Betting on the wrong horse: The battle to define moderate Islam
By James M. Dorsey
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Polling in the Middle East seems to
confirm that state-sponsored clerics lack credibility.
Recent research suggesting that
non-violent protest has increasingly become less effective magnifies problems
posed by the clerics' legitimacy deficit.
The combination of lagging
credibility and reduced effectiveness enhances the risk of politically inspired
violence.
Add to that that young Muslims
gravitate towards militancy in a world of perceived persecution of the
faithful.
Tam Hussein, an award-winning
investigative journalist and novelist, who has spent time with jihadists in
various settings, noted in a recent blog and an interview that a segment of Muslim youth, who see Western
militaries operating across the Muslim world, often embrace the jihadist
argument that Muslims would not be victims if they had a genuinely Muslim state
with an armed force and religious laws that would garner God’s favour.
Achieving a state, the jihadists say,
has to be ‘through blood (because) the rose isn’t got except by putting one’s
hand on the thorns.’
Mr. Hussein cautioned that “this
sentiment of young Muslims…cannot be combated with platitudes, ill thought out
deradicalisation programmes, and naff websites set up to combat social media.”
Mr. Hussein’s insight goes to the
crux of a rivalry for religious soft power in the Muslim world that, at its
core, involves a struggle to define concepts of moderate Islam.
In essence, Mr. Hussein argues that a
credible response to religiously inspired militancy will have to come from
independent Islamic scholars rather than clerics who do Muslim autocrats'
bidding.
The journalist’s assertion is
undergirded by some three-quarters of Arab youth polled annually by Dubai-based
public relations firm ASDA'A BCW who have consistently asserted in recent years that religious institutions need to
be reformed.
Commenting on the agency’s 2020
survey, Gulf scholar Eman Alhussein said that Arab youth had taken note of
religious figures endorsing government-introduced reforms they had rejected in
the past.
“This not only feeds into Arab youth’s scepticism towards religious institutions but also further highlights the inconsistency of the religious discourse
and its inability to provide timely explanations or justifications to the
changing reality of today,” Ms. Alhussein wrote.
Mr. Hussein warned that “what
many…well-intentioned leaders and Imams don’t realise, and I have seen this
with my own eyes, is that radical preachers…have a constituency. They hit a
nerve and are watched” as opposed to “those they deem to be ‘scholars for
dollars’… There is a dissonance between the young and the imams. …
When the no doubt erudite Azhari
sheikhs such as Ali Gomaa seemingly support Sisi’s killing of innocents
followed up by Habib Ali Jifri’s support for his teacher, one cannot help but
understand their predicament and anger,” Mr. Hussein said, referring to
scholars of Al Azhar, a citadel of Islamic learning in Cairo.
Mr. Hussein was pointing to Ali
Gomaa, who, as the grand mufti of Egypt, defended the killing of some 800 non-violent
protesters on a Cairo square in the wake of the 2013 military coup led by
general-turned president Abdul Fatah al-Sisi. The coup toppled Mohamed Morsi, a
Muslim Brother and Egypt’s only democratically elected president.
A Yemeni-born UAE-backed cleric, Mr. Al-Jifri,
a disciple of Mr. Goma, is part of a group of Islamic scholars who help project
the Emirates as a beacon of an autocratic form of moderate Islam that embraces
social reforms and religious diversity, rejects political pluralism, and
demands absolute obedience of the ruler.
The group includes the former
Egyptian mufti, Abdullah Bin Bayyah, a respected Mauritanian theologian, and
his disciple, Hamza Yusuf, one of America's foremost Muslim figures.
Mr. Hussein could have included
Mohammed al-Issa, the secretary general of the Muslim World League, the primary
vehicle employed by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to garner religious
soft power and propagate his autocratic version of Islam.
Autocratic reformers such as UAE
President Mohammed bin Zayed and Mr. Bin Salman offer an upgraded 21st-century
version of a social contract that kept undemocratic Arab regimes in office for
much of the post-World War Two era.
The contract entailed the
population’s surrender of political rights in exchange for a cradle-to-grave
welfare state in the oil-rich Gulf or adequate delivery of public services and
goods in less wealthy Arab states.
That bargain broke down with the 2011
and 2019/2020 popular Arab revolts that did not spare Gulf countries like Bahrain and Oman.
The breakdown was sparked not only by
governments’ failure to deliver but also by governments, at times, opening
political space to Islamists so that they could counter left-wing forces.
Scholar Hesham Allam summarised the
policy as “more identity, less class.” In effect, Middle Eastern government
were hopping onto a bandwagon that globally was empowering religious and
nationalist forces.
Using Egypt as a case study in his
just publisjed book, Classless Politics: Islamist Movements, the Left, and Authoritarian
Legacies in Egypt. Mr. Sallam argued that” in the long
run, this policy led to the fragmentation of opponents of economic reform, the
increased salience of cultural conflicts within the left, and the restructuring
of political life around questions of national and religious identity.”
To revive the core of the social
contract, Messrs. Bin Zayed and Bin Salman have thrown into the mix degrees of
social liberalization and greater women’s rights needed to diversify their
economies and increase jobs as well as professional, entertainment, and leisure
opportunities.
Even so, researcher Nora Derbal describes
in her recently published book, Charity in Saudi Arabia: Civil Society under Authoritarianism, discrepancies between interpretations of Islamic guidance as provided
by government officials and state-sponsored clerics and charity and civil
society groups that have their own understanding.
In one instance, Ms. Derbal noted
that the government sought to restrict charity recipients to holders of Saudi
national id card. She quoted a representative of one group as saying that “Islamically
speaking, any person, Muslim or not Muslim, deserves aid if in need.”
Nevertheless, the notion of an autocratic moderate Islam appears to work for the UAE
and holds out promise for Saudi Arabia but is on shaky ground elsewhere in the
Middle East and North Africa.
Recent polling by ASDA’A BCW showed
that of the 3,400 young Arabs in 17 Arab countries aged 18 to 24 surveyed,
fifty-seven per cent identified the UAE as the country where they would like to live. Thirty-seven per cent wanted their home country to emulate the UAE.
The survey's results starkly contrast
Mr. Hussein's perceptions of discontented, radicalized Muslims and jihadists he
encountered in Syria and elsewhere.
The diverging pictures may be two
sides of the same coin rather than mutually exclusive. The survey and other
polls and Mr. Hussein likely tap into different segments of Muslim youth.
Nobel Literature Prize laureate Orhan
Pamuk described the men and women that Mr. Hussein discussed as having a
"sense of being second or third-class citizens, of feeling invisible,
unrepresented, unimportant, like one counts for nothing—which can drive
people toward extremism.”
Some of those responding to polls may
be empathetic but probably wouldn’t pull up their stakes because they are at a
point where they have too much to lose.
Even so, recent surveys by the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy showed that 59 per cent of those polled in the
UAE, 58 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 74 per cent in Egypt, disagreed with the notion that “we should listen to those among us who
are trying to interpret Islam in a more moderate, tolerant, and modern way.”
Given that in the milieu that Mr.
Hussein depicts, the UAE is “seen by many as actively subverting the aspirations
of millions of Arabs and Muslims for their own political ends, one can see why
these (angry) young men will continue to fight,” the journalist said.
“When scholars don’t act as their
flock’s lightning rod, or do not convey their sentiments to power, or are not
sufficiently independent enough, the matter becomes hopeless and young men
being young men, look for other avenues,” Mr. Hussein added.
Pakistan is one place where Mr.
Hussein's scenario and Mr. Pamuk's analysis play out. In July, a United Nations Security Council report said that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani
Taliban, boasted the largest number of foreign militants operating from Afghan
soil.
The report suggested that many of
TTP’s 3,000 to 4,000 fighters were freed from Afghan jails shortly after last
year’s fall of Kabul.
Recent academic research suggesting
that non-violent dissent is seeing its lowest success rate in more than a
century even though the number of protests has not diminished magnifies the
resulting threat of militancy.
One study concluded that the number of protest movements worldwide had tripled between 2006 and 2020, including the dramatic 2011 popular Arab
uprisings. Yet, compared to the early 2000s when two out of three protest
movements demanding systemic change succeeded, today it is one in six, meaning
that protests are more likely to fail than at any time since the 1930s, according to Harvard political scientist Erica Chenoweth. Ms. Chenoweth
suggested that the sharp decline was starkest in the past two years.
By comparison, armed rebellion has
seen its effectiveness decline more slowly than non-violent protest, making the
two strategies nearly tied in their odds of succeeding. "For the first
time since the 1940s, a decade dominated by state-backed partisan rebellions
against Nazi occupations, non-violent resistance does not have a statistically
significant advantage over armed insurrection," Ms. Chenoweth said.
Ms. Chenoweth and others attribute
the evening out of success rates of violent and non-violent agitation to
deep-seated polarization, militant nationalism, media echo chambers, increased
restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression that cut off avenues to
release pent-up anger and frustration, and an enhanced authoritarian toolkit.
The toolkit includes divide and rule strategies, digital repression, propaganda
and misinformation, and the declaration of emergency powers under pretexts such
as the recent public health crisis.
Said Ms. Chenoweth: “As authoritarian
movements gain ground, democratic movements worldwide are struggling to expand
their constituencies among those who have grown frustrated with the systems of
inequality and injustice that continue to plague…countries worldwide.”
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning
journalist and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological
University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of
the syndicated column and blog, The
Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
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