Is the Gaza ceasefire buzz a fata morgana?

 

By James M. Dorsey

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It’s going to take more than the halt of Israeli-Iranian hostilities to replicate US President Donald J. Trump’s success in Gaza, let alone leverage it into a paradigm-changing Saudi, Arab, and Muslim recognition of the Jewish state.

It’s not because of a lack of effort but because the assumptions underlying the push to end Israel’s devastating 21-month-long assault on the Strip in response to Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel are problematic.

Earlier this week, Mr. Trump asserted, “We think within the next week we’re going to get a (Gaza) ceasefire.”

Mr. Trump’s prediction came amid increasing chatter about a possible long-evasive pause, if not a permanent halt, to the Israeli assault that has turned Gaza into a pile of rubble and sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

So far, negotiations have failed to bridge the gap between Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s refusal to end the war and withdraw Israeli troops from Gaza until Israel has destroyed Hamas and the group’s insistence that it will only agree to a two-month ceasefire that involves a pathway to a permanent end to the Israeli assault.

“Israel’s conditions for ending the war have not changed: the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, the freeing of all hostages, and ensuring that Gaza no longer poses a threat to Israel. The notion that Israel will agree to a permanent ceasefire before these conditions are fulfilled is a non-starter,” Mr Netanyahu declared earlier this month.

To be sure, Mr. Netanyahu’s hard line notwithstanding, there are some reasons to be optimistic.

Hamas has been publicly conspicuously silent, despite reports that Mr. Netanyahu had agreed earlier this week to terms of a ceasefire in a phone call with Mr. Trump that would be hard for the group to accept.

The reports suggested that as part of an agreement, Hamas leaders would go into exile, Gazans who elect to ‘voluntarily’ emigrate would be allowed to leave the Strip in line with Messrs. Trump and Netanyahu’s plan to depopulate the territory, and Hamas would release the remaining 50 hostages abducted during its October 7 attack. Less than half of the hostages are thought to be alive.

The terms further include provisions for post-war Gaza to be initially governed by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and two other unidentified Arab countries, together with US officials.

In addition, the deal would involve Saudi Arabia and other Arab and Muslim states recognizing Israel.

So far, of the 22 Arab states, only five – the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan – maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, alongside several non-Arab states such as Turkey and Muslim-majority Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Throwing a carrot to Mr. Netanyahu, the terms further involve a US recognition of “limited” Israeli sovereignty in the occupied West Bank to make an Israeli expression of support for a future two-state solution premised on reforms within the West Bank-based, internationally recognised Palestine Authority, more palatable.

Mr. Netanyahu, backed by his ultranationalist coalition partners, has consistently rejected the notion of a Palestinian state and repressed any expression of Palestinian national aspirations.

“We fought valiantly against Iran — and achieved a great victory. This victory opens up an opportunity for a dramatic expansion of the peace agreements. We are working hard on this. Along with the release of our hostages and the defeat of Hamas, there is a window of opportunity here that must not be missed,” Mr. Netanyahu said in response to the reports, only to deny a day later that Israel had agreed to the proposed terms.

Echoing Mr. Trump’s optimism, informal Palestinian-American Trump envoy Bishara Bahbah asserted that “the points of disagreement between the two sides aren't numerous… We've reached points, 85 per cent of which have been accepted by both sides.”

The parties may have agreed on many details but remain wide apart on the make-or-break issues that will determine the fate of the ceasefire negotiations.

For US, Qatari, and Egyptian negotiators, the problem is that they assume that the US and Israeli strikes at Iranian nuclear and military facilities and pillars of the Iranian regime may have made Mr. Netanyahu more amenable to ending the Gaza war and risking the collapse of his coalition government.

The prime minister’s ultranationalist partners, including members of his own Likud Party, reject an end to the Gaza war. The ultranationalists have threatened to collapse the coalition if Mr. Netanyahu agrees to a permanent ceasefire, let alone the notion of a Palestinian state.

Rather than Mr. Trump's prediction of a ceasefire in the coming week, US officials are suggesting a two-to three-week timeline based on the belief that Mr. Netanyahu may be more flexible after July 27, when the Knesset, Israel's parliament, goes into recess until October.

“What's happening now is that the Israeli Knesset will be in session until the end of next month. During this period, if any agreement is reached, such as a permanent ceasefire, ultranationalist (Finance Minister Bezalel) Smotrich and (National Security Minister Itamar) Ben-Gvir will dismantle the government. This is not in Netanyahu's interest,” Mt. Bahbah said.

The informal US envoy argued that Mr. Netanyahu would have a freer hand during the recess.

Moreover, US negotiators are betting on enticing the ultranationalists with Mr. Trump’s willingness to recognise a degree of Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank.

The negotiators also hope that Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir's announcement that the military would soon reach the goals set for this stage of the Gaza operation may help sway Mr. Netanyahu.

Officials and analysts interpreted Mr. Zamir’s announcement as the military telling Mr. Netanyahu that it was time to end the war.

US officials may also be more optimistic about the negotiators’ ability to coax Hamas into an agreement on the back of the banding together of Gazan tribal leaders, who have no love for Hamas, to secure aid convoys entering the Strip.

Members of the National Gathering of Palestinians Tribes, Clans, and Families gather on Al-Rashid street in northern Gaza. Credit: Screenshot from video by Abdel Qader Sabbah.

Israel accuses Hamas of looting the convoys, even though the tribals stepped in primarily to counter an Israeli-backed group responsible for much of the looting.

Moreover, like Mr. Netanyahu’s refusal to budge on his war goals, Hamas has not indicated a softening of its basic positions, even though the group has shown flexibility on the timing of the release of Israeli captives, the number of captives to be released, and the duration of an initial phase of a ceasefire.

Hamas sources charged that Israel had no “serious” intent to end the war.

Israel and Hamas further disagree on the role of the controversial US and Israel-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation that, with the help of private US military contractors, is attempting to replace the United Nations and international organisations in the distribution of aid in the Strip.

Hundreds of Palestinians have been killed attempting to get Foundation-distributed aid.

"Any operation that channels desperate civilians into militarized zones is inherently unsafe. It is killing people. People are being killed simply trying to feed themselves and their families. The search for food must never be a death sentence,” said UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

Israel and Hamas are also divided over the positioning of Israeli forces during the initial phase of an agreement: Israel wants its troops to remain in their current positions, while Hamas is demanding they withdraw to the locations held before fighting resumed in March.

Hamas has repeatedly said that it would not be part of a post-war Palestinian Gaza administration and that it may agree to put its weapons arsenal under the control of the Palestine Authority. Some Hamas sources suggested the group could agree to the exiling of its Gaza-based leaders, many of whom Israel has killed in the past 21 months.

Even so, it’s hard to see Hamas agreeing to a deal that would legitimise Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. It’s also hard to see Hamas accepting a post-war Gaza administration that does not include Palestinians from the outset.

It’s equally challenging to see Arab states participating in a deal that could be construed as endorsing US and Israeli plans to resettle Gaza’s Palestinian population and Israeli occupation.

Arab states have repeatedly asserted that they will not take part in the postwar rehabilitation of Gaza, absent Israeli acquiescence to the Palestinian Authority gaining a foothold in the Strip as part of a pathway to a future two-state solution involving all the West Bank and Gaza.

Similarly, there is no indication that Saudi Arabia would be willing to recognise Israel without a clear-cut Israeli agreement to the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. If anything, Saudi Arabia has hardened its position in the course of the Gaza war.

Saudi Arabia and other states may be autocracies, but that does not mean that they are insensitive to public opinion.

A recent Arab Barometer poll suggested a sharp decline in support for recognition of Israel across the Middle East and North Africa because of the Gaza war and Israel’s more aggressive regional posture.

“Public opposition has halted normalisation efforts, constraining regional governments’ foreign policy without progress on Palestinian statehood,” the Barometer said in a commentary on its polling.

The terms outlined are likely to constitute more of an Israeli-US road map rather than provisions of a more immediate ceasefire agreement.

More likely is that the Trump administration will use an imminent visit to Washington by Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, a Netanyahu confidante, to pressure Israel to prioritise the release of the Hamas-held hostages and end the war in the coming weeks, arguing that Hamas will be destroyed in due course.

That’s a hard pill for Mr. Netanyahu to swallow without something significant that he can use to neutralise ultranationalist opposition, like Saudi or Syrian recognition of Israel and/or US recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank, even if it is not in all the territory.

Mr. Trump has also tried to sweeten the pill by implicitly threatening that the Israeli judiciary’s failure to dismiss corruption charges against Mr. Netanyahu could jeopardise the United States’ annual US$3.8 billion in military assistance to Israel.

Calling the corruption proceedings against Mr. Netanyahu a “travesty of ‘Justice,’” Mr. Trump insisted, ”We are not going to stand for this.’”

US officials have also said that the president would consider a third Oval Office visit this year by the prime minister if Mr. Netanyahu agrees to end the war.

“There is lots of motion in the wake of Iran. The question is whether there is movement. That may become clear when Dermer is in Washington,” one US official said.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.