Ratcheting up tension: US designation of Revolutionary Guards risks escalation
By James M.
Dorsey
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The stakes
in the Middle East couldn’t be higher.
Suspicion
that the United States’ intent is to change the regime in Tehran rather than
its officially stated goal of forcing Iran to curb its ballistic missile
program and support for militias in Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen was heightened with
this week’s decision to designate
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization.
It was the
first time that the United States labelled a branch of a foreign government as
a terrorist entity, particularly one that effects millions of Iranian citizens
who get conscripted into the military and for whom the IRGC is an option.
“Today’s
unprecedented move to designate the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization demonstrates
our commitment to maximize pressure on the Iranian regime until it ceases
using terrorism as tool of statecraft,” tweeted Mr. Trump’s national security
adviser, John Bolton..
The
designation effectively blocks Mr. Trump’s potential successor from possibly
returning to the 2015 international accord that curbed Iran’s nuclear program,
complicates any diplomatic effort to resolve differences, and changes the rules
of engagement in theatres like Syria where US and Iranian forces operate in
close proximity to one another.
“Through
this, some US
allies are seeking to ensure a US-Iran war or to, at a minimum, trap them
in a permanent state of enmity,” said Trita Parsi, head of the National Iranian
American Council, referring to Saudi Arabia and Israel.
The
designation was likely to embolden advocates in Washington, Saudi Arabia and
Israel of a more aggressive covert war against Iran that would seek to stoke
unrest among the Islamic republic’s ethnic minorities, including Baloch, Kurds
and Iranians of Arab descent.
Both Saudi
Arabia and Israel were quick to applaud the US move. Israeli prime minister
Benyamin Netanyahu, on the eve of a hard-fought election, claimed
credit for the suggestion to designate the IRGC. The official Saudi news
agency asserted that the
decision translates the Kingdom’s repeated demands to the international
community of the necessity of confronting terrorism supported by Iran.”
The risk of
an accident or unplanned incident spiralling out of control and leading to
military confrontation has also been heightened by Iran’s response, declaring
the US military in the greater Middle East a terrorist entity.
The US move
and the Iranian response potentially put US military personnel in the Gulf as
well as elsewhere in the region in harm’s way.
The
designation also ruled out potential tacit US-Iranian cooperation on the ground
as occurred in Iraq in the fight
against the Islamic State and in Afghanistan.
That cooperation inevitably involved the IRGC.
Beyond
geopolitical and military risks, the designation increases economic pressure on
Iran because the IRGC is not only an army but also
a commercial conglomerate with vast interests in construction, engineering
and manufacturing.
It remained
however unclear to what degree the sanctions would affect the IRGC, which, already
heavily sanctioned, does much of its business in cash and through front
companies.
US policy,
even before the IRGC designation, had already raised the spectre of a nuclear
race in the Middle East. The designation increases the chances that Iran will
walk away from the nuclear agreement.
Saudi
Arabia has however already been putting in place the building blocks for its
own nuclear program in anticipation of Iran abandoning the agreement and
returning to its full-fledged, pre-2015 enrichment project.
The IRGC
goes to the heart of the Iranian regime. It was formed to protect the regime
immediately after the 1979 revolution at a time that Iran’s new rulers had
reason to distrust the military of the toppled shah.
Some of the
shah’s top military and security commanders discussed crushing the revolution
at a dinner on new year’s eve 1978, some six weeks before the shah’s regime
fell. It was the shah’s refusal to endorse their plan that foiled it. The shah
feared that large-scale bloodshed would dim the chances of his exiled son ever
returning to Iran as shah.
The IRGC has
since developed into a key pillar of Iran’s
defense strategy which seeks to counter perceived covert operations by the
United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel by supporting proxies across the Middle
East.
It is a
strategy that has proven both effective and costly, Iran’s failure to address
fears that the strategy is an effort to export its revolutions and topple the
region’s conservative regimes, particularly in the Gulf, has raised the cost.
To be sure,
the Iranian revolution constituted a serious threat to autocratic rulers. It
was a popular revolt like those more than 30 years later in the Arab world. The
Iranian revolt, however, toppled not only an icon of US power in the Middle
East and a monarch, it also created an alternative form of Islamic governance
that included a degree of popular sovereignty.
The
revolution unleashed a vicious cycle that saw
Gulf states fund the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s in which up
to one million people died; Saudi Arabia wage a
four-decade long US$100 billion campaign to globally propagate
ultra-conservative, anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian strands of Islam; repeated
attempts to stoke
ethnic tensions among Iran’s disgruntled minorities, and Iranian counter
measures including support for proxies across the Middle East and violent
attacks against Americans, Israelis, Jews and regime opponents in various parts
of the world.
“Given that
the IRGC is already sanctioned by the US Treasury, this
step is both gratuitous and provocative. It will also put countries such as
Iraq and Lebanon in even more difficult situations as they have no alternative
but to deal with the IRGC. It will strengthen calls by pro-Iran groups in Iraq
to expel US troops,” said Barbara Slavin, an Iran expert at the Washington’s
Atlantic Council
James M
Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, adjunct senior research fellow at the National
University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the
University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture
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