Turning Gulf Security Upside Down
06 Jul 2020
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story first appeared as an MEI
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Resolving
the tug of war in the Middle East will require a backing away from approaches
that treat conflicts as zero-sum games, and engagement by all regional and
external players. To achieve that, players would have to recognise that in
many ways, perceptions on both sides of the Gulf divide are mirror images of
one another: all parties see each other as existential threats.
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By James M Dorsey
Like many
paradigms across the globe, the pandemic and its associated economic downturn
have changed the paradigm shaping debates about Gulf security that was
inevitably set to gradually migrate from a unipolar US defense umbrella that
shielded energy-rich monarchies against Iran to an architecture that was more
multilateral. In many ways, the pandemic’s fallout has levelled the playing
field and not necessarily in ways that favour current policies of Gulf states.
Saudi
Arabia’s relations with the West are increasingly being called into question,
with the Saudi–Russian oil price war in March potentially having broken the
camel’s back. The Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stand to lose at
least some of the financial clout that allowed them to punch above their weight
even if they are likely to exclude arms purchases from their austerity
measures.
Weakened
financial clout comes at a moment when the Gulf states and Iran are gearing up
towards an arms race in the wake of Iran’s recent satellite launch and
unveiling of an unmanned underwater vehicle against the backdrop of the 2015
international agreement that curbed the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme
inching towards collapse. The unmanned underwater vehicle puts Iran in an elite
club, of which the only other members capable of producing them are the United
States, Britain and China.[1] The satellite adds Iran to a group
of only about a dozen countries able to do launches of their own. [2]
Add to this
the fact that none of the regional players — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar,
Iran, Turkey and Israel — feel secure that any of the external powers — the
United States, China and Russia — are reliable security and geopolitical
partners.
Gulf states
have, for years going back to the era of Barak Obama if not Bill Clinton,
increasingly perceived the United States as unfortunately their only option on
the premise that they are not willing to change their policies, particularly
towards Iran, but one that is demonstrably unreliable, unwilling to defend Gulf
states at whatever cost, and at times at odds with them in terms of policy
objectives.
The Gulf
states’ problem is that neither Russia nor China offer real alternatives at
least not on terms that all Gulf states are willing to accept. Russia is
neither interested nor capable of replacing the United States. Moreover, its
Gulf security plan is at odds with at least the policy of Saudi Arabia.
The plan
calls for a security arrangement modelled on that of Europe under the auspices
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It would be
an arrangement that, unlike the US defence umbrella in the Gulf, includes Iran,
not directed against it. It would have to involve some kind of regional
agreement on non-aggression.[3]
Saudi
Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has made clear that it is not
interested, as is evident in the pandemic where it has refrained, in contrast
to other Gulf states, from reaching out to Iran with humanitarian aid even
though it last year engaged in an indirect exchange with the Islamic Republic.
That exchange died with the killing by the United States in January of Iranian
general Qassim Soleimani.
The
Elephant in the Room
China is
obviously the elephant in the room.
Logically,
China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty
about current regional security arrangements. Like the Gulf states, China has
long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of
energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf in what the United
States has termed free-riding.
In
anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by
the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defense
strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the
Gulf from the Horn of Africa. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked
with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its
overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first
step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to
project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply.
But like
with the Russians, Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may
part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for
a rejuvenated regional security architecture, particularly with regard to Iran.
Any new architecture would break the mould of Chinese engagement in the Middle
East that is designed to shield the People’s Republic from being sucked into
the region’s myriad conflicts.
The
assumption has long been that China could at best postpone execution, but that
ultimately, it would have no choice but to engage in the politics of the
region. More recently, influential Chinese analysts are suggesting that China
has another option: turn its back on the region. That may seem incredulous
given China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy resources as well as its
significant investments in the region.
These
analysts argue, however, that China is able to diversify its energy sources and
that Chinese investment in the Middle East is but a small percentage of overall
Chinese overseas investment. They describe Chinese Middle Eastern economic
relations as past their heyday with economies of both in decline and the
prospects of the situation in the Middle East getting worse before it becomes
better.
“China–Middle
East countries is not a political strategic logic, it’s an economic logic. For
China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s
strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis,
will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment
model in the Middle East … The good times of China and the Middle East are
already gone… Both China and the Middle Eastern economies have been slowing
down … In the future, the pandemic, combined with the oil price problem, will
make the Middle East situation worse. So, the China economic relationship with
the Middle East will be affected very deeply,” said Niu Xinchun, director of
Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
(CICIR), widely viewed as China’s most influential think tank.[4]
Pessimistic
forecasts of economic prospects in the Middle East bolster Niu’s prediction.
Data and analytics company GlobalData predicted in an email that depressed oil
markets and prices in the Middle East and North Africa would lead to a
contraction in non-oil sectors, including construction. “Construction activity
for the remainder of 2020 is set to see poor performance … In addition, public
investment is likely to be moderate, which will translate into fewer prospects
for private sector businesses to grow — especially within sectors such as
infrastructure. Expected increase in taxes, selected subsidy cuts and the
introduction of several public sector service charges will influence
households’ purchasing power, having a knock-on effect on future commercial
investments,” said GlobalData economist Yasmine Ghozzi.
Moreover,
the downplaying of Chinese economic interest in the Middle East fits a pattern
of reduced Chinese capital outflows. “What we may not have seen is how much
China has retreated financially already for the past four years … Especially
since 2016, China’s outflows have come down dramatically in both lending and
investment. Foreign direct investment is now at about 30 per cent of what it
was in 2016,” said Agatha Kratz, associate director of Rhodium Group, an
independent research provider.[5]
To be sure,
Chinese officials and analysts have consistently maintained that the Middle
East is not a Chinese priority, that any future battles with the United States
will be fought in the Asia Pacific, not in the Gulf. Their assertions are
backed up by the fact that China has yet to articulate a comprehensive policy
towards the region and in 2016 issued its one and only white paper on policy
towards the Arab world that essentially was an elaboration of its basic foreign
and defense policy principles.
More likely
than China seriously entertaining turning its back on the Middle East is the
probability that it is sending the region a message that is not dissimilar from
what Russia is saying: get your act together and find a way to dial down the
tension. It is a message that appears to varying degrees to have been heard in
the smaller Gulf states but has yet to resonate in Riyadh. It is also a message
that has not been rejected out of hand by Iran.
Discussing a
possible extension of a United Nations arms embargo against Iran, Saudi
Ambassador Abdallah Al Mouallimi, arguing in favour of a prolongation, suggested
that it would serve Russian and Chinese interests even though they would not
agree with that assessment. “They have their views, we respect their views, but
their interests would be better served and promoted with the embargo extended,”
said Al Mouallimi.[6]
A Chinese
Communist Party newspaper made days later a first reference in the People’s
Republic’s state-controlled media to reports of an alleged secret 25-year
multi-billion-dollar co-operation agreement in Iran amid controversy in the
Islamic Republic. Chinese officials and media have largely remained silent
about Iranian reports of an agreement worth anywhere between US$120 billion and
US$400 billion that seemingly was proposed by Iran, but has yet to be accepted
by China.[7]
Writing in
the Shanghai Observer, a subsidiary of Liberation Daily,
the official newspaper of the Shanghai Committee of the Communist Party of
China, Middle East scholar Fan Hongda argued that the agreement, though nowhere
close to implementation, highlighted “an important moment of development” at a
time that US–Chinese tensions allowed Beijing to pay less heed to American
policies.[8] Fan’s suggestion that the US–Chinese
divide gave China more room to develop its relations with Iran will not have
gone unnoticed in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals.
An
Emerging Tug of War
How all of
this may shake out could be determined by the emerging tug of war in the Middle
East between China and the US. Israel has already been caught up in it and has
made its choice clear, even if it still attempting to maintain some wiggle
room. Nonetheless, Israel, in the ultimate analysis, knows where its bread is
buttered, particularly at a moment where the United States is the only backer
of its annexationist policies. In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find
the going tougher when it comes to persuading Gulf states to limit their
engagement with China, including with telecom giant Huawei, which already has
significant operations in the region.
Like Israel,
UAE officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the
United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test
when it comes to China. Gulf officials’ stress on the importance of ties will,
however, not shield them from American demands that they review and limit their
relations with China, nor its warnings that involvement of Huawei could
jeopardise sensitive communications, particularly given the multiple US bases
in the region, including the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the forward
headquarters of the US military’s Central Command, or Centcom, in Qatar.
The US
Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a
UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff.
The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health “Silk Road” diplomacy centered
on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal
protective and medical equipment.
A US
official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or
involved BGI Genomics, a Chinese company active in the Gulf, which raised
concerns about patient privacy. The US softened the blow when the prestigious
Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi
subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most
severe cases of coronavirus.[9]
The problem
for the US is that it is not only Trump’s policy or lack thereof towards the
Middle East that undermines confidence but it is also policies that, on the
surface, have nothing to do with the Middle East. The United States has been
asking its partners including Gulf states to give it time to develop an
alternative to Huawei’s 5G network. Yet at the same time, it is barring the
kind of people entry that technology companies need to develop systems.
A Silver
Lining
No matter
how the tug of war in the Middle East evolves, the silver lining is that, like
China, the United States despite its desire to reduce its commitment cannot
afford a power void in the region. That is what may create the basis for
breaking the mould.
It will
require a backing away from approaches that treat conflicts as zero-sum games
not only on the part of regional players but also of external players, like in
the case of the US versus Iran, and it will require engagement by all regional
and external players. To achieve that, players would have to
recognise that in many ways, perceptions on both sides of the Gulf divide
are mirror images of one another: all parties see each other as existential
threats.
Failure to
break the stalemate risks conflicts becoming further entrenched and threatening
to spin out of control. The opportunity is that confidence-building measures
and a willingness to engage open a door towards mutually acceptable regional
security arrangements and conflict resolution. However, for that to happen,
major powers would have to invest political will and energy at a time when they
feel they have bigger fish to fry and prioritise geopolitical jockeying.
In a twist
of irony, geopolitical jockeying may prove to be an icebreaker in a world, and
certainly a region, where everything is interconnected. Increasingly, security
in the Gulf is not just about security in the Gulf. It is not even just about
security in the Middle East. It is about security in the Mediterranean, whether
one looks at Libya on the sea’s southern shores, Syria in the east, or growing
tension in the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. And it does not stop there
with regional rivalries reaching into the Black and Caspian Seas and into
Central Asia.
Finally,
there are the grey and black swans built into partnerships and alliances that
are either becoming more fragile like those of the United States or ones that
have fragility built into their DNA like the ties between Iran, Turkey, China
and Russia. Those swans could at any moment swing the pendulum one way or
another.
To be sure,
contrary to Western perceptions, relations between Iran, Turkey, Russia and
China are not just opportunistic and driven by short-term common interests but
also grounded in a degree of shared values. The fact of the matter is that men
like presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei find common ground in a view of a new world order that rejects
democracy and the rule of law; disregards human and minority rights; flaunts,
at least for now, violations of international law; and operates on the
principle of might is right.
That glue,
however, is insufficient, to prevent Turkey and Russia from ending up on
opposite sides of conflicts in Libya and Syria. It is also unlikely to halt the
gradual erosion of a presumed division of labour in Central Asia with Russia
ensuring security and China focusing on economic development. And it is doubtful
it would alter the simmering rivalry between Iran and Russia in the Caspian Sea
and long-standing Russian reluctance to sell Iran a desperately needed
anti-missile defense system.
In short,
fasten your seat belt. Gulf and broader regional security could prove to be a
bumpy ride with unexpected speed bumps.
About the
Author
Dr James
M. Dorsey is an
award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological
University’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He is
also an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of
Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture in Germany.
Footnotes
[1] “Iran’s UUV to add new dimension to its
warfare capability: Forbes”, Tehran Times, 30 May 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/448370/Iran-s-UUV-to-add-new-dimension-to-its-warfare-capability-Forbes.
[2] Mike Wall, “Iran launches its 1st
military satellite into orbit: reports”, Space.com, 22 April 2020, https://www.space.com/iran-launches-first-military-satellite.html.
[3] Theodore Karasik, “Is Russia’s ‘old’
Gulf security plan the best it can do?”, Arab News, 20 July
2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1533096.
[4] Niu Xinchun speaking on “How are
China’s Relations with the Middle East Evolving During the COVID-19 Pandemic?”,
Chatham House, 19 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2721841274725780.
[5] Agatha Kratz speaking on “China and the
Mediterranean Region in and Beyond the Pandemic, German Marshal Fund”, 3 July
2020, https://www.gmfus.org/events/china-and-mediterranean-region-and-beyond-pandemic.
[6] Joyce Karam, “Russian and Chinese
interests ‘better served’ if Iran arms embargo is extended, says Saudi
official”, The National, 2 July 2020, https://www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/russian-and-chinese-interests-better-served-if-iran-arms-embargo-is-extended-says-saudi-official-1.1042822.
[7] Seth J Frantzman, “Iran media discuss
25-year deal between Iran and China”, The Jerusalem Post, 3 July
2020, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-media-discuss-25-year-deal-between-iran-and-china-633739.
[8] Fan Hongda, “Iran announced a 25-year
comprehensive cooperation plan with China, can Sino-Iranian relations get
closer?” [观察家 | 伊朗宣布与华25年全面合作计划，中伊关系能否进一步走近？], Shanghai
Observer, 20 June 2020, https://www.shobserver.com/news/detail?id=264494.
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