Drones and transport could reshape Eurasian geopolitics
By James M. Dorsey
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When US intelligence asserted that Iran
was selling hundreds of combat drones to Russia, it was
signalling more than Iranian support for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Suggesting that Russia was not capable of serial
producing its own drones, the intelligence served to question further Russian
military capabilities, already overshadowed by doubt because of the poor
performance of Russian military personnel and equipment on the Ukrainian
battlefield.
The US disclosure followed the inauguration in
Tajikistan of Iran’s
first overseas drone manufacturing facility. The factory
produces Iran’s Ababil-2 multipurpose reconnaissance and killer drone.
The disclosure likely also drew Gulf attention to
Iran’s potentially expanding role in assisting Russia, and China, in an
increasingly bifurcated world at a time that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates were manoeuvring to put their strained relations with the Islamic
republic on a more even keel.
Iran would enhance its geopolitical usefulness by
offering a route into Central Asia and Afghanistan that allows India to
circumvent its archenemy, Pakistan.
Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar pushed this
month at a meeting in Tashkent of foreign ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) to include
the Indian-backed Iranian port of Chabahar in the
corridor dubbed the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
The SCO groups alongside India, Russia, China, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Iran is set to join the
organization in the next year.
Earlier this month, at a summit of Caspian Sea
littoral states, Mr. Putin hailed the corridor as a “truly
ambitious project” that is the centrepiece of Russia’s
efforts to “improve the transport and logistics architecture of the region.”
The Ukraine crisis has given a new lease on life to
the INSTC, a 7,200-kilometre patchwork of independently operated railroads,
highways, and maritime routes that connect Russia and India through Iran.
If successful, the corridor that traverses Russia, Central
Asia, the Caspian, Iran, and the Arabian Sea would reduce travel time from
40-60 days to 25-30 days and cut costs by 30 percent. In addition, its
significance could be boosted by hook-ups with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.
“The
Islamic Republic is indispensable to Russia since
transit across its territory links that Eurasian great power with their shared
Indian strategic partner, which safeguards Russia’s strategic autonomy in these
new international conditions,” said analyst Andrew Korybko.
Alireza Peyman Pak, the head of Iran’s Trade Promotion
Organization, expects
the corridor to enable Iran to double its exports despite dim
prospects for a revival of the 2105 international agreement that curbed the
Islamic republic’s nuclear program. A revival would involve lifting at least
some of the crippling US sanctions against Iran.
This month’s Russian-Ukrainian
agreement to export grain from three Ukrainian Caspian Sea
ports under the auspices of the United Nations and Turkey highlighted the body
of water’s centrality.
A shipment in June of two and then 39 containers in
July of wood laminate sheets from Russia to India's Jawaharlal Nehru Port in
Mumbai served as pilot
projects for the corridor.
The cargos left St Petersburg for the Russian port of
Astrakhan, from where they were shipped to Iran's Anzali Caspian port. They
were then taken by road across Iran to Bandar Abbas, from where the cargo moved
to Mumbai. The entire journey in both cases took 24 days.
At the same time, RZD Logistics, a subsidiary of
Russian Railways, the largest multimodal transport operator in the former
Soviet Union and the Baltics, launched a new container train service along the
INSTC. Its first
train headed from Moscow to Mumbai left the Russian capital on
July 8.
“These
are the new routes east, and Moscow is very serious about
getting these put in place, especially as EU sanctions are expected to remain —
even after the conflict with Ukraine is over,” said Chris Devonshire-Ellis, a business
and investment consultant.
In an illustration of the new routes, India and
Uzbekistan agreed to do a
pilot shipment to Mumbai through Chabahar in August.
The INSTC has gained significance with a spike in
trade between Russia and India, fuelled by Indian imports of Russian oil. Imports
in April and May rose
by a stunning 272 per cent, with a value of more than US$5
billion or the equivalent in two months of 50 per cent of average annual trade
between the two countries that ranges on average between US$8 and 11 billion.
With Mr. Putin in Tehran for a meeting with his
Iranian and Turkish counterparts, Ebrahim Raisi and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iran
and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding under which Russian oil company
Gazprom
would invest US$40 billion in the extraction of Iranian gas and oil.
Few analysts expect the memorandum to be more than a
symbolic statement any time soon. The same is true for a Russian-Iranian
agreement to create an alternative
international payment system that would be unable to put a dent
in SWIFT. The Brussels-based group executes financial transactions and payments
between banks worldwide.
That leaves arms and transport alongside the conflict
in Syria, and a common desire to up-end a US-dominated world order as the
potential cornerstones of relations between two of the key powers that bookend
the INSTC. Both countries have sufficient interest in these areas not to allow
competition for selling oil and gas to Asia at discounted prices because of the
sanctions to stymie their cooperation.
Said security analyst Ali Ahmadi: “Iran…requires…a
strategy for turning trade routes into economic corridors that can benefit its
own citizens. If Tehran can rise to the challenge, it will have a
key role to play in the development of Asia and East-West trade
moving forward.”
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar, and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological
University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of
the syndicated column and blog, The
Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
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