The Iran Nuclear Deal: Rewriting the Middle East Map

RSIS presents the following commentary The Iran Nuclear Deal: Rewriting the Middle East
Map by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.).
Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at

No. 217/2013 dated 27 November 2013
The Iran Nuclear Deal:
Rewriting the Middle East Map

By James M. Dorsey

The agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear programme could rewrite the political map                           of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as strengthen the US pivot to Asia. It could                       also reintegrate Iran into the international community as a legitimate regional power.
IF ALL goes well, the preliminary agreement between Iran and the five permanent members
of the UN Security Council – the United States, Britain, China, France and Russia – plus
Germany, would ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and ultimately
reintegrate it into the international community. In doing so, it would not only remove the
threat of a debilitating war with Iran and prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and
North Africa but also return the Islamic republic to the centre stage of the region’s
It would force regional powers such as Israel and Saudi Arabia to focus on their most
immediate issues rather than use the Iranian threat as a distraction, while offering the US
the opportunity to revert to its stated policy of pivoting from Europe and the Middle East to

Complex panacea

To be sure, a resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue is not a panacea for the vast array of
social, political, economic, ethnic, national and sectarian problems in the Middle East and
North Africa. Political and social unrest, boiling popular discontent with discredited regimes
and identity politics are likely to dominate developments in the region for years to come.

Nonetheless, Iran’s return to the international community is likely to provide the incentive for
it to constructively contribute to ending the bitter civil war in Syria, breaking the stalemate in
fragile Lebanon where the Shiite militia Hezbollah plays a dominant role, and furthering efforts
to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians. That would also take some of the sting
out of the region’s dangerous slide into sectarian Sunni-Shiite conflict.

All of that would reduce the number of fires in the Middle East and North Africa that the
Obama administration has been seeking to control and that have prevented it from following
through on its intended re-focus on Asia.
Countering US policy

A resolution of the nuclear issue offers Iran far more than the ultimate lifting of crippling
international sanctions. Iran has over the last decade been able to effectively counter US
policy in the Middle East and North Africa through its support of Hezbollah which is the single
most powerful grouping in Lebanon; Hamas, the Islamist Palestinian faction in Gaza; its aid to
the embattled regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; backing of restive Shiite minorities
in the oil-rich Gulf states and Iraq; and ensuring that the government of Iraqi Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki looks as much toward Tehran as it does to Washington.

Iran’s incentive to become more cooperative is the fact that resolution of the nuclear issue
would involve acknowledgement of the Islamic republic as a legitimate regional power, one of
seven regional players - alongside Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Pakistan - that
have the ability or economic, military and technological strength to project power. It would
also allow Iran to capitalise on geostrategic gains it has made despite its international

Iran is likely to be further motivated by an easing and ultimate lifting of the sanctions that will
allow it to address boiling domestic social and economic discontent. President Hassan
Rouhani’s election earlier this year has for now replaced that powder keg with high expectations
that his more moderate policies would ease the heavy economic price Iran was paying for its
nuclear programme. This is despite many Iranians feeling disappointed that Iran will reap only
US$7 billion in benefits from the freshly concluded agreement in the coming six months. The $7
billion serve, however, as an incentive for Iran to come to a comprehensive and final
agreement on its nuclear programme.

From spoiler into a constructive player

What worries opponents of the nuclear deal like Israel and Saudi Arabia most is the potential transformation of Iran from a game spoiler into a constructive player. The nuclear deal removes
the Islamic republic as the foremost perceived threat to the national security of Israel and Saudi
Arabia. For Israel, this risks peace with the Palestinians reclaiming its position at the top of the
agenda, making it more difficult for the Israelis to evade the painful steps needed to end a
conflict that is nearing its centennial anniversary.

For Saudi Arabia, it complicates its efforts to fuel regional sectarianism, deflect calls for
equitable treatment of its Shiite minority as well as for greater transparency and accountability,
and establish itself as the region’s unrivalled leader.

Nowhere is that likely to be more evident than in Iranian policy towards Syria. Contrary to
perception and what Saudi Arabia and its allies would like the world to believe, Iranian-Syrian
relations are not based on sectarian affinity but on common interests stemming from
international isolation. That reality changes as Iran rejoins the international community.

For the US, a deal means evading at least for now the threat of another Middle East war
with potentially catastrophic consequences and enlisting Iran in addressing the region’s
problems. That creates space for it to focus on long term goals in Asia.

However, in removing Iran as a regional lightning rod, the US is likely to be forced to clearly
define a Middle East policy that balances short term national security with the reality of
years of regional volatility and unrest to come that could redraw some national borders and
is likely to involve messy political and social transitions, following the toppling in recent years
of autocrats in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen and the civil war in Syria.

James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also co-director of the
University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The
Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog and a forthcoming book with the
same title.

Click here for past commentaries.
Find us on Facebook.
Due to the high number of publications by our RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional
Security Studies (NTS), RSIS maintains a separate subscription facility for the Centre.
Please click here to subscribe to the Centre's publications.


Popular posts from this blog

Pakistan caught in the middle as China’s OBOR becomes Saudi-Iranian-Indian battleground

Israeli & Palestinian war crimes? Yes. Genocide? Maybe. A talk with Omer Bartov

Saudi religious diplomacy targets Jerusalem