Iran looms large in Central Asia despite sanctions and Saudi financial muscle
By James M.
Dorsey
A podcast version of this story is
available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.
Saudi Arabia
may have been getting more than it bargained for when authorities in Khujand,
Tajikistan’s second largest city, ordered that the city’s largest and
most popular mosque be converted into a cinema.
The order
followed the closure of some 2,000 mosques in the country in the last three
years and the arrest last month of scores of Muslim
clerics and teachers,
many of whom were accused of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group
that is banned in both Tajikistan and the kingdom.
Fewer men
sport beards in Tajikistan after being harassed by police, while women in
hijabs are far and few between after many were detained and intimidated.
Imams
deliver sermons praising President Emomali Rahmon that are approved by
authorities, reinforcing his effort to cloak himself in Islamic legitimacy
despite the crackdown.
Larger
mosques are equipped with surveillance cameras to ensure prayer leaders stick
to their texts.
The arrests
no doubt will have pleased Saudi leaders who stepped in to help Tajikistan
financially in 2015 as the country’s relationship with Iran soured over Iranian demands that Tajikistan pay
down its huge debt, allegations
that a businessman charged with fraud in the Islamic republic had deposited large sums of money in
the National Bank of Tajikistan, and a meeting between Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei and a Tajik opposition leader.
As relations
with Saudi Arabia improved and Saudi Arabia pledged to pump money into
infrastructure projects like the Rogun hydroelectric power plant and a highway
in eastern Tajikistan as well as education, Tajikistan accused Iran of involvement
in the murder of Tajik social and political figures as well as 20 Russian military
officers during the 1990s Tajik civil war, which Iran helped bring to an end.
Tajik
authorities also closed down an Iranian trade and cultural center in Khujand
and helped block Iran’s application to
become a member of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Iran is an observer at the SCO.
Developments
in Tajikistan, however, no longer look all that good from a Saudi perspective
and bode ill for the kingdom elsewhere in Central Asia. In fact, the more than
four years of strained relations between Tajikistan and Iran have made way for
quickly warming ties.
Driving the
patching up of differences is the fact that landlocked Tajikistan, like its
neighbour, Uzbekistan, needs access to ports and Iranian ports, including the
Indian-backed one in Chabahar at the top of the Arabian Sea, offer the cheapest
and shortest transportation options.
Iran’s
attractiveness to Central Asian nations increases the Islamic republic’s
importance to the Belt and Road, China’s infrastructure, transportation and
energy-driven initiative to connect the Eurasian landmass to Beijing.
There is an
element of irony in the Saudi-backed crackdown on mosques and clerics in
Tajikistan. That was long the preserve of Uzbek president Islam Karimov, whose
state security services tightly
controlled religion under the guise of combating Islamic extremism,
until his death in 2016.
Mr.
Karimov’s successor, Shavkat Mirziyoev, has promised to reverse his
predecessor’s repressive policies and put his government "at the
service" of the Uzbek people.
Mr.
Mirziyoev’s reforms included emasculating the security service's
Religious Committee,
by ending its oversight of all religious education, publications, and
gatherings, and sacking its supervisor, Aydarbek Tulepov, without replacing
him.
Mr.
Mirziyoev has also created an academy of higher Islamic learning that is
operated by the state-run Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Uzbekistan.
Meanwhile, delegations of Saudi businessmen visited Uzbekistan twice last year
to explore investment opportunities.
Saudi
Arabia’s textiles-focussed Ajlan & Bros Holding Group plans to invest over the next five years up to
US$2 billion in an Uzbek cotton-textile cluster.
Already a
vital node for Uzbek exports and imports, Iran is nonetheless written all over
Mr. Mirziyoev’s transportation infrastructure plans. A decree issued in late 2017 identified as key to the plans the
Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman. China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan, and three
Trans-Afghan corridors.
The three
Afghan corridors take a rail line connecting Uzbekistan’s Termez to
Afghanistan’s Mazar-i-Sharif as their starting point. Uzbek plans envision the rail line being extended
to the Afghan city of Herat from where it would branch out to
Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, Chabahar; and Bazargan on the Iranian-Turkish border.
The Central
Asian focus on Iranian ports, despite harsh US sanction, takes on added
significance with the Chinese-backed Pakistani port of Gwadar, a mere 70
kilometres down the coast from Chabahar, a Belt and Road crown jewel at the
core of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), running into problems.
China Ocean
Shipping Company (COSCO) recently terminated its container
liner services between Karachi and Gwadar because of a lack of cargo destined for transit to
Afghanistan.
Zhang
Baozhong, chairman of China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC), insisted
that transit trade was key to Gwadar’s success.
Port
authorities said last month that two 20-foot containers containing 54
tonnes of bagged fertilizers had been shipped to Gwadar from Karachi for onward
transport to Afghanistan in what amounted to an effort to kickstart transit trade.
Dr. James
M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow
at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director
of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture
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