Towards a New World Order in Eurasia: The 21st Century’s Great Game (Part 2)
By James M. Dorsey
Shaping Eurasia’s energy architecture
The joker in the Great Game is Donald J. Trump’s United
States. Trump has yet to spell out an overall policy towards Eurasia even
though he has articulated attitudes towards individual players. One of those
players, Iran, appears to be on his hitlist, much to Saudi Arabia’s delight.
A tougher US policy towards Iran, a nation of strategic
importance to several of the Great Game’s players, has consequences and could
undercut the Islamic republic’s strategic advantage in shaping the future
architecture of Eurasia’s energy landscape. Unfettered by international
sanctions, Iran is pivotal to the success of China’s trans-continental,
infrastructure-focussed One Belt, One Road initiative in ways that Saudi Arabia
is not.
In a study published in 2015, energy scholar Micha’el
Tanchum suggested that it would be gas supplies from Iran and Turkmenistan, two
Caspian Sea states, rather than Saudi oil that would determine which way the future
Eurasian energy architecture tilts: China, the world’s third largest LNG
importer, or Europe.
“Iran, within five years, will likely have 24.6 billion
cubic metres of natural gas available for annual piped gas exports beyond its
current supply commitments. Not enough to supply all major markets, Tehran will
face a crucial geopolitical choice for the destination of its piped exports.
Iran will be able to export piped gas to two of the following three markets:
European Union (EU)/ Turkey via the Southern Gas Corridor centring on the
Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), India via an Iran-Oman-India
pipeline, or China via either Turkmenistan or Pakistan. The degree to which the
system of energy relationships in Eurasia will be more oriented toward the
European Union or China will depend on the extent to which each secures Caspian
piped gas exports through pipeline infrastructure directed to its respective
markets,” Tanchum argued.
The lifting of international sanctions in 2015 as part of an
agreement on restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program significantly enhanced the
Islamic republic’s ability to Eurasia’s energy architecture. Iran boasts the
world’s second largest natural gas reserves and its fourth largest oil reserves.[i]
Source: International
Gas Union
Tancuhum’s analysis means that China would have to ensure
that it is Iran and Turkmenistan’s main gas importer. That would position One
Way, One Belt as Eurasia’s key energy infrastructure and solidify Chinese
influence in Central Asia. China already dominates Turkmen gas sales
The one option Tanchum appeared not to consider was Iran
choosing Europe and China as its main export markets despite Turkey’s
proximity, cultural affinity, and already existing arrangements for the import of
Iranian gas. Europe and China have already begun to put the blocks in place for
a shared role in Eurasia. Tens of rail links traverse the Eurasian landmass
from China to the Atlantic. Both China and Europe are developing new cities and
trade hubs in remote locations that often were nodes on the ancient Silk road.
These include Lanzhou in western China, Horgos/ Khorgos in the Saryesik-Atyrau
desert on the Chinese-Kazakh border, and Terespol on the Polish-Belarus
frontier.
The frenzy is attracting not only Chinese, Russian and
European but also Japanese and Indian investment in the knowledge that emerging
hubs and networks will be available to all. The open question is whether any
one power will dominate them and, if so, who.
China has already many of the building blocks needed to turn
its ambitions into reality: close and long-standing relations with Iran,
significant investment in Turkmen gas production and pipeline infrastructure,
and the construction of Pakistan’s section of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline.
Hooking the pipeline to One Belt, One Road would allow China to receive Iranian
gas not only by sea on its eastern seaboard but also in its land-locked,
troubled north-western province Xinjiang.
Compensating for handicaps
Iran in positioning itself as a key link in China’s
trans-continental One Belt, One Road initiative. Iran constitutes both a key
land and maritime node. Saudi Arabia’s importance beyond energy supplies is at
best maritime. The Maldives, a strategically located 820km-long chain of Indian
Ocean atolls, has emerged as a significant player in Saudi Arabia’s effort to
compensate for its handicap and ensure the secure export of its oil, gas and
other goods to China.
Saudi interest coincides with increased Chinese investment
in the Maldives, a collection of 1,200 coral islands, that opposition
politicians believe could eventually host China’s next military base as well as
Saudi military outpost. China and Saudi Arabia are independently constructing
their first foreign military bases in Djibouti. They “want to have a base in
the Maldives that would safeguard the trade routes, their oil routes, to their
new markets. To have strategic installations, infrastructure,” said ousted
former Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed.[ii]
Saudi Arabia was negotiating a $10 billion development, if
not the wholesale acquisition of Faafu, a collection of 19 low-lying islands
120 kilometres south of the Maldives capital of Male. The project would involve
construction of seaports airports, high-end housing, and resorts and the
creation of special economic zones policy. Saudi Arabia could be granted a
freehold provided that 70 percent of the project is executed on reclaimed land.[iii]
The investment would be three times the GDP of the Maldives, a nation of
400,000, including 100,000 foreign workers, that spans 1,000 kilometres across
the Indian Ocean and some of the world's key shipping routes.
Saudi interest in Faafu with a 2014 visit by then crown
prince Salman and his son Mohammed, now deputy crown prince. Mohammed returned
a year later to host a week of parties. He and his entourage took over two
resorts. Guests flew in night after night on private jets to attend the
parties, which featured famous entertainers including the rapper Pitbull and
the South Korean singer Psy. The Saudis signed at about that time a memorandum
of understanding that involved the sale of Faafu to the kingdom.[iv]
Saudi Arabia and China moreover shouldered complimentary
projects in the Maldives. Chinese premier Xi Jinping in 2014 construction of a
$210 million Friendship Bridge that would connect Male to the Maldives airport.[v]
The troubled Saudi Bin Laden Group won a contract to build a new terminal for
the Ibrahim Nasir International Airport after having first awarded the project
to an Indian company.[vi]
Saudi Arabia has also pledged tens of millions of dollars in loans and grants
for infrastructure and housing on an artificial island near Male.
China also agreed to build a new airport runway as well as a
port in Laamu, an atoll south of Faafu. The port would be one more stone in
China’s string of pearls. The Maldives, moreover, in 2016 leased Feydhoo
Finolhu, an uninhabited island close to Mahe previously used by the government
for school trips and youth activities, to a Chinese company for 50 years at a
cost of $4 million.[vii]
Saudi and Chinese interest in the Maldives comes as the two
countries upgrade military cooperation. “China is willing to push military
relations with Saudi Arabia to a new level,” Chinese Defense Minister Chang
Wanquan told his visiting Saudi counterpart, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman in August 2016.[viii]
Special counter-terrorism forces from the two countries held the first ever
joint exercise between the Chinese military and an Arab armed force two months
later. With the United States refusing to share its drone technology, China and
Saudi Arabia agreed that China would open its first overseas defense production
facility in the kingdom. State-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology
Corporation (CASC) will manufacture its
CH-4 Caihong, or Rainbow drone as well as associated equipment in Saudi Arabia.[ix]
To lay the ground for Saudi investment in the Maldives, Saudi
Arabia provided the island republic in 2013 $300 million on soft terms and has
massively funded religious institutions and education. The kingdom offers scholarships
for Maldives students to pursue religious studies at the kingdom’s
ultra-conservative universities in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and has
donated $100,000 to the Islamic University of the Maldives.
During a visit in 2015, Saudi Islamic Affairs Minister Saleh
bin Abdulaziz promised to help the Maldives improve the collection of zakat,
alms for the poor that constitute one of Islam’s five pillars, publish Islamic
texts in English, speed up mosque construction, and train imams.[x]
The kingdom has also funded the construction of the six-storey, multi-facility
King Salman mosque, the island republic’s largest.[xi]
The kingdom has also not shied away from influencing public
opinion by bribing journalists. In one incident, journalists were handed
cash-filled envelopes during an event at the Saudi embassy in Mahe.[xii]
Other journalists report that they are harassed when reporting critically on
Saudi interests in the Maldives or on the rise of ultra-conservatism. Many journalists
see the disappearance in 2014 of Ahmed Rilwan Abdulla, a prominent journalist,
who wrote about secularism and ultra-conservatism, as warning.
Saudi Arabia’s investment paid off in early 2016 when the
Maldives broke off diplomatic relations with Iran, charging that Iranian policy
threatened security and stability in the Indian Ocean.[xiii]
It has also left its mark on society. Saudi-funded ultra-conservatism has
contributed to the Maldives, a popular high end tourist destination that prided
itself on adhering to a blend of Sufism and other religions. becoming
increasingly less tolerant and less accepting of liberal lifestyles. Forms of
entertainment like mixed dancing and western beach garb have become acceptable
only within the walls of expensive resorts. Reflecting the shift towards
ultra-conservatism, a court in 2015 for the first time sentenced a woman to
death by stoning for having committed adultery.[xiv]
The Saudis “have had a good run of propagating their worldview to the people of
the Maldives and they’ve done that for the last three decades. They’ve now, I
think, come to view that they have enough sympathy for them to get a foothold,”
Nasheed said.
Indian intelligence sources worry that the Maldives could
become a base of a very different kind just off the sub-continental mainland[xv].
They and independent analysts[xvi]
assert that hundreds of Maldivians have joined the ranks of IS in Syria – a
significant number given the country’s tiny population.[xvii]
Some 200 people carrying Islamic State flags marched in 2014 through Mahe
demanding implementation of Sharia law instead of democracy.[xviii]
Punctured by protest
Troubled Asian ports that China envisions as part of it’s
string of pearls linking the Eurasian heartland to the Middle Kingdom shine a
glaring spotlight on the pitfalls threatening Beijing’s ambitious One Belt, One
Road initiative, and offer a window into the Great Game’s dynamics. The
pitfalls are magnified by mounting criticism of terms imposed by China in
agreements for the development of infrastructure and growing anti-Chinese
resentment.
Resentment has translated into increased violence in Balochistan,
the Pakistani province that is home to the warm water, deep sea port of Gwadar
that lies at the heart of One Belt, One Road. The violence is also fuelled by
Pakistan’s long-standing ties to militant groups that regularly rock the
country with their attacks. And it feeds on continued warfare in Afghanistan.
As a result, Gwadar has yet to emerge as a major trans-shipment hub in Chinese
trade and energy supplies.[xix]
Similarly, Chinese prospects for the development of Sri
Lankan ports, including Hambantota, are clouded. Opposition that has spilled
into the streets of the struggling port could dissuade Chinese investors from
sinking billions of dollars into the flailing projects aimed at turning
Hambantota into South Asia’s foremost port bolstered by an economic hub.[xx]
Violence and protests have put the spotlight on terms that appear to define
China’s win-win approach as China wins twice. China is not in the business of
providing either non-military aid or budgetary support. Its loans provided by
Chinese-backed development banks have turned out to be less soft that China
would have people believe and produced debt traps for recipients.
Sri Lanka is struggling to escape the trap, cool-headed
analysts fear Pakistan is heading towards one,[xxi]
and Tajikistan is struggling to cope with the burden of debt to China. Forced
to do a land for debt swap to reduce its huge debt to China, Tajikistan ceded
control of 1,100 square kilometres of mountainous farm land to the under the
garb of settling a centuries-old border dispute. The land in one of the world’s
most impoverish countries is being tilled by Chinese farmers to the chagrin of
many Tajiks.[xxii]
The cancellation of a plan to expand the gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan to
China is likely to exacerbate Turkmenistan’s economic crisis. Turkmenistan was
counting on increased gas sales to help it turn the economy around. The
expansion was cancelled because state-owned companies, China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) and Uzbekneftegaz, failed to agree on terms that would have
ensured that Uzbekistan would benefit from the pipeline beyond simply being a
transit country.[xxiii]
The downside of perceived Chinese largesse has prompted Asian
nations to play both ends against the middle. Sri Lanka, for example, initiated
a partnership dialogue with the United States that led to military cooperation.[xxiv]
A US naval vessel visited Sri Lanka weeks later followed subsequent visits[xxv]
as well as the US Pacific Command providing humanitarian and engineering
assistance in the Tamil north of the county.[xxvi]
Most symbolically, a US maritime patrol aircraft arrived at Hambantota’s
Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport in December of that year.[xxvii]
China’s efforts to balance its geopolitical ambitions with a
need to address overcapacity as a result of a downturn in its economy dictates
commercial terms of projects it backs creates opportunity for its rivals.
China’s advantage is its ability and willingness to commit massive resources.
Its Achilles Heel is the fact its initiatives are driven as much by domestic
concerns as they are by geopolitical ambition. Chinese commercial terms are
geared towards creating opportunity for China’s huge, state-owned
infrastructure companies to stay afloat and maintain employment at a time that
the government seeks to make consumption rather than production the main driver
of the country’s economy. Chinese companies are aided in their endeavour by
what Chinese chief executive officers call the China Way or the pursuit of
growth at all costs, including, if need be, slashing profits, marginalizing
shareholder returns and taking costly risks.[xxviii]
Western consultants estimate that China has allocated $100
billion a year to One Belt, One Road. Approximately half of that stimulates
China’s domestic economy as expenditure on raw materials for overseas projects.
It utilizes excess commodities such as steel and iron. Much of the remaining
50% is spent on construction, engineering, and high-tech equipment.[xxix]
China’s strategy may produce short-term economic relief but
could prove long-term detrimental both economically and in terms of the
country’s geopolitical ambitions. China brings as assets to the table funding,
low-cost labour, and an ability to carry long-term losses. However, to make the
strategy work, China needs to sub-contract Western engineering and construction
companies with the local networks and track records their Chinese counterparts
lack. Sub-contracting adds to the debt burden of Chinese state-owned
enterprises and with returns on investment years, if not decades, away could
come to haunt Chinas economy.
China’s commercial terms, moreover, fuel mounting
anti-Chinese sentiment that threatens China’s geopolitical ambitions. The
consequence is that protests puncture China’s string of pearls, a phrase coined
by defence consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton in 2004 in a report to US secretary
of defense Donald H. Rumsfeld.[xxx]
The pearls include beyond the Caucasus, Gwadar and Hambantota, the $10.7
billion development of an industrial city next to the Omani port of Duqm;[xxxi]
a $500 million container terminal in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo; Kyaukpyu
in Myanmar; a naval facility in Djibouti, China’s first foreign military base;
and a likely port in the Maldives. Separately
ten Chinese ports have formed an alliance with six Malaysian harbours.[xxxii] The string of pearls constitutes the maritime
leg of what China inexplicably has identified as the Road leg of One Belt, One
Road. The Belt refers to the land-based network of roads, railways and
pipelines. The protests and violence in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Sri Lanka have forced China to provide military assistance, dispatch
security forces, and contract private security companies to protect its
investments and personnel, adding significantly to the cost of One belt, One
Road projects.
Still up for grabs, ports in Bangladesh have emerged as a
focal point in the Great Game. Wooed by China, Japan and India and pressured by
the United States, Bangladesh, a country strategically tucked into India’s
armpit, has blown hot and cold on offers to develop the country’s first deep
sea port. Agreements and understandings have been signed only to be cancelled.
China has offered to sink $9 billion into Chittagong Port and position it as
Gwadar East. As tempting as the offer was, Bangladesh backed away. Instead, to
pacify critics, it granted access to Indian cargo vessels.[xxxiii]
In the latest twist in the port saga, Bangladesh signed in December 2016 two
memoranda of understanding with China Harbour Engineering Company Limited (CHEC)
and China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) for the $600
million development of its third most important port in Patuakhali.[xxxiv]
Bangladesh may also be wary of experiencing the volatility
that Chinese-backed ports else where are witnessing. Caucasian ports are no
less troubled than those in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Riots in March 2017 in the
Georgian pot town of Batumi were sparked by an incident unrelated to Eurasian
power plays but were indicative of a degree of volatility that could affect the
designs of regional powers. “The socio-political situation is so tense in at
least parts of the country that it, in fact, resembles a powder keg ready to
explode… It is highly unlikely that the Batumi protests will be the last of
their kind,” warned Vasili Rukhadze, an academic and former head of the
Georgian Truth Commission.[xxxv]
A decade of setbacks
Almost a decade of Chinese efforts to get the Pakistani port
of Gwadar up and running have been stymied by jihadists and Baloch
nationalists. Baluch insurgents have in recent years repeatedly targeted gas
pipelines, fuel tankers, trains and Chinese personnel.[xxxvi]
Investors and Chinese officials travel in Balochistan accompanied by Pakistani military
vehicles on roads that are picketed by policemen at 50-metre intervals and
cleared of all traffic.
An estimated 46 workers building a road between Gwadar and the
Baloch capital of Quetta have been DFDDDDD3killed in recent years.[xxxvii]
Chinese hopes suffered a further setback with the expansion of the Islamic
State’s (IS) theatre of operations into Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Baloch capital of Quetta was twice rocked
in 2017 by bombings that killed scores of police cadets and judicial personnel.
[xxxviii]
All in all, Balochistan government officials said the number of attacks on
security forces in the region rose dramatically in 2016, 48 compared to
approximately 20 in 2015.[xxxix]
Adding to the volatility is Balochistan’s potential to
become a launching pad for stepped up US pressure on Iran and a possible return
to a policy of regime change. Speaking to the US Senate Armed Services
Committee, General Joseph L. Voltel, head of US Central Command, advised that
“in order to contain Iranian expansion, roll back its malign influence, and
blunt its asymmetric advantages, we must engage them more effectively in the ‘gray
zone’ through means that include a strong deterrence posture, targeted
counter-messaging activities, and by building partner nations’ capacity.
Through both messaging and actions, we must also be clear in our communications
and ensure the credibility of U.S. intentions. Iran must believe there will be
prohibitive consequences if it chooses to continue its malign activities
designed to foment instability in the region… (We) believe that by taking
proactive measures and reinforcing our resolve we can lessen Iran’s ability to
negatively influence outcomes in the future.,” Voltel said.[xl]
Mega projects in Balochistan, one of Pakistan’s least
developed and most troubled regions, have a history of provoking local
resistance. The region has witnessed five rebellions in the last 70 years all
fuelled by Baloch claims that the federal government in Islamabad had exploited
the province’s extensive gas and mineral riches for the benefit of the
country’s ruling establishment in Punjab. picketed by policemen at 50-metre
intervals and cleared of all traffic.
China is investing $51 billion in Pakistan infrastructure
and energy,[xli]
including Gwadar port that has been struggling to attract business nine years
after it was initially inaugurated. The Pakistan government has deployed 15,000
troops to protect China’s investment, a massive project dubbed the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship of China’s Eurasian One Belt, One Road
initiative. The unit created especially to secure CPEC projects is made up of nine
army battalions and six civil armed forces wings.[xlii]
Copyright 2016 by the Council on
Foreign Relations. Reprinted with permission
Locals in Gwadar dismiss Chinese assertions that the town’s will
replicate the success of the Chinese port of Shenzhen. Shenzhen transitioned in
a matter of decades from a fishing village into an industrial urban centre.
Shenzhen, unlike Gwadar which is 650 kilometres from Karachi, the nearest city,
was able to piggyback on Hong Kong, located just next door, with a GDP multiple
times larger than that of all of Pakistan. “The local population have been made
prisoners in their own town,” said a frequent traveller to Gwadar.[xliii]
Hostility has been reinforced by hard-handed military tactics to squash the
insurgency.
Intimidation of the local population by the insurgents
aggravates the situation. Only four percent of eligible voters in Balochistan
turned out for a by-election in December 2015 after rebels threatened violence
and attacked candidates.[xliv]
The sense of incarceration and alienation is likely to increase with the
building of a security fence around the town and entry points that will grant
access only to those in possession of a residency pass.[xlv]
Chinese, Pakistani and Russian officials warned in December
2016 that militant groups in Afghanistan, including the Islamic State (IS) were
expanding their operations. IS in cooperation with the Pakistani Taliban
launched two months later a wave of attacks that has targeted government, law
enforcement, the military and minorities and killed hundreds.[xlvi]
Indian Prime Minister Mahindra Modi added to the tension by
charging in an Independence Day speech that Pakistan would “have to answer to
the world for the atrocities committed by it against people in Baluchistan.”[xlvii]
Modi’s remarks broke with India’s long-standing avoidance of public association
with Balochistan’s troubles, prompting fears in China that its problems in
Pakistan were about to multiply. Statements by Pakistani intelligence in the
military said several months later that surrendering Baloch insurgents had
asserted that they were funded by Indian intelligence.[xlviii]
The “policy of indifference towards Pakistan’s war crimes in
occupied Balochistan that include both ethnic cleansing and genocide, adapted
by the international community is worrying. The Indian Prime Minister’s
statement on Balochistan is a positive development. (The) Baloch nation hopes
that the United States and Europe will join Prime Minister Modi and hold
Pakistan accountable for the crimes against humanity and the war crimes it has
committed against the Baloch nation in 68 years of its occupation of
Balochistan and during the five wars that the Baloch nation has fought with Pakistan
to win its national freedom,” said Khalil Baloch, chairman of the Baloch
National Movement.[xlix]
Modi’s remarks were all the more significant given Gwadar’s
strategic importance to Chinese energy security. Once fully operational Gwadar
would be the key node in a land-see energy supply line from the Gulf to China
that would circumvent India as well as the South China Sea. Gwadar is a mere
380 kilometres from the Strait of Hormuz at the southern tip of the Gulf and
Oman, which governed the port until 1958. Gwadar would shorten the roughly
12,000-kilometre sea route from the Gulf to China’s eastern seaboard to a mere
2,395 kilometres with a pipeline ending in Xinjiang’s Kashgar, one of the
busiest bazaars on the ancient Silk Road. Literally translated as New Frontier,
Xinjiang is a resource-rich, militarily crucial but troubled province in
northwest China that is home to the Uyghurs, a restive Turkic Muslims.[l]
China sees economic development as the key to squashing the Uyghur’s
nationalist aspirations.
Source: The Federation of Pakistan
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI)
As China moved to gradually expand the scope of its military
and private security operations in Central and South Asia, IS followed up its
wave of attacks in Balochistan with a 30-minute video that denounced “evil
Chinese communist infidel lackeys” and promised to “shed blood like rivers” in
attacks on Chinese ones. Filmed in Iraq by IS’s Al-Furat Province, the video featured
Uyghur fighters and their heavily armed children who appeared to hail from
Xinjiang. Offering a stylized view of Uighur life in the caliphate, the video showed
scenes of their battles and prayers as well as the execution of alleged
informants. The group’s threat against China was issued by a fighter as he
prepared to put to death a suspected informant.[li]
Overlooked by most analysts, Australian scholar Michael
Clarke pointed out that the video also suggested that IS at a time that it was
on the defensive in Syria and Iraq was seeking to become the dominant jihadist
player in Xinjiang and among Uyghurs. A militant in the video denounced the Al
Qaeda-affiliated Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), the hitherto foremost Uyghur
group, as apostates and called on its members to defect to IS. TIP has roots in
Afghanistan and has had a presence in Syria since 2012.[lii]
Release of the video coincided with a rally in Xinjiang of
thousands of armed riot police backed by armoured vehicles and helicopters intended
to demonstrate their resolve to crush nationalist and Islamist militants.[liii]
China has cracked down on religious practice in the region as part of its
campaign against the militants.[liv]
The video featured images of Chinese riot police guarding mosques, patrolling
Uygur markets, and making arrests. It showed the Chinese flag engulfed in
flames. Chinese authorities have offered rewards of up to 100 million yuan ($14.5
million) for tips of militant Uyghur activity.[lv]
China concerns were already bolstered when IS identified
East Turkistan as one of its target areas. The group’s caliph, Abu Bakr Al
Baghdadi, listed the People’s Republic at the top of his list of countries like
the United States and Israel that violate Muslim rights in his 2014 declaration
of the caliphate.[lvi]
Maps circulating at the time on Twitter purporting to highlight IS’s expansion
plans included substantial parts of Xinjiang.
IS’s pivot eastward threatened not only Chinese policies in
Xinjiang but also the land pillar of China’s proposed Silk Road in Central Asia
and the Middle East. It put Chinese operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan in
the bull’s eye. Uyghurs were among the militants who attacked the Chinese
embassy in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan in August 2016, and several
months later on New Year’s Eve a
nightclub in Istanbul.[lvii]
A survey of Uyghur IS fighters has suggested that lack of
opportunity in Xinjiang was a key driver of militancy. Of 114 fighters surveyed
by New America, a Washington-based think tank, none had enjoyed a university
education, only two had been professional employed, and a majority had not
travelled abroad before joining IS. The survey suggested that the fighters were
primarily unskilled workers from rural areas of Xinjiang and that they had not
been associated with militant or jihadist Uyghur groups prior to joining IS.[lviii]
[i] Micha’el
Tanchum, A Post-Sanctions Iran and the Eurasian Energy Architecture, Challenges
and Opportunities for the Euro-Atlantic Community, Atlantic Council, September
2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Iran_Energy_Architecture_web_0925.pdf
[ii]
Karl Mathiesen and Megan Darby, Saudis make Maldives land grab to secure oil
routes to China, ClimateHome, 5 March 2017, http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/03/05/saudis-make-maldives-land-grab-secure-oil-routes-china/
[iii]
Ahmed Naish, No cause for concern over ‘US$10bn Faafu atoll project,’ insists
Yameen, Maldives Independent, 1 March 2017, http://maldivesindependent.com/politics/no-cause-for-concern-over-us10bn-faafu-atoll-project-insists-yameen-129120
[iv]
Hassan Moosa and Geeta Ananad, Inhabitants of Maldives Atoll Fear a Flood of
Saudi Money, The New York Times, 26 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/26/world/asia/maldives-atoll-saudi-money.html?_r=0&mtrref=undefined&gwh=E949ED9FC62A14D5A4BB0EE64817E4DC&gwt=pay
[v]
Ahmed Naish, “China-Maldives Friendship Bridge” project launched, Maldives
Independent, 31 December 2015, http://maldivesindependent.com/business/china-maldives-friendship-bridge-project-launched-121081
[vi]
Maldives Independent, Saudi Binladin Group awarded Maldives airport terminal
project, 22 May 2016, http://maldivesindependent.com/business/saudi-binladin-group-awarded-maldives-airport-terminal-project-124336
[vii] Dipanjan
Roy Chaudhury, Chinese company bags Maldivian island on 50-year lease, The
Economic Times, 30 December 2016, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/chinese-companies-bags-maldivian-island-on-50-year-lease/articleshow/56245729.cms
[viii]
Xinhua, China willing to advance military relations with Saudi Arabia: Defense
Minister, 31 August 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-08/31/c_135648206.htm
[ix]
Middle East Eye, China's Saudi drone factory compensates for US ban, 29 March
2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/china-build-factory-saudi-arabia-fill-drone-shortage-1200657135
[x]
Hassan Mohamed, Maldives parliament to form joint committees with Saudi
Arabia’s Shura Council, Maldives Independent, 5 January 2016, http://maldivesindependent.com/politics/maldives-parliament-to-form-joint-committees-with-saudi-arabias-shura-council-121170
[xi]
Yeni Safak, Turkish company to build Maldives' largest mosque, 30 March 2017, http://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/turkish-company-to-build-maldives-largest-mosque-2635989
[xii]
Avas Online, Saudi's cash 'gift' to Maldives journos sparks concern, February
2017, https://avas.mv/en/29796
[xiii]
Shihar Aneez, Maldives severs diplomatic ties with Iran citing security threats,
18 May 2016, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-iran-idUSKCN0Y91Z0
[xiv]
Hassan Mohamed, Maldives court sentences woman to death by stoning Maldives
Independent, 18 October 2015, http://maldivesindependent.com/crime-2/maldives-court-sentences-woman-to-death-by-stoning-118541
[xv]
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[xviii]
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[xix] Moign
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[xx]
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[xxi]
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[xxii]
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/ Bruce Pannier, Tajikistan Agrees To Allow Chinese Farmers To Till Land,
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[xxiii]
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[xxv]
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[xxvi]
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[xxvii]
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[xxviii]
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[xxix]
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[xxx] Juli
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[xxxi]
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[xxxiv]
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[xxxvi]
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[xxxvii]
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[xxxviii]
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[xxxix]
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[xl]
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[xli]
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[xliii]
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[xliv]
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[xlv] Ibid.
Shah
[xlvi]
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[xlvii]
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[xlviii]
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[xlix]
Ibid. The Indian Express
[l]
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[li]
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[lii]
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Middle East, Foreign Policy, 3 March 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/03/after-isis-threat-china-may-have-to-get-off-sidelines-in-middle-east/?utm_content=buffer36dbf&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
[liii]
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[liv]
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[lv]
Michael Martina, China offers big anti-terror rewards in Xinjiang, Reuters, 22
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[lvi] Abu
Bakr Al-Husayni Al-Baghdadi (4 July 2014). A Message to the Mujahidin and
the Ummah in the Month of Ramadan, Al Hayat Media Center, https://ia902501.us.archive.org/2/items/hym3_22aw/english.pdf
[lvii]
Raffaelo Pantucci, Isil's attack in Istanbul is a turning point – and more
violence could follow, The Daily Telegraph, 2 January 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2017/01/02/isils-attack-istanbul-turning-point-violence-could-follow/
[lviii]
Nate Rosenblatt, All Jihad is Local, What ISIS’ Files Tell Us About Its
Fighters, New America, July 2016, https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/ISIS-Files.pdf
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