How will the Qatar crisis affect internal Palestinian politics? (JMD quoted on Diwan)
Hani Masri | Director-general of Masarat, the Palestinian
Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies
Qatar maintains close ties with Hamas and the
Palestinian
Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas, while also
hosting
Hamas’ leadership in Doha. In this context, we can
understand
the significance of the visit of a Hamas delegation
to Cairo a day
after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, and its
agreeing to Egyptian
security conditions. This led to the reopening of
the Rafah crossing,
allowing Egyptian goods and fuel to enter Gaza.
Here was a change in the policy of Egypt, which had
preferred to
deal with Gaza through the Palestinian Authority.
The change
was explained by Egyptian anger at Abbas’ refusal
to reintegrate
Mohammad Dahlan—the former head of the Preventive
Security
Force in Gaza and now an ally of Egypt and the
United Arab
Emirates (UAE)—into Fatah’s Central Committee, and
the
Palestinian president’s punitive actions against
Gaza, despite
Cairo’s warning that an explosion there could harm
Egyptian
interests.
Egypt, the UAE, and other states opposing Qatar
seek to take
Gaza out of Qatar’s orbit. That explains the
coincidence of the
Egyptian agreement with Hamas and the
understandings
reached between Hamas and Dahlan, the Islamic
movement’s
old enemy, whose implementation could lead to a new
partnership in Gaza and the emergence of a strong
alignment
against Abbas. This would deepen Palestinian
divisions, with
Dahlan’s return hastening the battle over Abbas’
succession.
Israel would be the biggest beneficiary. It would
exploit
Palestinian divisions to claim that there is no
Palestinian
partner, thus implementing its plan to liquidate
the
Palestinian cause.
Nathan Brown | Non-resident senior fellow in the
Carnegie Middle East program, professor of
political science
and international affairs at George Washington
University,
and co-author of the recent Carnegie report
It is very old news—dating back to 1948 if not
earlier—that Arab
states fight their rivals on the turf of internal
Palestinian politics.
However, since the 1960s Palestinian national
leaders have built
a set of institutions (the different political
factions, the Palestine
National Congress, the Palestinian National
Authority) or seized
control of others (the Palestine Liberation
Organization) to cope
with such meddling and preserve some ability for
the Palestinians
to act for themselves.
The current round of intervention in Palestinian
affairs by the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and others is a
return to an
era when those institutions were weak or did not
exist. It is a
product not only of the new Arab proxy wars but also of
the decay of Palestinian institutions that now
facilitate rather
than resist such meddling. Hamas and the
Palestinian National
Authority, the newest elements in the Palestinian
institutional
makeup, actively allow others to write Palestine’s
future.
However, the current round of intervention is worse
for
Palestinians than its counterpart a half-century
ago, when outside
actors at least evinced a pretense of commitment to
the Palestinian
cause. Today’s meddlers benefit no identifiable
Palestinian interest.
James Dorsey | Senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang
Technological
University, syndicated columnist, and author
of the blog,
The short answer is that the jury is still out.
What is clear is that
Hamas has been left out from the list of
organizations drafted by
the Saudi-United Arab Emirates-led alliance opposed
to Qatar.
This was done as an incentive to push the Islamist
group to accept
a power-sharing agreement in the Gaza Strip that
would allow the
return of Mohammed Dahlan, the former head of the
Preventive
Security Force there. Dahlan is an Abu Dhabi-based
arch-rival of
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas who has
close ties to Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, Egyptian
President
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Israeli Defense Minister
Avigdor
Lieberman. Dahlan’s ambition is to succeed Abbas.
Lower salaries for public-sector employees in Gaza
paid by Abbas’
Palestinian Authority (PA) and reduced Israeli
energy supplies to
the strip at the PA’s behest have caught Hamas in a
pincer
movement imposed by Abbas, Israel, Egypt, and the
UAE. As a
result, it has been forced to turn for help to
Egypt, a UAE and Saudi
ally, and to enter into talks with Dahlan about a
power-sharing
agreement. Hamas is caught between a rock and a
hard place.
Continued economic pressure undermines its ability
to rule.
Surrendering any degree of control over Gaza
undermines its
power base. In short, whichever way the Gulf crisis
is resolved,
Hamas’ position and standing are likely to be
impacted.
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