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RSIS presents the following commentary Post-revolt Arab Transitions: Driven
by
Distrust and Inexperience by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online
at this
link.
(To print it, click on this link.).
Kindly forward any comments or feedback
No. 027/2013 dated 13 February
2013
Post-revolt Arab Transitions:
Driven by Distrust and Inexperience
By James M. Dorsey
Synopsis
Post-revolt Middle Eastern and North African countries are struggling to
manage the transition from autocratic to more transparent, accountable
societies. Increasingly prejudice, distrust and inexperience are proving to
be
greater obstacles to a successful transition than resistance of vested interests
of former regimes or alleged Islamists.
Commentary
POST-REVOLT Arab nations are
experiencing tumultuous times. The
assassination of a prominent Tunisian
opposition leader has sparked mass protests
against Islamists held responsible for his death. Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali has
called for the
replacement of the Islamist-dominated Cabinet by a government of
technocrats that would lead the country to elections, to the chagrin of his
Ennahada
party that fears loss of power.
Egypt has been wracked by violent street protests that have left more than
60 people
dead in three Suez Canal and Red Sea cities, forcing President
Mohamed Morsi to
declare emergency rule and bring the military back into
the streets and soccer
stadiums to maintain law and order.
Underlying fault lines
Underlying the volatility in Egypt and Tunisia as well as difficult
transitions in Libya
and Yemen is the increasing lack of confidence between
Islamists and
non-Islamist forces. That fault line is fuelled by an ever
deeper secularist suspicion
that the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists
who by and large have emerged
from the revolts as the largest, most organised political force, are bent on creating
Islamist states and
enforcing Islamic law. This mistrust drives the weakening of the
civilian
and armed opposition to President Bashar Al Assad in the continuing civil
war in Syria.
For their part, Islamists, including moderates, are not certain where the
allegiances
of non-Islamists lie and whether significant segments of the
secularists would opt for
a less free society in cooperation with
institutions like the judiciary, the police and
security forces in a bid to
halt what they see as an Islamist power grab.
To be sure, the militancy and violence of more radical Islamists in Tunisia
in recent
months as well as Morsi’s imperious style of government, his
failed attempt to
acquire absolute power, his unilaterally pushing through
of a controversial constitution,
his failed attempt to fire a state
prosecutor and increased reliance on the despised
police and security
forces, have done little to assuage anti-Islamist fears.
Similarly, Syrian opposition forces with Islamists in the lead have failed
to convince the
country’s key minorities who could have made a difference
in reducing the regime’s
power base, that there would be a place for them
and that their rights would be
secured in a post-Assad Syria.
Yet, lost in the mixture of misperception and prejudice is the recognition
that Islamists
came to power virtually unprepared for government, having a
history of a pressured
existence either underground, a legal nether land or
exile. The Muslim Brotherhood,
two years after the overthrow of Mubarak and
seven months after Morsi’s election as
president, remains nominally an
illegal organisation in Egypt. As a result, this reinforces
a sense that he
and the Brotherhood fail to truly understand the concept of democracy
and
are more focused on fending off threats and settling old scores.
A mental transition
Morsi, like his counterparts in other post-revolt Arab nations, (apart from
Libya that
suffers the consequences of Muammar Gaddafi’s refusal to build
institutions), have
inherited states dominated by police and security
forces and populated by institutions
molded by the former autocratic regimes
with their own vested interests. It takes a
degree of political savvy, mastering of electoral politics, backroom horse trading, give-
and-take and
an ability to manage public expectations rather than the bunker mentality
in which Islamist leaders operated in the past. With few exceptions, they
have yet to
demonstrate that they can make that mental transition.
In retrospect, Morsi’s deft alliance late last year with the second echelon
of Egypt’s
military command that allowed him to sideline long-serving commanders
who
unsuccessfully sought to grab power in the period between his election
and his
assumption of office, seems more an exception than an indication of
his ability to
manoeuvre the minefield that constitutes Egyptian transition
politics.
Jebali’s call for an interim technocratic government in a bid to avert a
second
popular revolt in Tunisia comes closest to Morsi’s rare display of
political deftness
in his handling of the military. It contrasts starkly
with Morsi’s surprising reluctance
to tackle reform of the police and
security forces who for many years targeted the
Muslim Brotherhood, his
seeming willingness to maintain Mubarak-era structures
and his increased
reliance on them despite the existence of reformists within all of
those
institutions.
Relative calm has returned to the streets of Egyptian cities, giving Morsi
at best a
month to build bridges in advance of the country’s next
flashpoint when a court in
Cairo pronounces verdict in the case of the
remaining 52 defendants accused of
responsibility for the deaths of 74
soccer fans a year ago in a politically-loaded
brawl in Port Said.
Flashpoint offers leverage
To do so, Morsi would have to convincingly reach out to his detractors in a
bid to
convince them that he has put the bunker mentality behind him, wants
his government
to be inclusive rather than exclusive and that he is serious
about reform of key state
institutions and is focusing on a turnaround of
the country’s economy.
As much as the Port Said case constitutes a flash point – the court’s
sentencing last
month of the first batch of 21 defendants to death sparked
the most violent protests –
it also gives Morsi leverage. In the absence of
a justification of the court’s ruling, a
leaked summary of the
prosecution’s case put the blame for the brawl as much on the
police as it
did on spectators in the stadium.
The prosecutor’s case, coupled with human rights reports that document that
the police
and security forces are a law unto themselves, provide Morsi
with the ammunition to
start the difficult process of reforming law
enforcement. It is a move that would prove
immensely popular and would help
restore political calm needed to embark on a road
of economic recovery.
A convincing move to amend the constitution in ways that removes fears of
an Islamist
takeover would further serve to bridge the widening gap in
Egyptian politics. It is too
early to write Morsi off as a failed leader.
The ball is in his court, though time is running
out.
James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, co-director
of the University
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