Saudi Iranian détente potentially sparks paradigm shifts.
By James M. Dorsey
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Chinese mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran
potentially signals paradigm shifts in Middle Eastern diplomacy and alliances.
The mediation suggests a more productive approach than that of
the United States by seeking to manage
rather than resolve conflicts based on principles enunciated by China in 2021.
The successful mediation between the Middle East’s foremost archrivals
also indicates it could lead to a broader regional détente.
Sources in Bahrain said the Shiite-majority Gulf state ruled by a
Sunni Muslim minority might be on the verge of restoring diplomatic relations
with Iran. The sources said Bahrain and Iran were already exchanging messages.
Long at the forefront of disputes between Iran and various Gulf
states, Bahrain would be the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member without
formal relations with the Islamic republic when Riyadh and Tehran exchange
ambassadors in accordance with the agreement negotiated by China.
The GCC groups Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain,
Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman.
In what looks like a possible second wave of détente in the
Middle East, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan could be next in line.
In the first wave, Saudi Arabia and the UAE buried their hatchets
with Qatar and Turkey; the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco established diplomatic
relations with Israel; and Israel and Turkey patched up their differences.
To be sure, the dialing down of tensions without parties making
major political concessions and the revival of economic ties meant countries
were no longer showing their fangs. Instead, they put their differences on ice.
Saudi Arabia
and Iran appear to be travelling down the same road.
The two countries agreed to no longer show their fangs, with the
kingdom allegedly promising to stop funding media and groups opposed to the
regime in Tehran.
In return, Iran reportedly
pledged to help end the eight-year-long war in Yemen and prevent Houthi rebels
from striking at targets in Saudi Arabia. The Iranian Foreign Ministry denied that
Yemen had been discussed in Beijing.
At the same time, the agreement appears to have potentially put a
monkey wrench in geopolitical maneuvering by Israel and various Arab states, including
Saudi Arabia. It also may spark new cleavages and exasperate existing ones.
The agreement has dampened Israeli and US hopes of a united
Saudi-Emirati-Israeli front against Iran that could risk a military
confrontation.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia will likely have been fortified in its
resolve to establish
formal relations with the Jewish state only when there is a solution to the
Palestinian problem.
In a sign of the times, Saudi Arabia this week prevented
Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen from attending a UN World Tourism
Organisation conference in the kingdom by refusing to discuss security
arrangements for the visit. Mr. Cohen's attendance would have been a
Cabinet-level Israeli official's first public visit to the kingdom.
While the timing may have been coincidental, the agreement put a reported
Emirati decision to stop purchasing Israeli military equipment in a larger
context.
Israeli media reports said the decision had been prompted by
Israel's domestic political crisis, which raised doubts about Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu's ability to control his far-right, ultra-nationalist, and
ultra-religious coalition partners.
The UAE has forged close economic and security ties with Israel
since establishing diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, together with
Bahrain and Morocco.
Last month, Israel and the UAE unveiled a jointly developed
unmanned surveillance, reconnaissance, and mine-detecting vessel.
Ali Shamkani, the Iranian national security official who
negotiated the deal with Saudi Arabia in Beijing, was in the UAE
this week to meet President Mohammed bin Zayed. The
Emirates has been out front in reaching out to Iran in recent years.
The Saudi and Emirati moves prompted Efraim Halevy, the former
head of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency and a long-time dove, to wonder
aloud whether
Israel, too, should reach out to Iran.
“This should be the moment for Israel to analyze the situation
and, inter alia, to determine whether this is an opportune moment to launch a
very careful positive probe in the direction of Tehran,” Mr. Halevy opined in
an article in Haaretz, Israel’s foremost liberal newspaper.
In a twist of irony, the UAE halt to Israeli arms acquisitions
makes a Saudi recognition of Israel any time soon even less likely.
Even so, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement appears to have
energized an emerging
cleavage between the kingdom and the UAE, onetime allies who increasingly
are becoming economic and political competitors.
The cleavage has prompted the UAE to suddenly speed up the
gradual normalisation of relations with Qatar, two years after the lifting in
2021 of the Emirati-Saudi-led diplomatic and economic boycott of the Gulf state
because of its alleged ties to Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood.
Together with Bahrain, the UAE has, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, been
slow in injecting warmth into the normalisation.
That appears to have changed.
In the last week, the UAE reportedly withdrew its bid to host the
2026 World Bank and International Monetary Fund meeting and said it would
support Qatar as a potential host instead.
The UAE also unblocked
Qatari news websites it had blocked during the boycott. These include the
Al Jazeera television network, the London-based The New Arab newspaper, and the state-run
Qatar News Agency.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia, which like the UAE, has
designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, appears to be cautiously
reviving ties to figures allegedly associated with the Brotherhood.
Saudi Arabia has long been more ambivalent towards the
Brotherhood, a particular bete noir of the UAE.
Prominent British Muslims, whom conservative members of the
Muslim community and other conservative groups accuse of having links to
Islamist organisations, including the Brotherhood, earlier this month were
invited to a two-day
conference in London hosted by Mohammed al-Issa, the secretary
general of the Muslim World League.
The conservative critics took exception to an allegedly prominent
role given
at the conference for British and European Muslim leaders to the Muslim Council
of Britain, an organisation that has been blacklisted for much of the past 14 years by successive British
governments.
The government refuses to engage with the Council because its
then deputy director-general called in 2009 for violence against Israel and condoned attacks
on the Royal Navy if it tried to intercept arms for Hamas, the
Islamist group controlling Gaza, from being smuggled into the Strip.
A widely respected British academic described the blacklisting as
“a political decision from the rightwing” that lacked evidence. He said the
allegations of Islamist connections were “off the mark" and that "the
current Secretary General is a wholly different generation than that of the
past."
The intellectual further noted that the government had reengaged
with the Council for a period before again blackballing the group.
“The current secretary-general was basically a child when all of
this happened but is still being clobbered over the head with it. It’s a double
standard, no such rigour of past connections exists around other representative
groups,” the academic said.
Since coming to office, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
has converted the Muslim World League into the propagator of his autocratic
form of Islam that is socially more liberal, politically repressive, and
demands absolute obedience to the ruler.
Once a Brotherhood stronghold, the League was a major global
funder of erstwhile Saudi religious ultra-conservatism for more than 60 years
since its founding in 1962.
Notwithstanding Mr. Bin Salman's repositioning, sources privy to
the League's inner workings suggest members of the Brotherhood remain
influential and on the organisation's payroll.
"The old guard is still very much present," one source
said.
"There is a bit of a schism in Saudi, and some of the
younger anti-Brotherhood guard can't believe how the Muslim World League is
operating," added another who follows the group closely.
Saudi Arabia's state-aligned Al Arabiya television network
reported from Cairo days before the London conference that exiled offspring of
prominent Egyptian Muslim Brothers were restructuring the group in Europe and the United States.
An article on the network's website critical of the Brotherhood
warned the activists were recruiting among Arabs in the West. It asserted that
they also sought to "infiltrate' human rights groups.
A third source with close ties to the kingdom argued that
"the question is whether the Muslim World League only restructured to meet
the new Muslim Brotherhood generation in the West. They seem to say one thing
to some people and something different to others."
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Dr. James M. Dorsey is an
award-winning journalist and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang
Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and
the author of the syndicated column and blog, The Turbulent World with James M.
Dorsey.
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