Qatar World Cup offers lessons for human rights struggles
By James M. Dorsey
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It’s a good
time, almost 12 years after the world soccer body, FIFA, awarded Qatar the 2022
World Cup hosting rights and five months before the tournament, to evaluate the
campaign to reform the country’s erstwhile onerous labor system and accommodate
fans whose lifestyles violate restrictive laws and/or go against deeply rooted
cultural attitudes.
Ultimately
the balance sheet shows a mixed bag even if one takes into account that Qatari
autocracy has proven to be more responsive and flexible in responding to
pressure by human rights and labour groups than its Gulf brothers in the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
On the plus
side, the initial wave of condemnation of the country’s repressive kafala labour
system that put employees at the mercy of their employers persuaded Qatar to become
the first Gulf state, if not the first Arab state, to engage with its critics.
Engagement meant giving human rights groups and trade
unions access to the country, allowing them to operate and hold news
conferences in Qatar, and involving them in drafting reforms and World
Cup-related model labour contracts. This was unprecedented in a region where
local activists are behind bars or worse and foreign critics don’t even make it
onto an inbound flight.
The reforms were
imperfect and not far-reaching enough, even if Qatar introduced significant
improvements in the conditions for unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
Furthermore,
on the plus side, the hosting rights sparked limited but nonetheless
taboo-breaking discussions that touched on sensitive subjects such as LGBT rights and the granting
of citizenship to non-nationals.
Qataris
openly questioned the granting of
citizenship to foreign athletes so they could be included in the Qatar national team for the
2016 Olympics rather than medical personnel and other professionals who had contributed
to national welfare and development.
Hosting the
World Cup has further forced Qatar, albeit in a limited fashion, to come to
grips with issues like LGBT rights that do not simply violate the country’s
laws but go against its social grain to produce an inclusive tournament.
In some
ways, that may have been more difficult than reforming the labour regime if one
considers the difference between standing up for democratic freedoms that may
have broad public support and the recognition of LGBT rights. In contrast to
democratic rights, opposition to LGBT rights is deeply
engrained in Qatar
and other Muslim societies. It would likely be socially rejected, even if they
were enshrined in law.
The
difference means that the defense of LGBT and other socially controversial
rights forces activists and human and LGBT rights groups to rethink their
strategies and adopt alternative, more long-term approaches.
It also
means that they will have to embrace less Western-centric attitudes frequently
prevalent in the campaign to reform Qatar's labour system. Those attitudes were
evident in debates that were also often skewed by bias, prejudice, bigotry, and
sour grapes.
Moreover,
the criticism often failed to consider the context. As a result, achieving
results and pushing for reform was, to a degree, undermined by what appeared to
be a ganging up on Qatar and a singling out of the Gulf state.
Labour is an
example. Human rights groups and trade unions treated onerous labour conditions
in Qatar, even if the World Cup turned it into a prime target, as uniquely
Qatari rather than a global problem that manifests itself in other parts of the
world such as Southeast Asia and even Western democracies like Britain. Recent
reporting by The Guardian showed that expatriate medical and caregiver
personnel face similar curtailing of rights and abuse in Britain.
By the same
token, Qatar was taken to task for being slow in implementing its reforms and
ensuring that they were applied not only to World Cup projects but nationwide.
The fact is
that lagging enforcement of policies and legal changes is a problem across the
broad spectrum of Qatari policies and reform efforts, including the Gulf
state's high-profile, fast-paced, mediation-driven foreign policy.
Qatar’s
handling of illegal recruitment fees paid by workers is a case in point.
The Supreme
Committee for Delivery & Legacy, the Qatari organizer of the World Cup, has
obliged companies it contracts to repay the fees without workers having to
provide proof of payment. Companies have so far pledged to repay roughly
USD$28.5 million to some 49,000 workers, $22 million of which have already been
paid out.
It is a step
the government could apply nationally with relative ease to demonstrate
sincerity and, more fundamentally, counter the criticism.
Similarly,
in response to complaints raised by human rights groups and others, the
government could also offer to compensate families of workers who die on
construction sites. Again, none of these measures would dent Qatari budgets but
would earn the Gulf state immeasurable goodwill.
Dr. James M.
Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and scholar, a Senior Fellow at the
National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and Adjunct Senior
Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and blog, The
Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
The
consequence of singling out Qatar without putting it in a broader context was
that initial Qatari willingness to work with its critics weakened as attitudes
hardened. Increasingly self-confident, Qatar engaged less with its critics and
responded to criticism more aggressively.
That was
evident at the FIFA Congress in Doha in March when Supreme Committee
secretary-general Hassan al Thawadi responded to critical remarks by Lise
Klaveness, the head of the Norwegian Football Association, by saying: “We’re
not seeking validation. Legacy is being delivered as we speak. We’ve showcased
to the world what tournament hosting can do.”.
Furthermore,
Qatar has done itself no favours in its dealings with the media regarding its
mediocre responses to inquiries and efforts to inhibit independent reporting
and suppress what Qatari officials would consider negative stories.
Take Qatar’s handling of the case of
Abdullah Ibhais, a
Jordanian-Palestinian Supreme Committee communications executive, who opposed
putting a spin on a strike by migrant workers, including some assigned to World
Cup-related projects. The workers were on strike because their salaries had not
been paid.
Mr. Ibhais
was subsequently accused of leaking state secrets and awarding a social media
tender to a Turkish bidder in return for Turkish citizenship. He asserts that
he was forced to sign a confession and was initially refused access to a
lawyer.
Mr, Ibhais
was sentenced to five years in prison based on evidence that, according to
Human Rights Watch, was “vague, circumstantial, and in some cases
contradictory.” However, an appeals court subsequently reduced his sentence to
three years in jail.
Qatar’s
cost-benefit analysis is often skewed as its repressive and defensive actions cause
greater reputational damage than the incidents it tries to suppress. It remains
an open question whether Qatar is driven by bad faith, ill will, and lack of
political will or ineptitude that gets it stuck in a rout.
The bottom line
of all of this is not whether criticism of Qatar is justified. It largely is.
The question for human rights groups and other activists is what is, given the nature
of the issues and the fact that the window on leverage over Qatar is closing,
what lessons can be learned from the experience of the last decade and what is
the best strategy and approach going forward.
There may be
no immediate answers, but what is evident is that strategies and approaches aim
to encourage further reforms, and post-World Cup reform will have to be updated
and adapted.
This
article is based on remarks of the author on June 27 at the Play the Game 2022 conference.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar, a Senior Fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute and Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang
Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and
the author of the syndicated column and blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer.
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