Israel’s limited retaliation against Iran demonstrates US can force Netanyahu’s hand
Israeli Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu vs Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Credit:
OpIndia
By James M. Dorsey
A earlier version of this story appeared
on Channel News Asia.
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This weekend’s carefully calibrated Israeli retaliatory strikes at Iranian military targets could lower
the risk of an all-out Middle East war, particularly
if Iran decides not to respond.
The Iranian military said as much by suggesting in a statement that Iran reserved the right to defend itself but may not respond to the attack if Israel agreed to ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appeared to back the military by declaring the armed forces would decide how the Islamic Republic should respond.
By avoiding escalatory tit-for-tat attacks, Iran would ensure that the international community remains focused on the wars in Gaza and Lebanon at a time when Israel’s support network is fracturing.
With Israeli-Iranian tensions contained, the fractures in Israel’s US and European diplomatic and military defence shield and the Jewish state’s existing and potential regional partnerships would likely return to the forefront, potentially with a vengeance.
Unwittingly, the Israeli-Iranian tit-for-tat illustrated that the United States has the leverage to impose its will on Israel when it wants to.
The US insisted in recent weeks that Israel’s response to Iran’s October 1 barrage of almost 200 missiles fired at Tel Aviv should target Iranian military facilities rather than nuclear or oil-related installations.
The demonstration of US power will increase pressure on the Biden
administration, particularly after the upcoming US presidential election on November
5, to push Israel to agree to ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon and speed up the
flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza.
The administration earlier this month opened the door to a more critical approach towards Israel when US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken gave Israel 30 days to boost humanitarian aid access in Gaza or risk having some US military assistance cut off.
Messrs. Austin and Blinken’s ultimatum constituted the first time since the Gaza war erupted a year ago that the US publicly threatened to sanction Israel if it failed to live up to its international obligations and comply with US law.
The State Department said a week after the letter was sent that aid was still not reaching Jabalia in northern Gaza that has been under Israeli siege for the last three weeks.
At the same time, spokesman Matthew Miller warned that the United States was deeply concerned by Israeli legislation that bans the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the main humanitarian aid organisation operating in Gaza.
The Knesset, Israel’s parliament, passed two unprecedented bills on Monday banning UNRWA from operating in Israeli-controlled territory.
Israel has denounced the agency that services Palestinian refugees and their descendants in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan of being a terrorist organisation infiltrated by Hamas.
The letter’s 30-day deadline falls after the US election, when electoral politics no longer inhibit the outgoing administration that will have a relatively free hand until the next president takes office on January 20 next year.
Credit: The Young
Turks
An ebbing of fears of an Israeli-Iranian
all-out war that could make it difficult for the US and regional players to
remain aloof would fortify European pressure on the US to force Israel to agree
to ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon.
Various European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron and Belgian Development Minister Caroline Gennez, have called for an arms embargo, while Spain and Italy have suspended new post-October 7 arms sales to Israel.
Last month, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that Britain had suspended 30 of 350 arms export licences to Israel after it found a “clear risk certain military exports to Israel might be used in violations of International Humanitarian Law.”
Britain also recently sanctioned seven Israeli groups it said were connected to illegal settlement construction in the West Bank.
Earlier this year, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia
recognised Palestine as a state,
bringing the number of European Union members who have accepted Palestinian
statehood to 11. They were joined by Norway, one of five non-EU European states
that also recognised Palestine.
In a further indication of the fracturing of Israel’s formal and informal support network, Gulf states were quick to condemn Israel’s retaliatory strike at Iran.
In a sign of the times, Saudi Arabia and Iran last week held joint naval exercises in the Sea of Oman to build confidence between the archrivals as they sought to ensure that the Gulf states would not be sucked into a possible all-out Middle East war.
The exercises suggested that Gulf states could reconsider their assessment of Israel’s value as a regional security partner.
Driving the reconsideration and fracturing is Israel’s war conduct, including its disproportionate bombings of Gaza and Lebanon; its weaponisation of food, medicine, and other humanitarian aid; its refusal to agree to a Gaza ceasefire, and its inability to achieve declared war goals, including the destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah, Lebanon’s Iran-backed Shiite militia.
“As the war drags on, the question … ‘Is Israel still a vital US interest?’ becomes increasingly relevant. The
failure to decisively defeat Hamas and the growing risks of a regional war
involving Iran may force US and European policymakers to reconsider the costs
associated with unwavering support for Israel,” Ali Shehab, a Saudi analyst who
is believed to be close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, wrote recently in
a column.
Mr. Shehab suggested that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states could also reconsider Israel’s geopolitical utility.
Mr. Shehab recited Hezbollah’s resilience in the face of serious body blows Israel inflicted on the group and Hezbollah’s successful exploitation of “gaps in Israeli intelligence and defences”, as well as an apparent cyberattack that degraded Israel’s anti-missile defence system in advance of Iran’s October 1 missile barrage.
Echoing the Saudi crown prince’s insistence that the kingdom would only recognise if Israel agreed to the creation of an independent Palestinian state, Mr. Shehab warned that mounting pro-Palestinian sentiment could force Gulf rulers to further distance themselves from Israel.
“Recent media portrayals of Israeli military setbacks at the hands of Hezbollah hint at the reality that public opinion in the Gulf remains opposed to unconditional support for Israel. This … becomes even more pronounced when Israel engages in aggressive military actions that provoke backlash across the Arab world,” Mr. Shehab noted.
“Gulf states may find themselves having to reassess their diplomatic positioning,” he added.
Dr James M Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M Dorsey.
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