JMD on ACJS: US’s Iran Sanctions: Mixed Prospects and a Beyond-SWIFT Question
The jury is out on the
likely effectiveness of crippling sanctions imposed on Iran by the United
States aimed altering Tehran’s regional policy. Similarly, the fate of the 2015
agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear agreement hangs in the balance.
Thursday,
27 December 2018 10:04 GMT
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US President Donald J.
Trump’s campaign to cripple Iran economically by imposing harsh economic
sanctions and force either changes in Iran’s regional policies or even better,
regime change, have gotten off to a relatively slow start. With much of the international
community pledging to salvage the 2015 international agreement that curbed
Iran’s nuclear program after Trump withdrew from the deal in May, the United
States is discovering that enforcing the sanctions that aim to reduce Iranian
oil exports to zero, cripple its shipping industry, and cut the Islamic
republic out of the international financial system is easier said than done.
While Iran will likely feel significant pain, Europe, China, and Russia have
pledged to soften the blow to the degree possible by continuing to purchase
Iranian oil, invest in the Islamic republic and create mechanisms to do
business in currencies other than the US dollar.
The jury is out on whether
that persuades Iran that the advantages of sticking to the nuclear agreement outweigh
the disadvantages. That in turn could depend largely on Europe’s ability to
ensure that Iran is not excluded from the Brussels-based Society for the
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) international financial
messaging system used by more than 10,000 banks worldwide for their more than
30 million transactions a day or is able to create one or more special purpose
vehicles to which China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey, who accounted
for 70 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2017, would have access.
A
Stuttering Start
President Trump’s severe economic sanctions appeared to be manoeuvring an
obstacle course even before they kicked in on November 5 despite US estimates
that the measures had already led to a reduction of Iranian oil exports from
2.7 million to 1.6 million barrels a day.
The impression that the sanctions
were getting off to a modest start was reinforced by the fact that the United
States gave eight countries, including the major importers of Iranian oil --
China, India, South Korea, Japan, Italy, Greece, Taiwan and Turkey – 180-day
waivers that, according to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, had already reduced
their purchases from the Islamic republic. China, India, South Korea,
Japan, and Turkey accounted for 70 percent of Iranian oil exports in 2017.(3) Earlier the US Treasury issued a license that allows an Iranian-backed
gas field in the North Sea that accounts for three percent of Britain’s gas
supply to keep operating.(4)
Pompeo said the waivers were
designed to “ensure a well-supplied oil market.” He mentioned two of the eight
countries had pledged to reduce their imports to zero within the six-month
period of the waiver, while the other six had agreed to “greatly reduced
levels.”(5) Trump defended the waivers, saying he was going slow on the
imposition of the sanctions to prevent shocks in the oil market and a spike in
prices. “I could get the Iran oil down to zero immediately, but it would cause
a shock to the market. I don’t want to lift oil prices,” Trump told reporters.(6)
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The United States has also
trumpeted the fact that the sanctions sparked the collapse of the Iranian
currency, the rial, wreaking havoc on the average Iranian. Unemployment is
shooting up, especially among the country's youth, inflation is spiralling
higher because of the cost of imported goods, and there have been water and
power shortages due to a lack of infrastructure investment after years of
on-again, off-again sanctions.(7) Raising fears that Iran would ration fuel and hike prices, the
government in December reintroduced fuel cards to put a halt on smuggling of up
to 40 million litres a day.(8) Smuggling of other subsidized goods such as pharmaceuticals and
foodstuffs as well as non-subsidized items like textiles has reportedly
increased sevenfold in recent months.(9)
The Trump administration
hopes the sanctions will complicate the Iranian support for groups like
Lebanon’s Hezbollah Shiite militia and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as its
military operations in Syria by forcing the Islamic republic to reduce military
spending. It bases its hope on the fact that in the decade prior to the lifting
of sanctions as part of the 2015 nuclear agreement, Iranian military spending
dropped by 30 percent, “one of the highest percentage decreases in military
spending globally,” according to Iranian researchers Sajjad F. Dizaji and
Mohammad Farzanegan.(10)
The researchers argued that
the difference in the sanction regime prior to the agreement and the current US
measures is that the Trump administration’s sanctions are unilateral rather
than multilateral. “While unilateral sanctions are not shown to influence
Iran’s military burden significantly, the impact of multilateral sanctions is
negative and statistically significant,” Dizaji and Farzanegan said. Military
expenditures, moreover, account for only three percent of Iran’s gross domestic
product.(11) Even so, the International Crisis Group concluded that the period
of multilateral sanctions and reduced military expenditure “coincided with what
many consider the most significant expansion of Iran’s military intervention in
the region.”(12)
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[Aljazeera]
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Reality
Kicks In
The implication of Trump’s and Pompeo’s remarks on waivers was that increased production
by suppliers such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, while compensating for the
reduced Iranian oil sales, could spark a fight for market share, which could
fuel price increases. They also suggested that the United States believed that
there was currently not oil in the market to replace Iranian crude. The United
States’ assumption appears to be that Iran, a country with a long experience in
circumventing sanctions, may have an oil industry that remains robust despite
its travails.
The waivers recognized that
the countries involved had no immediate alternative sources for oil. Three of
the eight waiver recipients — Greece, Italy and Turkey — are members of NATO.
Japan and South Korea have mutual defense treaties with the United States and
play key roles in the North Korea denuclearization initiative. India, the
world’s largest democracy, is crucial to the administration’s Indo-Pacific
strategy, which seeks to unite countries in the region to counter China’s
growing assertiveness. China is the largest importer of Iranian oil. Forcing it
to seek alternatives would have sparked shock tremors in the market.
US officials attribute
their apparent success in already reducing Iranian exports to the strength of
their alliances and the fact that countries and companies do not want to risk
being barred from access to US markets.(13) Japan and South Korea stopped buying Iranian crude ahead of the
sanctions. Japan nonetheless negotiated a waiver for 100,000 barrels per day,
down from the 165,000 barrels it was buying prior to the threat of US measures
while South Korea was granted a quota of 200,000 barrels a day.(14) The two countries said they were looking to renew imports in
January.
India is officially
asserting that it is importing at the agreed rate of 360,000 barrels per day.(15) By the same token, Indian claims that it had significantly reduced
imports prior to the waiver are countered, says energy analyst Ellen R. Wald,
quoting TankTracker com. The online monitor of oil tankers reported that Indian
oil imports from Iran remained virtually unchanged in recent months. Iranian
exports are frequently hidden by tankers that make stops at multiple Gulf ports
and at times shut down their responders to camouflage their movements. “The
data on oil movements show conclusively that Iran’s oil exports have not
decreased nearly as much as the media narrative has suggested… Oil speculators
and the Trump administration have been led to believe that the threat of
impending sanctions on Iran’s oil is removing so much from the market that oil
prices could skyrocket to $100 per barrel this year. The actual data on Iran’s
oil exports contradict this,” Wald said.(16)
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Moreover, relatively
unnoticed was a non-oil related waiver granted to India that allows it to
maintain its infrastructural investment in the Iranian port of Chabahar on the
shore of the Arabian Sea, a mere 70 kilometres from the Chinese-backed
Pakistani port of Gwadar.(17) The port would facilitate Indian links to Central Asia by
bypassing arch rival Pakistan, contribute to economic development in Afghanistan
and pre-empt Chinese efforts to gain a foothold in Chabahar. Similarly, there
is no indication that the US will sanction Russian, Chinese, and European
companies assisting Iran with its nuclear sites, Fordow, Arak, and Busher.(18)
China is one joker in the
pack. It negotiated a waiver for 360,000 barrels per day but retains the right
to production from fields in Iran in which Chinese companies have a stake. They
include China National Petroleum Corp’s (CNBC) 75 percent stake in Iran’s MIS
and the North Azadegan oilfield. China moreover has a history in busting
sanctions against Iran. In the years prior to the nuclear agreement, China used
the Bank of Kunlun, established in 2006 in its troubled, oil-producing
north-western region of Xinjiang as its handler of Iranian oil payments in
violation of US and UN sanctions. The bank was sanctioned by the US Treasury
for its business with Iran, including transferring funds to Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards Corps. Kunlun in October halted yuan and euro denominated
payments from Iran in anticipation of the US sanctions.(19)
Turkey is another joker.
Refusing to bend to the US sanctions would enhance its goal of exploiting its
geography to become a gas and oil transit hub. To do so, Turkey will have to
extend its current gas agreement with Iran that risks losing its Turkish market
share to producers like Qatar, Russia Azerbaijan and the United States. The
question is whether Iran can make a gas agreement sufficiently attractive in terms
of pricing as well as facilitating Turkish objectives in Syria where it is
determined to stymie Kurdish aspirations.
Payments and pricing are
but one, albeit the most immediate issue. Longer term, Iran will face
significant difficulty if it can’t secure the technologies to enhance
production from its predominantly mature oilfields. Iran currently uses
out-of-date technologies like pumping natural gas into the old oil fields to
produce ever-dwindling amounts of oil. That is likely to become untenable with
retail, commercial and industrial gas consumption on the rise. Countries like
China and Russia are unlikely to meet standards of technologies developed in
the United States and Europe.” As long as Washington can prevent it from
obtaining vital enhanced oil recovery technologies, Iran’s economy will become
increasingly fragile,” said energy scholar Micha’el Tanchum.(20)
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[O & G]
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The November sanctions
constituted round two. Earlier sanctions imposed in August targeted Iran’s
steel, aluminium and auto sectors by limiting access to raw materials and
essential parts. They prompted together with the prospect of the November
sanctions major European companies like Total, A.P. Moller-Maersk, Peugeot,
Renault, Airbus, Alstom and Siemens to withdraw from Iran. "There is a
primacy of the (US) political system. If that primacy is 'This is what you are
going to do,' then that is exactly what we are going to do. We are a global
company. We have interest and values and we have to balance both," said
Joe Kaeser, the chief executive of German industrial conglomerate Siemens.(21) Put more forcefully, Pompeo’s special advisor on Iran, Brian Hook,
quipped: “If you are the CEO of a European company and you are given the choice
between doing business in the United States market or the Iranian market, that
is the fastest decision you will ever make as CEO.”(22)
With Iran pushing Europe to
put in place mechanisms to counter the US sanctions, European leaders are
struggling to neutralize the measures while ensuring that European entities are
shielded against being barred from the US market for doing business with Iran.
European authorities have so far to convince the continent’s companies that
they are able to do so.
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Walking
a Tightrope
If the withdrawal of European
companies is one indication of the difficulty in countering sanctions, SWIFT,
the financial messaging system, is another. SWIFT is caught between a rock and
a hard place. The Trump administration has so far refrained giving it a waiver.
As a result, SWIFT’s board of directors made up of representatives of major international
banks risk being slapped with travel bans and asset freezes if the organization
continues to do business with Iran.
To counter the US threat,
the European Union invoked in July a blocking statute that makes US court
decisions and administrative actions regarding sanctions on Iran void in
Europe. It also prohibits Europe-based firms from discontinuing their business
ties to Iran due to foreign sanctions.(23) The blocking statute was intended to not only shield European
companies but also convince Iran that it was in its interests to remain
committed to the nuclear accord.
“It’s a difficult exercise
because the weight of the U.S. in the global economy and financial system is
obviously relevant. But we are determined to preserve this deal,” said European
Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini.(24) How difficult is evidenced by the fact that European measures have
so far failed to produce convincing results. Without referring to the US
sanctions, SWIFT said in early November that it was disconnecting an
undisclosed number of unidentified Iranian banks.(25) Some 30 Iranian banks are connected to SWIFT. The impact that a
disconnection from SWIFT would have was evident in 2012 when SWIFT complied
with UN and EU sanctions. The disconnection wiped off almost half the value of
the Iranian oil sector reducing revenues from oil exports from US$92.5 billion
to USS52 billion.(26)
The odds in a US-EU battle
over SWIFT are, however, not unequivocally in Washington’s favour. US sanctions
would significantly impact the global financial system and threaten America’s
dominant position. “We must increase Europe's autonomy and sovereignty in
trade, economic and financial policies,” said German Foreign Minister Heiko
Maas.(27) Europe appears to be putting its money where its mouth is by
developing a system of its own that would handle financial transactions with
Iran and be immune to US sanctions. Dubbed a special purpose vehicle, the
system would be open to Russia and China, both of which are signatories to the
nuclear agreement, as well as other countries. European officials were also
looking at a barter system that would allow Iran to sell oil and use the
proceeds to purchase goods or technology from Europe.(28)
The special purpose
vehicles would be designed to reduce the number of financial transactions with
Iran by bundling them and to shield commercial banks by limiting their role.
The advantage of multiple vehicles would allow sanctions busters to
differentiate between sanctionable and non-sanctionable transactions. They
could also cater to different business segments including small and
medium-sized enterprises that often have no exposure to the United States, the
oil industry, as well as sectors like automotive and aviation. European
officials privately concede that oil traders are unlikely to avail themselves
of the special vehicle(s).
The vehicles could be
stand-alone state-owned banks or clearing houses for companies that transfer
money to Iran, repatriate funds from the country, or engage in barter trade
with it.(29) The vehicles would avoid cross-border transactions that would be
easier to monitor by US authorities by arranging that a European importer of
Iranian goods gets paid by a European exporter. They would further coordinate
payments in ways that exporters would be paid from funds outside of Iran while
importers would be paid by funds within Iran.
Iran scholar and media
company owner Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and policy analyst Axel Hellman argued
that Europe could kickstart its vehicle initiative with one is that is focussed
on the humanitarian sector that is not included in the sanctions regime.
“Companies active in food and pharmaceuticals…have the longest-standing and
arguably most important presence in Iran. Companies like Nestle, Novo Nordisk,
Sanofi, and Unilever—which sell the high-volume packaged foods, cleaning
products, and medicines that households depend on—are at the heart of the most
important commercial ecosystem in Iran, which includes Iran’s private sector
and its vibrant consumer class… Despite the exemptions for trade in food,
medicine, and many consumer products, Iran’s trade in these goods is restricted
by the limited number of European banks willing to receive payments from
Iranian importers. The SPV would serve to increase the volume of trade that can
be conducted given the current state of banking ties,” Batmanghelidj and
Hellman said.(30)
The European initiative is
but one effort fuelled by the threat of sanctions against SWIFT to develop
alternative systems including ones using blockchain, a technology that uses
cryptography, that is already being considered by Russia and Iran.(31) Russia already uses a significantly cheaper alternative to SWIFT
for domestic payments and is marketing it to foreign institutions.(32) China is developing a similar system.(33)
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Conclusion
The jury is out on the likely effectiveness of crippling sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States aimed at forcing the Islamic republic to alter its regional policy. Similarly, the fate of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear agreement hangs in the balance after the US withdrew from the deal and re-imposed sanctions. The success of US policy and the agreement’s continued viability depend on the ability of Iran’s oil buyers and world powers, including Europe, China, Russia, India, Japan and South Korea to cushion the impact of the sanctions. They also depend on the degree to which the United States is forced to allow exemptions to the sanctions in its effort to balance its harsh approach towards Iran with its other geo-political concerns. The record so far suggests that Iran will endure significant pain but like in the past will be able to maintain its policy. The question is whether an opening for renewed negotiations that would address the concerns of the United States and its allies and cater to Iranian aspirations and needs will occur only when US President Trump leaves office or whether Trump may ultimately decide that talks are in the interest of both parties.
The jury is out on the likely effectiveness of crippling sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States aimed at forcing the Islamic republic to alter its regional policy. Similarly, the fate of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear agreement hangs in the balance after the US withdrew from the deal and re-imposed sanctions. The success of US policy and the agreement’s continued viability depend on the ability of Iran’s oil buyers and world powers, including Europe, China, Russia, India, Japan and South Korea to cushion the impact of the sanctions. They also depend on the degree to which the United States is forced to allow exemptions to the sanctions in its effort to balance its harsh approach towards Iran with its other geo-political concerns. The record so far suggests that Iran will endure significant pain but like in the past will be able to maintain its policy. The question is whether an opening for renewed negotiations that would address the concerns of the United States and its allies and cater to Iranian aspirations and needs will occur only when US President Trump leaves office or whether Trump may ultimately decide that talks are in the interest of both parties.
ABOUT THE
AUTHOR
Senior
Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the
University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and co-host of the New
Books in Middle Eastern Studies podcast.James is the author of “The Turbulent
World of Middle East Soccer”
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