Security architecture in the Gulf: Troubled prospects
By James M.
Dorsey
A podcast
version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, and Patreon, Podbean and Castbox.
Russia,
backed by China, hoping to exploit mounting doubts in the Gulf about the
reliability of the United States as the region’s sole security guarantor, is proposing a radical overhaul of the
security architecture
in an area that is home to massive oil and gas reserves and some of the world’s
most strategic waterways.
Chinese
backing for Russia’s proposed collective security concept that would replace the Gulf’s US
defense umbrella and position Russia as a power broker alongside the United
States comes amid heightened tension as a result of-tit for-tat tanker seizures
and a beefed up US and British military presence in Gulf waters.
Iran said
the vessel was smuggling oil to an unidentified Arab country. The taking of the
Iraqi ship followed last month’s Iranian seizure of the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero.
The seizure
was in response to the impounding off Gibraltar of an
Iranian tanker suspected of breaching EU sanctions against Syria.
The Russian
proposal entails creation of a “counter-terrorism coalition (of) all
stakeholders” that would be the motor for resolution of conflicts across the
region and promote mutual security guarantees. It would involve the removal of
the “permanent deployment of troops of extra-regional states in the territories
of states of the Gulf,” a reference to US, British and French forces and bases.
The proposal
called for a “universal and comprehensive” security system that would take into
account “the interests of all regional and other parties involved, in all spheres
of security, including its military, economic and energy dimensions.”
The
coalition, to include the Gulf states, Russia, China, the US, the European
Union and India as well as other stakeholders, a likely reference to Iran,
would be launched at an international conference on security and cooperation in
the Gulf.
It was not
clear how feuding Gulf states like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arb Emirates
and Iran would be persuaded to sit at one table. The proposal suggested that
Russia’s advantage was that it maintained good relations with all parties.
Chinese
backing of the Russian proposal takes on added significance with some analysts
suggesting that the United States, no longer dependent on Gulf oil imports, is
gradually reducing its commitment despite a temporary spike in the number of US
troops dispatched to the region as a result of the tension with Iran.
They suggest
that the US response to Iranian racking up of tension has been primarily
theatrics and hand wringing despite the Trump administration’s bellicose
rhetoric. Warnings of “severe consequences” have proven to be little more than
verbal threats.
“The United States is leaving the
Persian Gulf. Not
this year or next, but there is no doubt that the United States is on its way
out… Leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Manama, and Muscat understand what is
happening…and have been hedging against an American departure in a variety of
ways, including by making overtures to China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey,” said Steven
A. Cooke, a scholar at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations.
Recent
tanker statistics suggest that Saudi Arabia is sending an ever-larger portion of its crude to
China. On a visit to
Beijing last month, UAE crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed and Chinese president
Xi Jinping elevated their two countries’ relationship to that of a strategic partnership.
Perceptions
of a reduced US commitment may make the Russian proposal of a multilateral
approach more attractive in the short term. However, longer term banking on a
continued Russian Chinese alliance could be tricky. The alliance could prove to
be opportunistic rather than strategic.
That could
force Gulf states to accelerate taking charge of their own security. So far,
greater Gulf assertiveness has proven to be a mixed bag.
Fuelled by
uncertainty about US reliability, perceived regional Iranian expansionism, and
persistent popular discontent across the Middle East and North Africa, produced
the debilitating Saudi-UAE intervention in Yemen, a failed Saudi effort to force Lebanon’s prime minister to
accept the kingdom’s dictate, and Saudi and UAE projection of military force and
commercial clout in the Horn of Africa.
A recent meeting between UAE and
Emirati maritime security officials, the first in six years, as well as a partial UAE withdrawal from Yemen could, however, signal an emerging,
more constructive approach.
If adopted,
the Russian proposal could, however, suck China and Russia, despite having been
able so far to maintain close ties to all sides of regional divides, into the
Middle East’s multiple conflicts, particularly the Saudi Iranian rivalry. A multilateral
approach could also bring latent Chinese Russian differences to the fore.
Dubbing the
Russian Chinese alliance ‘Dragonbear,’ geo-strategist Velina Tchakarova
cautions that it is s “neither an alliance nor a marriage of convenience, but
rather a temporary asymmetric relationship, in which China is predominantly the
agenda-maker, while Russia is mostly the agenda-taker.”
The Russian
Chinese rapprochement operates in Ms. Tchakarova’s words on “the maxim ‘Keep
your friends close and your enemies closer.’ A status quo relationship would
remain acceptable and be further developed so long as China’s rise is not a
direct threat to Russia’s strategic interests of self-determination and
security along its peripheries,” including the Middle East.
The question
is less whether and more when Russia starts perceiving Chinese interests as a
threat to its own. One divergence could be energy given that Russia is one of
the world’s major oil suppliers while China is its top importer.
By the same
token, China may longer term not want to be dependent on Russia for both its
imports and the arrangements that would secure them.
Said Russia
and Eurasia scholar Paul Stronski referring to the sustainability of the
Russian Chinese alliance: “With China now recognising it may need to strengthen
its security posture…, it is unclear how long that stability will
last.”
Dr. James
M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the
National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the
University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture
Comments
Post a Comment