A new world: The Middle East tries cooperation alongside competition
Just in case
there were any doubts, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu demonstrated
with his visit to Lebanon this week that improved relations between Middle
Eastern rivals would not bury hatchets.
On the
contrary, improved relations shifts the battlefield away from potential armed
conflict, allowing rivals to compete while enjoying the benefits of trade and
economic cooperation as well as lines of communication that help prevent
disputes and conflicts from spinning out of control.
With his
visit, Mr. Cavusoglu was stepping into a breach. He sought to fill a vacuum
after Turkey’s geopolitical and religious soft power rivals, Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates, together with Bahrain and Kuwait, imposed an economic boycott on Lebanon and withdrew their
ambassadors from Beirut.
A one-time
middle-income country, Lebanon is teetering on the brink of collapse due to
endemic corruption and an elite willing to protect its vested interests at
whatever cost. As a result, the United Nations estimates that three-quarters of the population have
descended into poverty.
Aggravating
Lebanon’s predicament, the boycott intends to loosen the grip on the country of
Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia and political party, which has become
part of the elite. A Hezbollah protest in October, demanding the replacement of
a judge investigating last year's devastating Beirut port explosion that killed more than 200 people,
descended into sectarian violence reminiscent of
Lebanon’s 15-year long civil war in the 1970s and 1980s.
Mr. Cavusoglu
travelled to Beirut in advance of a one-day UAE-Turkey business forum in
Istanbul and a visit by UAE Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed,
the first in 12 years. Turkish interior minister Suleyman Soylu met
in Rome with his UAE counterpart, Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, days after the Beirut
visit on the sidelines of the Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.
Turkey and
the UAE have been at loggerheads because of Turkish allegations that the
Emirates had funded a failed 2016 military attempt to topple President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and Emirati objections to Turkish support for political Islam,
particularly the Muslim Brotherhood.
Turkey and
the UAE have fought military and/or political proxy battles in Libya, Syria, the Eastern
Mediterranean,
and France, where they were on opposite sides
of the divide. Moreover, Turkey supported Qatar and expanded its military
presence in the Gulf state during the 3.5 year-long UAE-Saudi-led diplomatic
and economic boycott of Qatar that was lifted in January.
Similarly, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been seeking to tone down their
differences with Turkey at a time of uncertainty over the United States’
security commitments in the Middle East and the need of all Middle Eastern
states to focus on some combination of economic reform, diversification, and
expansion as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and the demands of climate
change.
Against that
backdrop, Mr. Cavusoglu travelled to Tehran a day before arriving in Beirut. In
Tehran, he sought to bolster his position as a potential mediator in Lebanon,
manage Turkish-Iranian tensions in the
Caucasus
along the Azerbaijani-Iranian border, and find some common ground in Syria where the two countries are also at
odds.
“If there is
anything that can be done for the issue (in Lebanon) to be resolved as soon as
possible, we are ready to carry it out, ” Mr. Cavusoglu said.
Despite
improving relations between Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, it was unlikely
that the Gulf states would loosen their stranglehold on Lebanon or that they
would trust Turkey to be an acceptable and unbiased mediator.
At the same
time, Turkey appeared to be further drawing regional battle lines not only with
Saudi Arabia and the UAE but also Southeast European states as well as Russia
and Iran, with which it simultaneously competes and cooperates.
It did so in
a gathering in Istanbul last week of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking
States. The council groups Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan,
Turkic-speaking states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkmenistan, the only
other Turkic-speaking nation, and Hungary have observer status.
The Istanbul
gathering restricted membership and observer
status to Turkic-speaking countries. The decision bars not only other Southeast European
countries from associating themselves with the council but also Iran, where
Azeris, the country's largest ethnic minority, account for 15 per cent of the
population, and Russia with its Turkic minorities.
Add to all of
this the diplomatic impact of last week’s arrest on espionage charges and the
subsequent release of an Israeli tourist couple for taking pictures of Istanbul’s
Dolmabahce Palace, one of the city’s major tourism attractions. The palace on
the shores of the Bosporus served as the administrative headquarters of Ottoman
sultans in the 19th century and the place of death in 1938 of Kemal
Mustafa Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey.
The couple's
release prompted the first phone call between Mr. Erdogan and top Israeli
leaders in nine years, with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Naftali
Bennett phoning the Turkish president separately to thank him. Israel has until
now cold-shouldered Turkish efforts to improve long-strained relations between
the two countries.
Beyond the
fact that Mr. Erdogan does not want the incident to scare off badly needed
tourists at a time of severe economic crisis, it also provided an opportunity
to break through to Israel and reduce the UAE’s geopolitical advantage in
maintaining close ties to the Jewish state. Mr. Erdogan expects the Turkish
move to be reciprocated. That is precisely what Israeli conservatives fear.
“Ankara’s
accusations of ‘espionage’ and apparent threats to raise the price for the
detainees show that it was using hostage diplomacy involving innocent tourists.
This is how Hamas, which is backed by Ankara’s ruling party, has also behaved… Normal regimes don’t detain innocent
people,”
thundered Seth J. Frantzman, the right-wing Jerusalem Post’s Middle East
correspondent.
A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr,
Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon,
and Castbox.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar and a Senior Fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute.
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