury hotel frequented by Chinese nationals in the Chinese-backed
Baloch port city of Gwadar and a convoy
of Chinese engineers as well as the Chinese consulate in Karachi. Militants
killed 14 people in April in an assault
on an Iranian revolutionary guards convoy and exploded in December a car
bomb in Chabahar.
Saudi Arabia
is also suspected of supporting
the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a controversial Iranian exile group that seeks the
fall of the Iranian regime and enjoys support of senior Western politicians and
former officials as well as US national security advisor John Bolton prior to
his appointment and ex-Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal.
For now,
tacit Saudi support for Baloch militants is likely to be more about putting
potential building blocks in place rather than the result of a firm decision to
wage a low-intensity proxy war.
“The recent
escalation in militant attacks is a direct reaction to Pakistan army’s growing
atrocities in Balochistan and China’s relentless plunder of Baloch resources,”
Mr. Baloch said.
Asserting
that the Pakistani part of Balochistan has been occupied by Pakistan since
1948, Mr. Baloch insisted that the “Baloch nation is resisting against this
forced accession. This insurgency is the continuation of that.”
The alleged
Saudi support coupled with plans for a US$10 billion Saudi investment in a
refinery in Gwadar and a Baloch mine has sparked discussion in Beijing about
the viability of China’s US$45 billion plus stake in the region’s security and
stability.
Iranian
officials see a pattern of foreign support for insurgents not only in
Balochistan but also among Iran’s Kurdish, Arab and Azeri minorities. Their
suspicions are fuelled by statements
by Mr. Bolton prior to his appointment calling for support of insurgencies
and Prince Mohammed’s vow that any battle between the Middle East’s two major
rivals would be fought
in Iran rather than Saudi Arabia.
Complicating
the situation along Iran’s borders is the fact that like in the waters of the
Gulf where naval assets are eyeing one another, it doesn’t take much for the
situation to escalate out of control. That is particularly the case with Iran
having shifted tactics from strategic patience to responding to perceived
escalation with an escalation of its own.
Iran
moreover has been preparing for a potential covert war waged by Saudi Arabia
and possibly US-backed ethnic insurgent groups as well as the possibility of a
direct military confrontation with the United States by building a
network of underground military facilities along its borders with Pakistan and
Iraq, according to Seyed Mohammad Marandi, an Iranian academic who
frequently argues the Tehran government’s position in international media.
Iran
recently released a video
showcasing an underground bunker that houses its missile arsenal.
In a further
heightening of tension, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards attacked
on Friday Iranian armed opposition groups in the Kurdistan region of Iraq
with drones and missiles. Iranian artillery
separately shelled villages in a region populated not only by armed
anti-Iranian and anti-Turkish Kurdish groups but also smugglers.
The strikes
followed the killing
of three Iranian revolutionary guards. A spokesman for the Democratic Party
of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) denied responsibility for their deaths.
The risk of
escalation is enhanced by the fact that while the United States, Saudi Arabia,
Iran and Israel agree on the principle of maximum pressure, they do not
necessarily see eye to eye on what the end goal is.
While US
President Donald J. Trump appears to want to force Iran back to the negotiating
table, Israel and Mr. Bolton are believed to advocate gunning for regime change
ignoring the risk that the effort could produce a government that is even less
palatable to them.
That outcome
would suit Saudi Arabia that does not want to see a regime emerge that would be
embraced by Western nations and allowed to return to the international fold
unfettered by sanctions.
A palatable
government would turn Iran into a Middle Eastern powerhouse with a competitive
edge vis a vis Saudi Arabia and complicate the kingdom’s
ambition to become a major natural gas player and sustain its regional
leadership role.
Writing in
the Pakistan Security Report 2018, journalist Muhammad Akbar Notezai warned: “The
more Pakistan slips into the Saudi orbit, the more its relations with Iran will
worsen… If
their borders remain troubled, anyone can fish in the troubled water.”
Dr. James
M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow
at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director
of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture.
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