Pandemic threatens to drive wedge into US-Gulf relations
James
M. Dorsey
This article first appeared in Gulf
Insight
It is early
days, but first indications are that the global pandemic is entrenching
long-drawn Middle Eastern geopolitical, political, ethnic, and sectarian battle
lines rather than serving as a vehicle to build bridges and build confidence.
The coronavirus
crisis is also changing the region’s political landscape as non-governmental
organizations and militants in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon fill
gaps where governments have failed to cater to social and health needs created
by the pandemic.
The empowerment
of NGOs and militant groups, particularly where they fill a gap without
coordinating with government, potentially raises security issues as militants
capitalize on their ability to show up the state’s lack of capability.
The expanded
militants’ role takes on added significance as states like Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates use the pandemic to entrench as well as manage many of the
Middle East’s fault lines, if not widen them to their advantage.
The pandemic
has also not stopped the region’s foremost external power, the United States,
from taking Iran’s bait in an escalating tit-for-tat that risks a larger
military conflagration.
In a similar
vein, the UAE has used the pandemic to solidify its limited outreach to Iran
designed to shield the Gulf state from becoming a battlefield in any US-Iranian
military confrontation.
While the
United States reportedly blocked an Iranian
request for US5 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to fight the
virus, the UAE was among the first nations to deliver
medical aid to
Iran and facilitate shipments by the World Health Organization (WHO).
The shipments
led to a rare March 15 phone call between UAE foreign minister Abdullah bin
Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javid Zarif.
The UAE began
reaching out to Iran last year when it sent a coast guard delegation to Tehran
to discuss maritime security in the wake of alleged Iranian attacks on oil
tankers off the coast of the Emirates.
The Trump
administration remained silent when the UAE last October released US$700
million in frozen Iranian assets that ran counter to US efforts to strangle Iran economically with
harsh sanctions.
The UAE’s moves
amount to a lowering of the temperature. Officials insist that there will be no
real breakthrough in Emirati-Iranian relations as long as Iran supports proxies
like Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Houthi rebels in
Yemen.
UAE Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Zayed made that clear when he phoned Syrian President
Bashar -al-Assad in a bid to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran and
complicate Turkish military interventions in Syria as well as Libya.
UAE support for
Syria and Libyan rebel forces led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar spotlight
the contradictions in the Emirates’ projection of itself as a humanitarian
actor. Neither Mr. Al-Assad or Mr. Haftar have shied away from targeting
hospitals and medical facilities at a time functioning health infrastructure is
a priority.
In cuddling up
to Syria and reaching out to Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia may have common
goals even if they pursue them in different ways that are dictated by the
degree of risk they are willing to shoulder.
As a result,
Saudi Arabia, in contrast to the UAE, has maintained a hard line towards Iran,
casting aside opportunities to build bridges by, for example, offering Iran
medical aid.
Instead, Saudi
Arabia appeared to reinforce the divide by accusing Iran of “direct
responsibility” for the spread of the virus. Government-controlled media charged
that Iran’s allies, Qatar and Turkey, had deliberately mismanaged the crisis.
Moreover, the
kingdom, backing a US refusal to ease sanctioning of Iran, prevented the
Non-Aligned Movement from condemning the Trump administration’s hard line at
the time of a pandemic.
Saudi Arabia’s
failure to follow in the UAE’s footsteps could prove to be costlier than meets
the eye.
The coronavirus
coupled with the global economic breakdown and the collapse of the oil market
has somewhat levelled the playing field with Iran with the undermining of the
kingdom’s ability to manipulate oil prices as well as its diminished financial
muscle.
Add to that the
weakening of Saudi Arabia’s claim to leadership of the Islamic world as the
custodian of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s two holiest cities, as a result of its
efforts to combat the pandemic.
One has to go
way back in history to find a precedent for the kingdom’s banning of the Umrah,
Islam’s minor pilgrimage to Mecca; the likely cancelling of the haj, Islam’s
major pilgrimage that constitutes one of
the faith’s five pillars; and the closing down of mosques to avoid
congregational prayer.
Just to make
things worse, Saudi Arabia has jeopardized its close ties to the United States
with an oil price war against Russia that collapsed oil markets, drove oil
prices to rock bottom, and significantly undermined the US shale industry with
its ten million jobs.
Nonetheless,
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in a twist of irony given his record on
human rights and rule of law, has emerged as a model in some Muslim countries
like Pakistan that have been less forceful in imposing physical distancing and
lockdowns on ultra-conservative religious communities.
“What
if this year’s haj was under Imran Khan rather than Mohammad bin Salman? Would
he have waffled there as indeed he has in Pakistan?” asked
Pakistani nuclear scientist, political analyst and human rights activist Pervez
Hoodbhoy referring to the Pakistan prime minister.
Saudi Arabia
has so far carried the brunt of US criticism despite the fact that it remains
more closely aligned with US policies than the UAE which to date has succeeded
in flying under the radar.
That is a
remarkable achievement given that the Emirates backed Saudi Arabia in its
debilitating price war by announcing that it too would raise oil production.
The strategy
has since been put on hold with an agreement to radically reduce production
among members of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), non-OPEC
producers, including Russia, and the Group of Twenty that brings together the
world’s largest economies.
In the same
vein, the UAE’s outreach to Syria and Iran runs counter to US policy.
The policy
contradictions stem from Gulf efforts to ensure that entrenched conflicts do
not spiral out of control, particularly as they battle a pandemic and struggle
to cope with the economic fallout.
That is also
their core message to US President Donald J. Trump amid heightening tensions
with Iran: “Don’t let this get out of hand. You live thousands of miles away.
It will be us, not you who pays the price and you won’t be there to rush to our
defense,” said a prominent Saudi.
About the
author
Dr. James M.
Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang
Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in
Singapore. He is also an adjunct senior research fellow at the National
University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the
University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture in Germany
About
the Gulf Insights series:
The
"Gulf Insights" series is published by the Gulf Studies Center on a
weekly base with the aim to promote informed debate with academic depth. The
Gulf Insights are commentaries on pressing regional issues written by the
GSC/GSP faculty, staff PhD and MA students, as well as guest scholars, and they
can be between 1,200 to 1,500 words.
All articles published under “Gulf Insight”
series have been discussed internally but they reflect the opinion and views of
the authors, and do not reflect the views of the Center, the College of Arts
and Sciences or Qatar University.
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