Towards a New World Order in Eurasia: The 21st Century’s Great Game (Part 1)
By James M. Dorsey
Abstract
The 21st century’s Great Game is about the
creation of a new Eurasia-centred world. It locks China, Russia, India, Japan
and Europe into what is an epic battle. Yet, they are not the only players. While
US President Donald J. Trump’s policies are still largely shrouded in mystery,
early indications suggest a closer alliance with India in a bid to counter
potential Chinese dominance.
Middle Eastern rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran, are key
players too. As they vie for big power favour, they compete to secure the
ability to shape the future architecture of Eurasia’s energy landscape, enhance
leverage by increasing energy and oil product market share, and position themselves
as the key nodes in infrastructure networks.
With China and a US-backed India as the heavy weights, the
Great Game is unlikely to produce an undisputed winner. Nor do key players
perceive it as a zero-sum-game. The stakes in the game are about ensuring that
China despite its vast resources, economic leverage, and first starter
advantage in infrastructure linkage, does not emerge as the sole dominant power
in Eurasia’s future architecture.
For players, such as Europe, Russia and Japan, the game is
about ensuring that they remain influential stakeholders. Efforts to restrain
China’s rise are enhanced by growing anti-China resentment in key nodes of the
Middle Kingdom’s 65-nation, $3 trillion One Belt, One Road initiative and
increased questioning of China’s business practices.
Some of the alliances in the shaping of Eurasia’s future are
opportunistic rather than strategic. This is particularly true for Russian ties
to China and Iran. The contours of potential conflicts of interest are already
evident and likely to impact the degree to which China will have a free reign.
A game of Risk
The game’s outcome is unpredictable. Economic power,
population size, assertiveness, and military might are key factors but may not
be enough for China to become the unrivalled dominant power in Eurasia. It will,
however, no doubt be a player. One Belt, One Road virtually guarantees that
with a budget projected to be 12 times what the United States spent on its
history-changing Marshall Plan that helped Western Europe rise from the rubble
after World War Two. Nonetheless, the question is how multi-polar Eurasia will
turn out to be.
Predicting how the game will end is complicated by
volatility, instability and uncertainty that has sparked violence and
widespread discontent across a swath of land that stretches from the
Mediterranean into the deep recesses of Asia. The violence and discontent complicates
China’s grandiose plans for infrastructure and economic zones designed to tie
Eurasia to the Middle Kingdom, threatens Russian aspirations to position itself
as a global rather than a regional power, and scares off risk-adverse
investors.
The game resembles Risk, a popular board game. Multiple players
engage in a complex dance as they strive for advantage and seek to compensate
for weaknesses. Players form opportunistic alliances that could change at any
moment. Potential black swans threaten to disrupt. The stakes, however, could
not be higher.
Wracked by internal political and economic problems, Europe
may not have the wherewithal for geopolitical battle. Yet, despite a weak hand,
it could come out on top in the play for energy dominance. US backing of India
in the Great Game and efforts to drive wedges into mostly opportunistic
alliances such as cooperation between China and Russia and Russia and Iran
could help Europe compensate for its weakness.
The Great Game is played not only in Eurasia but across the
world map.[1] Like
Risk, it is a game that not only aims to achieve dominance of infrastructure
and energy, but also to reshape political systems at a time that liberal
democracy is on the defensive and populism is growing in appeal.
Players like China and Russia benefit from the rise of
populism, authoritarianism, and illiberal democracy. Russia, tacitly backed by
China, has sought to harness the new winds by attempting to undermine trust in Western
democratic structures, manipulate elections, and sew domestic discord in the
West Populism and the Trump administration’s economic nationalism have, in a
twist of irony, allowed China, led by a Communist party, to project itself as a
champion of free trade and globalization.[2]
Suggestions that Russian President
Vladimir Putin was bent on undermining Western democratic institutions were
initially viewed as a crackpot conspiracy theory. Yet, the notion has gained
significant currency against a backdrop of assertions that Russia is waging a
cyber war against the West. The United States has accused Russia of interfering
in its electoral process.[3]
German intelligence has sounded alarm bells about Russian efforts to manipulate
public opinion.[4] Putin
couldn’t supress a smirk when French National Front leader Marie Le Pen visited
him in 2017 weeks before French elections in which a Russian bank loan had
helped fund her campaign.[5]
East European leaders fear Russian
bullying and encroachment.[6]
Whether conspiracy theory or not, western intelligence agencies and analysts
see a pattern in Russian moves that would also serve Chinese interests. That
would be particularly true if the United States under Trump steps back as a
guarantor of the international order and de-emphasizes US promotion of
democratic values and human rights.
Undermining confidence in
democratic structures legitimizes Russian and Chinese efforts to rebalance
global geopolitical power arrangements. They are aided by the fact that
relations between the United States and many of its allies are testy. Trump’s
apparent affinity to illiberal and authoritarian leaders like Turkish president
Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not stop them from gravitating towards Moscow and
Beijing.
Erdogan, who has repeatedly accused
the West of supporting a failed coup attempt in July 2016 as well as a
mysterious international financial cabal that allegedly seeks to undermine the
Turkish economy, has applied for Turkish membership in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) that groups Central Asian states with China and Russia.[7]
Bent on enhancing his personal power,
Erdogan is not about to fully rupture
relations with the West anchored in Turkish membership in NATO and the European
Council. But he is happy to play both ends against the middle by publicly
aligning himself with Russian-backed Eurasianists. Iran, whose relations with
the United States have worsened since the rise of Trump, is already aligned with
Russia and China.
The notion of a Eurasian-dominated world order was initially
propagated in Turkey by Dogu Perincek, a left-wing secularist who spent six
years in prison for allegedly being part of a military-led cabal that sought to
stage a coup. Perincek has since become a player in Turkey’s hedging of its
bets. Together with the deputy leader of his Homeland Party, Ismail Hakki
Pekin, mediated the reconciliation between Moscow and Ankara following the
Turkish air force’s downing of a Russian fighter in 2015. The two men were
supported by Turkish businessmen close to Erdogan and ultra-nationalist
Eurasianist elements in the military.[8]
Pekin is a former head of Turkish military intelligence with extensive contacts
in Moscow that include Putin’s foreign policy advisor, Alexander Dugin.
Eurasianism in Turkey was buoyed by increasingly strained
relations the Erdogan government and the West. Erdogan has taken issue with
Western criticism of his effort to introduce a presidential system that would
grant him almost unlimited power. He has also blasted the West for refusing to
crack down on the Hizmet movement led by exiled imam Fethullah Gulen, whom
Erdogan holds responsible for the unsuccessful coup.[9]
Differences over Syria have intensified pro-Eurasianist thinking.
Circumventing sanctions
Turkey’s embrace of the Eurasianist idea takes on added
significance with Russia and the European Union slapping sanctions on each
other because of the dispute over Russian intervention in Ukraine.[10]
The EU sanctions halted $15.8 billion in European agricultural supports to
Russia.[11]
Russian countermeasures prevent shipment of those products via Russia to China.
To solve their problem, China and Europe have focused on an
alternative route that would bypass the Russian landmass, which stretches from
the Bering Sea to the Baltics.[12]
Turkey as well as Caucasian and Central Asian nations, eager to seize the
opportunity, fast-tracked port projects in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku,
Poti in Georgia, Aktau in Kazakhstan, and Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan as well
as a rail line linking Baku and the Georgian capital of Tbilisi with Kars in
eastern Turkey.[13]
The sanctions notwithstanding, Russia and China appear so
far to be scoring the most points in the Great Game. They have benefitted from the
rise of populism in an era of defiance and dissent in which significant
segments of the public in the West and beyond no longer have confidence in
traditional politics or leaders. To cement their gains, Russia and China will
have to go beyond focusing on geopolitics, public diplomacy and cyberwarfare.
They will have to address concerns of disaffected social groups who feel
marginalized by globalization and shun aside by elites. Already, much like
traditional politicians in the West, China is encountering resistance. Its
massive investments frequently generate opposition by population groups that
feel left out.
China is nevertheless better positioned than Russia to meet
Eurasia’s infrastructural needs despite the fact that has deep historical and
cultural roots in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moreover, Russia’s strategic
assets are also liabilities. Even without European sanctions and counter
sanctions, rail transport through Russia is easier said than done. Using
Russian rail with its unique gauge increases cost and makes linkages south of
the Russian border more attractive.
Russia is nonetheless working to
connect Moscow and Beijing by high-speed rail that would cut travel time to a
mere two days.[14]
Russia has also expressed interest in linking its Trans-Siberian Railway to the
Chinese-controlled Pakistani port of Gwadar.[15]
To further hedge its bets and bolster its leverage, Russia
has forged strategic ties to China and partnered with China in areas such as
aerospace, science, and finance.[16]
Russia has also sought hook-ups to Chinese networks where possible and struck
energy, commodity and construction deals beyond Eurasia with Middle Eastern and
North African nations such as Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Egypt, and Libya. Russia
was considering bidding for offshore drilling rights in Lebanon.[17]
In Libya, Russia has politically and militarily supported General Khalifa
Hafta, who is fighting a United Nations-backed government that Western states
see as the vehicle to restore stability.[18]
Forces loyal to Haftar captured in 2017 key oil-rich areas of eastern Libya and
associated ports.[19] Russian
intervention appears to acknowledge de facto partition of Libya.
Like with China, the longevity of Russia’s alliance with
Iran is far from certain. Iranian-Russian competition is already visible in
Syria,[20]
the Caucasus and Central Asia. How Iran deploys its strategic advantage in
determining Eurasia’s energy infrastructure is likely to feed into a potential
divergence of Chinese and Russian interests. Strains in relations with Iran
could complicate another Russian hedging strategy: projecting Russia as the
go-to-mediator in the Middle East. Russia believed it had a strategic
advantage, particularly with Iran, given that it, unlike the United States, had
good relations with all the region’s players.[21]
Recognizing opportunities, Gulf states have sought to ensure
that Russia has a greater stake in their survival by digging into their deep
pockets to invest at a time when Moscow’s embattled economy struggles with
lower oil prices. Qatar’s investment arm, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA),
bought in a joint venture with Swiss oil trader Glencore a 19.5 percent stake
in Russia’s state-owned oil group Rosneft. The stake was worth an estimated $11
billion.[22]
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, additionally put tens of
billions of dollars into Russia’s sovereign wealth the Russian Direct
Investment Fund (RDIF).[23]
The UAE has, moreover, bought Russian military equipment and services,
including anti-armour missiles, training and support for $1.9 billion. It also agreed to develop together with
Russia a fifth generation, joint light fighter aircraft while a consortium of
Middle East investors acquired a 12 percent stake in defense manufacturer, Russian
Helicopters.[24]
Microcosms of the Great Game
A microcosm of the Great Game is being played out a mere 70
kilometres west of Gwadar with Iran’s southernmost port city of Chabahar having
become the focal point of Indian efforts to circumvent Pakistan in its access
to energy-rich Central Asia. India sees Chabahar as its Eurasian hub linking it
to a north-south corridor that would connect it to Iran and Russia. Investment
is turning Chabahar into Iran’s major deep water port beyond the Strait of
Hormuz that is populated by Gulf states hostile to the Islamic republic.
Chabahar would also allow Afghanistan to break Pakistan’s regional maritime
monopoly.
Gwadar and Chabahar have much in common. Both are long
neglected, sleepy Indian Ocean port towns that lived off minor trade and have
been given a potential new lease on life as trans-national chokepoints backed
by regional rivals. The current Great Game has echoes of the 1970s when the
Soviet Union looked at Gwadar as a possible naval base and the United States
weighed similar plans for Chabahar. Instability in Pakistan dissuaded the
Soviets while the Islamic revolution in Iran thwarted US aspirations.
Instability may, however, prove to be Gwadar’s Achilles Heel
in a competition with Chabahar in which at first glance the cards are stacked
in the Pakistani port’s favour. Indian investment dwarfs that of China while
China’s engagement with Gulf states outstrips that of India. For geopolitical
as well as commercial reasons, potential Gulf investment in refineries and
pipelines is likely to target Gwadar, Asia’s deepest natural harbour, rather
than Chabahar. Pakistan licensed Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) in 2016 to
build a refinery near Gwadar[25]
and six months later agreed that Kuwait would construct a petroleum products
pipeline from Karachi to north of the country.[26]
Pakistan will have to manoeuvre nimbly to avoid the pitfalls
of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran as it plays out in the Indian
Ocean. Iran has a vested interesting in connecting Chabahar and Gwadar and has
found an ally in the foreign affairs committee of the Pakistani senate. The
foreign affairs committees of the two parliaments planned joint visits in 2017
to Gwadar as well as Chabahar to emphasize that the two would complement rather
than compete with one another.[27]
Security and political threats to China’s One Belt, One Road
initiative stretch far into Gwadar’s hinterland. The first
freight train traversing the newly inaugurated Sino-Afghan Special Transportation Railway
that links the Yangtze River port of Nantong
with the Afghan river port of Hairatan ran into political problems on
its maiden voyage.[28]
The train brought Chinese electrical supplies, clothing and
other goods to Afghanistan but returned to China empty. Uzbek officials refused
to allow Afghan goods to traverse their country charging that the train could
be used to smuggle narcotics and precious stones, which fuel criminal and
terrorist networks in the region.
Afghanistan supplies most of the world's opium, made from
poppies, and about a quarter of that is trafficked to global markets through
Central Asia. The crop is mostly grown in insurgent-held areas and is a major
source of revenue for the Taliban and other militant groups. Production rose
more than 40% in Afghanistan last year, according to the United Nations.[29]
The Uzbek action, however, reflects deeper concerns.
Uzbekistan, despite a raft of deals worth $6 billion, fears that it may feature
primarily as a link in railways connecting China to Europe rather than as a
partner with a real stake in the game. It also highlighted the fact that
regional tensions and lack of trust threaten to increase rather than decrease
travel time and cost of shipping goods across Eurasia.
Similarly, a $3 billion acquisition in 2007 by China
Metallurgical Group Corp of a 30-year concession to a huge copper deposit south
of Kabul, along with a concession in 2011 for oil and gas blocks in the north,
has largely remained idle because of turmoil in Afghanistan. Security concerns
have for all practical matters called into question China belief that economic
engagement will substitute stability for volatility. China’s economic footprint
in Afghanistan despite the investment remains miniscule. Afghan exports are primarily
geared toward Pakistan, Iran and India. Similarly, Chinese trade with the
Central Asian nation is negligible. To complicate things, Pakistan in February
2017 closed its border with Afghanistan, accusing Kabul of hosting militants who
caused havoc in Pakistani cities with a wave of suicide bombings.[30]
Expanding security engagement
Diverging Chinese and Russian interests remain for now
muted. The rise of populism, economic nationalism, and a reduced Western focus
on human rights is likely to keep their interests aligned at least for the
immediate future. Those interests, however, are potentially threatened by
emerging Chinese-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, greater Chinese engagement in
security beyond its borders and mounting anti-Chinese sentiment across Eurasia.
Chinese concerns about unrest in Xinjiang and fears that
violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan could spill into the resource-rich and
militarily strategic province that is China’s gateway to Central Asia has
already prompted China to move beyond its traditional reluctance to engage
militarily beyond its borders. Those concerns have also sparked fears in some
Chinese government agencies such as the ministry of public security and
authorities in Xinjiang that One Belt, One Road’s integration of the province
with its Muslim hinterlands in Central and South Asia would fuel rather than
undermine Uighur religiosity and nationalism.[31]
China by now, has, however, too much at stake in One Belt,
One Road for it to back away. Protection of Chinese investment and personnel
rather than retrenchment is the name of the game. In a rare cross border
operation, China sent personnel and military vehicles in 2016 to patrol the
Wakhan Corridor, Afghanistan’s eastern tongue that barely touches China’s
borders. The patrols suggested that China expanded beyond providing military
aid to the tune of $70 million Afghanistan and training of security forces to
conducting counter-terrorism operations.[32]
Chinese engagement on the Afghan side of the border as well
as closer military cooperation with Tajikistan appeared to be driven by concern
in Beijing that Uyghur militants had moved from Pakistan into Badakshan, a
region in northern Afghanistan that borders on China and the Central Asian
state. The engagement also constitutes a response to President Barak Obama’s
drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan and uncertainty over what policy Trump
would pursue.
Jonny, a blogging traveller, reported encountering Afghan,
Chinese and Tajik soldiers at a military checkpoint in Little Pamir in October
2016. “We had a fun adventure hanging with Afghan commanders, Chinese military
and Tajik soldiers,” Jonny wrote.[33]
The encounter served as a first indication that a Chinese proposal for
four-nation security bloc that would include Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Tajikistan was taking shape.[34]
The grouping would compete with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). Tajikistan, like Kyrgyzstan home to a Russian military
base, is already a CSTO member. The presence of Chinese forces in Afghanistan
suggested a broadening of the definitions of China’s foreign and defense policy
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others. The Chinese
units reportedly crossed twice a month from Tajikistan into Afghanistan.[35]
The patrols fit an emerging pattern of China using law
enforcement and its mushrooming private security industry for counter-terrorism
and anti-crime operations beyond its borders. Chinese and Pakistani special
forces held a joint military exercise in November 2016 in a bid to strengthen
cooperation in countering political violence.[36]
Similarly, the Afghan patrols resembled joint police operations with Laos,
Myanmar and Thailand along the Mekong river[37]
and border controls in Central Asia in cooperation with Kyrgyz, Kazakh and
Tajik forces. Chinese private security companies were also expanding operations
in and around Gwadar.[38]
China created the legal basis for cross-border operations
with the adoption in 2015 of an anti-terrorism law that allows the government
to deploy troops beyond the country’s frontiers.[39]
The Chinese defense ministry nonetheless indicated that the patrols in
Afghanistan were being carried out by private security companies with close
ties to the Chinese military rather than by the People’s Liberation Army
itself.[40]
Greater Chinese engagement in Afghan security reflected concern in Beijing of
the fallout of Obama’s withdrawal of the bulk of US forces from Afghanistan.
China’s new assertiveness signalled a potential first step
toward restructuring of tacit understandings whereby Russia acted as Central
Asia’s security guarantor while China focused on regional economic development.
Paving the road to greater assertiveness that would put China in competition
with Russia was Beijing’s first arms sales to Central Asian nations, including
its HQ-9 air defence system to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. China also supplied
Pterodactyl drones to Uzbekistan.[41]
Chinese plans to increase its marine corps five-fold from
20,000 to 100,000 men would allow it to station more of its own military
personnel in Gwadar as well as in Djibouti, home to China’s first overseas
military facility at the crossroads of key trade routes linking Asia, Africa,
the Middle East and Europe. “Besides its original missions of a possible war
with Taiwan, maritime defence in the East and South China seas, it’s also
foreseeable that the PLA Navy’s mission will expand overseas, including…offshore
supply deports like in Djibouti and Gwadar port in Pakistan,” said Liu
Xiaojiang, a former navy political commissar.[42]
A visit to Central Asia by Putin in early 2017, signalled
Russia’s intention to stand its ground against what it saw as encroachment on
its military position in the region.[43]
Putin’s focussed on security rather than on the Russian-led Eurasian Economic
Union that Tajikistan has wanted to join. CSTO and Russian bases in Central
Asia are central to Moscow’s efforts to counter Islamic militancy in
Afghanistan as well as drug trafficking. In Dushanbe, Putin announced that
Russian troops would again be patrolling Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan.[44]
Chinese concerns about unrest in Xinjiang and fears that
violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan could spill into the resource-rich and
militarily strategic province that is China’s gateway to Central Asia has
already prompted China to move beyond its traditional reluctance to engage
militarily beyond its borders. In a rare cross border operation, China sent
personnel and military vehicles in 2016 to patrol the Wakhan Corridor,
Afghanistan’s eastern tongue that barely touches China’s borders. The patrols
suggested that China expanded beyond providing military aid to the tune of $70
million Afghanistan and training of security forces to conducting
counter-terrorism operations.[45]
Chinese engagement on the Afghan side of the border as well
as closer military cooperation with Tajikistan appeared to be driven by concern
in Beijing that Uyghur militants had moved from Pakistan into Badakshan, a
region in northern Afghanistan that borders on China and the Central Asian
state. The engagement also constitutes a response to President Barak Obama’s
drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan and uncertainty over what policy Trump
would pursue.
Jonny, a blogging traveller, reported encountering Afghan,
Chinese and Tajik soldiers at a military checkpoint in Little Pamir in October
2016. “We had a fun adventure hanging with Afghan commanders, Chinese military
and Tajik soldiers,” Jonny wrote.[46]
The encounter served as a first indication that a Chinese proposal for four-nation
security bloc that would include Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Tajikistan was taking shape.[47]
The grouping would compete with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). Tajikistan, like Kyrgyzstan home to a Russian military
base, is already a CSTO member. The presence of Chinese forces in Afghanistan
suggested a broadening of the definitions of China’s foreign and defense policy
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others. The Chinese
units reportedly crossed twice a month from Tajikistan into Afghanistan.[48]
The patrols fit an emerging pattern of China using law
enforcement and its mushrooming private security industry for counter-terrorism
and anti-crime operations beyond its borders. Chinese and Pakistani special
forces held a joint military exercise in November 2016 in a bid to strengthen
cooperation in countering political violence.[49]
Similarly, the Afghan patrols resembled joint police operations with Laos,
Myanmar and Thailand along the Mekong river[50]
and border controls in Central Asia in cooperation with Kyrgyz, Kazakh and
Tajik forces. Chinese private security companies were also expanding operations
in and around Gwadar.[51]
China created the legal basis for cross-border operations
with the adoption in 2015 of an anti-terrorism law that allows the government
to deploy troops beyond the country’s frontiers.[52]
The Chinese defense ministry nonetheless indicated that the patrols in
Afghanistan were being carried out by private security companies with close
ties to the Chinese military rather than by the People’s Liberation Army
itself.[53]
Greater Chinese engagement in Afghan security reflected concern in Beijing of
the fallout of Obama’s withdrawal of the bulk of US forces from Afghanistan.
China’s new assertiveness signalled a potential first step
toward restructuring of tacit understandings whereby Russia acted as Central
Asia’s security guarantor while China focused on regional economic development.
Paving the road to greater assertiveness that would put China in competition
with Russia was Beijing’s first arms sales to Central Asian nations, including
its HQ-9 air defence system to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. China also supplied
Pterodactyl drones to Uzbekistan.[54]
Chinese plans to increase its marine corps five-fold from
20,000 to 100,000 men would allow it to station more of its own military
personnel in Gwadar as well as in Djibouti, home to China’s first overseas
military facility at the crossroads of key trade routes linking Asia, Africa,
the Middle East and Europe. “Besides its original missions of a possible war
with Taiwan, maritime defence in the East and South China seas, it’s also
foreseeable that the PLA Navy’s mission will expand overseas, including…offshore
supply deports like in Djibouti and Gwadar port in Pakistan,” said Liu
Xiaojiang, a former navy political commissar.[55]
[1] James
M. Dorsey, Towards a New World Order in Eurasia? The Role of Russia and China,
RSIS Commentaries, 22 December 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co16310-towards-a-new-world-order-in-eurasia-the-role-of-russia-and-china/
[2]
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[3]
Luke Harding, What we know about Russia's interference in the US election, The
Guardian, 16 December 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/16/qa-russian-hackers-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-us-presidential-election
[4]
Natalie Nougayrède, Watch out, Europe. Germany is top of Russian hackers’ list,
The Guardian, 13 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/13/europe-germany-russian-hackers-bundestag-angela-merkel-election
[5]
Shaun Walker and Kim Willsher, Putin tells Le Pen Russia has no plans to meddle
in French election, The Guardian, 24 March 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/24/vladimir-putin-hosts-marine-le-pen-in-moscow
[6]
James Kirchik, The Plot Against Europe, Foreign Policy, 6 March 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/06/the-plot-against-europe/
/ Joe Parkinson and Georgi Kantchev, Document: Russia Uses Rigged Polls, Fake
News to Sway Elections, The Wall Street Journal, 24 March 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-does-russia-meddle-in-elections-look-at-bulgaria-1490282352
[7]
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22 November 2016, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/11/21/china-eyes-turkey-for-shanghai-cooperation-organization/
[8]
Mustafa Akyol, What the 'Russian lobby' in Ankara wants, Al-Monitor, 15
December 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/turkey-russia-what-russian-lobby-wants.html
[9] Michelle
Martin, German spy agency chief says does not believe Gulen behind Turkey coup
attempt, Reuters, 19 March 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-germany-idUSKBN16P0LQ
[10] Daniel
Gros and Federica Mustilli, The Effects of Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions on
EU-Russian Trade Flows, Center for European Policy Studies, 5 July 2016, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/effects-sanctions-and-counter-sanctions-eu-russian-trade-flows
[11]
BBC News, Russia hits West with food import ban in sanctions row, 7 August
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28687172
[12] Alexander
Gabuev, Did Western Sanctions Affect Sino-Russian Economic Ties?, Carnegie
Endowment for Peace, 26 April 2016, http://carnegie.ru/2016/04/26/did-western-sanctions-affect-sino-russian-economic-ties-pub-63461
[13]
Wade Shephard, Reconnecting Asia: The Story Behind The Emerging
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Rail Line, Forbes, 15 December 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/15/reconnecting-asia-the-story-behind-the-emerging-baku-tbilisi-kars-rail-line/print/
[14]
Wade Shephard, 2 Days From China To Europe By Rail? Russia Going For High-Speed
Cargo Trains, Forbes, 14 January 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/01/14/2-days-from-china-to-europe-by-rail-russia-going-for-high-speed-cargo-trains/print/
[15]
Gwadar News, Russia formally requests access to Gwadar Port, 25 November 2016, https://gwadarnews.com/2016/11/25/russia-formally-requests-access-to-gwadar-port/
[16]
RT, Russia-China trade up almost 10% in May, 8 June 2016, https://www.rt.com/business/345827-russia-china-trade-turnover/
[17]
Henry Foy and David Sheppard, Rosneft takes key step in push into Middle East,
Financial Times, 3 April 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/5417e004-13a4-11e7-80f4-13e067d5072c
[18] Maria
Tsvetkova, Exclusive - Russian private security firm says it had armed men in
east Libya, Reuters, 10 March 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-libya-contractors-exclusive-idUKKBN16H2EI
[19]
BBC News, Libya's Khalifa Haftar 'retakes oil ports from Islamist militia, 14
March 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39266509
[20]
Ibrahim Hamidi, Syrian Regime’s Delay in Sealing Economic Agreements Cause Row
with Tehran (طهران«غاضبة» من بطء تنفيذ اتفاقات
استراتيجية مع دمشق), Al Hayat,
8 March 2017, http://www.alhayat.com/m/story/20602223
[21] Mark
N. Katz and Hussein Ibish, Can Moscow Be an Effective Mideast Mediator? Arab
Gulf States Institute in Washington, 24 March 2017, http://www.agsiw.org/can-moscow-effective-mideast-mediator/
[22] Katya
Golubkova, Dmitry Zhdannikov and Stephen Jewkes, How Russia sold its oil jewel:
without saying who bought it, Reuters, 25 January 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-rosneft-privatisation-insight-idUSKBN1582OH
[23] Theodore
Karasik, Why is Qatar Investing so much in Russia? Middle East Institute, 8
March 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/why-qatar-investing-so-much-russia
[24]
Leone Lakhani, Russia-Gulf Arab States: A Relationship of Convenience, The Cipher
Brief, 7 March 2017, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/exclusive/middle-east/russia-gulf-arab-states-relationship-convenience-1091?utm_content=bufferc3874&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
[25] Zafar
Bhutta, Kuwait wins approval for setting up oil refinery in Balochistan, Dawn,
10 September 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1179648/kuwait-wins-approval-setting-oil-refinery-balochistan/
[26] Zafar
Bhutta, Kuwait agrees to build oil pipeline in Pakistan, Dawn, 10 March 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1351241/kuwait-agrees-build-oil-pipeline-pakistan/
[27]
Dawn, Pakistan, Iran on verge of establishing strong economic ties, 9 March
2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1319360/pakistan-iran-on-verge-of-establishing-strong-economic-ties
[28]
Mariam Amini, China’s 'Silk Road' railway hits a snag in Afghanistan, CNBC, 13
October 2016, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/13/chinas-silk-road-railway-disrupted-by-uzbekistan-security.html
[29]
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghan opium production up 43 per
cent: Survey, 23 October 2016, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/October/afghan-opium-production-up-43-percent_-survey.html
[30]
James M. Dorsey, Challenging the state- Pakistani militants form deadly
alliance, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, 17 February 2017, https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.co.uk/2017/02/challenging-state-pakistani-militants.html
[31] Mohammed
Al-Sudairi, Changing State-Religion Dynamics in Xi Jinping’s China: And its
Consequences for
Sino-Saudi Relations, King Faisal Center For Research
and Islamic Studies, January 2017, http://kfcris.com/pdf/32a413c468c1b66c84d974e0b34c1efa58d77ebe4d1a1.pdf
[32]
Giles Gibson, Exclusive: Chinese security forces caught patrolling deep inside
eastern Afghanistan, WION, 3 November 2016, http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/exclusive-chinese-security-forces-caught-patrolling-deep-inside-eastern-afghanistan-8008/
/ Franz J. Marty, The curious case of Chinese troops on Afghan soil, The
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 3 February 2017, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13424-the-curious-case-of-chinese-troops-on-afghan-soil.html
[33]
Jonny, The Complete Adventure Guide To The Afghanistan Wakhan Valley And Pamir,
Backpacking Man, 24 October 2016, http://backpackingman.com/afghanistan-wakhan-hiking-little-pamir/
[34] Ting
Shi, China Moves Closer to Afghan Security Role, Bloomberg, 12 April 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-11/growing-terrorism-risk-leads-china-to-boost-role-in-afghanistan
[35] Ibid.
Gibson
[36]
People’s Daily, China, Pakistan hold joint anti-terrorism drills, 7 November
2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1107/c90000-9138367.html
[37] Andrew
R.C. Marshall, Led by China, Mekong nations take on Golden Triangle
narco-empire, Reuters, 17 March 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-southeastasia-drugs-mekong-idUKKCN0WH2ZW
[38]
Email interview with Chinese private security scholar Alessandro Arduino, 8
March 2017
[39]
BBC News, China passes controversial new anti-terror laws, 28 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35188137
[40]
Ministry of National Defense, Defense Ministry's regular press conference on
Feb.23, 24 February 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2017-02/24/content_4773551.htm
[41]
Sputnik International, China Supplies Air Defense Systems, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle to Uzbekistan, 2 February 2015, https://sputniknews.com/military/201502021017650004/
[42]
Minnie Chan, As overseas ambitions expand, China plans 400 per cent increase to
marine corps numbers, sources say, South China Morning Post, 13 March 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2078245/overseas-ambitions-expand-china-plans-400pc-increase
[43]
Rostilav Ishcenko, Putin’s Central Asia Tour? What’s at Stake, Fort Russ, 1
March 2017,
[44]
Sputnik, Russia to Help Boost Tajik-Afghan Border Protection Using Russian Base
– Putin, 27 February 2017, https://sputniknews.com/russia/201702271051082505-russia-tajikistan-afghanistan-putin/?mc_cid=0f7c66561d&mc_eid=f8da4b6ebe
[45]
Giles Gibson, Exclusive: Chinese security forces caught patrolling deep inside
eastern Afghanistan, WION, 3 November 2016, http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/exclusive-chinese-security-forces-caught-patrolling-deep-inside-eastern-afghanistan-8008/
/ Franz J. Marty, The curious case of Chinese troops on Afghan soil, The
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 3 February 2017, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13424-the-curious-case-of-chinese-troops-on-afghan-soil.html
[46]
Jonny, The Complete Adventure Guide To The Afghanistan Wakhan Valley And Pamir,
Backpacking Man, 24 October 2016, http://backpackingman.com/afghanistan-wakhan-hiking-little-pamir/
[47] Ting
Shi, China Moves Closer to Afghan Security Role, Bloomberg, 12 April 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-11/growing-terrorism-risk-leads-china-to-boost-role-in-afghanistan
[48] Ibid.
Gibson
[49]
People’s Daily, China, Pakistan hold joint anti-terrorism drills, 7 November
2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1107/c90000-9138367.html
[50] Andrew
R.C. Marshall, Led by China, Mekong nations take on Golden Triangle
narco-empire, Reuters, 17 March 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-southeastasia-drugs-mekong-idUKKCN0WH2ZW
[51]
Email interview with Chinese private security scholar Alessandro Arduino, 8
March 2017
[52]
BBC News, China passes controversial new anti-terror laws, 28 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35188137
[53]
Ministry of National Defense, Defense Ministry's regular press conference on
Feb.23, 24 February 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2017-02/24/content_4773551.htm
[54]
Sputnik International, China Supplies Air Defense Systems, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle to Uzbekistan, 2 February 2015, https://sputniknews.com/military/201502021017650004/
[55]
Minnie Chan, As overseas ambitions expand, China plans 400 per cent increase to
marine corps numbers, sources say, South China Morning Post, 13 March 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2078245/overseas-ambitions-expand-china-plans-400pc-increase
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