Playing for Higher Stakes: Saudi Arabia Gambles on Oil War with Russia
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With stock markets crashing and
economies grinding to a halt as the world struggles to get a grip on the
Coronavirus, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman could not have chosen a
worse time to wreak havoc on energy markets by launching a price and production
war against Russia.
Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Salman at the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan. June 28, 2019 (AP Photo Susan
Walsh, File)
Saudi Arabia’s oil spat with Russia throws a spanner into the works of
the Kingdom’s long-standing effort to hedge its bets, a strategy that has taken
on added significance as the Gulf comes to grips with the likelihood that the region’s
security architecture will fundamentally change.
Saudi Arabia, despite a primary focus on close ties to the United
States, has increasingly sought to put its eggs in multiple baskets by
initially forging closer military and economic relations with Britain, France,
and Germany, and more recently with Russia and China.
Saudi Arabia, has increasingly sought
to put its eggs in multiple baskets, forging closer military and economic
relations with Russia and China.
The Saudi strategy, stemming from mounting doubts about the reliability
of the United States as an ally and protector of last resort, was showcased
when China opened its first overseas defense production facility in Saudi
Arabia for the manufacturing of the CH-4 Caihong, or Rainbow drone, as well as
associated equipment.
The CH-4 is comparable to the US armed MQ-9 Reaper drone that Washington
has refused to sell to the Kingdom.
Saudi Arabia’s willingness to undermine its hedging strategy by
challenging Russia’s refusal to continue to align its production levels with
that of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) follows the
Kingdom’s bowing to US pressure to acquire Lockheed Martin’s Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system rather than Russia’s S-400
anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapon.
Mr. Putin made a last-ditch sales pitch last September after the
Kingdom’s six battalions of US-made Patriot batteries failed to detect drone
and missile attacks on two of the country’s key oil facilities that knocked out
half of its production capacity.
The decision by Mohammed bin Salman, known by his initials MbS, to
confront Russia stemmed from a stark choice confronting the Crown Prince:
endanger relations with the only power to have put forward a regional security
plan that would have allowed the Kingdom to hedge its bets while maintaining
close ties to the United States, or drive oil prices down in a bid to force
Russia to coordinate production levels that would ensure a higher price.
Ultimately, the Crown Prince’s choice was driven by economics rather
than longer-term security.
Low oil prices have already forced the Kingdom to
borrow from international financial markets. $80 USD per barrel is the price it
needs to balance its budget. It is also the price MbS needs for his ambitious
plans to diversify and streamline the Saudi economy and turn it into a cutting
edge 21st century knowledge hub.
MbS may in some respects have shot himself in the foot even if his
assumption proves correct that the Kingdom could win a price and production war
and that Russian President Vladimir Putin would see a longer term move from a
unipolar to a multilateral security arrangement in the Gulf as too big a prize
to lose.
Last year’s limited initial public offering (IPO) on the Saudi stock
exchange by Aramco, the Kingdom’s national oil company, that constituted a
crown jewel in MbS’ economic reform plans, failed to convincingly address fears
that it was subject to the whims of the Kingdom’s ruling elite.
The oil war with Russia may have
convinced investors’ worst fears with Aramco raising capacity and production to
help MbS with his gamble.
The war with Russia may have convinced investors’ worst fears with
Aramco raising capacity and production to help MbS with his gamble.
“This has proved to investors that their worst
fears about Aramco were a reality. The company’s plans and its output decisions
are based on MbS’ erratic behavior,” said a Saudi
official familiar with Aramco’s offering.
MbS may not be the only one to suffer consequences of the oil war but
his may be a tougher struggle because it involves restoration of trust.
The setback for US shale oil companies that need a relatively high oil
price to break even, the reason Russia was willing to go to war with Saudi
Arabia, is likely to be temporary as was evident in 2014 when Saudi Arabia
gunned for market share rather than price to drive American producers out of
business.
A protracted crude oil price war on the
supply side, combined with the simultaneous demand shock caused by Covid-19’s impact
on economic activity, will hurt oil producers everywhere.
“A protracted crude oil price war on the supply
side, combined with the simultaneous demand shock caused by Covid-19’s impact
on economic activity, will hurt oil producers everywhere,” said Tilak
K. Doshi, an energy scholar at the National University of Singapore’s Middle
East Institute.
If the Crown Prince’s decision was driven by domestic considerations, so
was Mr. Putin’s.
Yet, despite believing that OPEC had outlived its utility, Mr. Putin was
taken aback by the ferocity of Saudi Arabia’s response to the Russian
cancellation of its earlier production level agreement with OPEC, prompting
Moscow to call for a return to the agreed levels for the first quarter of this
year.
“OPEC is finished, so is any attempt to ‘manage’
the oil market. US shale (as a fully privately owned industry) operates on
aggressive free market principals. The Russians understand that and so does
Saudi. The energy game (including alternatives) is now a survival of the
fittest,” tweeted Ali Shihabi, a banker-turned-pro-Saudi-political commentator.
In Russia, MbS is up against an opponent that could prove to have a
longer breath.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an
award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He is also an
adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle
East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of
Fan Culture in Germany.
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