Ethnicity, Tribalism, and Pluralism in the Middle East and North Africa: Solutions to Conflict? (MEI Insight)
Ethnicity, Tribalism, and
Pluralism in the Middle East and North Africa: Solutions to Conflict?
By James M. Dorsey
Scholars, policy pundits, policymakers, and journalists have identified
any number of reasons for a crisis in the Middle East and North Africa that,
starting with the 2011 popular revolts, has swept the region; toppled leaders
in four countries – Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen; prompted Saudi-led military
interventions in Bahrain and Yemen; ignited brutal insurgencies and wars in
Syria, Iraq and Libya; and sparked the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria
and Iraq, and the expansion of its territorial reach to the Gulf and Africa.
Identifying the root causes of the crisis that is shaking the roots of
long-standing autocratic, un-democratic rule in the region, irrespective of
whether regimes are monarchies or republics, is key to mapping out solutions,
particularly ones that hold out hope for pluralism and respect for human,
social, economic, cultural, and ethnic rights. Complicating the identification
of root causes is the fact that analysts and policymakers were caught off guard
by the challenges to autocracy and the Middle East and North Africa’s long-standing
nation state order, as well as the emergence of simmering ethnic, tribal and
sectarian politics as centrifugal forces.[1]
Turkish Scholar Sener Akturk argues
moreover that, on the basis of case studies of Turkey, Algeria and Pakistan,
Muslim-majority nations established with a secularist ideology have the
potential for struggles over values including pluralism and human rights,
between secularists, who are more prone towards universal principles and
Islamists, and that these struggles are built at independence into their very
nature. These states were “founded on the basis of an Islamic mobilization
against non-Muslim opponents but having successfully defeated these non-Muslim
opponents, their political elites chose a secular and monolingual nation-state
model for these countries, which led to significant and recurrent challenges to
the state in the form of Islamist and ethnic separatist movements. Secular
nationalism faces a structural and path-dependent crisis of legitimacy in these
countries because of what could be described as a historical or “genetic”
disjuncture located at the very origins of these nation-states,” Akturk wrote.[2]
Further troubling the waters is the rise of a public and private
anti-terrorism industry[3]
that sees human rights as second to ensuring security and safety; has a vested
interest in couching the problem in terms of law enforcement and
counter-terrorism rather than notions of alienation, marginalization,
socio-economic disenfranchisement, youth aspirations and rights; is abetted by
autocratic Middle Eastern and North African regimes that define any form of
dissent as terrorism;[4]
and is supported by a public opinion that buys into support of autocrats and
some degree of curtailing of rights as a trade-off for security.
Analysts and policymakers have identified a
range of causes for the breakdown of the traditional order in the Middle East
and North Africa, ranging from a desire for greater freedom and social justice[5]
to the fragility of post-colonial regional states as a result of autocratic
failure to engage in nation rather than regime building that gave rise to
ethnic, tribal and sectarian strife,[6]
to inherent flaws in colonial border arrangements at the time of the demise of
the Ottoman Empire such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Treaty of Sevres.[7]
All of those notions contain kernels of truth but they have contributed to it
becoming common place to pay lip service to the need to tackle root causes of
the crisis in the Middle East, and that can mean almost anything. Many also
merely embrace notions that are crucial to creating an environment conducive to
respect of pluralism and human rights.
Putting One’s Money Where One’s Mouth
Is
Yet, translating the need to tackle root causes into policy is proving
difficult, primarily because it is based on a truth that has far-reaching
consequences for every member of the international community no matter how
close or far they are from IS’s current borders. It involves governments
putting their money where their mouth is and changing long-standing, ingrained
policies at home that marginalize, exclude, stereotype and stigmatize
significant segments of society; emphasize security at the expense of freedoms
that encourage healthy debate; and in more autocratic states that are abetted
by the West, reduce citizens to obedient subjects through harsh repression and
adaptations of religious belief to suit the interests of rulers.
The result is a vicious circle: government
policies often clash with the state or regime’s professed values. As a result,
dividing lines sharpen as already marginalized, disenfranchised or
discriminated segments of society see the contradiction between policies and
values as hypocritical and re-confirmation of the basis of their discontent. Western
nations, for example, in the fall of 2015, deferred to Saudi Arabia’s
objections to an investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Council
(UNHRC) into human rights violations by all sides during the Saudi-led military
intervention in Yemen in which thousands of civilians were killed.[8]
Media reports documented, a day prior to the Western cave-in, a British pledge
to support Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s foremost violators of basic human
rights and purveyors of sectarianism, in the Council.[9]
The kingdom, at the same time, objected to references to gay rights in the
United Nations’ newly formulated Sustainable Development Goals.[10
Creating a policy framework that is
conducive to an environment in the Middle East and North Africa that would
favour pluralism and respect of human rights and counter the appeal of jihadism
and emerging sectarian-based nationalism is not simply a question of
encouraging and supporting voices in the region, first and foremost those of
youth, or of revisiting assumptions of Western foreign policies and definitions
of national security. It involves fostering inclusive national identities that
are capable of accommodating ethnic, sectarian and tribal sub-identities as
legitimate and fully accepted sub-identities in Middle Eastern and North
African, as well as Western countries, and changing domestic policies in the
West towards minorities, refugees and migrants.
Tribalism Meets Modernity
Tribal and sectarian identities and loyalty have been reinforced in
Middle Eastern and North African nations as the fragility of nation states
becomes increasingly evident and the future of nation states like Syria and
Iraq in their post-colonial forms becomes ever more uncertain. Those identities
are strengthened by youth bulges that see little prospect for social and
economic opportunity and participation in politics against a backdrop of rising
education levels.
As a result, national identity is often an amorphous concept
that positions the tribe with its traditional support mechanisms as a more
responsive social and political entity. This trend is furthered by youth’s
greater access to information through the Internet. Educated and Internet-savvy
youth are conscious of vast income differences in their country and the failure
of governments to provide public goods and services. Mounting frustrations
drive calls for an end to corruption and greater rights.
The persistence of tribalism is evident in hiring policies in various
Middle Eastern and North African countries that officially adhere to
non-discriminatory policies but take into account tribal affiliation. It also
emerges in low tribal inter-marriage rates and official government emphasis on
the concept of tribal values that focus on maintaining peace, enforcing order,
protecting the weak, honouring authority, ensuring an equitable hearing and
enforcing justice. Cultural events promoted by governments reinforce the trend
towards tribalism.[11]
Saudi TV’s popular poetry contest, Shaer al-Milyon, The Million’s Poet,
features exclusively tribal contenders whose participation raises their tribes’
profile.[12]
Camel races and beauty contests serve a similar purpose. The emphasis on tribal
values and culture is part of a larger focus on heritage intended to cement
weak national identities.
Renewed emphasis on tribalism has forced
tribes to redefine themselves in a 21st century world in which the
issues they confront are no longer access to land and water but social and
economic development as well as political stability. It involves striking a
balance between being part of a national state and accommodating regional
differences that often emulate tribal lines. Ironically, one of the most
powerful national symbols that transcends tribal and other affiliations often
is the national soccer team. “We all support the national team irrespective of
who we are,” said a young Saudi.[13
“Young people are finding living conditions
harsh and they are asking, where has the money gone? The younger generation has
started to use social media and it is they that will cause human rights
problems, as they want to be part of government decision-making. It is the
young people who are going back to the tribes because they cannot see anything
to be proud about in central government. The older generation is content with
the government but they are richer than their children will ever be and have
benefited more from the country’s development of the last 40 years,” said a
young Saudi.[14]
“People are suddenly doing their family trees and looking for their origins.
Their family lineages are being revived and they have family diwaniyyat
(gatherings) every week with all the family who can come. This is happening
right across Saudi Arabia, not just in the Hejaz. Tribalism is back now,” added
another Saudi.[15
To accommodate the trend and ensure that it
strengthens rather than weakens national identity and promotes greater
identification with the state, youth across the Middle East and North Africa
are agitating, to various degrees, for more inclusive governance, by
introducing free and fair elections, elevating the fight against corruption,
and adopting more equitable social and economic policies.[16]
This is particularly true in the Gulf states and countries like Syria and Iraq,
whose future national borders are in question as a result of civil war that
stems from the fragility of a state formed on the colonial legacy of minority
rule. The same issues minus tribalism are prevalent in countries like Egypt, a
country with a millennial history and a strong sense of national identity.
Northern Iraq exemplifies the significant setbacks the Middle East and
North Africa has suffered as a result of sectarian policies by states and
non-state actor and the scars of war. A Yazidi mechanic shop owner, who in 2014
survived the slaughter and mass deportation of members of his sect, Ibrahim
Hajj returned in mid-2015 to his abandoned village of Sinouni. His return was
to be short-lived. Unwilling to contemplate the return of his Arab neighbours
on whom his business depended, Hajj was opting to again become a refugee.
“If they (the Arabs) try to come back, and we don’t have weapons to
kill them, we will tear them apart with our teeth and nails. I haven’t made a
single cent since I came back — with them gone, I have no customers. I have to
go back to the refugee camps,” he said.[17]
The picture repeats itself in Sunni Muslim towns like Rabea that are populated
by tribes that supported the Kurds in their fight against IS. Authorities in
the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq have yet to connect the town to
the power grid. Deep-seated distrust between Arabs and Kurds has replaced once
close communal ties. A former Sunni Muslim policeman was rebuffed when he went
to check on a Yazidi co-worker. “All of you Muslims are Isis,” the policeman
was told.[18]
Source: Financial Times
Increased sectarianism and tribalism have significant consequences for
stability, national security, pluralism and respect for human rights,
particularly in countries whose armed forces are organized along tribal or
ethno-religious lines. The potential risk involved is evident in the embattled
militaries of Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and built into the dual structures of
countries like Saudi Arabia that has a regular armed force tasked with
protecting the kingdom’s territorial integrity and a tribal-based national
guard that builds on tribes like the Al-Qahtani, Al-Utaibi and the Anizah, for
the protection of the regime.[19]
Middle Eastern and North African governments prefer to divert or prevent
mushrooming anti-government dissent by encouraging tribal, ethnic or sectarian
friction. One Saudi argued that the strategy would fail in the kingdom “because
the army and the national guard are tribal. People say there will be no more
tribal fighting but it is understood there was fighting near Al-Ha’il earlier
in 2014 and trouble in Jouf and Tabuk.”[20]
Closely related to the issue of tribalism as well as rights, are
differing concepts of justice. Rather than notions of justice or in Arabic, ‘adl ‘adāla’, that involve equality, inclusion,
non-discrimination and fairness, Middle Eastern and North African tribal
societies often employ concepts of ‘adāt wa taqālīd,
or tribal customs and traditions to mediate issues of justice and injustice. ‘Adat wa taqalid involves traditions of customary rather
than civil or Islamic law. One major difference is that justice in the Western
sense of the word involves only parties to a dispute or conflict while tribal
tradition can include parties’ communities who may not have a direct material
stake.[21]
In the case of the international
community’s effort to defeat IS, inclusiveness means, for example, that victory
has to be secured as much in Raqqa and Mosul, IS’s Syrian and Iraqi capitals,
as in the dismal banlieues, run-down, primarily minority-populated, suburbs of
French cities that furnish the group with its largest contingent of European
foreign fighters;[22]
the popular neighbourhoods in Tunisia that account for the single largest group
of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq;[23]
Riyadh, seat of a government whose citizens account for the second largest
number of foreign fighters and whose well-funded, decades-long effort to
propagate a puritan, intolerant, interpretation of Islam has been a far more
important feeding ground for jihadist thinking than the writings of militant
Islamist thinkers like Sayyid Qutb;[24]
and in Western capitals with Washington in the lead who view retrograde,
repressive regimes like those of Saudi Arabia and Egypt as part of the solution
rather than part of the problem.
Broadening the Debate
Focussing on root causes that are at the core of both the crisis and
deteriorating, if not total disrespect of, human rights, means broadening
scholarly and policy debate to concentrate not only on what amounts to applying
Band-Aids that fail to halt the festering of open wounds but also to question
assumptions made by the various schools of thought on how to solve the problem.
The facts on the ground have already convincingly contradicted the notion that
Western support of autocracy and military intervention primarily through air
campaigns despite paying lip service to ideals of democracy and human rights
could counter common enemies like IS. It has so far to produced only limited
results. Respect for human rights has, in many Middle Eastern and North African
nations, significantly deteriorated since the 2011 popular revolts and IS
standing its ground a year into a US-led air campaign, a Russian bombing
operation that began in the fall of 2015, and ground campaigns by the Iraqi
government and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.[25]
The group continues to advocate a regime that celebrates its rejection of
pluralism and human rights and metes out relatively transparent yet brutal
justice, and it poses a fundamental threat to the existence of post-colonial
nation states as the world knew them, first and foremost Syria and Iraq, but
ultimately also others like Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Libya.
Yet, even a convincing defeat of IS would
not solve the problem or promote notions of pluralism and respect of human
rights. Al Qaeda was degraded, to use the language of the Obama administration.
In the process, it weakened a jihadist force that, despite having no
appreciation for concepts of pluralism and human rights, increasingly advocated
a gradual approach to the establishment of its harsh interpretation of Islamic
law in a bid to ensure public support.[26]
Instead of reducing the threat of political violence, the largely military
effort to defeat Al Qaeda produced ever more virulent forms of jihadism as
embodied by IS. It may be hard to imagine anything more brutal than IS, but it
is a fair assumption that defeating IS without tackling root causes would only
lead to something that is even more violent and more vicious.
Nonetheless, defining repressive,
autocratic rule and IS as the greatest threat to regional stability and
security and the furthering of more liberal notions is problematic. In the case
of IS, that definition elevates jihadism – the violent establishment of
pan-Islamic rule based on narrow interpretations of Islamic law and scripture
-- to the status of a root cause rather than a symptom and expression of a
greater and more complex problem. It is an approach that focuses on the
immediate nature of the threat and ways to neutralize it rather than on what
sparked it. It also neglects the fact that the ideological debate in the Muslim
world is to a large extent dominated by schools of thought that do not advocate
more open, liberal and pluralistic interpretations of Islam.
That is where one real challenge lies. It is a challenge first and
foremost to Muslims, but also to an international community that would give
more liberal Muslim voices significant credibility if it put its money where
its mouth is. Support for self-serving regimes and their religious supporters,
as in the case of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, reduces the international community’s
choices to one between bad and worse, rather than to a palate of policy options
that take a stab at rooting out the problem and its underlying causes.
To be sure, change and progress towards the
embrace of pluralism and universal human rights will have to originate from
within Middle Eastern and North African nations. Saudi and UAE efforts to
target political Islam as such that have also resonated in the West, were
articulated by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Blair argued against
“a deep desire to separate the political ideology represented by groups such as
the Muslim Brotherhood from the actions of extremists including acts of
terrorism.” He acknowledged that it was “laudable” to distinguish “between
those who violate the law and those we simply disagree with” but warned that
“if we're not careful, they also blind us to the fact that the ideology itself
is nonetheless dangerous and corrosive; and cannot and should not be treated as
a conventional political debate between two opposing views of how society
should be governed.”[27]
On that basis, it is hard to see why Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia’s puritan
interpretation of Islam that is the well-spring of much of contemporary
jihadist thinking, does not top the list of ideologies that are “dangerous and
corrosive.” Saudi Arabia, like the Islamic State, was born in a jihadist
struggle that married Islamist warriors led by an 18th century jurist Mohammed Abdul
Wahab, with the proto-kingdom’s ruling Al Saud clan.
The failure of the 2011 popular revolts and
the autocratic counterrevolution that they provoked, the rise of IS, increased
repression and the region’s deterioration of respect for basic freedoms
constitutes a wake-up call for many in the Middle East and North Africa. It has
fuelled a long-overdue debate among Arabs and Muslims about the kind of world
they want to live in.
In an essay entitled ‘The Barbarians Within
Our Gates,’ prominent Washington-based journalist Hisham Melhelm wrote: “The
Arab world today is more violent, unstable, fragmented and driven by extremism
— the extremism of the rulers and those in opposition — than at any time since
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century ago… The promise of political
empowerment, the return of politics, the restoration of human dignity heralded
by the season of Arab uprisings in their early heydays — all has given way to
civil wars, ethnic, sectarian and regional divisions and the reassertion of
absolutism, both in its military and atavistic forms.... The jihadists of the
Islamic State, in other words, did not emerge from nowhere. They climbed out of
a rotting, empty hulk — what was left of a broken-down civilization.” [28
For his part, Turki al-Hamad, a liberal
Saudi intellectual, questioned how Saudi religious leaders could confront the
Islamic State’s extremist ideology given that they promote similar thinking at
home and abroad. Al-Hamad argued that the Saudi clergy was incapable of
confronting the extremism of groups like the Islamic State “not because of
laxness or procrastination, but because they share the same ideology."[29]
Neither Melhelm nor al-Hamad are Islamists.
Yet, they reflect widespread soul-searching among Islamists and non-Islamists
across the Arab world. Theirs is a debate that predates the rise of the Islamic
State but has been pushed centre stage by jihadists, autocrats and misguided
Western politicians alike. It is a debate that is at the core of tackling the
root causes on which jihadist groups feed, and which in turn has become a
primary alibi for autocrats to discount pluralism and greater freedoms. It is,
however, also a debate that threatens to be squashed by a policy that focuses
on military rather than political solutions and promotes status quo regimes
whose autocracy chokes off opportunities for the venting of widespread
discontent and anger, leaving violence and extremism as one of the few, if not
the only, option to force change.
As a result, the Obama administration’s
alignment with the Middle East’s counter-revolutionary forces and targeting of
groups other than IS, risks identifying the US with efforts by Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Egypt to target political Islam as such. The three
Arab nations have cracked down on non-violent groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood. The UAE particularly has since called for an expansion of the
campaign against the Islamic State to include all non-violent expressions of
political Islam. The US alignment prevents it from adopting a policy that would
seek to contain IS militarily while focusing on removing the grievances on
which the group feeds. It is a policy that is destined, at best, to provide a
Band-Aid for a festering wound.
Medium-term Rather than Short-term
Moreover, in a globalized world, events in the Middle East and North
Africa, and among minority populations elsewhere with roots in the region,
often mutually reinforce one another. By the same token, there are no quick
solutions or short cuts. The key is the articulation of policies that over the
medium term can help generate an environment more conducive to more liberal
change rather than the continuous opting for knee-jerk reactions to events and
facts on the ground as was evident in Tunisia’s response to a June 2015 attack
on a tourist resort,[30]
Kuwait’s reaction to the bombing of a Shiite mosque at about the same time,[31]
and France’s answer to an almost simultaneous assault on its territory by a
lone wolf.[32]
Tunisia deployed 1,000 armed policemen to
tourist sites even as tourists left the country en masse, and closed 80 mosques
suspected of hosting radical clerics; a move that was likely to push militants
further underground.[33]
Kuwait, which displayed a remarkable degree of inclusivity with Sunnis and
Shias joining hands in their condemnation of the bombing of a Shiite mosque that
left 27 people dead and more than 200 others wounded, looked at adoption of a
stringent anti-terrorism law[34]
while France is passing legislation that would authorise sweeping surveillance.[35]
None of these measures address the sense of hopelessness and willingness to
rebel that potentially pervades predominantly young Muslim minorities in
Europe, and is reinforced by increased prejudice sparked by violence and
brutality perpetrated by Muslim extremists. That hopelessness is matched by
despair and existential fears among youth, minorities, and alienated sects in
the Middle East and North Africa.
As a result, Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC, the 2011 Arab
revolts, the rise of IS and lone wolf attacks like the assault in January 2015
on satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris as well as attacks in Paris,
Ankara, Beirut, Tunisia and Kuwait, have served to undermine efforts at greater
inclusiveness and assurance of equal rights and opportunity - such as Europe’s
pursuit of multiculturalism - and sparked violent counterrevolutionary efforts
by Arab autocrats. The result has been, in the Middle East and North Africa,
fractured states and increased repression that seemingly place pluralism and
respect of human rights in the realm of wishful thinking. Autocratic and
Western responses to jihadist attacks and propaganda play into the militants’
hands by fuelling a sense of rejection among disenfranchised and marginalized
youth as well as ethnic and religious minorities. All of that is fed by growing
intolerance, suspicion of the other, stereotyping, and a feeling of not being
welcome among minority groups, and it is strengthened by sectarian policies
adopted by Middle Eastern and North African governments.
Ironically, US President George W. Bush’s
administration concluded, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, that Al Qaeda was as
much a product of US support for autocratic Arab regimes as it was the result
of politically bankrupt Arab leaders. The acknowledgement amounted to an
admission of failure of a US policy designed to maintain stability in a key
geostrategic and volatile part of the world and led to Bush’s ill-fated
initiative to promote democracy in the Middle East and North Africa.[36]
The argument in favour of pluralism and
respect for human rights, as opposed to prioritization of security and
criminalization of dissent as part of the survival strategy of Middle Eastern
and North African regimes, was evident in responses to a video clip produced in
2014 by supporters of storied Moroccan soccer club Raja Club Athletic. At face
value, the clip left little doubt about the fans’ support of IS.[37]
The clip shows fans of a club, that prides itself on its nationalist
credentials dating back to opposition to colonial French rule and its
reputation as the team of ordinary Moroccans, chanting: “Daesh, Daesh,” the
Arabic acronym for IS, and “God is Great, let’s go on jihad.
The clip appeared to reaffirm IS’s
widespread emotional appeal to youth across the Middle East and North Africa
rather than a willingness on the fans’ part to actually become a foreign
fighter in Syria or Iraq. To them, IS symbolized successful resistance for many
who were disillusioned by the failure of popular revolts; the intransigence of
autocratic regimes that fail to live up to their people’s aspirations; the lack
of prospects for economic advancement and political change; and the West’s
refusal to empower rebel groups opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as
well as its perceived strengthening of Assad with its military campaign against
IS, the foremost opposition to a regime that matches the jihadists in
brutality.
The fans attempted to explain their pro-IS
video by noting on the group’s Facebook page with its 111,000 followers: “We
are terrorists… Our goal is to bomb other clubs. We do not want land or oil, we
want titles” below a mock picture of Islamic State fighters with the
inscription, “Raja’s Volunteer Championship.” The supporters asserted elsewhere
on their Facebook page that “we will not start to argue and beg people to
believe that this is a sarcastic action and a joke.” Some supporters dismissed
the video as a public relations stunt. They insisted that they were demanding
reform not radical change. To emphasize the point, the supporters posted two
days after the appearance of the video, an image of Osama Bin Laden with the
words: “Rest in Pieces Motherf*****r.”[38]
The pro-pluralism and human rights argument as a way of solving
conflict is also evident in the case of prominent Moroccan dissident rapper
Mouad Belghouat, better known as Al Haqed, who was arrested, in 2014 on charges
of having scalped game tickets, as he was entering a stadium to watch a soccer
match. Al Haqed’s music, like the chanting of pro-Islamic State slogans, reflected
growing popular discontent and an increased willingness to challenge the
government whom many see as having backed down on its promises for true
political and economic reform.
The arrest occurred a day after he had
mocked King Mohammed VI on Facebook because he passed a performing group of
musicians on his way to Friday prayers. “In Islam, this would be highly
disrespectful given the spiritual solemnity of Jumuah prayer, and an even
bigger mistake to be made by the ‘Commander of the Faithful’ who claims part of
the legitimacy of his rule from his religious status," wrote Moroccan
blogger Zineb Belmkaddem[39].
“Hope for a more democratic Morocco is
fading, as the makhzen (the ruling group around the king) went back to relying
on its old ways, reassured by the 'success' of its systematic crackdown that is
responsible for disorganizing groups of protestors through repression and
propaganda. Slowly dismantling the February 20th protest movement over the past
years, the regime seems to have learned nothing and has chosen to walk
backwards to its dysfunctional comfort zone,” Belmkaddem added, referring to
Morocco’s 2011 anti-government protests.
Speaking to The New York Times earlier in
2015, activist Moroccan Maouanne Morabit warned that “a major part of the political
class refused to discuss in public real issues concerning the ills of our
society, namely the role of the monarchy, respect for human rights, the
distribution of wealth, and the separation of powers… The kingdom discredited
the left, trade unions, civil society and now the Islamists. It will soon face
a direct confrontation with the people, and it will no longer have any safety
valves.”[40]
By contrast to most reactions to political violence and expression of
pro-jihadist sentiment, Norway’s response to right-wing extremist Anders
Behring Breivik’s traumatic attacks in 2011 that killed 77 people stands as a
model for how societies can and should uphold concepts of pluralism and human
rights. Norway refrained from declaring war on terror, treated Breivik as a
common criminal and refused to compromise on its democratic values. In doing
so, Norway offered a successful example of refusing to stigmatise any one group
in society by adopting inclusiveness rather than profiling and upholding the
very values that autocrats and jihadists challenge.
Conclusion
The result of exclusively security-focussed approaches, coupled with
the exploitation of economic opportunity by autocratic Middle Eastern and North
African regimes and Western governments, is an increasingly insecure region in
which the creation of pluralistic societies that honour human rights seems ever
more distant. Said an Egyptian Islamist militant, whose non-violent
anti-government activism is as much aimed at opposing the regime of
general-turned-president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi as it is designed to persuade
increasingly frustrated youth that there are alternatives to nihilistic
violence: “The strategy of brutality, repression and restricting freedom has
failed to impose subservience. It hasn’t produced solutions. Governments need
to give people space. They need to prove that they are capable of addressing
the problems of a youth that has lost hope. We have nothing to lose if they
don’t.”[41]
The Egyptian’s inclinations pointed towards peaceful protest in favour of a
more liberal society, albeit bound by Islamic morality codes; his options,
however, left him little choice but to drift towards jihadism.
Creating the kind of options that would
give the Egyptian militant real choices is easier said than done and unlikely
to produce immediate results. It would, among others, have to involve:
- Recognition that the Middle East and North Africa are in the throes of a brutal process of change that is likely to play out over years. Attempting to halt the process is futile; nurturing it with policies that encourage non-violent, non-sectarian change - even if it means a redrawing of the region’s map and regime change - will ultimately far better serve the reestablishment of regional peace and security and the creation of an environment conducive to pluralism and respect of human rights;
- Tying political, military and economic support to governments in the Middle East and North Africa to progress towards support of human rights and greater equality for minorities through the adoption of inclusive, non-sectarian, and non-repressive policies;
- A halt to the global propagation of intolerant ideologies by some Middle Eastern governments and state-sponsored groups such as Saudi Arabia’s interpretation of Wahhabism that contrasts starkly with that of Qatar, the world’s only other Wahhabi state;
- Abolition of sectarianism in state rhetoric;
- Recognition of minority rights;
- Reform of brutal police and security forces that are widely feared and despised;
- Granting of greater freedoms to ensure the existence of release valves for pent-up anger and frustration and the unfettered voicing of grievances;
- A crackdown on corruption;
- Reform of education systems that produce a mismatch between market demand and graduates’ skills.
James M. Dorsey is a
senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director
of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, a syndicated
columnist, and the author of The
Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog and a forthcoming book with the same title.
[1] F. Gregory Gause III, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring,
The Myth of Authoritarian Stability,“
Foreign Affairs, July/Augist 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2011/90/4
[2] Sener Akturk, “Religion and Nationalism: Contradictions of Islamic
Origins and Secular Nation-Building
in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan,”
Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 96:3, p. 778-806
[3] John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry
Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, (New York: Free
Press, 2009) / Glenn Greenwald, “The sham “terrorism expert” industry,” Salon,
August 16, 2012, http://www.salon.com/2012/08/15/the_sham_terrorism_expert_industry/
Paul Harris, “How private firms have cashed in on the climate of fear since
9/11,” The Guardian, September 5, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/05/private-firms-fear-9-11
[4] Sharri Markson, “UK deal to back Saudi Arabia for UN Human Rights
Council exposed,” The Australian, September 29, 2015, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/uk-deal-to-back-saudi-arabia-for-un-human-rights-council-exposed/story-e6frg6n6-1227547936664
/ Glen Carey, “A Marriage on the Rocks? Saudis Look Beyond U.S. After Iran
Deal,” Bloomberg, July 30, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-29/a-marriage-on-the-rocks-saudis-look-beyond-u-s-after-iran-deal
/ Steven A. Cook, ´ The U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue: Drift Along the Nile,”
From the Potomac to the Euphrates, Council of Foreign Relations, July 29, 2015,
http://blogs.cfr.org/cook/2015/07/29/the-u-s-egypt-strategic-dialogue-drift-along-the-nile/
[5] Sheri Berman, “The Promise of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/libya/2012-12-03/promise-arab-spring
[6] Center for International and Regional Studies, “Fragile Politics, Weak
States in the Greater Middle East (Doha: Georgetown University School of
Foreign Service in Doha, 2014) / Bassam Tibi, The Simultaneity of the
Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-State in the Modern Middle East,”
in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, edited by Philip S. Khoury
and Joseph Kostiner, 127-151, Berkley: University of California Press, 1990
[7] Nick Danforth, “Forget Sykes-Picot. It’s the Treaty of Sèvres That Explains
the Modern Middle East,” Foreign Policy, August 10, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/10/sykes-picot-treaty-of-sevres-modern-turkey-middle-east-borders-turkey/
[8] Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Saudi Objections Halt U.N. Inquiry of Yemen War,”
The New York Times, September 30, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/middleeast/western-nations-drop-push-for-un-inquiry-into-yemen-conflict.html?ref=middleeast&_r=0
[9] Markson, “UK Deal to Back Saudi Arabia”
[10] Associated Press, “Saudi Arabia Protests Inclusion Of Gay Rights In UN
Development Agenda,” September 27, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/saudi-arabia-protests-inclusion-of-gay-rights-in-un-development-agenda_560841bbe4b0af3706dcaafe
[11] Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of
Yemen, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 80-83
[12] http://www.livehd.ae/shaer.html
[13] Interview with the author March 21, 2013
[14] Caroline Montagu. 2015. Civil Society in Saudi Arabia: The Power and
Challenges of Association, Chatham House, March, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150331SaudiCivil.pdf
[15] Ibid. Montagu
[16] Multiple interviews by the author in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait,
Oman, Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, Palestine, and Tunisia in the years
2008-2015
[17] Erika Solomon, “Arabs pay the price after Kurds drive Isis out,”
Financial Times, September 30, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0732b04-65b9-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html
[18] Solomon, “Arabs pay the price”
[19] James M. Dorsey. 2014. Introduction in Jean-Francois Daguzan and Stephane
Valter (eds), Armees et Societe, Le Printemps Arabes Entre revolution et
Reaction, Paris: Editions ESKA, p. 13-31 / Interview by the author with tribal
leaders in 2001 and 2002
[20] Ibid. Montagu
[21] Amr Abdalla, “Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict
Intervention”, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 15 (Fall 2001), p. 151‑184.
[22] Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria, The Soufan Group, June
2014, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf
[23] Barett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria
[24] “Thomas Friedman, “Our Radical Islamic BFF, Saudi Arabia,” The New
York Times, September 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/opinion/thomas-friedman-our-radical-islamic-bff-saudi-arabia.html
[25] David Kilcullen, “We’re Losing the War Against ISIS in Iraq,” The
National Interest, September 15, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/we%E2%80%99re-losing-the-war-against-isis-iraq-13848
[26] William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and
Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), p.
47-73
[27] Tony Blair, “Why the Middle East Matters,” The Office of Tony Blair,
April 23, 2014, Why the Middle East Matters
[28] Hisham Melhem, “The Barbarians Within Our Gates,” Politico Magazine,
September 18, 2014, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/the-barbarians-within-our-gates-111116
[29] Al Arabiya, “Saudi Author Turki Al-Hamad: Islam Needs a Luther, a Calvin;
Ideology of Most Clerics Is ISIS-Like,” July 13, 2015, http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/5038.htm
[30] Jessica Elgot, “Deadly attack on Tunisia tourist hotel in Sousse
resort,” The Guardian, June 26, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/tunisia-tourist-hotel-reportedly-attacked
[31] Al Jazeera, “Kuwait holds mass funeral for mosque attack victims,”
June 28, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/kuwait-hold-mass-funeral-mosque-attack-victims-150627090813135.html
[32] Matthew Weaver and Haroon Siddique, “France attack: terror inquiry
launched and suspect arrested – as it happened,” The Guardian, June 27, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jun/26/suspected-terror-attack-at-french-factory-live-updates
[33] Erika Solomon, “Tunisia’s poor neighbourhoods serve as supply line for
jihadis,” Financial Times, June 29, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/675350b6-1e57-11e5-ab0f-6bb9974f25d0.html
/ Youssef Cherif, “The 3000: Why are Thousands of Tunisians Flocking to
Daesh?,” LSE Middle East Centre Blog, September 3, 2015, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/09/03/the-3000-why-are-thousands-of-tunisians-flocking-to-daesh/
[34] Middle East Eye, “Kuwait mulls new 'anti-terror' laws after mosque
bombing,” June 28, 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kuwait-mulls-new-anti-terror-laws-after-mosque-bombing-1694868882
[35] Amar Toor, “France's sweeping surveillance law goes into effect,” The
Verge, July 24, 2015, http://www.theverge.com/2015/7/24/9030851/france-surveillance-law-charlie-hebdo-constitutional-court
[36] Richard N. Haas, “Towards Greater Democracy in the Muslim World,”
Council of Foreign Relations, December 4, 2002, http://www.cfr.org/religion/towards-greater-democracy-muslim-world/p5283
[37] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9YJwdu5Wb0
[38] James M. Dorsey, “Soccer fan support for the Islamic State: Protest or
a new generation of jihadists?,” The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer,
October 4, 2014, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg/2014/10/soccer-fan-support-for-islamic-state.html
[39] Zineb Belmkaddem, Moroccan Rapper El Haqed – L7a9ed- Arrested again by
Moroccan Authorities, زينب بلمقدم، بلوك 1، زنقة الحرية، حي الافتراضي ZINEB BELMKADDEM, May 19,
2014, http://belmkaddem.blogspot.com/2014/05/moroccan-rapper-el-haqed-l7a9ed.html
[40] Aida Alami, Morocco ’s King Slow to Deliver on Pro-Democracy Vows, The
New York Times, June 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/world/africa/moroccos-king-slow-to-deliver-on-pro-democracy-vows.html
[41] Interview with the author, March 2015
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