Testing boundaries

 

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

The rise of Artificial Intelligence magnifies the importance of journalists with true expertise, top-notch sourcing, and historical depth. These journalists, like me, tell and analyse in-depth stories. Their goal is to enhance their readers and listeners’ ability to form informed opinions of their own.

We don’t just chronicle events. Our reporting and analysis are shaped by years of on-the-ground coverage, expertise, and historical knowledge. In my case, I have covered geopolitics, the Middle East, and the Muslim world for decades, having been based in multiple countries, including Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Turkey.

Hard-hitting reporting and analysis that lets the chips fall where they may is even more critical in a world of brutal wars, unimaginable humanitarian crises, and increasing authoritarianism.

That is The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey’s mission since its inception 15 years ago.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by becoming a paid supporter by clicking here.

Subscribing allows you to participate in a poll, listen to the podcast, watch the video, access the archive, post comments, and direct message me with your questions.

Palestinian public opinion is blowing new wind into Hamas’s sails, shredded by two years of brutal warfare in Gaza.

The most recent public opinion poll, conducted in late October after a fragile ceasefire took hold, suggests that Hamas may have reversed its consistent rock bottom performance in repeated surveys during the war.

Thirty-two per cent of those surveyed expressed support for Hamas as opposed to 20 per cent for Al-Fatah, the backbone of the West Bank-based, internationally recognised Palestine Authority. Forty-three per cent supported neither or said they did not know.

Sixty per cent endorsed Hamas’s conduct of the Gaza war.

Credit: PCPSR

Forty-three per cent favoured armed struggle to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compared to 37 per cent opting for negotiations. Fifty-nine per cent described Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel that sparked the Gaza war as “correct.”

Similarly, 55 per cent of Gazans surveyed and 78 per cent of West Bankers opposed disarmament of Hamas as envisioned by US President Donald Trump’s proposal, even “if this is a condition for the war to not to return the Gaza Strip.”

Hamas has so far insisted it would only disarm once an independent Palestinian state has been established. Mediators have suggested a face-saving solution in which it decommissions what is left of its depleted missile and rocket arsenal but keeps sidearms, including automatic guns.

Fifty per cent of Gazans and 39 per cent of West Bankers supported the Trump proposal. Sixty-two per cent backed Hamas’s response to the plan. Fifty-one per cent of Gazans favoured the creation of a non-partisan, post-war Palestinian administration of Gaza.

Sixty-eight per cent of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank opposed the creation of an Arab and Muslim force if it were tasked with disarming Hamas, while 53 per cent of Gazans would support it if disarmament were not part of its mandate.

All of this is not to say that Hamas would win elections, but it suggests that it may be one reason the group has shown itself to be more assertive since Mr. Trump launched his 20-point Gaza proposal and coerced Israel and Hamas into accepting the plan’s first phase.

As a result, Israel and Hamas agreed to a fragile ceasefire that is on life support, and the troubled exchange of Hamas-held captives abducted during the group’s October 7 attack for Palestinians incarcerated in Israel and bodies of deceased Palestinians in Israeli custody.

With neither Hamas nor Israel enthusiastically welcoming Mr. Trump’s initiative and Arab, Muslim-majority, and European nations declaring support without buying into all of its provisions because of the president’s imprimatur and the fact that it is the only game in town, both Hamas and Israel have sought to push the envelope and test what the red lines may be.

In doing so, Hamas and Israel have weaponised the prisoner exchange, blaming each other for violations of the agreement, and twice in outbursts of violence brought the 19-day-old ceasefire to the verge of collapse.

At the core of the tit-for-tat is a deliberately muddled understanding of what Israel and Hamas have agreed to and what remains a matter of negotiation, particularly regarding Hamas’s potential disarmament and future role in Gaza, if any.

A Hamas refusal to disarm complicates key tenets of Mr. Trump’s proposal, including the creation of a primarily Arab and Muslim international stabilisation force.

In what amounts to the fog of an information war, Mr. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu have projected Israel and Hamas’s first-phase endorsement and third-country support of the president’s proposal as acceptance of the plan as such, while Hamas insists that the terms of implementation have yet to be negotiated.

Likely encouraged by the findings of the poll, Hamas has probed Israeli defences, prompting Israeli airstrikes in response, brutally cracked down on its opponents, including gangs and clans armed by Israel, and seemingly toughened its negotiating position.

Hamas may have taken heart from the fact that Mr. Trump’s proposal and subsequent statements potentially leave room for a political future for the group, even if it rules out Hamas being part of Gaza’s post-war governance.

The proposal allows for amnesty for “Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons” and “safe passage” to a third country should they want to leave Gaza.

Reacting to the latest bout of violence, Mr. Trump noted, “If (Hamas) are good, they are going to be happy and if they are not good, they are going to be terminated; their lives will be terminated.”

Hamas may have also been emboldened by Mr. Trump’s holding out the possibility of pressuring Israel to release imprisoned Marwan Baghrouti, widely viewed as the most popular Palestinian politician, a potential future president, and a proponent of a two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In prison, where he is serving five life sentences plus 40 years after being convicted by an Israeli court in 2004 of planning attacks in which five civilians were killed, Mr. Barghouti has sought to bridge differences between Hamas and Al-Fatah.

Forty-three per cent of those surveyed in the poll said they would vote for Mr. Barghouti as opposed to 17 per cent for Hamas and five per cent for the Palestine Authority.

While Mr. Trump spoke about Mr. Barghouti, arch-rivals Hamas and Al-Fatah agreed in meetings in Cairo to back an apolitical committee to govern post-war Gaza.

Like with Hamas, Israel has ruled out a role for the Palestine Authority in the future of Gaza.

Hamas officials have implied the agreement involved Hamas joining the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which Al-Fatah dominates. The PLO and the Authority have recognised Israel, in contrast to Hamas, which is pushing for a multi-year ceasefire between an independent Palestinian state and Israel.

However, boosted by the vagaries in US statements that differ from Mr. Netanyahu’s insistence on the “total destruction” of Hamas, the group appears to be testing boundaries not only on the battlefield but also at the negotiating table.

Since Cairo, Hamas officials have seemingly backtracked on their repeated concession that they would not be part of post-war governance in Gaza. However, the group likely expected that it could influence the composition of the apolitical committee.

Speaking to Al Jazeera Arabic, Hamas Political Bureau member Mousa Abu Marzouk warned, “Do they know what excluding Hamas means? It could mean a civil war… It could mean internal fighting… Hamas is part of the Palestinian people and has accepted being part of the Palestinian people's administration or representatives of the Palestinian people through the PLO and the Authority… Excluding it…will lead to chaos.”

In a similar vein, Mr. Abu Marzouk’s Beirut-based colleague, Osama Hamdan, lashed out at the United Arab Emirates, which, like Israel, is viscerally opposed to Hamas, because of its past links to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Mr. Hamdan’s attack reflected concerns that the UAE was manoeuvring to capitalise on Israeli, US, Arab, and European rejection of a role for the group in Gaza and Israel’s opposition to involvement of the Palestine Authority to promote Abu Dhabi-based Mohammed Dahlan as head of a post-war administration.

Hailing from Khan Younis, Mr. Dahlan, a former Al-Fatah security chief, whose forces Hamas routed in 2007 when the group seized control of Gaza, is a confidante of Mohammed bin Zayyed, who frequently serves as the Emirati president’s Palestinian troubleshooter.

Mr. Hamdan accused the UAE of “sending (to Gaza) an intelligence and security team under the guise of the UAE Red Crescent to search for missile launch sites and give their coordinates to the occupation. Its foreign minister is asking the Israelis to continue the battle until the resistance, specifically Hamas in Gaza, is crushed.”

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.