By James M. Dorsey
Thank you to all who have demonstrated their appreciation for my
column by becoming paid subscribers. This allows me to ensure that it continues
to have maximum impact. Maintaining free distributions means that news website,
blogs, and newsletters across the globe can republish it. I launched my column,
The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, 12 years ago. To borrow a phrase
from an early proprietor of The Observer, it offers readers, listeners, and
viewers ‘the scoop of interpretation.’ If you are able and willing to support
the column, please become a paid subscriber by clicking on Substack on
the subscription button and choosing one of the
subscription options.
To watch a video version of this story on
YouTube please click here.
A podcast version is
available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Spreaker, and Podbean.
Saudi
Arabia’s little touted effort to overhaul its defense and national security
architecture may be the United States’ best bet to rebuild relations with the
kingdom in ways that imbue values and complicate the establishment of similar
defense ties with China or Russia.
“Through the
vehicle of defense reform, the Biden administration has an opportunity to
engage the Saudis on critical national security matters while safeguarding US
strategic interests and honoring American values,” said political-military
analyst and former Pentagon official Bilal Y. Saab.
“It's a wise
form of US assistance that isn't politically controversial, doesn't cost much
US taxpayer money, and doesn't require a significant US presence on the ground.
It is perhaps the only way to reset the currently tense relationship by
gradually rebuilding trust between the two sides,” Mr. Saab concluded in a detailed study amid debate about the future of
US-Saudi relations and controversy over a visit to the kingdom by
President Joe Biden earlier this month.
Mr. Biden’s
visit may have helped persuade Saudi Arabia to
divert to Europe oil shipments destined for Asia but did little to restore
Middle Eastern confidence in the reliability of the United States as a global
leader and security guarantor.
If anything
the visit served to rehabilitate Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reputation,
tarnished by the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi with little
in return in terms of, for example, human rights in the kingdom.
Drawing a
comparison to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 economic reform
and diversification plan, Mr. Saab argued that the development of
implementation mechanisms that are refined as plans move forward would
determine the success of the defense and other change programmes.
“What Riyadh
lacks in Vision 2030 is not strategies or ideas—it has plenty of those—but
processes that help get them from point A to point B. It's the same problem
with the defense transformation plan,” Mr. Saab argued.
“The trick
for well-intentioned American advisers involved in the Saudi defense
transformation plan is to get the Saudis to stop treating it as an end in
itself and get them to work on essential processes they desperately need to
defend the kingdom today and adequately plan for the future,” he added.
The overhaul
of the defense and national security architecture, the most radical military
reform since the creation of Saudi Arabia in 1932, aims to enable the kingdom
to defend itself, absorb and utilize US weapons systems, and make meaningful
military and defense contributions to regional security,” Mr. Saab said. If
successful, the reforms would offer “invaluable lessons for US military
assistance across the region.”
So far,
"the kingdom has been the model of dysfunctional US-Arab military
cooperation, representing everything that has gone wrong in US-Arab defense ties,”
Mr. Saab, who at the Pentagon had oversight responsibilities for US Central
Command that operates in the Middle East, noted.
“For far too
long, Washington has sold the Saudis and other Arab partners expensive weapons
they either didn't need or know how to use and sustain properly, never
bothering to assist them in developing their armed forces so they could ably
assume their own national-security duties,” Mr. Saab asserted.
Over the
years, Saudi expenditure on the acquisition of arms, among the highest in the
world, juxtaposed with the kingdom’s inability to perform on the battlefield
and defend itself, made it the butt of jokes and ridicule.
The Saudi
failure was one driver of past widespread empathy with jihadists who, with 9/11
and until the defeat of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, appeared able to
achieve more with less.
To be sure,
Gulf states have progressed since the days when they were unable to field a
military response to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and
needed the international community to come to their rescue.
Saudi Arabia
has since fielded and sustained a military force in Yemen for the past seven
years but has been unable to reverse the territorial and strategic advances of
the Houthi rebels or prevent one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Mr. Bin
Salman, who has gained complete control of all of Saudi Arabia’s defense and
security forces since coming to office, has been driven in his national
security reforms by the lessons of the war in Yemen, Houthi and/or Iranian
attacks on oil and other critical infrastructure in the kingdom as well as the
United Arab Emirates, and the US failure to respond robustly to those incidents.
“Instead of
breaking or downgrading defense ties with the Americans, the Saudis wisely
chose to more effectively partner with them and seek their advice on how to
create a better-functioning defense establishment. Washington answered the call,”
Mr. Saab said.
But Mr. Saab
cautioned that while “this change in the US attitude toward defense relations
with Saudi Arabia and Saudi self-defense is monumental, necessary, and overdue,”
it was only one part of the equation. “The Saudis still have to execute, and given
the broad scope of their defense reforms, the journey will be long and
arduous,” he said.
Mr. Bin
Salman set the tone for the reforms by noting, “when I enter a base in
Saudi Arabia, I find the ground is made of marble, walls are ornamented and
finished with high quality. When I enter a base in America, I see no ceiling;
the ground is neither furnished with carpets nor made of marble, but only
concrete and practical.”
The state of
Saudi defense was abysmal before the launch of the reforms in 2017.
“Saudi
Arabia had no ability to formulate a coherent national-defense strategy nor any
effective operational and tactical guidance for its armed forces. Vision
existed only in the minds of one or two Western-educated royals close to the
king, and there were no clear procedures to ably communicate strategic and
policy direction to the military,” Mr. Saab said.
The Saudis
lacked systematic defense analysis and strategic planning to prioritize
missions and capabilities and identify requirements, which would have helped
them avoid buying expensive equipment they did not need.
Analysis and
planning world have also enabled them to monitor, assess, evaluate, or improve
the readiness levels of their troops. Similarly, Saudi ground and air forces
could not communicate with one another, which made coordination all but
impossible.
Saudi air
and missile defense may be where the kingdom has progressed the most. It has
intercepted hundreds of Houthi missile and drone attacks, even if some have
defeated Saudi defenses.
“Many of
Saudi Arabia's defense problems…still exist. What's encouraging, though, is that
the Saudis, under MBS's (Mohammed bin Salman’s) leadership, now recognize these
deficiencies and seem, for the first time, determined to address them in
partnership with the United States and to a degree with the United Kingdom.,”
Mr. Saab said.
Atmospherics
and public posturing may be one thing, the nitty gritty of US-Saudi cooperation
another. In the ultimate analysis, cutting through the noise to focus on what
is happening in the real world may be the best measure of the future of
US-Saudi relations. And that may be a more optimistic picture than meets the
eye.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an
award-winning journalist and scholar, a Senior Fellow at the National
University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and Adjunct Senior Fellow at
Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
Comments
Post a Comment