Contesting Russia requires renewed US engagement in Central Asia
By James M.
Dorsey
When US
Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III declared that Washington wanted to see
Russia so “weakened" that it would no longer be able to invade a
neighbouring state, he lifted the veil on US goals in Ukraine. He also held out
the prospect of a long-term US-Russian contest for power and influence.
Mr. Austin's
remarks were problematic on several fronts. For one, they legitimised Russian
President Vladimir Putin's justification of the invasion of Ukraine as a
defence against US-led efforts to box Russia in and potentially undermine his
regime.
“US policy
toward Russia continues to be plagued by lack of
rhetorical discipline. First calling for regime change, now goal of
weakening Russia. This only increases Putin’s case for escalating & shifts
focus away from Russian actions in Ukraine & toward Russia-US/NATO
showdown,” tweeted New York-based Council of Foreign Relations president and
former senior State Department official Richard Haas.
Mr. Haas was
referring to President Joe Biden’s remark last month, which he subsequently walked
back, that Mr. Putin "cannot
remain in power."
Leaving
aside that Mr. Austin's remark was inopportune, it also suggested a lack of
vision of what it will take to ensure that Mr. Putin does not repeat his
Ukraine operation elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. That is an endeavour
that would involve looking beyond Ukraine to foster closer ties with former
Soviet republics that do not immediately border Ukraine.
One place to
look is Kazakhstan, a potential future target if Russia still has the
wherewithal after what has become a draining slug in Ukraine.
Mr. Putin
has long set Kazakhstan up as a potential future target.
He has
repeatedly used language when it comes to Kazakhstan that is similar to his
rhetoric on the artificial character of the Ukrainian state.
Referring to
his notion of a Russian world whose boundaries are defined by the presence of
Russian speakers and adherents to Russian culture rather than its
internationally recognised borders, Mr. Putin asserted last December that “Kazakhstan is a
Russian-speaking country in the full sense of the word."
Mr. Putin
first sent a chill down Kazakh spines eight years ago when a student asked him
nine months after the annexation of Crimea whether Kazakhstan, with a 6,800
kilometre-long border with Russia, the world’s second-longest frontier, risked
a fate similar to that of Ukraine.
In response,
Mr. Putin noted that then-president Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan's
Soviet-era Communist party boss, had "performed a unique feat: he has
created a state on a territory where there has never been a state. The Kazakhs never had a
state of their own, and he created it."
To be sure,
Russian troops invited in January by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to
help put down anti-government protests were quick
to withdraw from the Central Asian nation once calm had been restored.
Mr. Putin’s
remarks, coupled with distrust of China fuelled by the repression
of Turkic Muslims, including ethnic Kazakhs, in the north-western province
of Xinjiang, and the shutdown
of Russia’s Black Sea Novorossiysk oil terminal, Kazakhstan’s main Caspian
oil export route, creates an opportunity for the United States.
Last month, Kazakhstan
abstained in a United Nations General Assembly vote that condemned Russia
for its invasion of Ukraine. Since then, its sovereign wealth fund announced
that it would no
longer do business in rubles in compliance with US and European sanctions
against Russia. This week, Kazakhstan stopped
production of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine against Covid-19.
In an apparent
effort to stir the pot, Russian
media accused Kazakhstan of preventing Russian nationals from expressing
support for Mr. Putin’s invasion and firing Kazakhs who supported the Russian
president’s actions from their jobs. At the same time, opponents of the war
were allowed to stage demonstrations.
“As
Washington policymakers look for ways to counter Russian influence and
complicate Mr. Putin's life, helping
Kazakhstan reduce its dependence on Moscow-controlled pipelines, reform its
economy, and coordinate with neighbouring Central Asian states to limit the
influence of both China and Russia might be a good place to start,” said Wall
Street Journal columnist Walter Russell Mead.
Last month,
Mr. Tokayev, the Kazakh president, promised sweeping reforms in response to the
January protests.
A high-level
Kazakh delegation visited Washington this week to discuss closer
cooperation and ways to mitigate the impact on Kazakhstan of potentially crippling
sanctions against Russia.
Supporting
Kazakhstan would involve a renewed US engagement in Central Asia, a key region
that constitutes Russia as well as China’s backyard. The United States is
perceived to have abandoned the region with its withdrawal from Afghanistan
last August.
It would
also mean enlarging the figurative battlefield to include not only military and
financial support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia but also the
strengthening of political and economic ties with former Soviet republics such
as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan are, alongside Kazakhstan, members of the Russian-led Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU), which Mr. Putin, referring to Kazakhstan, described as a bulwark
that “helps them stay within the so-called 'greater Russian world,' which is part
of world civilization."
The invasion
of Ukraine has given Uzbekistan second thoughts. Uzbekistan failed to vote on
the UN resolution, but Uzbek officials have since condemned the war and
expressed support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
As a result,
Uzbekistan appears to have reversed its ambition to join the EEU and forge
closer ties to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the region’s
Russian-led military alliance.
“The way
Central Asia thinks about Russia has changed. While before, Russia was seen as
a source of stability, it now seems that its presence in a very sensitive
security dimension has become a weakness for regional stability, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity,” said Carnegie Endowment Central Asia scholar Temur
Umarov.
“I think
that Central
Asian governments will seek to minimise the influence of Russia, which will
be difficult to do, but they have no choice since it has become an
unpredictable power.” Mr. Umarov predicted.
To watch a video version of this story please
click here.
A podcast version is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon,
and Castbox.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar, a Senior Fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute and Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang
Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and
the author of the syndicated column and blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer.
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