The Gulf: Not All That’s Gold Glitters (JMD in Middle East Perspectives)
The Gulf: Not All
That’s Gold Glitters
By James M. Dorsey
Gleaming glass skyscrapers, state-of-the-art technology,
and wealthy merchant families have replaced the Gulf’s muddy towns and villages populated
by traders and pearl fishers
that once lacked electricity, running water or modern communications. The
region’s modern day projection of a visionary
cutting- edge, 21st century urban environment masks however the fact that some things
have not changed.
Gulf states continue
to be ruled by the same families,
generation after generation. The families have become what an Emirati
regime critic, Yousif
Khalifa al-Yousif, termed
“an institution of entitlement.”1 Alongside autocrats, the region also remains home to holy warriors and modern-day pirates.
The principle of governance that
what is good for business is good for the village-turned-nation still guides rulers
who rank among the region’s foremost businessmen.
If, however, the region’s physical transformation speaks
to an almost unitary vision of modernity, its politics tell a very different story, one of
deep-seated social conservatism despite concessions in some states to cultural
attributes of expatriate communities, resistance to political change, and a
clinging to the status quo at whatever price.
Close tribal ties, intermarriage between
ruling families and an intertwining of tribal economic
relations compensate for weak institutionalization. Concepts
of conflict of interest are moreover blurred
with little distinction between the economic
and commercial interests
of the state and those of ruling families. Dubai’s foremost governing
institutions, ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum’s Executive
Office, his private staff, and his Executive Council or Cabinet operate
in obscurity with no clear legal anchor.
“The problem in discussing concepts
like leadership and vision is that the Gulf and its Western
partners use the same terms but
understand them very differently. There is no institutionalized decision-making in the Gulf. Leadership in the Gulf amounts to a few members of a
family taking decisions in private. The need for greater efficiency and demands
for more transparency are balanced with the region’s traditional method of consensus,” said a Western diplomat.2
Demands for institutionalization and transparency reflect
far more fundamental changes that Gulf leaders
have to come to grips with. Those changes are driven by populations that in
majority are under the age of 30, oil and gas revenues that in
the medium term will be unable to sustain rulers’ cradle-to- grave social
contract with their populations, and communication technologies that render censorship and non-transparency increasingly meaningless. They guide former
US ambassador Gary A. Grappo’s description of the environment that ailing Omani Sultan
Qaboos bin Said’s successor will encounter, but are equally true for all Gulf leaders.
“Qaboos’ successor will confront challenges nearly as
great as those Qaboos faced in the first years
of his reign in the early 1970s.
Omanis today are much better educated and more engaged, and will want to see change. They will want to play a role in determining the direction of their country.
They will also want
and need to see a transformation in the country’s economy away from dependence on comparatively sparse hydrocarbon reserves
to other areas that will ensure the country’s continued
prosperity and standard
of living and, most important, produce jobs for a rapidly
growing population… Vision will be the defining challenge of
Qaboos’ successor,” Grappo said.3
That vision, Grappo
argued, would have to involve
gradual liberalization including a greater devolution of decision-making authority to a consultative council, allowing it to prepare
and approve budgets;
greater press freedom and transparency; lifting of restrictions on civil
society organizations; economic diversification; and inclusion of minority cultures
in the preservation of Omani culture. Grappo’s prescriptions are applicable across
the Gulf. His list is easily expandable to include notions
of a gradual transition from
absolute to constitutional monarchy, decriminalization of non-violent opposition activity, and social and economic policies that are inclusionary.
Grappo’s vision entails the kind of boldness and risk
taking that has become the trademark of Dubai’s ruling Al Maktoum family in the last two centuries
but has yet to be applied to the challenges
facing today’s rulers in the region. For now, Gulf rulers have sought to fine tune the status quo by casting themselves
in the role of protectors
of national and tribal identity,
traditions and heritage;
projecting themselves as agents
of the transition from energy-driven to post-oil and knowledge-based economies
and of greater independence by asserting themselves politically and
militarily; and seeking to enhance their countries’ international status by
hosting mega events like the 2020 Expo in Dubai and the 2022 World Cup in Qatar.
To be sure, the need to prepare
for a post-oil era in the Gulf is immediate. Newly born in all Gulf states with the exception of Qatar and Kuwait are expected to witness their countries running out of fossil energy resources within
their lifetimes.4 That gives rulers
at best several
decades to diversify their economies – a transition that involves more than simply
developing new economic
sectors. It will require
revamping education systems to match labour supply and demand; motivating
citizenry to depend less on government jobs, handouts and subsidies; streamlining bureaucracies; and rewriting
social contracts already threatened by fiscal tightening.
Looming in the back of the minds of Gulf leaders is the memory of Algeria
where a collapse in oil prices
in the 1980s put an end to the social contract. Protests erupted as incomes
dropped and inflation and unemployment increased. The country slipped
into civil war that ultimately ended with a revival of the
social contract on the back of rising oil prices.
Unlike Algeria, Gulf leaders have the financial
muscle to weather a storm for some time. But more fundamentally as The Economist recently
noted, Gulf states "may have learned many lessons from the past but there is one that remains largely
undigested. Despite innumerable warning and innumerable failed attempts to diversify their economies away from oil, nearly all of them still rely on the sticky stuff to get by. With relentlessly growing
populations and public expectations, it is still only a matter of time before
the crunch comes."5
The Singapore model
Gulf leaders look to Singapore, a city state
that has developed
within a matter
of decades from an impoverished island with no resources into a
first world state and global hub with a highly
diversified economy, as their model.
It is a model that combines authoritarianism with empowerment. Delegations from the Gulf travel to Singapore to discover the secret of its success
and enlist Singaporean institutions to assist
them in developing for example education systems.
“Singapore is an authoritarian success story. It is everything
the Gulf wants to be and never will be,” said
a long-standing observer of both Singapore and the Gulf states. “It has the
three key attributes the Gulf lacks: a high degree of
institutionalization; transparent rule of law; and a population that despite restricted
freedoms is empowered,” the observer said.6
The UAE, home to 200 nationalities, unlike countries
like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain has adopted one aspect of Singapore, traumatized by its
expulsion from Malaysia in the 1960s and race riots at the time that
few analysts have focused on: the building of a society that sees diversity as
an asset and respects different
cultures and faiths.
Like Qatar, the UAE recognized that tight political
control did not preclude the building of a society whose cultural and racial tolerance is steeped in Islam in an effort to ensure domestic
stability and counter extremism. Up to a third of the UAE’s population is non-Muslim.
Amid mounting international criticism that Gulf states have failed to pull their weight in welcoming refugees from the mayhem in Syria, Gulf News
reported that some 100,000 Syrians had been allowed into the UAE since 2011.
In an official statement, the UAE declared
in mid-September the Syrian refugee crisis a foreign policy priority that it was tackling “in a sustainable and humane fashion
together with its regional and
international partners.”7
Emirati writer Maria Hanif recently
compared the UAE to Al Andalus, the Islamic empire in Iberia established in the 8th century that has become a reference point
for Muslim tolerance, pluralism and the productive
and harmonious interaction of Arabs, Jews and
Christians.
“The UAE, just like Al Andalus…is home to hundreds of
nationalities and various religions and sects, each free to practise their religious
beliefs so long as they do not attack or undermine the other. It has also
become a target for constant criticism by extremists for that very reason. Most
recently the UAE came under attack
after having announced
allocation of a plot in the capital
Abu Dhabi for the construction of a Hindu temple to serve the
Hindu population of the country (which makes up 25 per cent of the
population)… The UAE stands strong against the preachers of discrimination and intolerance, with an unwavering conviction that pluralism
is the very foundation that built this country,” Hanif argued in Gulf News.8
Politics on the other hand weaves a tale of regional rivalries
and leaders’ different
visions of how to balance modernity with social and political conservatism and how to ensure regime
survival and maintain a regional security environment
which is dependent on a US defence umbrella that is increasingly
perceived by Gulf states as unreliable.
Compounding the region’s
leadership challenge is the progressive breakdown of a social contract
based on a cradle-to-grave
welfare state that assists citizens even in the cost of getting married in exchange
for surrender of political rights.
For more than a decade Gulf leaders
starting with the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
have been nibbling
away at the welfare state
in a bid to rationalize government finances and foster national identity.
The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has urged Gulf states to rationalize spending
that has ballooned
with increased military
budgets and billions
of dollars in handouts designed
to pacify potentially restless populations. 9
“Cuts in social spending
and subsidies are a difficult proposition given populations who expect to receive
rather than give,” said a Gulf analyst.10
Cloaked in elegant
traditional flowing robes and head dresses, Gulf leaders project
an image of conservatism and adversity to risk. Yet, risk is at the core of their varied leaps towards
modernity fuelled by phenomenal oil and gas revenues and a bid to fend off pressure
for change that informs Saudi, Emirati and Qatari visions of the future rooted in
late 18th and early 19th century tribal leadership.
Some risks and threats are inevitable in the drive for modernity
such as the influx of expatriates and migrant labour
that has turned
the region’s demographics upside down and raised questions of societies’ sustainability and viability for which there
are no good answers.
Others are the immutable result of restrictive and discriminatory policies
that have transformed popular revolts into battles ranging
from inflexible attitudes towards naturalization, low-intensity conflict in Bahrain to civil war in Syria; given holy warriors
like the Islamic
State a new lease on life; driven sectarian
tensions that have sparked wars in Iraq and Yemen; and fuelled discontent among majority and
minority populations alike.
Gulf leaders’ hopes
that violence and brutality that followed most of the 2011 revolts
coupled with their determined
counterrevolutionary strategies at home and abroad would cow restless
populations were dashed this summer.
Mass anti-government demonstrations erupted in Lebanon
and Iraq demanding
an end to corruption and improved services
and lowly paid policemen and tax authority officials protested in Egypt, a mainstay of the Saudi and UAE-backed regime of general-turned-president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi.
Similarly, there is little reason to assume that Gulf
states despite successful co-optation and repressive policies are immune to anti-government
protest. Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia witnessed mass demonstrations in recent years.
Gulf youth have said in surveys that democracy was a top priority for them even though recent developments
have dampened their hopes.11 Financial muscle has allowed
several Gulf states to buy precious time with generous
handouts but reduced
oil revenues forcing economic
rationalization spotlight the fragility of such safety valves.
Nothing highlights the need to broaden the focus of vision
and leadership in the Gulf like the region’s lack of inclusiveness, incapability and unwillingness to address what some analysts
describe as a ticking time bomb: the Bidoun or Without, hundreds
of thousands of predominantly Gulf Arabs who are denied citizenship
despite having often populated the rank of file of national armies. Most are
Bedouin from the region with a sprinkling of migrants from Iran, Iraq and Pakistan
who destroyed their documents in a
failed bid to ensure that they would be granted citizenship as Gulf states
achieved independence.
In the UAE, Bidoun are denied benefits
enjoyed by Emiratis
such as free education, health care, and housing allowances. Finding employment is difficult because
they lack passports needed to obtain
work permits. Demanding their
rights puts them at risk of arrest or deportation as writer and activist Ahmed Abdul Khaleq found out in 2012 when he was deported to Thailand
for campaign online for Bidoun rights.12
The worst fears of Kuwaiti
politicians who have called on the Kuwaiti
government for the past 30 years to solve the Bidoun problem
became reality in June when the driver of a car that took a Saudi to a Shiite mosque where
his suicide bomb killed 26 worshippers and wounded 200 others turned out to be a Bidoun.13
Kuwaiti media reported that 13 of the 29 people arrested
in the wake of the attacks were Bidoun. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the
attack.14 Afraid to single out the Bidoun, Kuwaiti officials and analysts
were quick to identify Bidoun involvement as part of a broader process of radicalization among Sunni Muslims.
Vision with pitfalls
Gulf leaders face identical problems
and share similar
visions of their place in the international community. Yet, their strategies to get from A to B, approaches to notions of national and regional security, perceptions of development, and responses to domestic and international criticism vary widely. The differences in vision range
from the economic
and commercial brashness
of Dubai, to Qatar’s well thought
through but poorly executed soft power strategy, to Saudi Arabia’s high-risk
use of financial and military muscle
supported by the UAE’s increasing projection of itself
as a regional military power. In
projecting itself militarily, the UAE benefitted from having participated in
virtually every U.S.-led coalition campaign since 1991.
Beyond demographics, other limitations of the varying
visions are also becoming increasingly obvious. Abu Dhabi had to bail out Dubai’s real estate driven
model when the emirate in 2008 suffered
the world’s steepest
property slump with home prices
dropping 50 percent
and had to reschedule some $120 billion in
debt.
The bail out together with the collapse in 2013 of low
budget airline Bahrain Air also raised long-term questions
about the Gulf’s fundamental business
model in which the state is the primary economic
driver. Gulf airlines
have emerged as major players
in aviation benefitting from the region’s
geography as well as its ability
to profit from changing patterns in international trade and politics.
“In a part of the world where almost every other airline
is subsidized…it was always going to be difficult to be truly profitable. There is not enough
point-to-point traffic, and regional connecting traffic yields are too low to
sustain an airline. So it was always going to struggle by traditional
measures,” Bahrain Air CEO Richard Nutall told The Aviation Writer.15
The Dubai bail out highlighted the different visions
of the emirate and Abu Dhabi visions
and the dynamics of the power relationship between the two key states in the UAE. Rather
than opting for Dubai’s brashness, relative autonomy and commercial drive, Abu Dhabi relies on the creation
of a military-industrial complex, nuclear
and renewable energy programs, and its wealth to cement its dominant position in the federation, and
ensure its ability to project regional and international power.
Meanwhile, Qatar’s successful effort to host the 2022 World Cup has with US and Swiss legal investigations into the integrity of its bid and widespread criticism of the Gulf-wide migrant
labour kafala or sponsorship
system that puts employees at the mercy of their employers turned into a public relations nightmare.
Saudi Arabia’s harsh justice system with its public
beheadings, its war in Yemen that is bombing
the Gulf’s poorest
nation into even greater abject poverty, and its puritan
interpretation of Islam that deprives
women of basic
rights has made it all but a pariah state
tolerated because of its financial largess and
geo-strategic importance.
Compounding the downside of the varying visions are the
budgetary consequences of expensive hard and soft power strategies at a time of dropping
oil prices that raise the spectre of budget deficits
and are forcing Gulf states to nibble at the edges of the cradle-to-grave
welfare state that underwrites relative social peace. The IMF estimates
that falling global
oil prices will cost the Gulf an estimated $380 billion in export earnings this year.
Dubai’s vision is in your face. Superlatives are its trademark. Its skyline boasts
its rulers’ long-standing knack for bold decisions and an insatiable
and unashamedly ambitious drive to implant
itself in the mind of every one of the world’s 7 billion inhabitants developed by Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed, the current ruler, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid’s father.
“Rashid wanted the name of his town, Dubai, on the lips
of every person on earth. When a family sat down to dinner in America,
Rashid wanted them to discuss the happenings of Dubai. And when two Englishmen
paused for a glass of beer, it was Dubai he wished them to talk about. Farmers
in China, bankers in Switzerland, and generals in Russia: all of them must know about Dubai,”
wrote Jim Krane, author
of City of Gold: Dubai and the Dream of Capitalism.16
The list of Dubai’s biggest,
best, the richest,
newest, most luxurious, most over the top, and most expensive projects is long. It includes the
world’s biggest mall, indoor ski slope, artificial islands, the world’s tallest
building and largest
man-made port, the largest ever New Year’s fireworks and LED screen, the world’s
only seven-star hotel,
the Middle East’s
top financial centre
and plans for the world’s largest
amusement park and even larger indoor ski facility.
Nothing seems to bold or outrageous as long as it
fulfils Sheikh Rashid’s vision of keeping Dubai Inc. in the global public eye. Catchy slogans and slick advertising and public relations
put Dubai on the world map.
“Dubai and the Gulf states are very good at projecting.
On paper, they look like they are responding
to modernity and the obsessions
of the international community. It’s all the product of having hired good communication
companies,” said a Western official with long-standing experience in the Gulf.17
Sultan Sood Al Qassimi, a UAE businessman, author and art collector who is a critical member
of Sharjah’s ruling family,
quipped last month when Qatar announced for the umpteenth time in response
to international criticism
of its labour regime that it was introducing major reforms: “Every few months a
Gulf state issues a similar statement.”18
Bold gambles
Much of Dubai's
contemporary model is rooted in history. Sheikh Rashid's bold notion of 'build and the will come' anticipated British tycoon
Richard Branson's principle of 'screw it, let’s do it.' In doing so, Rashid
set a template for development that has been to a large degree adopted by the
Gulf flush with oil money after the 1973 oil crisis.
For Sheikh Mohammed, the metaphor was trees. Answering a
question about the source of his vision by someone
close to him, Sheikh Mohammed
replied Bedouin style
by recounting a story. He described how he planted
trees when he was building
a house in Armoun in the desert.
Sheikh Mohammed noticed that birds
interrupted their migration to spend a few days in his trees. So he planted
more trees and more birds came. Eventually they settled instead
of continuing their migration.19
“In Sheikh Mohammed’s mind, the way to do things is by
nature and by natural law. Things take their natural order. If he planted
trees in Dubai,
if he offered opportunity, people
would stop in Dubai. Sheikh Mohammed came from a large family.
He had to find his own place and did that with natural opportunity,” the person close to Sheikh
Mohammed said.
Comparing differing approaches between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, people close to the rulers of both emirates
noted that Abu Dhabi’s geography of islands meant that they ensured that their forts
were looking inwards.
Sitting on the Creek, Dubai was forced to look outwards so that it could attract
the attention of passing merchant
vessels and fend off pirates.
“The difference in attitude of the two families is reflected in how they approach
everything,” one person said.20
The very presence
in Dubai of the Maktoums
signalled their knack for bold gambles that more often than
not have paid off over the past two centuries. Unhappy with internecine tribal
infighting initiated by their cousins and later rulers of Abu
Dhabi, the Al Nahayans, the Maktoums decamped in the first half of the 19th century
from their ancestral oasis of Liwa and headed for an forlorn fishing village on the coast.21
There was then little reason to assume that Dubai would serve as a useful base, let alone become
a 21st century, hyper-modern global hub.
The Maktoums took their bold gamble a step further when
in the late 1890s and early 1900s they laid the foundations for Dubai as a free port by
abolishing customs, tariffs and vessel licensing in a move that was also designed
to ensure that Dubai would serve as the anchor for Britain's
colonial presence in the Gulf.
The moves gave Dubai an edge over Iranian-controlled ports
on the Arab side of the Gulf that had imposed taxes to provide revenue for a
cash-strapped Iranian administration.
Sheikh Maktoum bin Hasher similarly
embraced the need to import people to bolster Dubai’s sparse population.
They first targeted disgruntled Gulf merchants hit by Iranian tax increases.
Next was the Iranian
business community that was offered free land and easy access to the ruler and
promised that the government would not intervene in their affairs. Merchants
were later enticed and co-opted with government contracts and monopolistic trade licenses.22
In contrast to today, the Maktoums like other Gulf Arabs at the time embraced the Bedouin ritual of hospitality
for strangers irrespective who they were. Migrants, unlike modern day expatriates and migrant
labour, were encouraged to make Dubai their permanent home rather than accept an arrangement
that ended with their departure once they had fulfilled their contractual obligations.
At the time,
the Maktoums recognized the multiple benefits
of migration. It was a lesson they had learnt from
their own migration from Liwa. Migrants were the stuff that would make Sheikh
Rashid's dream a reality. They were an asset, one that
Dubai was eager to hold on to, not the necessary evil utility that the Gulf tolerates
today because it has no choice but sees as a threat
to the region's identity and ultimately
to rulers' hold on power.
Dubai and with it the Gulf, however,
owes a debt to the Iranians whose
outward looking worldview,
African and Asian
networks, and modern
technology, helped set the remote
fishing village on an unparalleled path to modernity. Later waves of migration were welcomed but offered less benefits, foremost among which the option of legally
secured, permanent integration into society.
Dubai benefitted from both pre- and post-revolution
IranIan policies. Its economy thrived on its competitive
free-wheeling, free market policies as opposed to the red tape and financial burdens imposed by Iran. Since
the Iranian revolution, Dubai has become
home to more liberal Iranians
seeking to
escape the strictures of the Islamic republic.
Iranians today rank among Dubai's foremost merchant
families, largest developers and major investors while Iran is one of the emirate's
foremost trading partners.
Much like today’s
migrant workers, the Iranians
and the next wave of migrants, the Indians, fulfilled economic roles that
Dubai's local population was too proud to embrace.
Walking the walk
The Gulf’s different
styles of leadership are reflected in the way states project
themselves. Saudi Arabia wears
secrecy and conservatism on its sleeve. Brash and aggressive, Dubai trumpets
its status of being a modern, forward
looking global city. It boasts being a multicultural metropole. Qatar basks in controversy
over its idiosyncratic, counter intuitive foreign policy that forges relations
with friend and foe alike, yet squirms when it is cast under the spotlight.
For much of their recent history as independent states,
Gulf nations expressed leadership in employing vast amounts of oil and gas revenues
to build relations anchored on their
alliance with the United States with
countries across the globe; turn their backwaters into architectural landmarks
and business hubs through investment in infrastructure and
exploitation of their geostrategic location; high profile investments in Western real estate and global brands;
and the creation of a limited number of world class global
businesses that include
Saudi Arabia’s national
oil company Aramco
and Sabic, its petrochemical industry; Qatar Gas and Qatar Airways;
Dubai’s global port manger DP World, Emirates Airlines
and Etisilat telecommunications company; and Abu Dhabi’s Ettihad airline.
Increasingly however, concepts of leadership particularly in the
smaller Gulf states have been challenged
by regional threats
such as the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the fallout of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the more recent wave of popular
revolts that in 2011 toppled
four Arab leaders
and sparked a civil and proxy war in Syria, the rise of political
Islam, and the emergence of the Islamic
State that with its eradication
of the borders between Iraq and Syria and pan-Islamist ideology that threatens the notion of the nation state as the basis for regional order in
the Middle East.
Leadership concepts have also been challenged by a wearing thin of the
strategy of talking the talk but not walking the walk. Restless populations have for now been cowed by the crushing or reversal of most
of the successful revolts and intimidated by violence engulfing the region and
harsh crackdowns on domestic dissent. Yet, discontent simmers
at the surface while minorities chafe at continued discrimination and disenfranchisement.
The rise of Islamic State and the wave of violence and brutality has moreover focused international attention
on root causes that include
sectarian and intolerant ideologies as well as a lack of inclusiveness and public space for dissenting political
expression. The downside of autocratic visions of leadership that have yet to come to grips with the shadow
side of break speed development have further been brought into sharp relief
with the Gulf’s
restrictive labour regime
moving centre stage
with Qatar’s successful bid for the 2022 World Cup
hosting rights.
The World Cup represented Qatari vision that differed fundamentally from that of Dubai but was no less
bold and audacious. If Dubai’s approach was commercially-driven, Qatar’s was
politics per se. If Dubai’s was creating a commercial and
economic hub that would rank among the world’s top global cities while
preserving the regional status quo, Qatar’s was embracing political change
everywhere but at home.
Qatar signalled its intentions with the launch
in 1996 of the Al Jazeera television network, the freewheeling airing of news and opinions
that were banned from a regional landscape
dominated by staid state-run television stations that
never veered away from government directives. Within a matter of years Al Jazeera
had become the Middle East’s most popular
Arabic-language television station,
forcing an irreversible rewriting of the region’s media landscape.
It matched the success of Al Jazeera with its strategic alliance
with the Muslim Brotherhood, fending off severe Gulf pressure to change its policy; several
high profile not always successful efforts to mediate regional conflict in Lebanon,
Afghanistan and Darfur; and a strategic attempt to make sports a pillar
of national identity and Doha a global sports hub with the World Cup as its
crowning success.
Offence is the best defence
The vast difference in Emirati and Qatari responses to multiple challenges was evident in their responses
to international pressure
to reform their restrictive labour
regimes. The responses also defined the degree to which human rights and labour activists
have been able to leverage
an environment in which pressure on
Gulf leaders is mounting to match words with
deeds.
The activists got nowhere with the UAE that opted for
traditional retrenchment by barring entry to
the country of critics, closing
down even mildly critical policy think tanks, unfounded portrayals of labour conditions
that defy reality, and clumsy attempts at influencing public opinion with the
help of highly paid communication consultants and a string of Emirati-funded
non-governmental organizations that lack credibility. Its response has failed to counter campaigns
denouncing labour conditions
on high- profile projects like a branch of the Guggenheim Museum and a New
York University campus.23
That is not to say that Sheikh Mohammed is insensitive to the criticism.
On the contrary. He finds it embarrassing and a stain on Dubai’s
reputation, according to people close
to him. “Dubai
seeks to project integrity. It’s not like Qatar that feels that any news including bad news is good news. Qatar doesn’t mind being vilified,” one person
said.24 Yet,
at the same time Dubai like Abu Dhabi does not want to be seen to be caving in to external pressure.
In contrast to the UAE, Qatar decided
that offence was its best defence. In a break with Gulf’s long- standing
refusal to engage
and policy of stonewalling, Qatar
welcomed its critics
in constructive dialogue. It also promised greater transparency.
Representatives of Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch were granted
entry, access to officials and labour camps,
allowed to hold news conferences and launch damning
reports in Doha, and major Qatari institutions worked with them
to develop internationally condoned labour
standards.
The Qatari effort
demonstrates nonetheless the degree to which Gulf states no longer can get away with going through the motions and statements designed
to mollify critics
that are not backed up by the fulfilment
of their promise. Four years of Qatari engagement that have produced little
more than lofty promises of labour reform enshrined in glossy documents
are starting to turn counterproductive as even minimal change prove difficult to implement.
In the latest round of missed opportunity, Qatar announced with fanfare in August the introduction of a Wage Protection System
(WPS) that would
ensure that workers
are paid in full on time by forcing companies to make fortnightly or monthly
payments by direct bank transfer, only to say days later that the reform had
been indefinitely delayed.25
Transparency is nowhere
to be found. Rather than providing chapter
and verse on its controversial World Cup bid in an effort to counter mounting
evidence of bribery
and wrongdoing, Qatar has limited itself to issuing a string of denials, plain
vanilla assertions that it upholds
the highest standards of integrity, and
promises to cooperate with any and every investigation.
Enquiries into details of the awarding of World
Cup-related contracts, including who submitted
competing bids, and the grounds
on which winning
consortia were chosen
are stonewalled with statements consisting of platitudes and unrelated detail on the provision of comfortable housing
for workers involved in the
construction of stadia.
Qatar’s failure to live up to its promises is exasperating the United Nations’
International Labour Organization (ILO) as well as human rights
and labour activists and undermining whatever
goodwill the Gulf state had achieved.
Frustrations were reflected in an Amnesty report in May
on Qatar’s lack of follow-up entitled, ‘Promising
Little, Delivering Less.’ The report noted that “none of the proposed reforms have been implemented.26
Responding to a pledge by Qatari Labour and Social Affairs Minister
Abdullah Saleh Al Khulaifi to implement
reforms before the end of the year, Amnesty said: “This is not the first time
such promises have been made. Senior Qatari officials have reiterated their
commitment to labour rights over the past year, usually in response to international criticism.”27
Despite growing doubts about Qatar’s
sincerity, its hosting
of the World Cup still holds out the promise of
being a rare sporting mega event that leaves a legacy of social and economic,
if not political change rather than a mountain of debt and a slew of white elephants. If so, it would demonstrate the kind of bold,
risk taking leadership and vision that matches that of the Al Maktoums.
A Pandora’s Box
Granting workers’ rights
risks opening a Pandora’s Box in smaller
Gulf states where
foreigners constitute a majority of the population and citizens fear that their identity, culture
and control of society and state is increasingly becoming tenuous.
“Today, they don’t ask for political rights, but what about in a decade or
two?” said Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.28
Khashoggi’s articulation of Gulf fears notwithstanding, Qatar’s response to pressure has also dented the taboo
on public discussion of demography in terms other
than support of the status
quo. Expressing an alternative view Sharjah intellectual Al Qassemi argued in an article in the Gulf News that “UAE national identity has proven to be more
resilient and adaptive to the changing environment and times than some may believe.”29
Al Qassemi noted that the UAE had taken a first step towards a more liberal
nationality policy by granting the offspring of mixed Emirati-non-Emirati nationals the right to citizenship rather than restricting
it to children whose parents
were both UAE citizens. He went on to point out that the success of
the United States was in no small part due to the contribution of immigrants.
“Perhaps it is time to consider a path to citizenship for them that
will open the door to entrepreneurs, scientists, academics and other
hardworking individuals who have come to support
and care for the country
as though it was their own,” Al Qassemi said.30
Pressure on Qatar to move forward with implementation of
its promised reforms has further persuaded all the region’s
states to tinker in one way or another with their labour regimes. Kuwait’s
parliament has gone the furthest
with the passing
of a bill that grants rights to domestic servants.
Kuwait also became the first Gulf state to open a refuge
for female migrants.
At the bottom
line, Gulf states
are discovering what Europe realized
in the wake of the wave of Gastarbeiter
or foreign workers they invited in the 1960s to accommodate an expanding labour market in
the belief the workers would eventually return to their home countries. They
didn’t and eventually were joined by their families. In the Gulf,
it is middle class expatriates rather than unskilled and semi- skilled labour
who are striking social roots.
Asked recently whether he was bothered by the fact that
he had no rights, the Dubai-born, third generation son of a prosperous Indian family
answered: “No, why should I? Life is good.” The young man’s tone changed abruptly
when queried whether
it troubled him that his children would have no rights
in their country of birth. “Absolutely,” he said slamming his fist on the table.31
The young man is unlikely
to risk family and fortune
to stand up for his rights. Yet, his is a widespread, largely unspoken sentiment that cannot simply
be ignored or allowed to fester until
a time when circumstance makes
turning it into a public demand either opportune or inevitable.
Buying time
Gulf leaders are also discovering that gleaming high
rises, eight-lane freeways, and glittering
shopping malls hosting
luxury brands; paying lip service
to modernization; and buying foreign
talent allows them to project
their conservative, autocratic societies on the cutting edge of creativity and inn ovation
for at best a limited period of time.
“Innovation today is not an option but a necessity, not a general
culture but business
style. Governments and companies that do not renew or innovate lose competitiveness and control. They are bound
to regress. We have doubled our
investments in innovation and in the equipment, training and education of expert national
cadres, because keeping
pace with the world around
us requires innovative resources and an
environment that is supportive of innovation,” Sheikh Mohammed said last month.32
Much of Sheikh Mohammed’s requirements can be acquired.
The environment is where he and other Gulf leaders feel the squeeze. Dubai’s Media
City is home to the global and regional headquarters of the world’s major media houses.
Efforts to add creativity and innovation to the concept
of a real estate- driven media hub faltered however
on legal restrictions, physical environs and lack of a creative,
intellectual environment.
As a result,
Media City’s neighbouring cluster, Dubai Internet
City, hosts big brand services
and marketing hubs who keep their regional
research and development in Israel and India that boast educational institutions who produce top
flight engineers/
Consultants hired to help Dubai make the transition
advised the government that to achieve its goal it would have to broaden
freedoms of expression, allow foreigners greater
professional mobility, and create a physical environment that encourages the kind of creativity not found in modern office blocks.
“Creativity is an organic process.
A part of town that is at the outset of gentrification is the perfect physical
environment. A kind of Soho with the freedom to experiment, and aspiring opera
singers who earn their keep as waiters.
Sterile office blocks and visas
that make having
different occupations simultaneously impossible stymie creativity.
Dubai has yet to put those building blocks in place,” one of the consultants said.33
Back to the
Stone Age
Rather than liberalizing, institutionalizing and
seriously rationalizing, Gulf states have in recent years tightened the
reigns as they seek to insulate themselves from regional volatility, maintain
market share in rapidly changing
energy markets, fend off jihadist
threats, fight proxy wars and with limited
success assert themselves
militarily in a bid to shape the Middle East in their mould, and all of that as budgets shrink
and oil prices tumble.
The jury is out on whether the strategy will work. 2015 has turned out to be a difficult year for Gulf leaders.
The US-fostered agreement with Iran to resolve the nuclear crisis promises to
be a mixed bag. Countries like the UAE expect an initial economic boon but the
agreement returns to the international fold one of the Middle East’s most powerful
nations whose system of governance is rooted in political Islam and
whose policies are diametrically opposed to those of many of the Gulf states.
The wars in Yemen, Syria and Iraq and to a lesser degree
Libya constitute powerful threats that have highlighted the limitations of military
forces flush with some of the world’s most advanced hardware but hampered
by reluctance to commit ground troops in large numbers, a longstanding rulers’ distrust of armed forces capable
of staging a military coup, and a tradition of wielding financial
rather than military
muscle.
Saudi and UAE support for Al Sisi’s
military coup in 2013 that toppled Egypt’s
first and only democratically elected
president has produced
one of the region’s most repressive dictatorships. Al Sisi’s brutal
crackdown on all dissent has fuelled an insurgency that is spilling out of the
Sinai desert into Cairo and other major Egyptian cities.
Emirati special forces, widely viewed as the region’s best after Israel as a result of a decade of UN peacekeeping experience, have earned praise for
their performance in Yemen in support of Saudi-led efforts to defeat the rebel Houthis in Yemen
and return exiled president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi to power.
The inclusion of a woman fighter pilot in the first UAE
raid on Islamic State targets as part of the
US- led coalition offered the Emirates a picture perfect
opportunity to project
itself as a nation on the cutting edge of modernity. The Emirati air force demonstrated its potential reach
in attacks in cooperation with Egypt
on Islamist targets in Libya that did little to change the balance of power
between rival forces in the North African nation.
Yet, undeterred by the military
campaign against it, the Islamic
State is entrenching its alternative, harsh governance
structures that not only challenge Gulf rulers’ vision of leadership but also
their notions of the nation-state as opposed to an irredentist, expansionary pan-Islamist entity and is able to threaten domestic stability with attacks that target
security forces and Shiite Muslim minorities.
Yemen despite major
military advances in southern Yemen threatens to become the conservative Gulf’s Vietnam. Retaking
northern Yemen and the capital
Sana’a where the Houthis enjoy
greater support than in
the south is likely to prove more difficult. And military victory may prove
difficult to translate into sustainable
political achievement. Saudi-led
Gulf interference in Yemeni politics
lies at the core of problems
in a nation in which many blame the Gulf states for having bombed them back to
the Stone Age in a six-month long air campaign that has wreaked humanitarian havoc.
Yemen could affect
efforts by the UAE and Qatar, the most recent
Gulf states to dispatch ground
troops to the war-torn country,
to strengthen national
identity with the recent introduction of conscription. UAE conscripts barely
a year later suffered their
first casualties in Yemen, leaving
their grieving families
in shock and angry. More than 50 Emiratis and five Bahrainis were killed in Yemen in the last six
weeks. “These young men are forced to do military service and should not be
taken to hot conflict areas. They are civilians who are supposed
to go back to their lives and work after finishing their service,"
Middle East Eye quoted an Emirati as saying.34
Differences
in vision
Despite attempts to project a united front to the region’s multiple
crises, responses by Gulf leaders
have laid bare differences in vision. Qatar and Oman with soft power strategies that emphasize being politically
and diplomatically proactive in contrast to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s
increased reliance on military might and repression have
largely opted for engagement and efforts at dialogue. The UAE remains alone among Gulf states in seeing political Islam as the greatest threat
to Gulf rulers’
longevity after King Salman of Saudi Arabia cautiously began to reverse
his predecessor’s war on the Muslim Brotherhood
in a bid to form a pan-Sunni alliance against Iran.
The UAE’s position
is ironic given that Sheikh Rashid in 1974 provided
the Brotherhood with the start-up
funding it needed to establish
a branch in the Emirates
and the fact several Brothers
rose to prominent including ministerial end educational positions.35
Political differences are compounded by a fundamental
tension inherent in the region’s security architecture: several of the smaller Gulf states have resisted militarization of the six member Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) comprised of Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, fearing Saudi dominance.
Gulf leaders’ divergent
views of regional
security echo far beyond the Gulf, home to a vast US military infrastructure designed to ensure
security that includes
the Bahrain base of the Fifth Fleet,
which patrols the Gulf and accesses facilities in various littoral
states; Camp Arifjan
in Kuwait that serves as a logistics base for US operations against the Islamic States; the Al-Udeid
air base in Qatar, the largest U.S. air base in the region; and access to air base
facilities in Oman and the UAE as well as Saudi airspace.
In a rare public outburst,
Omani minister of state for foreign affairs Yousef bin Alawi Al Ibrahim, a onetime representative of a separatist movement and key mediator in bringing the United States and Iran to the negotiating table,
rejected in 2013 US and Saudi attempts
to militarize the Gulf alliance
through integration of missile defence.
“We absolutely don’t support Gulf union. There is no agreement in the region on this …. If this union materialises, we will deal with it but we will not be a member. Oman’s position is very clear. If there are
new arrangements for the Gulf to confront existing or future conflicts, Oman
will not be part of it,” he said.36
Alawi’s comments and repeated reluctance by various smaller
Gulf states to join past GCC military operations bodes ill for the creation
of a Gulf military command
announced late last year. The command would involve a force of several hundred
thousand soldiers capable of responding to regional threats that include
militant Islamists and rival Iran.
“Every effort at military unity among the Arab states
has ended in failure, to a greater or lesser
degree. There are plenty of reasons for this. For one, smaller
states fear diluting
their sovereignty and autonomy in a larger bloc. In the 1960s, they feared
being overpowered by Egypt; now, they worry about Saudi Arabia, a wariness that has also played a large role in preventing the formation of a political and financial union in
the Gulf,” noted military affairs scholar Shashank Joshi in a Foreign Affairs commentary.37
A fraying
social contract
Dropping oil prices and revolutionizing new technologies
such as fracking pose no less a challenge to Gulf leaders. Saudi-led efforts to allow
prices to drop in a bid to undermine the US shale industry have failed. Lower revenues and higher expenditure have forced Saudi Arabia to draw on its reserves
and turn to the domestic
bond market while
Qatar predicts for 2016 its first budget
deficit in 15 years. Qatar in
September issued 15 billion riyals ($4.1 billion) of bonds to take advantage of
low borrowing costs and replenish funds eroded by the decline in
oil prices.38
“New political challenges will emerge in the coming years as fiscal policy
becomes unsustainable – and as the Gulf confronts its critical long-term
challenge, the beginning of the post-oil age. Fiscal spending in the GCC
states has soared to such an extent in recent years that they are now
chronically dependent on high oil prices – a long-term structural
risk,” noted a Chatham House report on future trends in the region.39
More
threatening than the economics is the fact that the social contract
on which autocratic Gulf rule is based
is fraying at the edges and has been for more than a decade. The last time that
happened was at the turn of the century
when Saudi gross national product
(GNP) per capita
was at $7,700 less than half of what it had been 20 years earlier and the
kingdom encouraged frustrated young men to join the anti- Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.
Young Saudis forced to do two or three jobs to make ends
meet joined Al Qaeda as then Crown Prince Abdullah’s cost cutting measures, including
the introduction of rents in student dormitories. Real GDP growth in the kingdom
is, according to the IMF, likely to drop 2.8 percent this year and another 2.4 percent
in 2016. The IMF predicts that a Saudi fiscal deficit of 19.5% of GDP this year.40
Things never got that bad in the UAE where male Emiratis
receive some $55,000 a year in subsidies that include
free land, healthcare, water, and education
that can include
degrees at Western
universities; cheap electricity, and subsidized food and gasoline.
In addition, Emiratis
pay no income or property tax.
Yet, even the UAE sees itself forced to rationalize in line with IMF advice.
The UAE in July tied petrol prices to world market prices leading to a 30 percent hike at the pump and prices that were only 13 cents below the American retail price. The hike tackling
cheap petrol, which many Emiratis
see as a birth right, did nothing
to rock the boat but like Abdullah’s
measures more than a decade ago constituted writing on the wall. Oman and Kuwait, which backed away from
raising diesel and kerosene prices in January following a public outcry, were
quick to announce that they had no intention of following in the
Emirates’ footsteps.
The UAE is also looking at expanding its corporate tax,
which currently applies only to foreign banks and the oil industry, to the corporate
sector as such and introducing a sales tax on the back of an expected GCC agreement to levy a value added tax (VAT) across the Gulf states.41
Similarly, Saudi Arabia is studying whether to cut state subsidies that
keep domestic gasoline prices at some of the lowest levels in the world
while Kuwait is mulling taxes on luxury items and tolls on highways and is
reviewing the pricing of goods and fees charged for public services
and land rental. The IMF warned in September that Saudi Arabia's
growing budget deficit
could rapidly erode its reserves
unless drastic action is taken. The
IMF urged Riyadh to implement urgent reforms, including bolstering energy
efficiency, reducing energy subsidies, cutting government
spending particularly on wages and diversifying the economy.42
“None of these states can afford to keep increasing public spending in the way to which
their economies and societies have become accustomed in the
last decade of high oil prices. All have long-term plans envisaging a transition to a post-oil economy, developing
a mix of energy-intensive and knowledge- based industries, employing
more nationals in the private sector, and considering the introduction of taxation, all of which
will have implications for their social
contracts... Citizens who will in future need to
make a greater contribution to their economies, and receive fewer economic
benefits from the state, are likely to have very different
expectations about government transparency and accountability,” the Chatham
House report said.43
“Leaner times provide the opportunity for governments to
revisit inefficiencies in their systems and
to develop a more sophisticated
and effective political relationship with their citizens. Given the increasingly
young and informed public, building and maintaining a strong national identity
must be encouraged to create active citizens who produce more than they
consume,” added Zaid M. Belbagi, a member of Young Arab Leaders
(YAL), in the inaugural addition
of a new academic journal,
Gulf Affairs.44
Ironically, tax regimes of various sorts do not simply challenge leaders’
concepts of absolute power. They also make regimes dependent
on their expatriate populations not only for their labour but also their contributions to the coffers
of the state and they grant leverage
to a business community that historically was reliant on government.
Grabbing the
bull by the horns
The fraying of the Gulf’s traditional social contract
poses not only a threat but also an opportunity to ensure regime survival. While it inevitably will provoke a restructuring of the relationship between rulers and ruled, it offers leaders
with vision an opportunity to grab the bull by its horns. That would have to involve the kind of bold and gutsy moves that Dubai’s Al Maktoum’s
and Qatar’s Al Thanis have made their trademarks.
“Social and political changes in the Gulf are certain.
The questions are rather what form they will take and how they will be managed. One scenario could be a consensus-based process
of adaptation, building on some of the existing institutions, and making parliaments and courts more independent. But this would entail bringing in new checks on the
power of the rulers, which, in turn, would require those in authority to judge that voluntary reform today would ultimately cost them less than having change thrust upon
them in the future,” Chatham House concluded.45
For now, with crackdowns on freedom of expression and dissent Gulf leaders’ vision appears one of salvaging the status quo rather than
managing political transition. Amid the growing doubts about US reliability, China looms large
as a model of achieving extraordinary economic performance while maintaining tight
political control.
It’s a model that seeks to suppress inevitable demands
for greater sharing of power and resources and risks exacerbating fault
lines that include
divides along sectarian lines, between urban and tribal communities
and between regions within the borders of various Gulf states.
Yet, the jury is still out. It’s not what Qatari leaders
had in mind when they submitted their bid for
the 2022 World Cup but the tournament despite feet dragging
on promised reforms
could prove to be a Trojan horse
that drives change.
As could the overall strategy
of countries like the UAE and Bahrain
to project themselves
internationally through the hosting of major sporting events and the
acquisition of big name clubs and other assets.
“We need to rethink this and give human rights a much
higher status,” said Theo Zwanziger before he stepped down as a member
of the FIFA executive committee.46 His words are echoed in the International Olympic Committee’s Agenda 2020 that emphasizes rights in the
awarding of the games.47
Initial signs of change, the product of pressure not
only by FIFA and human rights and labour activists but also Western
governments and corporations, go beyond Qatar’s
engagement with critics.
They remain tentative
and have yet to be bolstered by robust legislation and implementation but are sparking a
process that is likely to be irreversible, take on dynamics of its own that
Gulf regimes may find hard to control, and is part of a growing realization in the region that it cannot escape global demands
for greater transparency and
accountability. They also keep open the promise that enlightened leadership
can manage the process.
Leaders of Dubai
and UAE have in as yet small
ways signalled that they are not oblivious to the winds of
change that are sweeping the Middle East and North Africa even if they have yet
to wholeheartedly get in front
of the cart. One indication are reports that Qatar has approved the creation of an independent soccer players union, the country’s
first trade union and a move that could open the door to a more radical restructuring of its labour system.
Another is the decision by traditionally secretive, major state-owned companies such as Qatar
Airways and the Investment Corporation of Dubai ICD) that owns Emirates airlines
among other of the emirate’s
crown jewels, to publish their results for the first time to counter criticism
by Western governments and airlines of unfair
competition and restore investor confidence.
A third indication was Qatar Airways’ recent lifting of
restrictions on pregnancy and marriage for its female personnel in response to criticism by
the ILO, the UN labour organization.48 The airline said it was also reviewing
rules that impose curfews on women and do not allow women to be brought or picked up from work by men who are not family of theirs.
Similarly, women in Saudi Arabia,
the Gulf’s most restrictive nation,
were in August
allowed to register
for the first time for municipal elections scheduled for December.
Labour reform presents
leaders an opportunity to project themselves as agents of inevitable change and foresighted adaptation to new realities. It
is low hanging fruit because it does not involve the granting of political rights and would
take the sting
out of the most immediate
criticism of Gulf leaders and project them as enlightened rulers. Yet, at the same time labour reform is as tricky and potentially treacherous as political reform. It involves managing what are
legitimate, existential fears among the region’s citizenry about a future in which demography threatens
their ability to maintain indigenous
control of their culture and societies.
A report commissioned and endorsed by the Qatari
government lays out a roadmap for labour reform that would involve the introduction of
minimum wages, abolition of the sponsorship system, development of unfettered labour markets,
setting of wage rates through collective bargaining, workers’
freedom to change employers, and ethical recruitment that eradicates corruption and the indenture of workers.49
To be sure, the Gulf’s need for foreign labour has an upside. “Foreign
migrant workers earn vastly more in the GCC than they would at home in Bangladesh
or India, where they would make around $1,000 per year. By welcoming migrant
workers, the UAE and its neighbour Qatar
do more than any other
rich country to reduce global inequality, professors Eric
Posner and Glen Weyl argued in New Republic
in defence of kafala.50
“The kafala system exists as part of an effort by
Qataris to retain control of their country. Abolishing the system means opening up a labour
market in a country where there is no labour
market. The requirement
for an exit visa is partly the result of Qatar not having extradition treaties with a lot of countries and wanting to prevent those who break the law from simply skipping the country,” added Ray Jureidini, author of a Qatar Foundation report that advocates
far-reaching reform of the labour system.51
Yet, in a further sign that Qatar’s top leadership
recognizes the political, social and economic implications of the labour
issue, the Doha-based Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies,
an initiative fostered
by Sheikh Tamim, warned that “in the absence of the establishment of a modern
state based on the bond of
citizenship, justice, the rule of law, and equal opportunity among all
components of society, it is extremely
difficult to assimilate immigrants. … The Gulf countries, due to the delay in the
construction of the modern state on the institutional, legal and constitutional
levels, have extreme difficulties integrating the population of
their home societies – let alone assimilating
immigrants.”52
The cost to Gulf states of restrictive labour regimes is not just reputational and the risk is not simply demographic. Despite perceptions that the kafala
system ensures the supply of cheap labour,
it is proving to be detrimental to the efforts of Gulf leaders to turn their countries into cutting edge, 21st century knowledge-based societies. A study
by researchers of Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar argued that Qatar would be near the top of the United Nation’s
Human Development Index (HDI) if adjustments
were made for the country’s large population of migrant workers.53
The cost of cheap unskilled labour is magnified by the
fact that it offers little incentive to governments to develop economic
policies that encourage
the private sector to focus on exports.
Business opts instead for low-tech, labour intensive products
for a domestic market and shies away from the higher risk investments
in human capital, facilities and innovation that would allow companies to compete internationally. The aluminium and petrochemicals sectors
although they only marginally contribute to diversification
because of their dependence on oil are the exception that demonstrate Gulf countries’ ability to compete if the right policies are adopted.
If the Gulf was ever in need of vision and leadership it is in the forthcoming decade. The challenges are multiple and enormous. They are both domestic and regional and the two often are inseparable. The list is long and includes managing almost
impossible demographics; cementing national identities; institutionalization and political reform
that need not endanger the longevity of ruling families but will have to involve accommodating a citizenry that wants to see greater
inclusion, involvement in the political process, transparency and
accountability; transition to truly diversified, post-oil economies; and adjustment to a Middle East in which Iran with its history and sense of empire, huge population base, and an economy that after several
years of deep structural reform
is likely to be alongside
Turkey one of the most vibrant
in the region.
Gulf leaders appear to be still grappling with the
enormity of these challenges. They have yet to
reveal statements of vision that
address the full gamut of issues they will have to confront. Dubai, Qatar and Oman,
despite concerns about transition to a post-Qaboos era, are furthest down the
road in addressing at least some of the issues. In doing so, they hold out the promise of being best able to manage multiple
processes of almost simultaneous political, social and economic change.
In some ways, Sheikh Mohammed has set a model for
ensuring that populations are on board. “Sheikh Mohammed puts ideas out there before their time,” a person close to the Dubai ruler said. “He has a keen
sense of supply and demand. He understands that people have demands. He leaves
his ideas out there and waits. People get their time and finally they are desensitized.”54
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies as Nanyang Technological
University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of the
University of Würzburg and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer,
and a forthcoming book with the same title.
1 Al
Jazeera, Oil resources in the Gulf. 25 November 2009,
2 Interview with
the author, August 30, 2015
3 Gary A. Grappo,
In the Shadow of Qaboos:
Contemplating Leadership Change
in Oman, The Arab Gulf States
4 Tina Nika Snoj, From here to where? The Gulf states face social and economic crises without oil revenues,
BQ‐Magazine, 1 April 2015, http://www.bq‐magazine.com/economy/2015/04/oil‐revenues
5 The Economist,
The perils of relying on the sticky stuff, 5 September 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/middle‐east‐and‐africa/21663235‐persistent‐low‐prices‐threaten‐entire‐ region‐perils‐relying
6 Interview with
the author, 1 September 2015
7 Gulf News, UAE
has eased residency rules for Syrians, 17 September 2015,
8 Maria Hanif,
Standing tall against discrimination, Gulf News, 29 August 2015,
9 Simeon Kerr,
IMF urges Gulf countries to reduce spending as oil price plunges, Financial
Times, 21 January
10 Interview with
the author, 5 September 2015
11 ASDA'A Burson‐Marsteller, Arab Youth Survey 2014,
7 April 2014,
12 The
Independent, UAE deports rights activist Ahmed Abdul Khaleq in clampdown on
dissent, 17 July 2012,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle‐east/uae‐deports‐rights‐activist‐ahmed‐abdul‐khaleq‐in‐ clampdown‐on‐dissent‐7946871.html
13 Claire
Beaugrand, Biduns in the Face of Radicalization in Kuwait, Arab Gulf States
Institute in Washington,
14 Angus McDowall
and William Maclean, Islamic State weaves web of support in Gulf Arab states,
Reuters, 1
July 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/01/uk‐kuwait‐blast‐plot‐insight‐idUKKCN0PB54X20150701
15 The Aviation Writer, Bahrain Air CEO Richard
Nutall discusses the airline’s closure, 13 March 2013,
http://www.theaviationwriter.com/2013/03/exclusive‐interview‐bahrain‐air‐ceo.html
16 Jim Krane, City of Gold: Dubai and the Dream of
Capitalism, New York: Picador, 2010, Kindle
edition 17
Interview with the author 4
September 2015
18 Sultan Sood Al
Qassimi, Twitter, 17 August 2015,
https://twitter.com/sultanalqassemi/status/633146419352760320
19 Interview
with the author, 5 September 2015 20
Interview with the author, 6
September 2015 21
Ibid. Krane
22 Ibid. Krane
23 James M. Dorsey,
Qatari promises of labour reform
ring hollow amid revived corruption allegations, The
Turbulent World of Middle
East Soccer, 5 May 2015, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg/2015/05/qatari‐
promises‐of‐labour‐reform‐ring.html
24 Interview with
the author, 25 August 2015
25 David Harding, Qatar to launch
major labour reform for migrant
workers, Agence France
Press, 16 August
2015, https://news.yahoo.com/qatar‐launch‐major‐labour‐reform‐migrant‐workers‐023123662.html
26 Amnesty
International, Promising Little, Delivering Less, 20 May 2015,
27 Ibid. Amnesty International
28 James M. Dorsey,
International sports associations caught between $ signs and human rights
ideals, The
Turbulent
World of Middle East Soccer, 13 March 2015,
http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg/2015/03/international‐sports‐associations.html
29
Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi, Give expats an
opportunity to earn UAE citizenship, Gulf News, 22 September
30
Ibid. Al Qassemi
31
Conversation with the author, 12 June 2014
32
Mary Sophia, Sheikh Mohammed launches UAE
Innovation Week, Gulf Business, 6 August 2015,
33
Interview with the author, 12 June 2012
34 Rory Donaghy,
UAE sends conscripts into Yemen battle,
leaving Emirati families
shocked and angry,
Middle
East Eye, 10 August
2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae‐sends‐conscripts‐yemen‐battle‐leaving‐
emirati‐families‐shocked‐and‐angry‐557104176
35 Mazhar al‐Zo’by
and Birol Baskin,
Discourse and oppositionality in the Arab Spring: The case of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the UAE, International Sociology, Vol 30:4, p. 401‐417
36 James M.
Dorsey, Gulf Security: A Risky New US‐Saudi Blueprint, RSIS Commentaries, 10
December 2013,
37
Shashank Joshi, United They Stand, Can the
Gulf's Joint Military Command Live Up to the Hype?, Foreign
Affairs, 10 December 2014,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle‐east/2014‐12‐10/united‐they‐
stand
38
Bloomberg Businessweek, Qatar Bond Issue Raises
$4.1 Billion, 2 September 2015,
39
Jane Kinninmont, Future Trends in the Gulf,
Chatham House, 2015,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150218FutureTrendsGCCK inninmont.pdf
40
Simona Sikimic, IMF warns deficit could erode
Saudi reserves, Middle East Eye, 10 September
2015,
41 The
National, Tax change is necessary to diversify UAE’s economy, 13 August 2015,
http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/editorial/tax‐change‐is‐necessary‐to‐diversify‐uaes‐eco
42Ibid. Sikimic
43
Ibid. Chatham House
44
Zaid Belbagi, Renegotiating the Social Contract
in the GCC: Lessons from the Rousseau Playbook, Autumn
45
Ibid. Chatham House
46
CNN, FIFA: Human rights records to get 'greater
status' in future World Cup bids, 13 August
2014,
47 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Agenda 2020, http://www.olympic.org/olympic‐agenda‐2020 48 Maria Khan,
Qatar Airways 'shamed into action' over sacking staff found getting married or pregnant,
International Business
Times, 27 August 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/qatar‐airways‐shamed‐into‐action‐
over‐sacking‐staff‐found‐getting‐married‐pregnant‐1517385
49
DLA Piper, Migrant Labor in the Construction
Sector in the State of Qatar, April 2014,
50
Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, A Radical Solution to
Global Income Inequality: Make the U.S. More Like Qatar,
the New Republic, 6 November 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120179/how‐reduce‐global‐
income‐inequality‐open‐immigration‐policies
51 James M. Dorsey, Qatar:
Perfecting the art of scoring
own goals, The Turbulent World of Middle
East Soccer,
52 Baqir
al‐Najjar, Foreign Labor and Questions of Identity in the Arabian Gulf, Arab
Center for Research &
53
Ravinder Mamtani,, Albert B Lowenfels, Sohaila
Cheema and Javaid Sheikh, Impact of migrant workers on
the Human Development Index, Perspectives in
Public Health, June 5, 2013,
54
Interview with the author, 5 September 2015
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