Counterintuitive Palestinian politics: Is Hamas treading a path paved by the PLO?
By James M.
Dorsey
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Spanish
philosopher George Santayana didn’t have Palestine in mind when he coined the
phrase, ‘history repeats itself.’
Yet, Mr.
Santayana’s maxim may apply to Hamas when comparing the group’s political
evolution to the 16-year-torturous road traversed by the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) from classification by Israel and its Western allies as a
terrorist organization to establishing the Palestine Authority on
Israeli-occupied Palestinian land.
To be sure,
there is no guarantee that Hamas, despite its brutal October 7 attack on Israel
and wanton slaughter of 1,200, mostly civilian Israelis, will emulate the PLO
in eventually recognising Israel and abandoning the armed struggle.
Moreover,
Hamas’ current notion of realpolitik falls far short of anything that would
qualify it as an acceptable and credible party to the negotiation of a
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Even so, the
parallels between the PLO and Hamas’ political evolution are noteworthy.
The PLO
embarked on its road to recognition of Israel and abandonment of the armed
struggle in 1974 with a first ever direct appeal to Israelis published as an advertisement in
Yediot Ahranot, a leading Israeli newspaper, by Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) leader Nayef Hawatmeh.
The PLO
refused to address Israelis directly prior to publication because that would
acknowledge the Jewish state.
The DFLP’s
pioneering advocacy of Palestinian engagement with Israel and recognition of
the Jewish state as part of the PLO’s endorsement of a two-state resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not stop the group’s primarily Gaza-based paramilitary
wing, the National Resistance Brigades, from participating in Hamas’ October 7 attack.
The Brigades
said it had lost three fighters in combat with the Israeli military. It said it
had engaged Israeli forces in the towns
of Kfar Aza, Be'eri, and Kissufim.
The October
7 attack claimed the lives of at least 130 Israeli
civilians or ten per
cent Be’eri’s residents, including women, children, and infants.
The
publication of Mr. Hawatmeh’s appeal was negotiated by American activist and
journalist Paul Jacobs as part of an initiative that would have included talks
hosted by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba between the PLO and two prominent
Israeli politicians, Arie Eliav, a member of parliament and former secretary
general of the then governing Labour Party, and Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the head of
Histadrut, Israel’s national trade union, that was closely aligned with Labour.
The plan was
scuttled months after the advertisement when DFLP operatives attacked a girls’ school in Maalot. They took 115 people hostage and killed
31, including 25 schoolgirls.
The DFLP
attacked Maalot to reestablish its credibility among Palestinians after being
heavily criticised for its outreach to Israelis.
The Maalot
attack overshadowed the significance of the PLO’s first formal steps towards
accepting a two-state solution a month after the incident.
The PLO’s
parliament, the Palestine National Council, meeting in Cairo, adopted a 10-point program that called for "the
establishment of the people's independent combatant national authority over
every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated."
The Council
endorsed three years later the Palestinians’ right to "establish their own independent
national state over
their national soil."
For the
first time, the PLO stressed "the importance of connecting and
coordinating with the Jewish progressive and democratic forces inside and
outside the occupied homeland.”
It took the
PLO another decade to unambiguously recognise Israel and
declare an end to its armed struggle.
Similarly, Hamas
adopted an updated charter in 2017 that differed significantly from its
1988 fundamental document but was as ambiguous and ambivalent as the PLO
pronouncements in the 1970s.
Hamas’
original 1988 charter called for the killing of Jews based
on a saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. Hamas dropped the call to kill
Jews in its new charter.
The 1988
charter also insisted on a Palestinian state in all of historic Palestine that
would replace the State of Israel.
Significantly,
Hamas adopted its first charter months before PLO leader Yasser Arafat recognised
Israel.
Hamas’ revised
charter still calls for Israel to be replaced by a Palestinian state in all of
historic Palestine but allows for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside
Israel as an interim step provided it does not involve recognition of the
Jewish state.
Instead, the
charter advocates a long-term ceasefire that would de facto acknowledge
Israel’s existence.
Complicating
Hamas’ potential to follow the PLO’s path is the group’s rejection of an
Israeli and US negotiating framework that demands recognition of Israel and
abandonment of the armed struggle as a prerequisite rather than an outcome of
negotiations that was adopted by Mr. Arafat.
Hamas
concluded from the failure of the PLO’s approach and the 1993 Oslo accords to
produce an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel that Palestinian
concessions upfront were counterproductive.
The
brutality of Hamas’ October 7 attack ensures that any role for Hamas or a
potential successor in future negotiations will have to adopt the Israeli-US
framework. This reduces the likelihood that Hamas or its successor may follow
in the PLO’s footsteps.
Even so, the
jury is out on whether Hamas, or a possible successor, will retain spoiler
capability.
Irrespective
of whether Hamas adopts the PLO model, Palestinian moderation has proven to be
a torturous process. It often adheres to the principle of two steps forward,
one step backwards.
To be sure,
Hamas’ decision to randomly kill or kidnap anyone, Jewish or non-Jewish, during
the October 7 attack rather than only target Israeli military personnel and
facilities is a huge step backwards that has reeked unimaginable Palestinian
suffering, which is not to absolve Israel of responsibility for its conduct of
the Gaza war.
The jury is
out on who Palestinians will hold responsible for the Gaza carnage, Israel
and/or Hamas.
Even so, it’s
becoming increasingly clear that Israel is unlikely to wipe Hamas off the face
of the earth. Even if Hamas is destroyed, its hardline philosophy will survive,
probably embodied in a successor.
More than 30
years after Mr. Arafat recognised Israel and abandoned the armed struggle and
three decades after the conclusion of the Oslo accords it is evident that Palestinian
moderation is a fragile process that needs nurturing.
Israel’s
emphasis on the stick rather than the carrot coupled with the Palestine
Authority and Hamas’ failure to provide good governance and effective
leadership created the environment for a nascent armed resistance on the West
Bank, the October 7 Hamas attack, and the DFLP’s participation in the assault.
To be clear,
nothing justifies the random killing of innocent civilians. Even so, more
killings and greater repression of Palestinians is not a solution.
A pathway
towards a solution lies in fewer Israeli sticks and more Israeli carrots. It
lies in empowering Palestinians rather than undermining them. It resides in
encouraging Palestinian moderation rather than stymying it.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an Honorary
Fellow at Singapore’s Middle East Institute-NUS, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at
Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M.
Dorsey.
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