Playing games in NATO, Turkey eyes its role in a new world order
By James M. Dorsey
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NATO’s spat over Turkish
opposition to Swedish and Finnish membership is about
more than expanding the North Atlantic military alliance. It's as much about
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's immediate political goals as Turkey's
positioning itself in a new 21st-century world order.
On its surface, the spat is about Turkish efforts to
hinder support for Kurdish ethnic, cultural, and national aspirations in Turkey,
Syria, and Iraq and a crackdown on alleged supporters of a preacher who lives
in exile in the United States. Turkey accuses the preacher, Fethullah Gulen, of
instigating a failed military coup in 2016.
The spat may also be a play by NATO's second-largest
standing military to regain access to US arms sales, particularly upgrades for
Turkey’s aging fleet of F-16 fighter jets as well as more advanced newer models
of the F-16 and the top-of-the-line F-35.
Finally, playing the Kurdish card benefits Mr. Erdogan
domestically, potentially at a time that the Turkish economy is in the doldrums
with a 70 per cent inflation rate.
“Erdogan always benefits
politically when he takes on the Kurdistan Workers Party (the PKK) and groups
linked to it, like the YPG in Syria… In fact, attacking the
PKK and the YPG is a two-for-one. Erdogan is seen to take on genuine terrorists
and separatists, and at the same time, he gets to take a swipe at the United
States, which taps into the vast reservoir of anti-Americanism in Turkey,” said
Middle East scholar Steven A. Cook.
While important issues in and of themselves, they are
also likely to influence where Turkey will rank as the world moves towards a
bi-polar or multi-polar power structure.
The battle over perceived Scandinavian, and mainly,
Swedish support for Kurdish aspirations involves the degree to which the United
States and Europe will continue to kick the can down on the road of what
constitutes yet another Middle Eastern powder keg.
Mr. Erdogan announced this week that Turkey would soon
launch a new military incursion against US-backed Kurdish fighters in northeast
Syria. Mr. Erdogan said the operation would extend the
Turkish armed forces' areas of control in Syria to a 30-kilometer swath of land
along the two countries' shared border.
“The main target of these operations will be areas
which are centers of attacks to our country and safe zones,” the Turkish
president said.
Turkey asserts that the US-backed People's Protection
Units (YPG), a Syrian militia that helped defeat the Islamic State, is an
extension of the PKK. The PKK has waged a decades-long insurgency against
Turkey, home to some 16 million Kurds. Turkey, the United States, and the
European Union have designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation.
Mr. Erdogan charges that Sweden and Finland give the
PKK sanctuary and is demanding that the two countries extradite the group’s
operatives. Turkey has not officially released the names of 33 people it wants
to see extradited, but some were reported
in Turkish media close to the government.
Swedish
media reported that a physician allegedly on the list had
died seven years ago and was not known to have had links to the PKK. Another
person named was not resident in Sweden, while at least one other is a Swedish
national.
Swedish
and Finnish officials were in Ankara this week to
discuss Turkey’s objections. Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson
insisted as the officials headed for the Turkish capital that “we do not send
money or weapons to terrorist organizations.”
Conveniently, pro-government media reported the day
the officials arrived that Turkish forces found
Swedish anti-tank weapons in a cave in northern Iraq used by the PKK.
Turkey recently launched Operation Claw Lock against PKK positions in the
region.
Mr. Erdogan’s military plans complicate Swedish and
Finnish accession to NATO. The two Nordic states slapped an arms embargo on
Ankara after its initial
incursion into Syria in 2019. The Turkish leader has demanded the
lifting of the embargo as part of any deal on Swedish and Finnish NATO
membership.
A renewed incursion that would cement Turkey’s
three-year-old military presence in Syria could also throw a monkey wrench into
improving relations with the United States due to Turkish support for Ukraine
and efforts to mediate an end to the crisis sparked by the Russian invasion.
Turkey slowed its initial incursion into Syria after
then US President Donald J. Trump threatened to “destroy
and obliterate” Turkey’s economy.
The State Department warned this week that a renewed
incursion would
“undermine regional stability.”
Revived US arms sales would go a long way to cement
improved relations and downplay the significance of Turkey's acquisition of
Russia's S-400 anti-missile system, even if Turkey’s opposition to Scandinavian
membership will have a lingering effect on trust. The United States expelled
Turkey from its F-35 program in response to the acquisition.
This week, Mr. Erdogan appeared to widen the dispute
in NATO after Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis lobbied the US Congress
against military sales to Turkey. “Mitsotakis no longer exists for me. I will
never agree to meet him,” Mr. Erdogan said. He said that Mr. Mitostakis’
lobbying violated an agreement between the two men “not to involve third
countries in our bilateral issues.”
The US arms sales would also impact Turkish Russian
relations, even if Turkey, in contrast to most NATO members, will continue seeking
to balance its relationships and avoid an open rift with Moscow or Washington.
“Russia’s geopolitical revisionism is set to drive
Turkey and the West relatively closer together in matters
geopolitical and strategic, provided that Turkey’s current blockage of Sweden
and Finland’s NATO membership bid is resolved in the not too distant future,”
said Turkey scholar Galip Dalay.
Turkey's NATO gamble is a game of high-stakes poker,
given that Russia is as much a partner of Turkey as it is a threat.
NATO is Turkey’s ultimate shield against Russian
civilizationalist expansionism. Russian support in 2008 for irredentist regions
of Georgia and annexation of Crimea in 2014 created a buffer between Turkey and
Ukraine and complicated arrangements between Turkey and Russia in the Black
Sea.
Nevertheless, Mr. Erdogan risks fueling a debate about
Turkey's membership in NATO, much like Prime Minister Victor Orban's opposition
to a European embargo of Russian energy has raised questions about Hungary's
place in the EU.
“Does
Erdogan’s Turkey Belong in NATO?” asked former US vice-presidential
nominee Joe Lieberman and Mark D. Wallace, a former senator, in an oped in The
Wall Street Journal. Unlike Finland and Sweden, the two men noted that Turkey
would not meet NATO's democracy requirements if it were applying for membership
today.
"Turkey is a member of NATO, but under Mr.
Erdogan, it no longer subscribes to the values that underpin this great
alliance. Article 13 of the NATO charter provides a mechanism for members to
withdraw. Perhaps it is time to amend Article 13 to establish a procedure for
the expulsion of a member nation,” Messrs. Lieberman and Wallace wrote.
The two men implicitly argued that turning the tables
on Turkey would force the complicated NATO member back into line.
Adding to that, prominent Turkish journalist and
analyst Cengiz Candar cautioned that “giving into Ankara’s demands amounts to letting
an autocrat design the security architecture of Europe
and shape the future of the Western system.”
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar, a Senior Fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute and Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang
Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and
the author of the syndicated column and blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer.
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