The Middle East in Transition: Repression, Discontent and the Role of Football (JMD on movements@manchester)
The Middle East in Transition: Repression, Discontent
and the Role of Football
Ulrike Flader
An interview with James M.
Dorsey, Senior Fellow at S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies of
Nanyang Technological University
in Singapore and co-director of the
Institute of Fan Culture in
Würzburg/Germany. He is also an award-winning
journalist, working
among others on the Middle East since the mid 1970s.
His monograph
Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer was published
with Hurst Publishers in 2014 [1].
Middle East over the recent years arguing that
despite the repressive reactions
of the governments towards political dissent, a
radical shift in status quo is
underway. He describes the economic
and social factors which continue to
nourish discontent in various countries in the
Middle East, and explains,
focusing on the case of Eygpt, why football has
played such a central role in
the protests.
You have recently argued that the current protests
in Lebanon and
elsewhere in the region seem to defy the impression that the
brutal
suppression of civic protest in the Middle East has been successful.
Can tell us more about the protests that are going on at the moment
and to what extent they are challenging the current governments?
Let me paint a larger picture first. I think there
is a broad sort of sense that –
post popular revolts of 2011 – the effort for
change has been defeated; that
the Middle East is a bloody ugly mess and nothing
has changed. And I think
that is fundamentally wrong. The Middle East is in
transition.
Firstly, you might not like the Islamic State and
various other forces that have
originated, but the fact is the Islamic State is
an agent of change. It may not
be the change one wants regarding democracy,greater
freedom etc, but it is a
fundamental challenge to the status quo. Secondly,
where ever this goes, it
will take a long time. The status quo is no longer a
sustainable paradigm.
What that means is that on the one hand, transition
as an answer to protest,
anger and frustration, had been closed off and
public space has vanished,
obviously resulting in more militant, more radical,
more mobile responses.
The assumption then again was that some people had been
cowed, either
because of the situation in their own countries, or because
they look at the
situation in Syria, in Iraq or Yemen and feel they would
rather have a degree
of security and stability, than the chaos that they see around
them. However,
what we are seeing in certain groups in Iraq, and also to a
lesser degree in
Egypt, is that this is not really the case.
When things get to a point where it is no longer
sustainable, when the
garbage is piling up on the streets [like in Lebanon],
suddenly the people
are back on the streets. Secondly, what you see – certainly
in the case of
Lebanon and Iraq – is that these kind of protests cross ethnic and
sectarian
boundaries. Everybody smells the same stuff in Beirut. So, that is what I
think
the bigger picture is. In a sense, one could argue that the Islamic State on
one extreme and peaceful protest in Beirut, Bagdad or Basra on the other
extreme, are flipsides of the same coin, depending on what margins and
public
space there is. The fundamental point it is that the Middle East is
in
transition.
So, are you arguing that the authoritarian regimes
are currently
breaking up and that there is space for different
kinds of contestation
or are saying that in a way we have overlooked the
potential that
there was before?
I am saying a bit of both. There is a tendency that
people have written off
peaceful protest. But, I think it is more that – on
a whole range of different
levels, from country to country, but also differing
from sub-region to sub-
region – the traditional paradigm is breaking down.
Whether that is a
government which cannot get its waste management
together or whether
it is a government that cannot provide electricity
or water, or it is a social
contract, like in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, which is
frayed because of the
economics of it, this paradigm is on the defensive.
You have a mix of
popular responses to that, exploiting whatever
opportunities or margins
there are. For example in Lebanon, there is now a
margin to take to the
streets. In Iraq, you have both that margin, but
also many Sunni are
opting for the Islamic State, not because they
necessarily like their
particular interpretation of Shari’ah, but because
they are not being
offered an alternative. This is the least of the
bad alternatives that there
are. The responses like the Egyptian one, call it
counter-revolution or
whatever, are also failing. So, that is the magnet
field in which they are
operating in.
In a way, you are saying that however harsh the
responses might
currently be, the underlying critique of the
current governments
or regimes is so strong that it reemerges in
specific moments again
and again, is that right?
Yes, or to phrase is differently: The simple return
to the status quo is no
longer an option. No matter how defensive the
various regimes are, it could
very well prove to be Saudi Arabia’s Vietnam. And
the final chapter of the
Lebanese stories is by far not written. What you
essentially have is a paradigm
of authoritarian rule and a paradigm of
exclusionary rule, rather than
inclusionary rule of a very passive public, and a
growing inability to produce
the kind of drive to keep a social contract which
is no longer sustainable, to
deliver the minimum of public services and goods.
This has over the last four
years produced a situation which is fluid and in
which the push for change
occurs in multiple ways depending on opportunities,
circumstances etc. These
many ways are unpredictable in the same way as we
cannot predict a popular
revolt.
Is it possible to see a similar pattern in these
different countries
that this exclusionary kind of politics and the
failure to provide public
services triggers popular critique of the
governments?
It differs from country to country. Obviously,
Egypt is not supplying the public
services and goods, neither is Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon; Jordan is struggling, but it
also has the refugee influx. In the Gulf, certainly
in Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia, in
the UA the social contract, in terms of maintaining
of the social welfare state is
fraying: the introduction of taxes, charges for
services etc. Saudi Arabia is
definitely exclusionary in terms of its minorities.
While the UA is at a cultural
level very inclusive, you have Synagogues, Hindu
Temples, you have churches
etc. and yet, the social contract is fraying. There
is a lot of grumbling. While
there is on the one hand pride in the military
performance, on the other,
conscription is only a year old and now there are
soldiers dying in a war that
was not part of the bargain. There are
democratic issues that play a role. In
Kuwait, one of the shocks of the last mosque
bombing was that the Bidoon
were very heavily involved. So, it is not that one
glove fits all. It differs from
country to country. But, the underlying more general
issues are sort of the
same even if the way they are articulated and the
way they emerge in
different countries may be different.
Would you say that the Arab Spring, as we call it,
had a triggering
effect on the general questioning of the status quo
or are there
broader underlying issues?
I think it is broader than that. In 2001 and 2002,
the King in Saudi Arabia
at the time had already started tinkering with the
welfare state. Saudi Arabia
is almost unique in this. If you look at the per
capita income, at the GDP per
capita income, in Saudi Arabia: In 1985, it was
17,000 $. On the 11 September
2001, it was $ 6,700. This means it had dropped
by more than 100% in an
oil-rich country. The Saudis were struggling. They
were having two and three
jobs, if they could find jobs, trying to make ends
meet. At the time of the self-
(Saudi Arabia) over another mishandling of flooding issues. You had huge
clashes
in Amman (Jordan) in which 250 people were injured during a soccer
match.
This is November 2010. This was brewing and it all sort of came
together
with the revolts.
And
I think the argument you are making is that it is still brewing
today,
that there is still a transition going on, is that right?
Absolutely.
If we take a step back, whatever you think of George W. Bush,
there
is actually one very wise thing that he said in 2001 after 9/11 that
many
people have forgotten, and I am paraphrasing now, but he essentially
said,
the United States or the West was equally guilty in terms of the 9/11
attacks
because of its support for undemocratic regimes. That is where his
democracy
initiative came from, which was totally mishandled. But, it was
the
recognition that stability wasn’t working. So, in that period of time,
officials,
analysts etc. were waiting for the Arab street to act, but the Arab
street
never responded on their timetable. So, if you were an analyst in those
times
saying it is bubbling, you were dismissed. But, fact is that these things
bubble
and they can bubble for a long time and there may or may not be the
spark
that brings them to explode, but that doesn’t mean it is not there.
Do
you think that the current protests could increase so strongly that
there
would be another great wave of contestation like the Arab Spring?
Or
do you think people are more careful? I think you mention that in a
recent
analysis of the current situation in Lebanon.
Algerians
are also more careful now, because they still remember the war. I
don’t
think you can predict it. First of all, it is too early. In other words, if
Lebanon
succeeds, i.e. they force the government out or force change,
obviously
people will take heart from this. But, if they don’t succeed, that will
be
less encouraging. You could also argue – but this is pure speculation – that
the
paradigm of brutal response to peaceful protest – in the form that you
have
in Bahrain – is a model that works for a period of time, but look at Syria.
So,
whether or not a regime may respond differently, because it looks at Syria
and
doesn’t want to end up that way: the jury is out. So, I don’t want to predict
anything. But, what you can say is that the discontent is there. It comes
to the
surface whenever there is an opportunity and something that sparks it.
The
region
is in change and the paradigm is shifting, without a moral judgment
whether
it is going in the right or wrong direction. But, fundamentally, there
is
no way back to status quo.
So,
does this means that there is a potential that the governments
also
change their strategies towards these kinds of protest?
First
of all, there is also another level of change. The chances of Syria
ever
becoming a nation-state again are minimal. I would also place no
bet
on Iraq, neither on Yemen. So, that is a whole different dynamic we
have
now. The last four years have shown that the willingness of certain
regimes
to retain power at whatever price is quite remarkable, whether
that
is the Saudis or Bashar [Al-Assad] or Ali Abdullah. It is a degree of
unprecedented willingness. Bahrain, is a success story in those terms. I
would
say it is a failure, but they are managing to keep the lid on.
However,
it is a question how long that will last. Syria is an obvious total
failure.
So, there are no clear answers.
I
think a figure which you recently cited, underlines quite well what
you
have been explaining so far that the discontent and protest
continue
to bubble. According to these figures from Democracy
Index, 807 anti-government protests were
staged by militant
football
fans and students in Egypt between October of last year
and
June this year, despite the repressive regime of Abdel Fattah
Al
Sisi.
That
is true. But, you also had in Egypt is a popular revolt – miscalculated
in
lots of different ways – which, however, succeeded in indirectly forcing
the
resignation of the president. This lead to a lot of aspirations and
expectations,
which, however, were dashed in the following. So, while
you
have some young people that have become apathetic, disillusioned,
grown-in-age
etc, there is a whole segment of the youth that hasn’t given
up.
Egypt
draws on almost a century of tradition and history [of a student
movement].
In other words, the traditional understanding of the 1919
revolution
is that it was the students who staged their revolt that lead to
independence
in 1922. What that establishes is that students have played
a
very important role throughout various periods of history in Egypt. And if
you
look at who those students were in 1919, they were football fans. The
place
where they met, what was their breeding ground, was the founding
of
[the football club] Al Ahly SC under the auspices of the Wafd Party. If
you
fast forward to around the 1970s, where the Brotherhood had gone
through
basically 25 years of oppression until Sadat started to use them
against
the Left, the Brotherhood was almost withered away and it was the
student
movement that blew new life into it. The older generation, especially
the
spiritual guides, engaged with the students travelling the country
crisscross.
Today,
you see the same thing happening. The backbone of the student
movement
are football fans, who are also students, who are pushing,
radicalizing.
They are sort of caught between the repression which they
are
dealing with and not really wanting to cross the line towards the
jihadists.
Some of them are like one young man who I spent some time
with.
He is a 22 year-old man, very smart, very knowledgeable. He is a
member
of the Brotherhood. He is from either of the student groups. He is
steeped
in Islamic history, in the history of the student movement and the
history
of football fans in Egypt. He moves around Cairo in a protective
envelop,
because he has been sentenced twice in absentia; once to life in
prison.
That is what we are talking about. So, in that sense, there is this
special
history and tradition in Egypt.
Is
there an awareness of this history of the centrality of students
and
football in transformation and revolution among students and
football
fans today?
Yes,
this young man was not the only one I spent time with. They do have
that
history. There is also an awareness of this in the leadership. Whether
all
football fans know that, I would question that. The student movement
partly
does. There is also a whole apathetic community.
It
is possible to locate the football fan groups in dichotomies of right-
left,
religious-secular, or does football totally conflate these
differences?
All
grass-roots movements, certainly those that lead to public protests
and
even more those that get to the point that there is a change in leader,
face
the problem of how to then make the transition into more classic
politics.
They are not prepared for that. But on top of that, the militant
football
fans, the politicized football fans, very deliberately define themselves
as
apolitical. It is very deliberate, very strategic. This has to do with the fact
that
if they define themselves as political, they become much more vulnerable.
Also,
they transcend or reach a common denominator, which is a passion for
the
sport, for the club and a very specific power analysis of the sport, in which
the
management relies on the regime and the players are mercenaries who
are
only there for the money. So, fans – particularly militant fans – are the
only
really true supporters of the game, which gives some sort of rights, e.g.
the
right to the stadium, right to the space, and a dislike of authority in
particular.
Once you transcend those parameters, the views run the gamut
from
right to left. So, that of course, as a group if you get into that, you will
fall
apart. Which is also why, in the case of summer of 2013 you saw football
fans
on all squares and sites. On the other hand, Islamists among them are a
strong
group. I am not saying they are a majority, but they are very
prominent
group in what is a conservative society.
That
is a very interesting point. So, you are saying that the militant,
the
most politicized, football fans actually deliberately see themselves as
apolitical…
Absolutely.
If we think back to the 24 January 2011, two major groups in Cairo issued
almost identical statements on facebook, which were reasonably quoted.
This
was the day before Police Day, the first mass-protest. The statement said,
‘We
are not part of this. We are not involved in politics. However, individual
members are free to join to do what they want’. Privately, the word was, ‘Look,
this
is what we have been preparing for, go for it’. But, the official statement
was,
‘We are not part of this and what our members do is their personal
business’.
What
I am wondering is whether it would be right to say that
nevertheless
these fan groups help frame discontent in political
terms,
or would that be wrong?
No,
I wouldn’t articulate it in that way. They are more of a reflection of
discontent.
Firstly, because of the centrality of football in Egyptian life.
Secondly,
because there were not many ways in which you could express
yourself.
If we look at the two decades before that, there were big
demonstrations
on Palestine, but much of that was actually just as much
about
Palestine as it was about Egypt. Besides this, they have a very
emotional
value, a very strong bond to the game and the club, and a very
specific
analysis of the power structures and also a very clearly defined way
of
expressing their support in the stadium, which automatically brought
them
in conflict with the security forces of the regime. That is what made
them
popular. They derived that popularity from the degree of passion for
a
club that millions of others supported as well as from the fact that they
were
the only group – leaving the Bedouin aside – the only urban group that
consistently and on a regular basis physically confronted the regime on issues
that
as a matter of principle a lot of people agree on. I think it is more that
than
that they were framing or shaping anything.
In
that sense, they were in opposition to the state through the position
they
were in and it triggered from there, rather than that they had a
certain
politically framed position towards the state or regime.
Exactly.
The security forces were a problem for everybody. They were corrupt,
brutal,
and that on a daily basis in popular neighbourhoods. So, for a lot of the
less
educated, unemployed, here there was this group that was battling it out
and
standing its ground in the stadium and they too were football fans. This
was
the release valve. For a lot of these people, it was not so much about the
state
etc. It was about the security forces.
Is
this limited to Ultras or does it go beyond just them? Obviously, it
triggered
something…
No,
this is specific to the Ultras. I would argue – and you can see that from
what
people tweeted on Tahrir Square – that the Ultras played a very key role
in
breaking what people called the ‘barrier of fear’. For example, the fact the
Ultras
were there standing their ground, people who left felt bad, and other
people
stayed because they thought, ‘if the Ultras stay why should we be
running’.
So, there were lots of different dynamics. They also played a role in
the
build-up, in the marches towards Tahrir. On the 25th,
the Ultras played a
great
role in breaking down those barriers. They made use of their experience.
They
were fearless. They were willing to put their lives on the line.
Does
this fearlessness have something to do with them as football fans?
Is
there something characteristic about being a football fan or
belonging
to club that brings this with it?
I
think it has to do with the tribal nature, the real emotional depth of the bond
to
the club. I mean, football is an aggressive sport. It is about conquering the
other
half of the field. You have groups in Europe where one of the problems is
that
these militant football fan groups make appointments somewhere in the
woods
to ‘fight it out’. If you assume that this is just lower class youth, you are
wrong. They are groups of doctors, professors, lawyers who fight it out with
each
other. So, there is a lot of identity politics involved. If you put sports
into popular
culture, football is the most popular expression of popular
culture. There is
nothing
that competes with it: no other sport, not arts, painting, theatre,
literature
etc. Roughly 5% of the world’s population is in one way or another
professionally involved in football.
In
this context, where something is bubbling, such emotional attachment
to a
club can have a mobilizing effect…
Sure.
Again if we look at Egypt, for the greater part of the past four year stadia
have
been closed. There are moves to criminalize them, as it has been in
Turkey
too, by the way. Two things have happened: Groups have emerged that define
themselves as Ultras and are formed by football fans, but are no longer
associated with the club and no longer describe themselves as apolitical, but
define
themselves as explicitly political. That is one development and on the
other
hand, although the number is still small to my knowledge, there are
people
who cross the line and join the jihadists.
It
looks as if in places in which direct open political critique is
suppressed
very harshly, sport and football become spaces where
this
discontent erupts in certain moments, as you said like in
confrontation
with the security forces.
It
depends on the circumstances, if the stadia get closed or the games
suspended
it gets more difficult. I think a better way of approaching it –
and
that sets the Middle East and Africa apart from other places in the world
–
that football particularly has played an important role in the development
of
the region, consistently for more than a century. What I mean with that
is
in terms of nation formation and nation building, regime formation and
regime
survival as well as decline; whether it is the 1920s, the anti-colonial
struggle
in Algeria was on the football pitch, or Al Ahly in Egypt. If you look
at
the history of football clubs in the region and the introduction of the sport,
and
this includes Turkey and Israel, almost all major clubs were founded with
a
political motivation. This might have been anti-colonial v. monarchical, may
have
been ideological, as various expressions of Zionism, it may have been
identity.
That is the history of most of these clubs. So, in other words the
sport
was political from day one and was a political vehicle for fans but also for
others.
There is probably – certainly prior to the revolts – nothing that
evokes
that kind of passion (except for religion) than football.
So,
although football is entirely entangled with politics from the
beginning,
you are saying that the critical element within football now comes
from the
emotional tie to the club and football itself,
rather
than an ideological persuasion. Is that right?
What
I am saying is that it always was a venue. And depending on whether or
not
the venue was available, football would play a role. In a sense, you can
argue
that the stadia in the last for years of the Mubarak regime were a grunt
school, like the first few years of basic training when you join the military.
In
other
words, that is why they were the most street-battle hard group on Tahrir. None
of the other people had ever been in this situation before. So, in an
environment in which you don’t have multiple options, and multiple public
spaces
then football – assuming it is played in public – becomes one of the
very
few.
Thank
you very much for this interview.
[1] For his book, see
http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-turbulent-world-of-middle-east-soccer/ and his
blog, see http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com.tr/
[2] Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi (29 March 1984 – 4
January 2011)
was a Tunisian street vendor who set
himself on fire on 17 December 2010 after
his cart had been confiscated by the
municipal authorities. His self-immolation triggered demonstrations and
protests throughout Tunisia leading to the Tunisian Revolution and
the
Arab Spring.
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