China could signal increased engagement with Iran but doesn’t
By James M.
Dorsey
Here are two
potential indicators of Chinese interest in moving ahead with a proposed US$400
billion economic and military cooperation agreement with Iran: a Chinese push
for Iranian membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and
renewed interest in a China-Pakistan-Iran-Turkey energy pipeline. China has
moved on neither.
While
converting Iran’s SCO observer status into membership would primarily signal Chinese
interest in substantially increasing its engagement with the Islamic republic,
moving ahead with the pipeline could be a geopolitical game changer.
China’s
refusal to signal interest in putting flesh on the skeleton of its
partnership with Iran following the leaking of a purported, wide-ranging
agreement between the two countries suggests that the People’s Republic neither
wants to increase tension with the United States by blatantly violating harsh
US sanctions against the Islamic republic nor does it wish to upset its
balancing of relations with Tehran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia.
The pipeline
that would cater to the energy, economic and security needs of all participants
may be on the backburner for now, but geo-politicking in the Middle East and
South Asia is likely to spur a renewed Pakistani, Iranian and Turkish push for
the project.
Driving a
potential push are shifting sands that raise the spectre of geopolitical
realignment. They include a rift
between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia over the lack of Gulf support for
Islamabad in its conflict with India over Kashmir; calls for India
to align itself with the Saudi-United Arab Emirates-led alliance against
Turkey, Qatar, and Iran; and ambitions of Turkey, embroiled in multiple
conflicts in the Mediterranean, to position itself as an energy
transit hub.
The pipeline
was first touted in 2015 in anticipation of the lifting/and or easing of US and
United Nations sanctions against Iran as a result of an international agreement
that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear programme.
Funded by
China, construction that was slated to incorporate an already partially built
link between Iran and Pakistan, was to be carried out by a subsidiary of
state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation.
The United
States’ withdrawal in 2018 from the nuclear agreement and reimposition of
sanctions put the pipeline project on ice with neither Pakistan nor China
wanting to be in violation of US law.
But Pakistan
and Iran, in a first step aimed at reviving the project, agreed last year that
the Islamic republic that completed its section of the link between the two
countries would withdraw
from arbitration procedures that would have likely forced Pakistan to pay a
penalty for not living up to its part of the deal. Under the agreement,
Pakistan has to complete its leg of the pipeline by 2024.
Chinese
scholars Fei-fei Guo, Cheng-feng Huang, and Xiao-ling Wua concluded in a
detailed study that “China urgently needs to open up new energy channels to
reduce the reliance on the Malacca Strait,” a chokepoint in Southeast Asia that
China fears could become a stranglehold in a confrontation with the United
States.
The scholars
went on to note that “the energy corridor is in line with the energy strategic
objectives of China, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey,” but cautioned that regional
conflicts, including in Pakistan’s Balochistan province as well as in
south-eastern Turkey and in Iran posed threats.
A Chinese Communist party
newspaper, in a rare comment on possible greater engagement with Iran,
suggested in July in an oped written by Middle East scholar Fan Hongda that there
could be a point in the downward spiral of US-Chinese relations at which China
would no longer regard the potential cost of violating US sanctions as too
high.
A “factor
that cannot be ignored regarding the improvement of Sino-Iranian relations is
that China is less and less constrained by US factors when considering its
diplomacy with Iran,” Mr. Fan said.
China is not
there yet but the Middle East and South Asia’s shifting sands are lending
urgency to the project from Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran’s perspective.
Pakistan initially
signalled last December its interest in aligning itself with Turkey, Qatar and
Iran by agreeing to participate in an Islamic
summit in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur convened to challenge Saudi
leadership of the Muslim world.
Bowing to
Saudi pressure, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan withdrew from the summit at
the last minute.
Eight months
later, Pakistan was again challenging Saudi leadership.
Complaining
about lack of support of the Saudi-dominated Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) that groups 57 Muslim-majority nations for Pakistan in its
conflict with India over Kashmir, Foreign
Minister Shah Mahmood Qureishi suggested that his country would seek to
rally support beyond the realm of the kingdom.
The spat, coupled
with Turkish support for Kashmir, much to the chagrin of India, has opened the
door to South Asian nations potentially lining up on different sides of the
Middle East’s fault lines at a time that China and India are at loggerheads.
The potential
line-up and Chinese-Indian tensions are likely to be insufficient for Beijing
to divert for now from its Saudi-Iranian balancing act.
Ultimately,
that keeps the China-Pakistan-Iran-Turkey corridor on ice but does not take it
off the table.
However, greater
South Asian alignment with rivalling Middle Eastern states constitutes one more
incentive for China to step up its subtle efforts to persuade Middle Eastern
states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, to dial down regional tensions and
seek arrangements to manage their differences in a way that prevents them from
spinning out of control.
The stakes
for China are high given that it is investing up to US$62 billion in Pakistan,
the People’s Republic’s single largest country investment related to its Belt
and Road Initiative that seeks to tie Eurasia to Beijing through transport, energy,
and telecommunications infrastructure.
Nonetheless,
Daniel S. Markey, author of a recent book on China’s
Western Horizon, cautions that “we should not underestimate the extent to
which…China remains relatively conflict-averse and conservative, reluctant to
throw itself into potentially costly situations…”
At the rate
at which Middle Eastern and South Asian sands are shifting, that could prove to
be increasingly difficult.
A podcast
version of this story is available on
Soundcloud, Itunes,
Spotify,
Stitcher,
TuneIn,
Spreaker,
Pocket Casts, Tumblr,
Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.
Dr. James
M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang
Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in
Singapore. He is also a senior research fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture in Germany.
Comments
Post a Comment