Afghanistan highlights link between religious soft power and Gulf security
By James M.
Dorsey
When Qatari foreign minister
Sheikh Mohammed Abdulrahman Al-Thani this week described the Taliban’s
repressive policies towards women and brutal administration of justice as “very disappointing” and taking
Afghanistan “a step backwards,” he was doing more than holding Qatar up as a model of
Islamic governance and offering the militants cover to moderate their ways.
Sheikh
Al-Thani was seeking to shield the Gulf state from criticism should Qatari
efforts fail to persuade the Taliban to shave off the sharp edges that marked
their rule 25 years ago before they were toppled by US military forces and
characterize their governance since they retook control of Afghanistan in
mid-August with the US withdrawal.
The minister
was implicitly referring to the Taliban’s refusal to allow Afghan female secondary school
students to resume their studies two weeks after schools opened for boys and hanging the bloodied corpse of a man accused of kidnapping on a crane in
the main square of the western Afghan city of Herat. Elsewhere in the city,
three other men were also strung up for public viewing.
Sheikh
Al-Thani’s effort to position his country as a model of Islamic governance was
not only an effort to offer the Taliban an alternative but also a bid to garner
brownie points in a competition with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
for religious soft power in the Muslim world and international recognition as
an icon of an autocratic, yet ‘moderate’ interpretation of Islam.
Sheikh
Al-Thani’s remarks constituted his first sharp rebuke of the Taliban and have
gone further than statements issued by the kingdom and the Emirates that so far
primarily urged the group to ensure regional security and stability.
“We have…been
trying to demonstrate for the Taliban how Muslim countries can conduct their
laws, how they can deal with the women’s issues,” Sheikh Al-Thani said. “One of
the examples is the State of Qatar, which is a Muslim country; our system is an
Islamic system (but) we have women outnumbering men in workforces, in
government and in higher education.” The minister warned that the Taliban
risked misusing Sharia or Islamic law.
Hoping for
Taliban moderation may be wishful thinking. "Policies are pitched at the
group's lowest common denominator to preserve concord. That makes it difficult for the
Taliban to change," The Economist reported.
Against the
backdrop of the rivalry, the stakes are higher for Qatar’s religious soft power
rivals to be seen as distancing and differentiating themselves from the
Taliban. To be sure, the UAE competes with Qatar in having made significant
progress on women’s rights while Saudi Arabia has substantially enhanced
women’s professional and social opportunities since the rise of Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman.
Yet, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE were alongside Pakistan the only three countries to
recognize the first Taliban government in 1996. Saudi Arabia, moreover,
together the United States, created the Taliban’s cradle by funding and arming
the mujahedeen who forced the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan in the late
1980s.
“In the name
of common decency as well as political expediency, the Gulf states must exert
their maximum leverage, whether financial, political, or moral, on the Taliban
to dissuade them from reimposing the barbarous regime of twenty years ago.
Through their financial support of the mujahideen, the Gulf has been inextricably
linked with Afghanistan from the beginning of its troubles in the 1980s and own what happens
now,” said former US ambassador to Qatar Patrick Theros.
While the
same could be said about the United States, Mr. Theros’ remarks appeared to include
a dig at Saudi Arabia and the UAE despite an agreement in January to end a 3.5
year-long diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar led by the kingdom and the
Emirates. To be fair, Mr. Theros buffered his criticism of Gulf states by
noting that they needed to bury their differences to confront the threat posed
by Iran.
Mr. Theros is
a strategic adviser for the Washington-based Gulf International Forum, a Qatar-linked thinktank, launched in 2018 days after the
U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, an annual series of bilateral meetings between
high-level U.S. and Qatari officials was inaugurated.
Former Saudi
intelligence chief Prince Turki
al-Faisal, in a bid to distance Saudi Arabia from the Taliban, recently distinguished
Wahhabism, the kingdom’s ultra-conservative strand of Islam, and Deobandism,
another ultra-conservative interpretation of the faith that originated in India
and constitutes the theological wellspring of the Taliban.
Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed’s social reforms have shaved off sharp edges of Wahhabi
practices but have not involved attempts to tinker with Islamic jurisprudence
that justified them. Likewise, decades of Saudi theological influence and
funding shaped the evolution of Deobandism in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan.
Media reports
suggested that Prince Turki secretly met Taliban leaders in
August.
Prince Turki reportedly seemingly unsuccessfully sought to convince the group
to moderate its policies and put flesh on the notion of a changed Taliban 2.0.
As head of
Saudi intelligence from 1979 to 2001, Prince Turki dealt with the mujahedeen
during the war against the Soviets and sought to persuade the Taliban to hand over
Osama bin Laden after Al-Qaeda bombed US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in
1998.
The need to
distance Islam as practised in conservative Gulf states from the Taliban’s
interpretation of the faith takes on added significance amid doubts about US
reliability reinforced by the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the United States
rejiggering its commitment to guaranteeing security in the region. It is where
religious soft power meets defence and security policy in a court of public
opinion that may not delve into the nuanced differences between Wahhabism and
Deobandism.
“The unsavoury
reputation of Gulf regimes’ human rights practices has lessened the American
public’s appetite for committing troops to their defence over the past decade.
The Gulf states must come to grips with the possibility that the US willingness
to fight Iran in their defence has significantly declined and may well
disappear over the coming years… If the intellectual and political elite of the
region do not start thinking about how to manage the future, it will turn and
bite them,” Mr. Theros said.
Most
immediately, Saudi Arabia fears that Houthi rebels in Yemen may take a page out
of the Taliban playbook and fight the war in Yemen till victory while paying
only lip service to a negotiated end to the war.
US President
Joe Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, met on Monday in the
kingdom with Prince Mohammed to discuss the war 6.5-year-old Saudi intervention
in Yemen. It was the first encounter between a senior
official of the Biden administration and the crown prince, whose image has been severely
tarnished by the 2018 killing in Istanbul of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr,
Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon
and Castbox.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar and a Senior Fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute.
Comments
Post a Comment