How Qatar is its own worst enemy
How Qatar is its own
worst enemy
By James M. Dorsey
This is the Accepted Manuscript of this article that was published by Taylor Francis Group in The International Journal of the History of Sport, DOI:10.1080/09523367.2015.1008212
Qatar is proving to be
its own worst enemy in achieving its soft power goals of embedding itself in
the international community as a good citizen despite having put crucial blocks
in place. Its failure to convincingly follow through on promises to reform its
controversial migrant labour system, demonstrate its sincerity in stopping a
flow of funds to jihadist organizations, and develop a robust communications
strategy that counters legitimate criticism as well as attacks by its
detractors has cost it significant reputational damage and diplomatic and
political capital.
As a result, Qatar has
found itself in recent years under continuous attack amid allegations of
corruption in its successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup, denunciation by
human rights and trade union activists of its migrant labour sponsorship system
as a form of modern slavery,[1] and charges that it
tolerates funding of militant Islamist groups ranging from Hamas, the group
that controls the Gaza Strip, to the Islamic State, the jihadists that have
conquered swaths of Syria and Iraq.[2]
Qatar suffered its setbacks
despite its development of a foreign policy that emphasizes mediation and peace-making;
a sports policy that seeks to garner empathy from a global public by hosting
high-profile sports mega events and acquiring top league foreign soccer clubs; a
strategy to acquire high profile commercial and cultural assets; a world class
airline that positions Qatar as a hub connecting continents; and a global news
and sports broadcaster that competes with the BBC and CNN.
These policies led to
Qatar’s hosting of the Al-Udeid airbase, the largest US military facility in
the Middle East as well as the U.S. Combat Operations Air Center for the Middle
East, making it a key regional US ally. Yet, its alliance like sponsorship of
BelN, a global sports broadcasting network that gives Qatar exposure to an
audience in which many know little, if anything, about the Gulf state has
earned little reputational capital.
Similarly, Qatar’s Arabic
language Al Jazeera channel has lost much of the admiration it initially won the
Gulf state by revolutionizing a Middle Eastern and North African media
landscape that had been dominated by state-owned broadcasters and projected
Qatar as a country that encouraged free and open debate – a key element of soft
power. Al Jazeera Arabic’s success made it the most widely watched regional
news channel until its image as a free-wheeling news channel was undermined by
perceptions that it had become a partisan tool in backing controversial groups
like the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of the Arab popular revolts.
Qatar further earned
few brownie points by accommodating an Israeli diplomatic presence in Doha
until the 2009 Israeli attack on Gaza or being the only Arab country to have
ever openly invested in Israel with funding for a soccer stadium in the Galilee
city of Sakhnin and of two Israeli Palestinian clubs.[3]
Qatar’s successful
mediation of the release of hostages held by Islamist groups and conflicts in
various part of the Middle East and North Africa positioned it as the skilled and
experienced go-to negotiator. Yet, the allegations of funding of terrorism, its
differences with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over the Brotherhood
and corruption in its World Cup bid have offset whatever mileage Qatar earned
from its mediation efforts.
Finally, Qatar’s
engagement with critics such as human rights groups and trade unions served to
project it as a forward looking state willing to embrace change in sharp
contrast to other Gulf states that regularly bar entry to foreign activists and
either deprive domestic critics of their nationality or imprison them. But its
failure to follow through on promises has undermined activists’ confidence, sparked
criticism and threatens to refuel demands that it be deprived of its right to
host the World Cup. A member of the executive committee of world soccer body
FIFA warned that Qatar could lose its hosting rights if it failed to implement
recommendations that included the creation of a minimum wage for each category
of construction worker made by a Qatar-sponsored review of its labour
legislation by British-based law firm DLA Piper.[4]
The adoption in
December of a human rights declaration at a summit in Doha by the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC)[5], the regional grouping of
which Qatar is a member, opens Qatar up to a new line of criticism on the
labour issue despite the fact that the flawed document was intended to enable
Gulf states to deflect attacks on their human rights record. Overall, the
declaration signalled the GCC’s refusal to recognize its citizen’s political
rights including the right to freedom of thought and expression. It did however
acknowledge that “people are equal in dignity and humanity, in rights and
freedoms, and equal before the law” with “no distinction between them for
reasons of origin, gender, religion, language, colour, or any other form of
distinction.”
That acknowledgement
strengthens demands by human rights and trade union activists that Qatar
embrace the principle of collective bargaining that would eliminate its system
of setting wages for migrant workers according to nationality. “It is not
entirely certain how the comparative wage differences have been derived, or why.
The QF (Qatar Foundation) Standards state clearly a universal principle in the
world of work, namely,,, workers shall receive equal pay for equal work irrespective
of their nationality, gender, ethnic origin, race, religion or legal status,”
said a report by migration scholar Ray Jureidini, compiled for the Qatar
Foundation.[6]
QF is one of two Qatari institutions in the forefront of attempting to address activists’
concerns.
The report recommended
introduction of a minimum wage to eliminate discriminatory wage policies as
part of an effort to ensure Qatar’s competitiveness. “If Qatar wishes to have
wage rates of migrant workers set by supply and demand in a local labour
market, then it will need to lift the current kafala sponsorship system, allow
workers to change employers without sponsor approval (as is now the case in
Bahrain) allow collective bargaining to take place that will establish wage
rates, terms and conditions of all occupations filled by non-Qataris in the
country”, the report’s said.[7] A similar recommendation
was made by the United Nations Special Rapporteur for migrants’ human rights.[8] The kafala system puts
workers at the mercy of their employers.
Source: Migrant Labour Recruitment to Qatar, Qatar Foundation
At the core of Qatar’s
inability to turn the building blocks of its soft power strategy into successes
from which it could reap the fruits is a lack of political will to respond to
criticism it recognizes not only with words and window dressing but convincing
deeds. Qatar’s ability to capitalize on its soft power assets is further
hampered by a lack of management infrastructure to ensure monitoring and
enforcement of existing legislation, rules and regulations; and a need to
manage domestic public opinion, particularly within the factitious ruling Al
Thani family. In addition, Qatar has been unable or unwilling to develop a
communications strategy capable of addressing criticism stemming from its
winning of the right to host the World Cup and a backlash from its shift in
foreign policy from strict neutrality and mediation to proactive intervention
in support of popular revolts that swept the Middle East and North Africa in
the second decade of the 21st century.
Friend or Foe?
Qatar’s desired status
as a good citizen of the international community has been called into question
by statements by senior US Treasury officials as well as think tank reports
alleging that it maintains links with jihadist groups and at the least turns a
blind eye to the funding of such organizations. Prominent among the reports is a
three-part study entitled ‘Qatar and Terror Finance’[9] by the Foundation for the
Defense of Democracies. “Qatar’s performance in the fight against terror
finance tests the notion that it is a reliable friend and ally,” the foundation
report concluded. Qatar’s credibility is further called into question by its support
for Hamas, the Islamist group that governs the Gaza Strip, its differences with
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states over its alliance with the Muslim
Brotherhood, and a United Arab Emirates-funded anti-Qatar media campaign that
has succeeded in generating negative media reporting.
In many ways the
debate about funding of jihadist groups by wealthy individuals in the Gulf and
particularly Qatar is slanted. For one, most estimates of the income of the
Islamic State conclude that donations account for a small fraction of its total
revenues.[10]
"These rich Arabs are like what 'angel investors' are to tech start-ups,
except they are interested in starting up groups who want to stir up hatred. Groups
like (Jabhat) al-Nusra and ISIS (the former acronym for the Islamic State) are
better investments for them. The individuals act as high rollers early,
providing seed money. Once the groups are on their feet, they are perfectly
capable of raising funds through other means, like kidnapping, oil smuggling, selling
women into slavery, etc," said former U.S. Navy Admiral and NATO Supreme
Commander James Stavridis, now the dean of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at
Tufts University.[11] Other sources of Islamic
State’s include taxation of people, businesses and transport routes.
Although Qatar is but
one of several Gulf states that hosts alleged jihadist financiers, it has taken
the brunt of public criticism because of its high profile mediation-driven
foreign policy that seeks to maintain relations with all parties, including
some that are internationally proscribed; organized media campaigns to
undermine its credibility by the UAE as well as Israel; and an inherent
reluctance by Western governments to confront head on Saudi Arabia, the largest
and wealthiest of the Gulf states, whose puritan interpretation of Islam,
constitutes an ideological source for jihadist thinking and creates a breeding
ground for militant Islamist views.
The argument against
Qatar is strengthened by alleged links between suspected financiers and sports.
In addition, Qatar’s emphasis on sports offers its critics an additional line
of attack. Prominent among the alleged financiers is Abdulrahman Omar al
Nuaimi, a historian of religion and former head of the Qatar Football
Association (QFA), who was detained for three years in 1988 for his opposition
to government-led reforms particularly regarding women’s rights. Al Nuaimi was
released in 1991 on condition that he no longer would speak out publicly.[12] Although Al Nuaimi was
originally arrested on the orders of the then emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa
Al-Thani,[13]
he was received by Hamad after the emir had ordered his release. Al Nuaimi was
identified in late 2013 as a specially designated global terrorist by the US
Treasury[14]
and blacklisted in 2014 by the European
Union and the United Nations.[15]
The Treasury charged
that Al Nuaimi had “provided money and material support and conveyed
communications to al-Qa'ida and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and
Yemen for more than a decade. He was
considered among the most prominent Qatar-based supporters of Iraqi Sunni
extremists.”[16]
The Treasury charged Al Nuaimi had transferred at least $2.6 million to Al
Qaeda, had served as an interlocutor between Qatari donors and Al Qaeda in Iraq
and assisted the group in its media communications. It also said Al Nuaimi had
channelled funds to Al Shabab jihadists in Somalia and Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen.[17]
Al Nuaimi despite his
designation has denied the allegations and is believed to remain a free man in
Qatar fuelling allegations that he has close ties to senior officials in the
Qatari government and ruling family. Al Nuaimi issued his initial denial at a
news conference hosted by the Doha-based Arab Center for Research and Policy
Studies (ACRPS).[18]
ACRPS is headed by Azmi Bishara, a former Palestinian member of the Israeli
parliament who left in Israel in 2006 after being accused of having spied for
the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia Hezbollah. Bishara has since become a Qatari
national and a close associate of Qatari emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani,
who also serves as chairman of Qatar’s National Olympic Committee (NOC) and is
a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Tamim as NOC head gave
Al Nuaimi an award for his contribution to Qatari sports in 2010.[19]
The politicization of
the debate about Qatar was highlighted by the fact that the UAE in November
2014 designated 83 organizations as terrorists that included the bulk of usual
jihadist suspects as well the Muslim Brotherhood and groups in the West
believed to be affiliated with it. The list glaringly failed to list Hamas whose
leader in exile Khaled Mishal is based in Doha.[20] Proscribing Hamas, which
has strong links to the Brotherhood, would have put the UAE in direct
confrontation with a significant segment of Palestinian public opinion and
risked stirring significant segments of Middle Eastern and North African public
opinion.
To be fair, the
international community is divided on its judgement of both the Muslim
Brotherhood and Hamas. Arab states, even those like Egypt and Saudi Arabia that
have turned against Hamas, have like the UAE stopped short of proscribing Hamas
and insist on the Palestinians’ right to resist continued occupation of the
Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. Egypt on the one hand has shut down
underground tunnels linking the Sinai with Gaza in a bid to cut off supplies to
anti-government insurgents in the Egyptian desert peninsula as well as Hamas but
has so far maintained its lines open to Hamas in recognition of the fact that
no interim or more permanent agreement with Israel is possible without its consent.
A senior Hamas official, Mousa Abu Marzouk, moreover remains resident in Cairo.
Similarly, Saudi Arabia has taken Hamas to task for its ‘mistakes’ that include
in the words of former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki bin Faisal al Saud
its “ill-advised alignment with Qatar and Turkey” but has been careful not to
group it among Islamist groups targeted by the kingdom.[21]
This lay of the land
could change with an Egyptian court hearing a petition to categorize Hamas’ military
wing as a terrorist organization.[22] A possible outlawing
could lead to similar measures in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It would weaken
Egypt’s ability to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians and strengthen
Qatar’s credentials as one of the few backchannels to the group.
Nonetheless, Qatar
walks a fine line in seeking to carve out a niche of its own and how it
projects that effort to the world and maintaining its relations with Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states. The Gulf states agree on the need to ring fence
their neck of the woods against multiple threats, including widespread domestic
discontent, jihadism and Iran. They differ however on how to accomplish that
with Qatar believing that it can best achieve its goal by supporting popular and
Islamist movements elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa.
Qatar can afford to do
so because despite domestic criticism of government policies, its rulers are
among the least threatened in the region and Qatar’s success in assuring
harmonious relations between its majority Sunni and minority Shiite Muslim
communities. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait have
experienced various degrees of expression of popular discontent over the past
four years while the UAE like others has cracked down on any form of dissent.
Banning the
Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and the UAE meant cracking down on a group that was
at the least a strong influence on major underground opposition forces in the
two countries. It also enabled Gulf states to attempt to distract public
opinion from domestic grievances and concern about the economic fallout of
dropping oil prices – issues that are of less concern to Qatari rulers.
Meanwhile, the Brotherhood
and/or its affiliates remains legal in the United States and Europe and was
only proscribed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2013. The banning of the
group as a terrorist group was primarily driven by the Egyptian military’s
protection of its vested interests with the coup in 2013 that toppled Mohammed
Morsi, a Muslim Brother and Egypt’s first and only democratically elected
president. Saudi opposition to the group is rooted in its threat perception of
any Islamist group that offers an alternative to the kingdom’s version of
Islamist rule, particularly if it involves free and fair elections. The UAE’s
rulers have long seen the Brotherhood and Qatar, one of the group’s main
supporters, as a threat because of the Brother’s appeal among a significant
segment of the Emirati citizenry.
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Armed Forces Chief of Staff
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Zayed warned US diplomats as far back as 2004
that "we are having a (culture) war with the Muslim Brotherhood in this
country.“ The US embassy in Abu Dhabi reported that “Sheikh Mohammed and his
brothers Hamdan and Hazza rarely miss an opportunity to talk to high-level USG
(US Government) interlocutors about the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on
moderate-thinking Emiratis. In a meeting with Deputy Secretary Armitage on
April 20, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed noted that UAE security forces had
identified ‘50 to 60’ Emirati Muslim Brothers in the Armed Forces, and that a
senior Muslim Brotherhood sympathizer is within one of the ruling families - a
reference, we believe, to Sharjah Ruler Sheikh Sultan Al Qassimi, whose ties to
Saudi Arabia are well known. Sheikh
Mohammed has told us that the security services estimate there are up to 700
Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers in the UAE.
He also said that when the Armed Forces discovered Muslim Brotherhood
sympathizers within their ranks, they were arrested and given a form of reverse
brainwashing.”[23]
In 2009. Sheikh Mohamed went as far as telling US officials
that Qatar is "part of the Muslim Brotherhood."[24]
He suggested that a review of Al Jazeera employees would show that 90 percent
were affiliated with the Brotherhood.
Sheikh Mohammed charged that Qatar was facilitating Iranian inroads into
the Arab world and that “he sees Iranian influence in the Brotherhood very
clearly as both a way to agitate the Arab populace and render the traditional
leaders of Arab society impotent.”[25]
Other UAE officials privately described Qatar as “public enemy number 3”, after
Iran and the Brotherhood.[26]
Because of the Brotherhood’s inroads into the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed
said he had sent his son with the Red Cross rather than the Red Crescent on a
humanitarian mission to Ethiopia to cure him of his interest in Islamist
teachings. “His son returned from the mission with his vision of the west
intact and in fact corrected. He was
astonished that the Christians with the Red Cross were giving food and support
to anyone who needed the support, not just to Christians. His son had only heard the stories of the
west through the lens of Al Jazeera and others similarly aligned,” the embassy
recounted Sheikh Mohammed as saying.[27]
A war of words
Qatar’s ties to the
Brotherhood notwithstanding, the significance of funding from other Gulf
states, particularly Kuwait, cannot be underestimated according to senior Obama
administration officials and theology scholar Zoltan Pall. “Kuwaiti Salafis
have built up vast transnational networks by financially supporting Salafi
groups worldwide, making them one of the main financiers of the international movement.
This practice has provided them with significant influence over Salafism on the
global level… The different Kuwaiti Salafi groups mobilize vast financial
resources from Kuwaiti citizens to sponsor a variety of Salafi armed groups in
Syria, which has contributed to fragmentation and sectarianism within the Syrian
armed opposition,” said Pall in a study of Kuwaiti Salafism, the Islamic trend
that seeks to emulate the period of the Prophet Mohammed and his immediate
successors.[28]
In a speech in April 2014, US Treasury Department Under-Secretary for Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence David Cohen warned that “our ally Kuwait has become
the epicentre of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria.”[29] Cohen added that “Qatar
has become such a permissive terrorist financing environment, that several
major Qatar-based fundraisers act as local representatives for larger terrorist
fundraising networks that are based in Kuwait.”
None of this diminishes
the fact that Qatar has systematically failed to act against proscribed
financiers of jihadist groups that reside and operate from the Gulf state.
Nevertheless, in shaping public opinion, particularly in the United States, the
UAE and Israel critics have remained largely silent about Kuwait’s role but
have been happy to pinpoint Qatar. Ron Posner, Israel’s ambassador to the
United Nations, headline an opinion piece in The New York Times: Club Med for
Terrorists. “It is time for the world to wake up and smell the gas fumes. Qatar
has spared no cost to dress[30] up its country as a
liberal, progressive society, yet at its core, the micro monarchy is
aggressively financing radical Islamist movements,” Posner wrote.
In the only major
manifestation of soccer fan discontent since protests in 2013 against world
soccer body FIFA in Brazil in the walk-up to the World Cup, football supporters
in London rallied in September outside the Qatar embassy to demand that the
Gulf state be deprived of its right to host the 2022 competition because of its
support for Hamas. The protest under slogans that included ‘Football fans
deserve better than Qatar,’ ‘Kick Terrorism out of Football,’ and ‘Qatar: Stop
Funding Terrorism,’ was organized by the Sussex Friends of Israel and the
Israel Forum Task Force.
“We should not
negotiate with terrorists, we should not finance terrorists and we should
certainly not reward terror by awarding the World Cup to Qatar in honour of its
role in financing terror… (It is) time for the referee of world opinion to blow
the whistle and show a red card to Qatar. It’s time to kick Blatter out of FIFA
and time to kick terrorism out of football and it’s time to kick the World Cup
out of Qatar,” lawyer Mark Lewis, one of the protest’s organizers told the
demonstrators referring to FIFA president Sepp Blatter. Organizers said the
protest was the beginning of a campaign to deprive Qatar of the World Cup.[31]
Similarly, the UAE,
the world’s largest spender on lobbying in the United States in 2013[32],
sought, according to US media reports to plant anti-Qatar stories in American
media. To do so it employed California-based Camstoll Group LLC that is
operated by former high-ranking US Treasury officials who had been responsible
for relations with Gulf state and Israel as well as countering funding of terrorism.[33]
Camstoll signed a consulting agreement with Abu Dhabi’s state-owned Outlook
Energy Investments LLC on December 2, 2012,[34] a week after it was incorporated in Santa
Monica, California.[35]
Camstoll reported receiving $4.3 million in 2012[36]
and $3.2 million[37]
from Outlook in 2013 as a retainer and compensation for expenses.
Under the contract,
Camstoll would consult Outlook on “issues pertaining to illicit financial
networks, and developing and implementing strategies to combat illicit
financial activity.”[38]
In its registration as a foreign agent, Camstoll reported that it “has
conducted outreach to think tanks, business interests, government officials,
media, and other leaders in the United States regarding issues related to
illicit financial activity.”[39]
Camstoll’s “public
disclosure forms showed a pattern of conversations with journalists who
subsequently wrote articles critical of Qatar’s role in terrorist
fund-raising,” The New York Times reported.[40]
Camstoll’s reported multiple conversations with reporters of The New York
Times, The Washington Post, The Daily Beast, Dow Jones News Wires, Financial
Times, Bloomberg News, CNN and the Washington Free Beacon.[41]
The lobbying effort
resulted among others in a Daily Beast feature entitled ‘U.S. Spies Worry Qatar
Will ‘Magically Lose Track’ of Released Taliban’ that asserted that Qatar’s
track record is troubling” and that “the emirate is a good place to raise money
for terrorist organizations”[42];
a CNN special report asking ‘Is Qatar a haven for terror funding?’[43]; and stories in The Washington Post declaring
that “private Qatar-based charities have taken a more prominent role in recent
weeks in raising cash and supplies for Islamist extremists in Syria, according
to current and former U.S. and Middle Eastern officials”[44]
and “increasing U.S. concern about the role of Qatari individuals and charities
in supporting extreme elements within Syria’s rebel alliance” and linking the
Qatari royal family to a professor and U.S. foreign policy critic alleged by
the U.S. government to be “working secretly as a financier for al-Qaeda.”[45]
The Washington Post
story quoted among others “a former U.S. official who specialized in tracking
Gulf-based jihadist movements and who spoke on the condition of anonymity
because much of his work for the government was classified.” The description of
the source fits the bios of Camstoll executives, including the company’s owner,
Matthew Epstein, a former Treasury Department official who served as its
financial attaché to Saudi Arabia and the UAE; Howard Mendelsohn, former Acting
Assistant Secretary of Treasury, who according to a US State Department cable
“met with senior officials from the UAE’s State Security Department (SSD) and
Dubai’s General Department of State Security (GDSS)” to coordinate disruption
of Taliban financing,[46]
and other former Treasury officials who had been contact with Israel regarding
their strategy to counter funding of Palestinian groups.[47]
In disclosing the
UAE’s efforts to influence US media reporting on Qatar, The Intercept’s
Greenwald argued that “the point here is not that Qatar is innocent of
supporting extremists… The point is that this coordinated media attack on Qatar
– using highly paid former U.S. officials and their media allies – is simply a
weapon used by the Emirates, Israel, the Saudis and others to advance their
agendas… What’s misleading isn’t the claim that Qatar funds extremists but that
they do so more than other U.S. allies in the region (a narrative implanted at
exactly the time Qatar has become a key target of Israel and the Emirates).
Indeed, some of Qatar’s accusers here do the same to at least the same extent,
and in the case of the Saudis, far more so.”[48]
Qatar’s response to
the media campaign against it is illustrative of its inability to fight its
public relations and public diplomacy battles, clumsiness in developing
communication strategies, meek denials of various accusations and failure to
convincingly defend its at time controversial policies. In response to the
labour criticism, two key Qatari Institutions, the Qatar Foundation and the
2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy, issued lofty charters
governing the working and living conditions of migrant labours to be enshrined
in contracts of companies contracting with them.[49]
Qatar has yet to
enshrine in national legislation all of the principles established by the
charters and sufficiently beef up its monitoring and supervision infrastructure,
including a satisfactory number of labour inspectors, to ensure implantation of
current rules and regulations. Such moves would convince its critics of its
sincerity despite the evident hope that improvement of working and living
conditions will fend off demands by human rights and trade union activists that
it abolish its sponsorship system. As a result, Qatar is losing the confidence
of human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that
were willing to give it the benefit of the doubt.[50]
In a bid to counter
its World Cup critics, Qatar contracted Portland Communications founded by Tony
Allen, a former adviser to Tony Blair when he was prime minister, according to
Britain’s Channel 4 News.[51] The television channel linked
Portland to the creation of a soccer blog that attacked Qatar’s detractors by
Alistair Campbell, Blair’s chief communications advisor at Downing Street
Number Ten and a former member of Portland’s strategic council. Channel 4 reported
that the blog projected itself as “truly independent” and claimed to represent
“a random bunch of football fans, determined to spark debate” of
“astro-turfing,” the creation of fake sites that project themselves as
grassroots but in effect are operated by corporate interests. Portland admitted
that it had helped create the blog but asserted that it was not part of its contractual
engagement with Qatar. The blog stopped publishing after the television report.
Talking to the devil
On the terrorism
finance front, Qatari officials have rejected allegations that they turn a
blind eye to the flow of funds to jihadist groups but defend the importance of
maintaining lines to all parties as part of their mediation-focused foreign
policies that allows Qatar to step in at times that others are unable to
propose solutions or build bridges. “I am very much against excluding anyone at
this stage, or bracketing them as terrorists, or bracketing them as al‑Qaeda. What we are doing is only creating a sleeping monster,
and this is wrong. We should bring them all together, we should treat them all
equally, and we should work on them to change their ideology, i.e. put more
effort altogether to change their thinking,” Qatari Foreign Minister s Khalid
bin Mohamed al-Attiyah told an international security conference in Manama in
December 2012. Al-Attiyah was referring to Syria but his remarks go to the
heart of Qatari policy.[52]
Speaking on CNN in
September 2014, Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim, said: “We have to see the
difference between movements. I know that in America and some countries they
look at some movements as terrorist movements. In our part of the region, we
don't. But if you're talking about certain movements, especially in Syria and
in Iraq, we all consider them terrorist movements. And we don't accept any fund
for those and we don't accept anybody funding those groups… We have a strong
law against funding terrorist groups. But as I said, there is differences
between some countries, of who are the terrorists and who are the maybe
Islamist groups, but we don't consider them as terrorists… There are
differences that some countries and some people that any group which is --
which comes from an Islamist background are terrorists. And we don't accept
that. And all this is because of political difference. We don't -- we don't
accept that. But people, especially in Syria and Iraq and other Arab countries,
who don't believe in the freedom of speech, we don't believe that they have to
live with others and accept others, and also accept the choice of the people,
their own people. Those are the people that we don't fund.Other than that, I
believe that we'll make a big mistake for any Islamic movement. But we have
differences, ideological differences with them. I'm talking about some
countries, to consider them extremist, I think this is a big mistake and it's a
danger. Other than that, extremists are well-known. Terrorist groups are well-
known and we know them. Everybody knows them.”[53]
Left unsaid in the
statements of Qatari officials is the fact that maintaining relations with
various groups serves to shield the Gulf state from being targeted. It also,
like in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood enables Qatar, sandwiched between
two regional giants and rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran, with Islamic systems of
government that Qatar goes to great effort to evade. The statements moreover
have done little to prevent perceptions of Qatar from changing from that of a
neutral mediator to one of a country that actively intervened by backing rebels
in Libya and Syria as well as supporting the government of Muslim Brother
Mohammed Morsi in Egypt. Instead, Qatar’s more activist foreign policy made it
more vulnerable it to overt and covert attacks on its credibility by its
detractors, prominent among which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt
and Israel.
Fundamental problems
A recent study of
Qatari mediation efforts by The Brookings Institution concluded that “while
Qatar’s record of success in these efforts is mixed, an in-depth analysis of
its mediation history reveals a number of areas that, if fine-tuned, could
potentially enable Qatar to play a much-needed role in regional conflict resolution...
Both in terms of distance and cultural affinity, where opposing parties can
meet to hash out their differences in a relatively neutral setting.”[54] The study recommended
that Qatar establish an independent non-governmental entity to lay the
groundwork for dialogue and mediation and use its financial muscle to invest in
long-term development of areas prone to and affected by conflict, rather than
to incentivize parties to come to the negotiating table. This would have to
involve proper and systematic documentation of its mediation efforts as a
resource for the training of diplomats and negotiators.
The recommendations reflected
a more fundamental problem that Qatar confronts across the board in its soft
power strategy whether it relates to the hosting of sports mega events like the
2022 World Cup or its mediation-focused foreign policy: a failure to anticipate
potential roadblocks; a lack of institutional capacity and manpower to prepare
and follow-up on issues and initiatives that result from its successful
establishment of the building blocks of the strategy; differences within the
ruling family and between various state institutions; centralization of
decision making that restricts the ability of officials at lower levels to
respond publicly in a timely and adequate fashion to public relations
challenges; a need to balance its
mediation with Saudi concerns about meddling in areas like Yemen which the
kingdom views as proprietary; and an inability to develop a communications
strategy that would allow it to manage public perceptions.
In addition Qatar at
times appears more concerned about how its initiative help project its image
than about their substance even though that is what would be crucial for
cementing the reputation it is trying to create. That focus underlies its
emphasis on articulating lofty labour principles rather than ensuring that they
are nationally adopted and enforced. It at times also appeared to dictate
Qatar’s approach to mediation. Barakat, the author of the Brookings report,
quoted a negotiator from Darfur as saying that Qatar’s effort to resolve the
conflict in the war-ravaged Sudanese province “often ends up placing more
emphasis on the ‘news’ of mediation rather than the outcomes.”[55]
Barakat noted that “post-agreement
implementation is the critical phase of conflict resolution, often overlooked
as external actors lose interest following the signing of an agreement and
direct their attention elsewhere… Key issues include the provision of mechanisms
to resolve post-settlement disputes, building popular and political support for
sustained peace, and ensuring civil society and local stakeholders’ participation
in monitoring potential flashpoints and conflicts… This is an area where Qatari
mediation is most glaringly lacking, with the country frequently criticized for
failing to ensure that implementation plans are sufficiently robust and
inclusive. Other criticisms identify a failure to follow through on agreements
over the long-term… This kind of follow-up requires infrastructure for
sustained engagement in the post-mediation phase even before negotiations
begin. This is difficult for Qatar, however, given the scant number of civil
servants with the requisite skills, knowledge, and experience to support such
engagement… Qatar has also come under growing criticism regarding its weak
portfolio of skills. Notably, critics target the country’s inadequate
institutional knowledge of best practice strategies in mediation,
post-settlement implementation, and ceasefire monitoring.”[56]
To be fair, Qatari
complacency about widespread criticism was in part motivated by the
international community’s failure since the Gulf state became independent in
1971 to tackle it on issues like the conditions of migrant labour, human rights
and political freedoms. Similarly, Qatar was until 2013 and in fact is until
today not the only Gulf state to engage with groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia as far back as the 1950s offered refuge to thousands
of Brothers who fled repression in Egypt and Syria. Over time, they integrated
into Saudi society, occupied key public sector positions, including in the
education sector, and blended their politicized Islam with Wahhabism, the
puritanical Saudi interpretation of Islam developed by the 18th
century warrior priest, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Bahrain, despite joining Saudi
Arabia and the UAE in withdrawing its ambassador from Doha in 2014 for a period
of eight months and inviting Saudi troops in 2011 to help in brutally
repressing a popular revolt, remains hesitant to act against the Brotherhood. Bahraini
rulers fear that a crackdown on the Brothers could undermine its support in their
minority Sunni Muslim power base.
Qatar’s lack of
preparedness for criticism and its failure to develop a communications strategy
was evident in initial Qatari responses to the migrant labour criticism and its
handling of high-profile labour disputes. Qatari officials believed when the
migrant labour issue first exploded that it was a public relations battle they
would not be able to win and therefore should best ignore in the conviction
that it would eventually blow over. They rejected the notion that failure to
engage amounted to surrender of the battlefield, losing an opportunity to
conquer a moral high ground, and allowing a wound to fester.[57]
Hassan al Thawadi,
secretary of the Qatar 2022 Supreme Committee that was later restyled as the
Qatar Supreme Committee for Legacy and Delivery admitted as much at a Leaders
in Football conference in 2011. “When Qatar was pulled from the envelope in
Zurich on December 2nd (2010), amid all the celebrations and joy, we knew that
the work was only just beginning. What we did not know or expect was the
avalanche of accusations and allegations that we would face in the immediate
aftermath of what was a historic day for sport in our country and for the wider
region. I‘m sure all of you in this audience are well aware of the very tough
challenges we have faced since our success last December. Baseless accusations
were made against our bid. We were presumed guilty before innocent without a shred
of evidence being provided,” Thawadi said.[58]
Yet even when an
upcoming communications fiasco is evident, which Qatari officials recognize
needs to be addressed swiftly and decisively, they find themselves hampered by
vested interests of various institutions and a centralized decision making
process. Employment-related complaints
by two international players, one of whom was barred from leaving Qatar for 18
months and as a result saw his career wrecked and has since been forced to work
as a waiter in France,[59] have undermined Qatari
arguments in favour of its kafala system.
Belounis was locked
into a salary dispute with Al Jaish SC, the club owned by the Qatari military
that refused to let him leave the country until the labour dispute against the
advice of others that Qatar would suffer greater reputational damage than the
dispute was worth.[60]
He said the dispute was about almost two years of unpaid salary. This is a
crazy story… I cannot move around freely, I cannot work anymore, I'm 33 years
old ... Who wants a player who has not played for months? Frankly, my career
takes a hit,” Belounis told Jeune Afrique.[61]
Similarly, Moroccan
international Abdessalam Ouadoo, who was allowed to leave Qatar to join AS
Nancy-Lorraine, complained about failure to honour his contract as well as ill
treatment. Ouadoo who said he was owed five months of salary told the BBC’s
World Football that “the Qataris showed me no respect and I can never forgive
them for that. I know that money is king but you don’t treat a man like that
without paying a price.”[62] He said he had been
forced to train in the Gulf state’s excruciating summer heat when temperatures
go up to 50 degrees Celsius “just to push me to forget my rights. They did
everything to discourage me…. The Qataris think they can do everything because
they think money can buy anything: buildings, jazz, beautiful cars and men…
Human rights are not respected. Human beings are not respected. The workers are
not respected. A country that does not respect all these things should not
organize the World Cup 2022.”
A mixed record
On balance, Qatar’s
mediation track record over the past decade proved its ability to bring parties
to the table for negotiations that produced the defusing of an immediate crisis
rather than a long-term solution. Qatar initially played a key role in talks in
Cairo to end Israel’s assault on Gaza in the summer of 2014 before it was side
lined by Egypt with the backing of Saudi Arabia and the UAE who not only wanted
to isolate Qatar but position post-coup Egypt as a key player in regional
geopolitics. Months before, Qatar arranged a prisoner exchange in which five
Taliban detainees were released from the US detention facility in Guantanamo
Bay into Qatari custody in return for the release of US Army Sgt. Bowe
Bergdahl. US Secretary of State John
Kerry said the deal “exemplifies how vital our partnership with Qatar is and
will remain.”[63]
The release of the Taliban came a year after an effort failed to allow the
Taliban to open an office in Doha as a basis for negotiations with the United
States in advance of the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.[64] In March 2014, Qatar
successfully negotiated the exchange of 13 Syrian and Lebanese nuns held by
Jabhat al Nusra for 150 women and children held by the government of Bashar
al-Assad.
Reports that Qatar had
paid Jabhat al Nusra ransom money as part of the deal has fuelled questions
about the Gulf state’s relations to jihadist groups.[65] A seven-country, in-depth
investigation into efforts to persuade the Islamic State to release hostages
established Qatar as the major alternative to private security firms operating
on behalf of insurance companies that have extended kidnap and ransom policies
mostly for Westerners employed by non-governmental organizations. “The
alternative’s name is Qatar. The filthy rich dwarf state in the Persian Gulf likes
to ingratiate itself as the international community’s best friend and when
needed conducts negotiations and even foots the bill. The emir’s pockets are
deep, the investments pay off in diplomatic weight,” the investigation
concluded.[66]
Qatar’s successful
negotiation of the release of hostages is in contrast to the durability of
agreements to end regional disputes. Qatar’s success in negotiating an initial
ceasefire between the government and Houthi rebels in 2007 and a peace
agreement in 2008 ultimately failed to pave the way for a lasting solution to
the conflict that addressed underlying grievances amid acrimony between the
Qatari and Yemeni governments despite a Qatari pledge of up to $500 million in
aid for development of Houthi areas. The failure ultimately led to a virtual
Houthi takeover of the country in 2014.
Qatar successfully
negotiated an agreement in 2008 to end the worst crisis in Lebanon since the
end of the country’s civil war in 1990 that averted a new round of fighting but
failed to address issues that would have built the confidence among the
country’s multiple sectarian communities needed to shield it against threats
emanating from the Shiite group Hezbollah’s continued existence as the foremost
armed non-state actor and the fall-out of regional conflicts like Syria.
Similarly, Qatar persuaded various parties in Darfur to agree on a ceasefire in
2011 that remained shaky because of the refusal of powerful rebel groups to
accept it and its failure to tackle the grievances that had sparked the
conflict.
Qatar’s
mediation-focused foreign policy nonetheless challenged traditional academic
wisdom on the limits on the ability of small states to project power and the
assumption of an automatic link between size and power.[67] “Weak states are not
entirely weak. They have important internal sources of strength which they have
learned to use to their advantage. They have also learnt to manipulate the
strength of the great powers on their own behalf, and to draw on this external
source of strength to further their own national interest … In evaluating the
relative strength or weakness of a state, its geographic location must be taken
into account,” wrote sociologist Michael Handel.[68] In doing so, small states
benefit from the ability to continue a successful policy of neutrality or
alliance membership but replace a failed policy by a new choice. Such a simple
alternative is not available to great powers, which are not only concerned with
direct threats to their own security, but with broader national interests,”
added political scientists Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl.[69]
Qatar’s mixed record
on mediation meant that it produced mixed results in achieving its soft power
goals in terms of definitions of the strategy developed by political scientists
Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. and Ira William Zartman as evidenced by the controversy
over its relationship with Hamas and the allegation of funding of terrorism. Nye
defined soft power as an “indirect way to get what you want … (and) set the
agenda and attract others in world politics… This soft power – getting others
to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.[70] Zartman noted that “states
use mediation as a foreign policy instrument. They seek a reduction (management
or resolution) of conflict because it is in their interest. That interest may
be merely one of reducing human cost, nothing else, but that reduction usually
also has to bring benefits to the mediator for it to enter the fray. Mediating
states are likely to seek terms that will increase the prospects of stability,
earn them the gratitude of one or both parties, enable them to continue to have
a role in future relations in the region, or deny their rivals opportunities
for intervention, as well as simply ending the killing.”[71]
Qatar falls into both
categories of mediators developed by political scientist Jacob Bercovitch: “trust-based
mediators who basically clarify misunderstandings; and resource-based mediators
“who at times rely on some positive or negative incentives to get things moving.”[72] Qatar frequently has
acted as a go-between attempting to clarify positions and narrow differences
while using its financial as an incentive.
In doing so, it
benefitted from the fact that decision making being limited to a very small
group of people. Yet, Qatari leaders have been hampered in their mediation
efforts as well as their larger soft power strategy that involves among other
things heavy investments in sports and the acquisition of foreign commercial
and cultural assets by criticism of aspects of the policy within the ruling
family and segments of Qatari society at large. Criticism has focused on issues
such as:
- The huge expenditure on mediation efforts;
- Qatar’s exposure to embarrassment and criticism as a result of the mixed results of its mediation efforts, its relations with controversial groups and the fall-out of its successful bid for the 2022 World Cup hosting rights;
- A belief that a large portion of Qatar’s wealth should be invested domestically in things like health care, job creation for Qataris and education;[73]
- Unfulfilled promises of change that would give Qataris a greater say in their country’s affairs;
- A stark increase in foreign labour to complete ambitious infrastructure projects many of which are World Cup-related and have exposed Qatar for the first time to real external pressure for social change;
- More liberal catering to Western expatriates by allowing the controlled sale of alcohol and pork in violation of religious restrictions;
- Potential tacit concessions Qatar may have to make to non-Muslim soccer fans during the World Cup, including expanded areas where consumption of alcohol would be allowed, public rowdiness and dress codes largely unseen in the Gulf state, and the presence of gays.
Concern about domestic
criticism prompted Qatar’s emir, Tamim, to signal his intention to focus of
domestic rather than foreign policy when he succeeded his father, Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa Al Thani, the architect of the Gulf state’s soft power strategy, in
June 2013. The policy shift was waylaid by the coup in Egypt almost immediately
after Tamim’s ascension; the eight-month rupture in diplomatic relations with
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain less than a year after he took power; and the
Islamic State’s expansion from Syria into Iraq and declaration of a caliphate.
Conclusion
Qatar has invested
heavily in a soft power strategy whose pillars include sports and foreign
policy as well as the forging of strategic alliances that were designed to
enhance its global reputation as a prominent, forward-looking and modern good
citizen of the international community. That investment has yet to pay off.
Rather than being widely viewed as a reputable host of sport mega events and as
a force for good in Middle Eastern and North African geopolitics, Qatar is
under attack for allegedly being a slave state that treats migrant workers
working on infrastructure, including facilities for the 2022 World Cup, as
serfs. It successful bid to host the tournament is mired in controversy.
Similarly, Qatar stands accused as allowing funding to flow to jihadist
organization and as a promoter of militant Islamist organizations.
While there is
certainly substance to the allegations, Qatar has valid counter arguments and
has taken steps to address criticism. Those steps however have done little to
halt escalating reputational damage let alone turn around a tidal wave of
negative publicity. To do so, Qatar would not only have to match its promises
and words with deeds but also develop a communications strategy to counter both
legitimate criticism and its multiple distractors who are willing to go to
significant length to undermine its credibility. Qatar has shown little
inclination to do either.
[1]
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 2011. Hidden faces of the Gulf
miracle, May, http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/VS_QatarEN_final.pdf
[2] David
Weinberg. 2014. Qatar and Terror Finance, December, Foundation for Defence of
Democracies, http://defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/qatar-and-terror-finance-part-1
[3]
James M. Dorsey. 2014. Qatar invests in Israeli soccer despite Gaza and war of
words with Jerusalem, July 30, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2014/07/qatar-invests-in-israeli-soccer-despite.html
[4]
Adrian Franke. 2014. Theo Zwanziger: Ultimatum an Katar, December 17,
Sportal.de, http://www.sportal.de/theo-zwanziger-ultimatum-an-katar-1-2014121745876500000
[5]
Saudi-US Information Service. 2014. 35th GCC Summit Communique, December 11, http://susris.com/2014/12/11/35th-gcc-summit-communique/
[6]
Ray Jureidini. 2014. Migrant Labour Recruitment to Qatar, Qatar Foundation, http://www.qscience.com/userimages/ContentEditor/1404811243939/Migrant_Labour_Recruitment_to_Qatar_Web_Final.pdf
[7] Ibid.
Jureidini
[8]
Francois Crepeau. 2013. UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants
concludes country visit to Qatar, November 10, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?tab=wm#inbox
[9] Ibid.
Weinberg
[10] A
BBC investigation in late 2014 concluded that Islamic State’s sources of
revenues were primarily $600 million in oil sales, $20 million in ransom from
kidnappings and upwards of $20-30 million a year from taxation; bank robberies;
sale of antiquities, livestock and crops; and human trafficking. Tom Keatinge.
2014. Finances of jihad: How extremist groups raise money, December 12, BBC
News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30393832
[11]
Robert Windrem. 2014. Who's Funding ISIS? Wealthy Gulf 'Angel Investors,'
Officials Say, September 21, NBC News, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/whos-funding-isis-wealthy-gulf-angel-investors-officials-say-n208006
[12]
James M. Dorsey. 2014. Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia,
July 10, Singapore Middle East Reflections, http://meisingapore.wordpress.com/publications/
[13]
US Department of State. 2001. Qatar, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
February 23, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/815.htm
[14]
US Department of the Treasury. 2013. Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters
in Qatar and Yemen, December 18, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2249.aspx
[15] United
Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. 2014. The List established and
maintained by
the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with respect to
individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida,
December 12, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/AQList.htm
[16] Ibid.
US Department of the Treasury
[17] Ibid.
US Department of the Treasury
[18]
Al Raya. 2013. ”,توثيق 1000 حالة قتل خارج القانون
برابعة العدوية, December 24, http://www.raya.com/news/pages/006f8f55-e8ef-4499-b91b-fc809c9021b9
[19]
Al Raya. 2010. الشيخ حمد بن ثامر شخصية الموسم الرياضية May 23, http://www.raya.com/home/print/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/79f2940a-f4e0-4662-b870-c43cd3cf4542
[20]
The National. 2014. List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the
UAE, November 16, http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae
[21] Prince
Turki bin Faisal al Saud. 2014. Israel's actions in Gaza trample hopes of Arab Peace
Initiative, July 25, Al-Monitor, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/israel-gaza-brutalities-arab-peace-initiative-turki-faisal.html
[22]
Ariel Ben Solomon. 2014. Egyptian court weighs labeling Hamas military wing as
terror organization, December 15, The Jerusalem Post, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egyptian-court-weighs-labeling-Hamas-military-wing-as-terror-organization-384706
[23] US Embassy Abu Dhabi. 2004. ‘UAE Minimizing
Influence Of Islamic Extremists,’ November 10, http://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=04ABUDHABI4061
[24] US
Embassy Abu Dhabi. 2009. ‘Strong Words in Private from MBZ at IDEX -- Bashes
Iran, Qatar, Russia.’ February 25, http://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/search.php?q=Strong+Words+in+Private+from+Mbz+at+Idex&qo=0&qc=0&qto=2009-02-26
[25] Ibid. US
Embassy Abu Dhabi
[26] Andrew
Hammond, Qatar’s Leadership Transition: Like Father, Like Son, February 2014,
European Council on Foreign Relations, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf
[27] Ibid. US
Embassy Abu Dhabi
[28]
Zoltan Pall. 2014. Kuwaiti Salafism and its Growing Influence in the Levant,
May, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/kuwaiti_salafists.pdf
[29]
US Treasury Department. 2014. Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American
Security on "Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing", April
3, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx
[30]
Ron Posner. 2014. Club Med for Terrorists, August 24, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/opinion/qatar-club-med-for-terrorists.html?_r=0
[31]
James M. Dorsey. 2014. Israel mobilizes to deprive Qatar of the World Cup,
September 23, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2014/09/israel-mobilizes-to-deprive-qatar-of.html
[32]
Lindsay Young. 2014. What countries spent the most to influence the USA in 2013,
May 8, Sunlight Foundation, http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/05/08/what-countries-spent-the-most-to-influence-the-usa-in-2013/
[33]
Glenn Greenwald. 2014. How former Treasury officials and the UAE are
manipulating American journalists, September 26, The Intercept, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/25/uae-qatar-camstoll-group/
/ David D. Kirkpatrick. 2014. Qatar’s Support of Islamists Alienates Allies
Near and Far, September 7, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/world/middleeast/qatars-support-of-extremists-alienates-allies-near-and-far.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A8%22%7D
[34]
US Department of Justice. 2012. Exhibit A to Registration Statement Pursuant to
the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, December 10, http://www.fara.gov/docs/6144-Exhibit-AB-20121210-1.pdf
[35]
Wysk B2B Data. 2014. Wysk Company Profile for CAMSTOLL GROUP LLC, THE, August
26, http://www.wysk.com/index/california/santa-monica/vvnan6g/camstoll-group-llc-the/profile
[36]
US Department of Justice. 2013. Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended, July 30, http://www.fara.gov/docs/6144-Supplemental-Statement-20130730-1.pdf
[37]
US Department of Justice. 2014. Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended, January 30, http://www.fara.gov/docs/6144-Supplemental-Statement-20140130-2.pdf
[38] Ibid.
US Department of Justice, 2012
[39]
Internet Archive. 2013. Camstoll Group, LLC Foreign Agents Registration Act
filing, July 30, https://archive.org/stream/745411-camstoll-group-llc-foreign-agents-registration/745411-camstoll-group-llc-foreign-agents-registration_djvu.txt
[40] Ibid.
Kirkpatrick
[41] Ibid.
US Department of Justice 2013 and 2014
[42]
Eli Lake. 2014. U.S. Spies Worry Qatar Will ‘Magically Lose Track’ of Released
Taliban, June 5, The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/05/u-s-spies-worry-qatar-will-magically-lose-track-of-released-taliban.html
[43]
Erin Burnett. 2014. CNN OUTFRONT SPECIAL REPORT: Is Qatar a haven for terror
funding?, June 8, CNN, http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/18/outfrontcnn-special-report-is-qatar-a-haven-for-terror-funding/
[44]
Joby Warrick. 2013. Syrian conflict said to fuel sectarian tensions in Persian
Gulf, December 18, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-conflict-said-to-fuel-sectarian-tensions-in-persian-gulf/2013/12/18/e160ad82-6831-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html
[45]
Joby Warrick. 2013. Islamic charity officials gave millions to al-Qaeda, U.S.
says, December 22, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/islamic-charity-officials-gave-millions-to-al-qaeda-us-says/2013/12/22/e0c53ad6-69b8-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html
[46]
US Embassy United Arab Emirates. 2010. US-UAE Further Cooperation to Disrupt
Taliban Finance, January 7, Wikileaks, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ABUDHABI9_a.html
[47]
US Embassy Tel Aviv. 2009. GOI'S New Terror Finance Designation Strategy, July
9, Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TELAVIV1502.html
[48] Ibid.
Greenwald
[49]
James M. Dorsey. 2014. The 2022 World Cup: A Potential Monkey Wrench for Change,
The International Journal of History of Sport, Vol. 31:14, p. 1739-1754
[50]
James M. Dorsey. 2014. Activists expand labour and human rights campaign beyond
Qatar to include all Gulf states, November 24, The Turbulent World of Middle
East Soccer, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2014/11/activists-expand-labour-and-human.html
[51]
Channel 4 News. 2014. FA chief slams attacks made on blog set up by Qatar's PR,
September 26, http://www.channel4.com/news/fa-chief-condemns-online-dirty-tricks-by-qatar-s-pr-firm
[52] International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Priorities for Regional Security: Q&A
Session,” 8 December 2012, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/manama%20dialogue/archive/manama-dialogue-2012-f58e/second-plenary-session-f3e9/qa-3d28
[53]
CNN’s Amanpour. 2014. Key Coalition Partner Qatar on ISIS War; Imagine a World,
September 25, http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1409/25/ampr.01.html
[54]
Sultan Barakat. 2014. Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement,
November, The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/10%20qatari%20mediation/final%20pdf%20english.pdf
[55] Ibid.
Barakat
[56] Ibid.
Barakat
[57]
Multiple interviews by the author with Qatari officials between 2011 and 2014
[58] Gulf
Times. 2011. ‘Text Hassan al Thawadi Speech - Leaders in Football 2011, Gulf
Times, October 7, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=462347&version=1&template_id=36&parent_id=16
[59]
James Masters. 2014. Zahir Belounis: From 'soccer prisoner' to waiter, November
27, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/27/sport/zahir-belounis-anniversary/index.html
[60]
Interviews with the author
[61] Alexis
Billebault. 2013. Algérie - Belounis : "Les Qataris ne veulent pas me
délivrer mon visa de sortie," April 23, Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130423162839/alg-rie-france-football-qatar-football-alg-rie-belounis-les-qataris-ne-veulent-pas-me-d-livrer-mon-visa-de-sortie.html
[62] World
Service World Football. 2013. Bad times for Qatar, April 26, BBC, http://wehearus.com/podcasts/episode/80067
[63]
US Department of State. 2014. Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, May 31, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/05/227013.htm
[64]
Lauren Williams. 2014. Prisoner exchange ‘strengthens hand of Taliban in Doha,
June 24, The National, http://www.thenational.ae/world/qatar/prisoner-exchange-x2018strengthens-hand-of-taliban-in-dohax2019
[65]
BBC News. 2014. Syria crisis: Nuns freed by rebels arrive in Damascus, March
10, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26510202
[66]
Die Zeit. 2014. Die Geschäfte des Kalifen, November 27
[67] Kristian
Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates in the Wake of the Arab Spring, 2012, HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad
al-Sabah Publication Series, Kuwait, October 2012
[68]
Michael Handel. 1990. Weak States in the International System, London:
Routledge, p. 51
[69] Iver
B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl. 2006. Introduction in Iver B. Neumann, Sieglinde
Gstöhl, Christine Ingebritsen and jessica Bayer (eds), Small States in
International Relations, Seattle: University of Washington Press, p. 3
[70]
“Joseph S. Nye Jr. 2004. Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics,
New York; Public affairs, p. 5
[71]
I. William Zartman. 2013. Mediation roles for large small countries, Canadian
Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 19:1, p 13-25
[72]
Jacob Bercovitch. 2011. Introduction: Or How to Study and Do Research On
Mediation, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed), Selected Essays: Theory and Practice of
International Mediation, London: Routledge, p 1-10.
[73] A
survey conducted in 2013 by the Doha campuses of Northwestern and Georgetown
University concluded that 77 percent of Qataris polled believes that more
resources should be invested domestically rather than overseas. Only 13 percent
wanted increased spending on “international affairs and investments,” while 10
percent said they were content with the current balance. The unpublished survey
is quoted in Justin Gengler. 2013. Collective Frustration, But No Collective
Action, in Qatar, December 7 Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP),
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero120713.
The World Bank noted that Qatar lags in number of beds per 1,000 people with
1.2 per 1,000 behind the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) average of 3.8 per 1,000 (Source: The World Bank. 2014. Hospital beds
(per 1,000 people), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.BEDS.ZS
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