India could be this decade’s China.
By James M. Dorsey
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This could be India’s decade if it plays its cards right.
The subcontinental state is poised to be the next China,
even if its path will likely be less straightforward than that of China and
more of a Leninist two steps forward, one step backwards.
Leaving aside the multiple domestic issues India will have
to address to realise its full potential, it is already, in the words of an
Indian analyst, in a "geopolitical
sweet spot.”
Recently concluded defence
and technology agreements with the United States constitute a milestone.
The agreements acknowledge reality, including
that one underestimates the United States at one's peril and that, despite their
domestic travails, the US and Britain still produce 50
per cent of the global wealth as opposed to China and Russia's combined 20 per cent.
“For India, the West is the most
important trading partner, the dominant source of capital and technology, and
the major destination for the Indian diaspora,” said columnist and former
member of India’s National Security Advisory Board C. Mohan Raja in a Foreign
Policy article, entitled ‘It’s Time to Tie India to the West.’
With India set to become the world's
third largest economy, Mr. Raja advocated turning the Group of 7 (G-7), which
groups the world's foremost democratic economies, into a G-8 with India as its
newest member.
The agreements reinforce the notion that
supply chain security and geopolitics have become as important as economics and
pricing in creating and/or managing global value chains.
Furthermore, they are a step towards
enabling India to redress its trade imbalances skewed in China's favour.
Finally, the agreements constitute a building
block for a potential future multilateral security arrangement in the Gulf in
which India would be a key player.
Gulf security was not foremost in the
minds of Indian and US policymakers when they conceived the agreements.
However, inevitably, that is where the
Gulf is going for multiple reasons.
These include a US desire to rejigger America’s
commitment to Gulf security and share the
burden with regional players.
The United States is not yet at a
point where it is willing to share control of Gulf security commitments with
other external powers. Still, it is something that policymakers in both the
Trump and Biden administrations have at various times considered.
It’s an option that the US has not
pursued, but neither has either administration rejected it out of hand.
“I don’t think we are ever again going to
see a position where the United States is prepared to be the primary security
provider and bear any burden or pay any price
to uphold order in the Middle East,” said former Singaporean diplomat and
chairman of the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute
Bilahari Kausikan.
Mr. Kausikan added that “the United
States made dreadful mistakes in the Middle East 20 years ago, and an analogous
shift from direct intervention to the role of an offshore balancer is happening
in the region right now.”
Gulf states continue to look to the
United States to guarantee their security interests. But over time, and as US
thinking evolves, Gulf states, like in other aspects, are likely to want to hedge
their bets and diversify their relationships assertively.
India is one player on which Gulf
states have set their sights.
Already, India's security posture in
the region is changing. India regularly deploys ships in the Arabian Sea and
the Gulf of Aden as part of stepped-up military engagement with Arab states.
This week, a six-member Saudi army delegation visited India for briefings on the Indian
military's training methodology and infrastructure. In addition, India has a
presence in Oman’s Duqm Port.
Regarding regional engagement, Iran remains for India the most vexing
issue in its evolving security posture.
To be sure, India will not allow its foreign
relationships to be put at risk by cooperation with Iran. Yet, Iran is India’s gateway
into Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Add to this that, depending on how
US-Chine relations evolve, it’s only a matter of time before China will no
longer want to rely on an adversary to guarantee its energy security.
Chinese port, pipeline, and other
infrastructure investments in various parts of Asia may allow it to reduce
energy security risks in the Indo-Pacific but do not address threats in various
strategic Gulf waters.
More fundamentally, there is no
effective Indo-Pacific strategy that does not include the Arabian Sea, which
requires Indian involvement, not least because of geographic proximity.
That maxim is reinforced from India’s
perspective by the security presence of China, India's main regional rival,
which starts with a military base in Djibouti and is likely to expand.
US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken
noted that the I2U2 that groups India with the United States, Israel, and the
United Arab Emirates was as much about economic cooperation as
it was about working together on maritime security.
Last but not least, India has its own strategic,
energy, security, and economic interests in the Gulf, including the millions of
Indian expatriates and workers who work and live in the region.
India’s regional relationships,
ability to get its domestic house in order, and grow its economy will likely
shape its place in a new 21st-century world order.
This year’s Indian chairmanship of the
Group of 20, which brings together the leaders of the world's 20 largest
economies, is an opportunity for President Narendra Modi to showcase where
India is heading.
One focus will be the impact of the
rise of Hindu nationalism, the country's increasingly strained inter-communal
relations, and what India’s motto for its chairmanship, 'One Earth. One Family.
One Future' means in practice.
So far, India, like China, has
benefitted from Muslim-majority states emphasizing national interests rather
than communal and identity concerns. However, that may prove to be a fragile
proposition.
Even so, India is likely to be a factor
in determining whether a new world order will be multi-polar or bipolar and
dominated by the United States and China.
Already, it is a world in which middle
powers have greater agency and are more assertive.
Functional and regional blocs like
I2U2; Chip4, the semiconductor alliance between
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, or the northern transport corridor linking India and the Indian Ocean
with Europe will play a greater role in a new world order.
Furthermore, it will be a world in
which Russia, as a result of the Ukraine war, is likely to be a middle rather
than a superpower, a consideration that will not be lost on India, particularly
at a time that the principles of the inviolability of international borders and
the right to self-determination have become ever more paramount for stability.
The functional and regional alliances take
on added significance in an environment in which Russia, the United States, and
China, because of its handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and assertive wolf warrior diplomacy, have suffered reputational damage.
The United States may have suffered
the least, given its ability to marshal its allies in Europe and some in Asia
to forcefully support Ukraine while remaining focused on its rivalry with China
in Asia.
Even so, as former Indian national
security advisor Shivshankar Menon notes, "worries remain… about the United States being distracted by
Ukraine from its roles elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.”
Those worries are compounded by the
bungled US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and concern about the impact of
deep polarisation in the United States that is likely to be reflected in the
campaign for the 2024 presidential election.
“There are new opportunities in this
uncertain world. India….can work with neighbors to build the peaceful and more
prosperous periphery that its own development demands. It can participate in
the remaking of the rules of the international system now underway… And it can
reengage economically with the dynamic economies of Asia, participating in
global value chains, to further its own transformation,' Mr. Menon said.
This story is based
on the author’s remarks at the Maharana Pratap Annual Geopolitics
Dialogue 2023
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