Gulf states test the boundaries of their agency
By James M.
Dorsey
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More than three
years after burying the war hatchet, erstwhile Gulf rivals are moving in
separate ways as they maneuver big power competition.
Ironically,
anti-Islamists like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have drifted
towards greater independence from the United States while Qatar, long seen as a
haven for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, is hueing closer to the
region's long-standing security partner.
The UAE and
Saudi Arabia led a 3.5-year-long diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar in a
failed bid to force it to change its policies and break its ties to the
Brotherhood and others. The embargo was lifted in 2020.
Since then,
the UAE has spearheaded efforts to return Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to
the Arab fold, improve relations between Iran and the conservative Gulf states,
and accommodate Russian efforts to
circumvent Ukraine-related US and European sanctions.
Saudi Arabia
last month hosted Mr. Al-Assad at an Arab League summit in Jeddah. Mr.
Al-Assad’s presence ended the League’s suspension of Syria’s membership a
decade ago because of his brutal conduct during the country’s civil war.
The United States opposed Mr. Al-Assad’s
rehabilitation and
has vowed to maintain its sanctions on Syria.
In support
of the US, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
left the summit
before Mr. Al-Assad addressed the Jeddah gathering.
Mr.
Al-Thani's walkout demonstrated Qatar's deepening ties to the United States in
response to the UAE-Saudi-led boycott. Last year, NATO designated Qatar a major non-NATO
ally for its role
in the US evacuation from Afghanistan.
The
deepening ties have not stopped Qatar, home to the largest US military base in
the Middle East, from keeping its lines open to China, among others, by
granting the People’s Republic access to Hamad Port and purchasing Chinese ballistic missiles.
Even so, Qatar,
in contrast to the UAE, has been careful not to irritate the United States or
stray too far from US policies.
In the
latest move to chart its own course, the UAE recently pulled
out of a US-led maritime security force, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).
Led by a US admiral, the CMF groups
38 countries, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in a bid to halt Iranian
attacks on commercial ships, weapons smuggling, and piracy.
The UAE said its withdrawal was part
of an assessment of “effective security cooperation” in the Middle East.
The UAE foreign ministry maintained
that “the UAE is committed to peaceful dialogue and diplomatic engagement as a
means of advancing the shared goals of regional security and stability.”
The Emirati
withdrawal follows Iran’s recent seizure of two oil
tankers in the
Strait of Hormuz. One of the tankers was travelling between two Emirati ports,
Dubai and Fujairah, when it was attacked. The attacks reinforced Emirati doubts
about the US ability and/or willingness to protect Gulf shipping.
In response
to the seizures, the US announced increased allied patrols in the Strait but did not send
additional ships or personnel to the region.
Similarly, like
the UAE, Saudi Arabia increasingly appears willing to go against US policies.
It has resisted US pressure to recognise Israel. The US sees recognition as
crucial to its efforts to fashion an integrated regional air defense that would
allow the United States to rejigger its security commitment to the Gulf.
By attaching
conditions to potential recognition, including a firm US defense commitment and
support for a Saudi civilian nuclear programme, Saudi Arabia has created a
litmus test for US attitudes towards the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia
has rejected US preconditions for nuclear cooperation, including a demand that
it follow the UAE’s example and surrender its right to extract, enrich or
process uranium.
At a mining
conference in January, Saudi Oil Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud insisted
that the kingdom seeks to own “the entire nuclear fuel cycle which involves the production of
yellowcake, low-enriched uranium and the manufacturing of nuclear fuel."
In response,
the kingdom turned to China. As a result, China and Saudi Arabia extended nuclear cooperation beyond
uranium exploitation to nuclear technology last month.
The
stepped-up cooperation follows a Chinese-mediated agreement between Saudi
Arabia and Iran to restore diplomatic relations. Relations ruptured in 2016 after
mobs stormed the kingdom’s diplomatic missions in protest against the execution
of a prominent Saudi Shiite cleric.
While
competing on multiple levels, Saudi Arabia and the UAE gamble that they can
successfully play the United States and China against one another as they
position themselves as regional leaders. In doing so, they place big bets.
China has a
significant interest in Gulf security but has neither the ability nor the will
to replace the United States as a guarantor.
Meanwhile,
Gulf states remain dependent on an external guarantor.
Their large-scale
sophisticated arms acquisitions have yet to enable them to create credible
fighting forces. Their inability is not due to lack of resources. Instead, they
have shied away from turning their militaries into fighting forces fearing that
these could challenge monarchical rule.
Consequently,
Saudi Arabia is groping for a face-saving exit from its failed eight-year-old
military intervention in Yemen. At the same time, the UAE has established a
string of strategic outposts along the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa that
it may not be able to defend sustainably.
“Saudi-US
relations are achieving a renewed equilibrium. The UAE is still testing the
waters and brinkmanship while Qatar plays it safe. There's an element of bluff
poker in this. But, sooner or later, reality will reassert itself, and the Gulf
states will accept that dependence on a security guarantor comes at a
price," said a Western diplomat.
Thank you for joining me today. I hope you enjoyed the
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Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological
University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of
the syndicated column and podcast, The
Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.
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