Turkey and Iran find soft power more difficult than hard power
By James M. Dorsey
The times they are a changin’. Iranian leaders may not
be Bob Dylan fans, but his words are likely to resonate as they contemplate
their next steps in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Lebanon, and Azerbaijan.
The same is true for Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan. The president’s shine as a fierce defender of Muslim causes, except
for when there is an economic price tag attached as is the case of China’s
brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims, has been dented by allegations of lax defences
against money laundering and economic mismanagement.
The setbacks come at a time that Mr. Erdogan’s
popularity is diving in opinion polls.
Turkey
this weekend expelled the ambassadors of the US,
Canada, France, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and
Sweden for calling for the release of philanthropist and civil rights activist
Osman Kavala in line with a European Court of Human Rights decision.
Neither Turkey nor Iran can afford the setbacks that
often are the result of hubris. Both have bigger geopolitical, diplomatic, and
economic fish to fry and are competing with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as
Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama for religious soft power, if not leadership of the
Muslim world.
That competition takes on added significance in a
world in which Middle Eastern rivals seek to manage rather than resolve their
differences by focusing on economics and trade and soft, rather than hard power
and proxy battles.
In one recent incident Hidayat Nur Wahid, deputy
speaker of the Indonesian parliament, opposed
naming a street in Jakarta after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
the general-turned-statemen who carved modern Turkey out of the ruins of the
Ottoman empire. Mr. Wahid suggested that it would be more appropriate to
commemorate Ottoman sultans Mehmet the Conqueror or Suleiman the Magnificent or
14th-century Islamic scholar, Sufi mystic, and poet Jalaludin Rumi.
Mr. Wahid is a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and a board member of the Saudi-run Muslim World League,
one of the kingdom’s main promoters of religious soft power.
More importantly, Turkey’s integrity as a country that
forcefully combats funding of political violence and money laundering has been
called into question by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
international watchdog, and a potential court case in the United States that
could further tarnish Mr. Erdogan’s image.
A US appeals court ruled on Friday that state-owned
Turkish lender Halkbank can be prosecuted over accusations it helped Iran evade
American sanctions.
Prosecutors have accused Halkbank of converting oil
revenue into gold and then cash to benefit Iranian interests and documenting
fake food shipments to justify transfers of oil proceeds. They also said
Halkbank helped Iran secretly transfer US$20 billion of restricted funds, with
at least $1 billion laundered through the US financial system.
Halkbank has pleaded not guilty and argued that it is
immune from prosecution under the federal Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
because it was "synonymous" with Turkey, which has immunity under
that law. The case has complicated US-Turkish relations, with Mr. Erdogan backing Halkbank's innocence in a
2018 memo to then US President Donald Trump.
FATF placed Turkey on its grey list last week. It joins
countries like Pakistan, Syria, South Sudan, and Yemen that
have failed to comply with the group’s standards. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) warned earlier this year that greylisting would affect
a country’s ability to borrow on international markets, and cost it an equivalent of up to 3 per cent
of gross domestic product as well as a drop in foreign direct investment.
Mr. Erdogan’s management
of the economy has been troubled by the recent firing of three
central bank policymakers, a bigger-than-expected interest rate cut that sent
the Turkish lira tumbling, soaring prices, and an annual inflation rate that
last month ran just shy of 20 per cent. Mr. Erdogan has regularly blamed high-interest
rates for inflation.
A public opinion survey concluded in May that 56.9%
of respondents would not vote for Mr. Erdogan and that the
president would lose in a run-off against two of his rivals, Ankara Mayor
Mansur Yavas and his Istanbul counterpart Ekrem Imamoglu.
In further bad news for the president, polling company
Metropoll said its September survey showed that 69
per cent of respondents saw secularism as a
necessity while 85.1 per cent objected to religion being used in election
campaigning.
In Iran’s case, a combination of factors is changing
the dynamics of Iran’s relations with some of its allied Arab militias, calling
into question the domestic positioning of some of those militias, fueling
concern in Tehran that its detractors are encircling it, and putting a dent in
the way Iran would like to project itself.
A just-published
report by the Combatting Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy West
Point concluded that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) faced “growing
difficulties in controlling local militant cells. Hardline anti-US militias
struggle with the contending needs to de-escalate US-Iran tensions, meet the
demands of their base for anti-US operations, and simultaneously evolve
non-kinetic political and social wings.”
Iranian de-escalation of tensions with the United
States is a function of efforts to revive the defunct 2015 international agreement to curb Iran’s
nuclear program and talks aimed at improving relations with Saudi
Arabia even if they have yet to produce concrete results.
In addition, like in Lebanon, Iranian soft power in
Iraq has been challenged by growing Iraqi public opposition to sectarianism and
Iranian-backed Shiite militias that are at best only nominally controlled by
the state.
Even worse, militias, including Hezbollah, the Arab
world’s foremost Iranian-supported armed group, have been identified with
corrupt elites in Lebanon and Iraq. Many in Lebanon oppose Hezbollah as part of
an elite that has allowed the Lebanese state to collapse to protect its vested
interests.
Hezbollah did little to counter those perceptions when
the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, threatened
Lebanese Christians after fighting erupted this month
between the militia and the Lebanese Forces, a Maronite party, along the Green
Line that separated Christian East and Muslim West Beirut during the 1975-1990
civil war.
The two groups battled each other for hours as Hezbollah
staged a demonstration to pressure the government to stymie
an investigation into last year’s devastating
explosion in the port of Beirut. Hezbollah
fears that the inquiry could lay bare pursuit of the group’s interests at the
expense of public safety.
“The biggest
threat for the Christian presence in Lebanon is the Lebanese Forces party and
its head,” Mr. Nasrallah warned, fuelling fears of a return to sectarian
violence.
It’s a
warning that puts a blot on Iran’s assertion that its Islam respects minority
rights, witness the reserved seats in the country’s parliament for religious
minorities. These include Jews, Armenians, Assyrians and Zoroastrians.
Similarly,
an alliance of Iranian-backed Shiite militias emerged as the biggest loser in this month’s Iraqi
elections. The Fateh
(Conquest) Alliance, previously the second-largest bloc in parliament, saw its
number of seats drop from 48 to 17.
Prime
Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi brought forward the vote from 2022 to appease a
youth-led protest movement that erupted two years ago against corruption,
unemployment, crumbling public services, sectarianism, and Iranian influence in
politics.
One bright
light from Iran’s perspective is the fact that an attempt in September by
activists in the United States to engineer support for Iraqi
recognition of Israel
backfired.
Iran last
month targeted
facilities in northern Iraq operated by Iranian opposition Kurdish groups. Teheran
believes they are part of a tightening US-Israeli noose around the Islamic
republic that involves proxies and covert operations on its Iraqi and
Azerbaijani borders.
Efforts to
reduce tension with Azerbaijan have failed. An end to a war of words that duelling
military manoeuvres on both sides of the border proved short-lived. Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev, emboldened by Israeli and Turkish support in last
year’s war against Armenia, appeared unwilling to dial down the rhetoric.
With a
revival of the nuclear program in doubt, Iran fears that Azerbaijan could
become a staging pad for US and Israeli covert operations. Those doubts were reinforced
by calls for US backing of Azerbaijan by scholars in conservative Washington
think tanks, including the Hudson Institute and the Heritage Foundation.
Eldar
Mamedov, a political adviser for the social-democrats in the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament, warned that “the US government should resist calls
from hawks to get
embroiled in a conflict where it has no vital interest at stake, and much less
on behalf of a regime that is so antithetical to US values and interests.”
He noted
that Mr. Aliyev has forced major US NGOs to leave Azerbaijan, has trampled on
human and political rights, and been anything but tolerant of the country’s
Armenian heritage.
A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr,
Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon
and Castbox.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar and a Senior Fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute.
Comments
Post a Comment