UAE chalks up diplomatic successes with uncertain payoffs
By James M.
Dorsey
It has been
a good week for United Arab Emirates Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed.
Headline-grabbing,
fast-paced moves reinforce the UAE's position as a regional power. They
highlight the UAE's willingness to chart a course that increasingly competes
with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf's regional behemoth; is at times at odds with US
policy; and scoffs at assertions of human rights abuse by activists and Western
politicians.
Controversial
Emirati
general Ahmed Naser al-Raisi was elected this week as the next president of
Interpol despite calls by the European Parliament for
an investigation
into allegations that he oversaw physical abuse of detainees. Last month, two British nationals filed court
cases against him.
The UAE has
denied the allegations. “Major General Al-Raisi is a distinguished professional
with a 40-year track record in community and national policing. As the
President of Interpol, he will remain committed to protecting people, making communities safer and
providing global law enforcement the latest tools in the fight against
sophisticated criminal networks,” the UAE embassy in London said.
Mr. Al-Raisi
won the election at a gathering of the international policing body in Istanbul
weeks before the UAE takes up its seat as a
non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Turkey has been accused of being a
major abuser of the Interpol system.
Human rights
activists fear that Mr. Al-Raisi will use his new position to legitimize abuse
by autocrats of Interpol’s red notice arrest warrants to detain abroad and
extradite dissidents and political refugees. The UAE designated four exiled dissidents as
terrorists days
before Mr. Al-Raisi’s election.
Mr. Al-Raisi
was elected a day after Prince Mohammed paid a ground-breaking visit to Ankara
to patch up relations with Turkey and throw President Recep Tayyip Erdogan an
economic lifeline. Turkey and the UAE have been at odds for a decade over
Turkish support for popular revolts in the Middle East and North Africa and
political Islam.
The
rapprochement is part of a broader effort by Middle Eastern rivals, spurred
independently by the United States, China, and Russia, to reduce regional
tensions and prevent disputes and conflicts from spinning out of control.
The UAE and
Turkey have been on opposite sides of civil wars in Libya and Syria that
erupted in the wake of popular revolts and at odds in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The UAE has sought to reverse the achievements of uprisings supported by Turkey
that succeeded in toppling an autocratic leader like in Egypt. Turkey has suggested
that the UAE funded a failed 2016 military
attempt to remove
Mr. Erdogan from power.
The Emirati
moves also include a bid to replace Qatar and Turkey as managers of Kabul's
international airport; efforts to return Syria to the international
fold despite US
policy that aims to isolate the country; and steps to improve relations with
Iran. In addition, the UAE this week
concluded a solar energy deal with Jordan and Israel that Saudi Arabia sought to thwart.
The UAE
hopes that reviving Syria's membership in the 22-nation Arab League and
reconstruction funding will persuade President Bashar al-Assad to loosen his
ties to Iran. Prince Mohammed’s visit to Turkey coincided with talks in Dubai with a senior Iranian
official in advance
of an expected trip to Tehran by the crown prince’s brother and
national security advisor, Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
The moves reinforce
the UAE's position as an influential middle power on the international stage in
defiance of being a small state with a population deficit.
Nonetheless,
the moves also prove that reducing tensions and managing differences do not by
definition bury hatchets, end rivalries, or reduce competition.
The jury is
out on the degree to which the Emirati moves will successfully persuade
one-time detractors like Turkey to alter their policies fundamentally. For
example, Turkey is unlikely to shutter its military base in Qatar that it
expanded during the 3.5-year UAE-Saudi-led diplomatic and economic boycott of
the Gulf state. Closing the base was one of the boycott's demands.
Mr Erdogan
desperately needs the investments. He sees Prince Mohammed’s economic olive
branch as a way to reverse a downturn in his economy that threatens to spiral
further downwards. The crisis has already fueled street protests and opposition hopes to defeat him in the next election.
In a welcome
step, the UAE announced hours after Mr. Erdogan met with Prince Mohammed that
it would put US$10 billion into an investment
fund that would
target energy, food, health and climate change-related sectors of the Turkish
economy as well as trade.
Emirati
investments in Turkish ports are likely to significantly strengthen Dubai
global ports management and logistics company DP World’s network in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
In addition,
Iranian officials said the UAE moves had made a
transport corridor from the UAE to Turkey via Iran possible. A first ship departing from
Sharjah in the UAE en route to Mersin in Turkey docked at the Iranian port of
Shahid Rajai a day after Prince Mohammed ‘s visit.
Mr. Erdogan
expects the Emirati investments to buoy Turkey's floundering economy at a time
that its currency is tumbling. The Turkish lira appreciated by about one
point as Prince
Mohammed arrived in the country.
However, Qatar,
with US$22 billion already invested in
Turkey, may not
stand idly by as the UAE improves relations with Ankara. On the contrary, it
could well seek to cement its existing relationship with further investments.
It remains
unclear how much of a political price, Mr. Erdogan may be paying for UAE
support. So far, he has curbed Muslim Brotherhood activity in
Istanbul in response
to Emirati and Egyptian demands but refused to expel the Brothers or extradite
them to Egypt.
Similarly,
the UAE’s bid to displace Qatar and Turkey at Kabul airport may prove to be an
uphill battle. It is hard to see why the Taliban would want to create friction
with Qatar, representing US interests in Afghanistan as well as offering a home
to Western diplomatic missions focused on Afghanistan, and hosting talks
between the Islamist group and the United States.
In sum, Mr.
Erdogan may be down as he rebuilds relations with the UAE, but he's not out.
That, in turn, could put a damper on what reconciliation with the UAE will
achieve politically.
"Turkeys
s economy might be going through its darkest days decades, yet foreign policy still allows...Erdogan
to score points,"
said prominent Turkish journalist Cengiz Cander.
Indeed, as
he seeks to improve strained relations with Middle Eastern states -- the UAE,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel -- Mr. Erdogan is also attempting to carve out his own sphere of influence by blowing new life into the
Organization of Turkic states. The organisation groups Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, with a total population of some 170 million people.
However, the
Emirati-Turkish rapprochement could help shape developments in conflict zones
like Libya, where the UAE and Turkey supported opposing sides.
With the Libyan
election scheduled for next month, the UAE is betting on one of two horses
in the race: rebel
commander Khalifa Haftar and Aref al-Nayed. Mr. Al-Nayed is a former UAE
ambassador to the Emirates who heads a UAE group that propagates the UAE's
moderate but autocratic version of Islam. The group was one of several created
to counter Islamist clerics supported by Qatar.
Suggesting
that rapprochement with the UAE has not reduced Turkish influence in Libya,
unconfirmed reports said that Mr. Haftar’s son, Saddam Haftar, made separate
visits to Turkey and Israel to solicit support.
In a move
that simultaneously supported UAE diplomacy, Mr. Haftar this week released seven Turkish nationals held captive by his forces for the
last two years,
"Turkey
is in bad shape economically, and Erdogan seems to be crumbling politically.
However, it may still be too early to write him off thanks to foreign
developments," said Mr. Candar.
A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr,
Podbean, Audecibel,
and Castbox.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar and a Senior Fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute.
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