Iran upgrades perceptions of Saudi threat
By James M. Dorsey
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If there is one place Saudi Arabia was happy to be low on the
totem pole, it was Iran. Those days are over. Strategic thinkers in Tehran have
upgraded their perception of the threat posed by the kingdom.
Rather than simply viewing Saudi Arabia as a Middle Eastern
extension of the United States and a political rival, Iran today sees the
kingdom as a security threat.
Iran’s reevaluation of Saudi Arabia comes as the kingdom focuses
on enhancing its military capabilities, Iraqi-mediated talks between the
kingdom and the Islamic republic stall, and hopes have all but faded for a
revival of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program.
In military terms, Saudi Arabia was in Iranian eyes, for the
longest period, little more than an arena for targeting US interests.
That perception was reinforced when Saudi Arabia opted not to
retaliate on its own for Iranian
attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019. These attacks briefly
knocked out five per cent of global oil supply.
It was the first time that Iran hit targets on Saudi soil.
The kingdom refrained from hitting back even after the United
States made clear that it would not respond.
Nevertheless, Iran has since replaced its disdain for Saudi
Arabia as a military force with a strategy of
deterrence.
This amounts to a reevaluation of the threat posed by its
perception of being surrounded by hostile or adversarial countries and targeted
by the United States and Israel. This is with regime change as the ultimate
goal.
Hampered by crippling US sanctions, the shift in thinking
reflects Iran’s inability to compete with Saudi Arabia’s economic and financial
muscle, lobbying in Western capitals, and its influence on US and Israeli
policy.
In addition, Saudi-backed media, particularly Iran International,
a Farsi-language satellite broadcaster, have gained traction among Iranian
anti-government demonstrators.
The demonstrations rocked the Islamic republic by sustaining
nationwide protests for some four months in the second half of last year.
Initially based in London, Iran
International last month moved its operations to the United States after
British police and intelligence said they had foiled “15 plots since the start
of 2022 to either kidnap or even kill British or UK-based individuals perceived
as enemies of the regime.”
The station’s appeal was its coverage of the protests that
included information that was censored in reporting on state-controlled Iranian
television and radio networks.
Initially, Fahad Ibrahim Aldeghither, a former chairman of Zain
Saudi, the kingdom’s third-largest telecoms provider, owned 75 per cent of the
shares of Volant Media that operates Iran International, and its sister
channel, Afghanistan International.
Another
Saudi media figure, Adel Abdulkarim Alabdulkarim, acquired
Mr. Aldeghither’s shares in 2018.
That year, The Guardian reported that the court of Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman had funded Iran
International to the tune of US$250 million.
In recent months, Iranian official have become more
assertive in their warnings to the kingdom.
"I am warning the Saudi ruling family.... Watch your
behaviour and control these media ... otherwise you will pay the price. This is
our last warning because you are interfering in our state matters through these
media. We told you, be careful," said Hossein Salami, commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Iran's intelligence minister, Esmail Khatib, said Iran was
running out of patience.
"Until now, Iran has adopted strategic patience with firm
rationality, but it cannot guarantee that it will not run out if hostilities
continue," Mr. Khatib said.
Referring to several unidentified Gulf monarchies, he threatened
that “if Iran decides to retaliate and punish, glass palaces will crumble, and
these countries will not experience stability anymore."
Iran’s upgraded perception of the Saudi threat is further fuelled
by massive Saudi expenditure on defense, Saudi efforts to build a domestic
defence industry, and its cooperation with the United States in turning the
Saudi military into an effective combat force.
Beyond Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of sophisticated US and
European weapon systems to which Iran has no access, the kingdom’s efforts to
build a domestic defense industry aim to create capabilities that target the
backbone of Iranian defense strategy, drones and ballistic missiles.
Saudi Arabia has in recent years agreed with China to build a
drone manufacturing facility in the kingdom. The facility will be China’s
first overseas production plant.
The US and Saudi Arabia intend to hold their first-ever
experimental counter-drone exercise at the end of this month.
Satellite imagery in recent years suggests that the kingdom has
built missile bases with the help of Chinese technology.
As Iran inches ever closer to nuclear weapons capability, Saudi
Arabia is pushing to build nuclear power plants. Saudi Arabia is also aiming to
acquire the knowledge and technological building blocks to match Iran if it
crosses a threshold for the production of nuclear weapons.
Saudi leaders, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have
warned that Saudi Arabia
would develop its own capability if Iran becomes a nuclear power.
Saudi Arabia has denied reports that it was building a facility
for extracting yellowcake from uranium with the help of China.
Producing yellowcake is part of the process leading to the
enrichment of uranium.
Nevertheless, the Saudi energy ministry said it was cooperating
with China on unspecified aspects of uranium exploration.
At the same time, the kingdom insisted that mining its uranium
reserves was part of its economic diversification strategy.
Last month, Saudi Arabia
received bids to build its first nuclear power plant.
The kingdom plans to construct 16
nuclear power reactors in the next two decades at a cost of an
estimated $100 billion.
In addition, Saudi Arabia has signed nuclear cooperation
agreements with multiple countries, most recently last month with France.
“While both Riyadh and Tehran attempt to put a diplomatic
communication mechanism in place, no
meaningful reduction of threat perceptions has happened,” said
scholar Abdolrasool Divsallar.
“Trends seem to indicate a hardening of both countries’
securitized approach to each other, complicating concessions on designing a
pathway for bilateral de-escalation,” Mr. Divsallar added.
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Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist
and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated
column and blog, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.
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