Challenging China: Turkey walks a fine line on repressed Uighurs
By James M. Dorsey
To watch
a video version of this story on YouTube please click here.
A podcast version is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Spreaker, and Podbean.
An official
visit to Xinjiang to assess the fate of Turkic Muslims in the troubled
north-western Chinese Province is a risky proposition by any definition.
Even so, it
would be worth the risk if China and Turkey could agree on the terms of a
visit.
The problem
is that the terms constitute a zero-sum game.
China wins
if it controls the program of a visiting Turkish delegation as it does with
whoever else is granted access to a region where in recent years, more than one
million Turkic Muslims were reportedly incarcerated in reeducation camps dubbed
vocational schools.
“Why would we be a tool of Chinese
propaganda?” Turkish
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu snapped at a recent news conference when
asked about a visit to Xinjiang by Turkey’s ambassador in Beijing, Abdulkadir
Emin Onen.
“It's been
five years since (Chinese President) Xi (Jinping) proposed this. Why have you
been preventing this delegation from visiting for five years? Why don't you
cooperate?" Mr. Cavusoglu said.
The foreign
minister conceded that “Turkish-Chinese ties have suffered over Beijing being
disturbed by our attitude on the Turkic Uyghurs issue,” including a Turkish refusal to extradite to China Uighurs resident in the country.
China and
Turkey started discussing a Turkish visit in
2019. However, the
talks were put on ice when China effectively closed to shield the nation from
the Covid-19 pandemic.
In an
indication of the importance, both countries attribute to a possible visit,
discussion of the terms restarted within weeks of China’s recent lifting of
Covid-19 restrictions.
By controlling
Mr. Onen's program, China is seeking to ensure that he walks away from his
visit praising the Chinese administration of Xinjiang.
Coming from
Turkey, endorsement of China’s effort to Sinicise Islam and turn Uyghur
identity into a folk tale would have particular significance.
Turkey has
long fashioned itself as the hub of a Turkic world that stretches from the
Turkish Diaspora in Western Europe through the Balkans across the Caucasus and
Central Asia into Xinjiang and a defender of threatened Muslim communities.
Moreover,
Turkey is home to the largest Uighur exile community.
The blue
flag of East Turkistan, as Uighurs describe Xinjiang, is banned in China but flies
in shop windows and restaurants in Istanbul neighborhoods heavily populated by
the ethnic group.
Mr.
Cavusoglu’s rare public challenge of China could prove a first test for China’s
newly appointed foreign minister, Qin Gang. China has yet to respond to Mr.
Cavusloglu.
A former
ministry spokesperson, a deputy director-general of its information department,
and most recently, ambassador to the United States, Mr. Qin made his name as a pioneer of China’s wolf warrior
diplomacy involving confrontational
and coercive responses to criticism of the People’s Republic.
Positioning
Turkey as unwilling to walk on a Chinese leash, Mr. Cavusloglu is brandishing
the nationalist credentials of his ruling Justice and Development or AK Party
(AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in advance of a critical election
later this year.
With Uighurs on their minds, more than half of Turks polled in
multiple surveys over the past two decades express critical and/or negative
attitudes towards China.
In one of
the latest polls, a survey conducted by the Center for Turkish Studies at
Istanbul’s Kadir Has University concluded that only 27 percent view China positively.
Meral
Akşener, the leader of the nationalist Iyi or Good Party, one of the opposition
parties aligned against the AKP, and Ankara’s mayor Mansur Yavaş, viewed as one
of Mr. Erdogan’s potentially most serious challengers, got significant traction
on social media for commemorating the 1990 Baren Township
Massacre during an
armed clash between Uighur militants and Chinese security forces. Twenty-three
people are believed to have died in the fighting.
Mr. Erdogan
is seeking a third term as president in an election scheduled for June 18, the
centennial of the founding of the Turkish republic on the ruins of the Ottoman
empire.
Concerned
that he could face the most serious challenge to date to his power, Mr. Erdogan
uses every trick in the book to ensure that the election goes his way.
Recent polls
suggest that the AKP could win less than 30 per cent of the vote.
Challenging
China on the Uighurs follows sabre rattling in Syria, where Mr. Erdogan again wants to intervene
to subdue Syrian Kurds.
At the same
time, Turkey is engaging under Russian auspices with the regime of President
Bashar al-Assad in a bid to open a pathway for the return of up to four million
Syrian refugees in Turkey.
Anti-migrant sentiment is a major topic in the election
campaign.
Mr.
Cavusoglu’s refusal to “be a tool of Chinese propaganda” jars with the past
acceptance by Turkey’s state-owned news agency, Anadolu Agency, and journalists working for other
pro-government media,
of Chinese paid and tightly controlled
tours of Xinjiang
designed to counter allegations of abuse against Turkic Muslims.
Even so, a
recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace noted that in the absence of much Turkish-language content
in Chinese media that target foreign audiences, China "is now assertively
developing new strategies to engage with local actors in Turkey.”
The strategy
emphasises China's economic and commercial ties to Turkey at a time when the
country is struggling with an inflation rate that peaked at about
80 per cent in 2022
but dropped last month to 64.7 per cent.
It’s a
strategy that may work.
Chinese telecommunications
giant Huawei, slated to build Turkey’s 5G network,
has four times more Turkish followers on Twitter than the Chinese embassy in Ankara.
Now and
then, Turkey reasserts itself as a rare Muslim nation willing to tackle China
publicly on the Uighurs. But, by and large, Turkey shines by mainly remaining
silent.
In the final
analysis, domestic politics, rather than principled concern, determines if and
when Turkey takes on China. This year, elections are the driver.
As a result,
Uighur exiles fear that their utility is temporary and that they ultimately
could be sacrificed on the altar of Turkish-Chinese economic relations.
Said one
exile: “Our existence is tenuous. Our space in Turkey is shrinking.”
Thank you
to all who have demonstrated their appreciation for my column by becoming paid
subscribers. This allows me to ensure that it continues to have maximum impact.
Maintaining free distributions means that news website, blogs, and newsletters
across the globe can republish it. I launched my column, The Turbulent World of
Middle East Soccer, 12 years ago. To borrow a phrase from an early proprietor
of The Observer, it offers readers, listeners, and viewers ‘the scoop of
interpretation.’ If you are able and willing to support the column, please
become a paid subscriber by clicking on Substack on the subscription
button and choosing one of the subscription options. You can
also support the column on Patreon at www.patreon.com/mideastsoccer.
Your support is invaluable. Thank you.
Dr. James
M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow
at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and blog, The Turbulent World of
Middle East Soccer.
Comments
Post a Comment