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The Globalist's Top Ten Books in 2016: The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer


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The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer is one of the weightiest, most revelatory, original and important books written about sport"

“The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer has helped me immensely with great information and perspective.”


Bob Bradley, former US and Egyptian national coach: "James Dorsey’s The Turbulent World of Middle Eastern Soccer (has) become a reference point for those seeking the latest information as well as looking at the broader picture."
Alon Raab in The International Journal of the History of Sport: “Dorsey’s blog is a goldmine of information.”
Play the Game: "Your expertise is clearly superior when it comes to Middle Eastern soccer."
Andrew Das, The New York Times soccer blog Goal: "No one is better at this kind of work than James Dorsey"
David Zirin, Sports Illustrated: "Essential Reading"
Change FIFA: "A fantastic new blog'

Richard Whitall of A More Splendid Life:
"James combines his intimate knowledge of the region with a great passion for soccer"

Christopher Ahl, Play the Game: "An excellent Middle East Football blog"
James Corbett, Inside World Football


Tuesday, November 26, 2019

Global Turmoil: Ethics offer a way out of the crisis



By James M. Dorsey

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Rarely is out-of-the-box thinking needed more than in this era of geopolitical, political and economic turmoil.

The stakes couldn't be higher in a world in which civilizationalist leaders risk shepherding in an era of even greater political violence, disenfranchisement and marginalisation, and mass migration.

The risks are magnified by the fact that players that traditionally stood up for at least a modicum of basic economic, social, political and minority rights have either joined the civilisationalists or are too tied up in their own knots.

The United States, long a proponent of human rights, even if it was selective in determining when to adhere to its principles and when to conveniently look the other way, has abandoned all pretence under President Donald J. Trump.

Europe is too weak and fighting its own battles, whether finding its place in a world in which the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance is in doubt, Brexit or the rise of civilizationalist leaders within its own ranks.

The long and short of this is that civil society’s reliance on traditional strategies and tactics to exert political pressure serves to fly the rights flag but is unlikely to produce results.

The same is true for traditional often heavy-handed and violent government attempts to quell protests.

In some ways, this weekend’s landslide vote for pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong lays down a gauntlet for the governments of the city and China.

“Even if the current wave of protests recedes, the instability will very likely persist for some time and may even become a permanent situation… because the problems that cause the protests appear unresolvable by means of the current political and economic system,” said Israeli journalist Ofri Ilany.

Mr. Ilany put his finger on the pulse. This decade’s global breakdown in confidence in political systems and leaders not only spotlights the problem but may also create opportunities for out-of-the-box thinking.
The key lies in the fact that protesters across the globe in Santiago de Chile, La Paz, Bogota, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Paris, Barcelona, Moscow, Tbilisi, Algiers, Cairo, Khartoum, Beirut, Amman, Tehran, Jakarta, and Hong Kong as well as movements like the Extinction Rebellion essentially want the same thing: a more transparent, accountable and more economically equitable world.

The Middle East and North Africa, the one part of the world that exasperates the most, also represents the worst and the best of responses to the global clamour for change.

While Egypt under general-turned-president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi is almost a textbook example of what drives global protest, Tunisia and Kuwait, offer lessons to be learnt. So do some of the world’s longer standing success stories such as Singapore.

Tunisia has emerged as the one country that experienced a successful revolt in 2011 and was able to safeguard its achievements because its leaders, much like Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, saw power as a tool to secure national rather than personal interests and at a time of crisis worked with civil society to engineer a national dialogue that crafted a way forward.

Similarly, Kuwait, a constitutional semi-democratic anomaly in a region governed by secretive autocrats, recently opted for a more transparent competitive approach towards politics.

As a result, Kuwait saw this month its ruling family take its internal differences and disputes public. The differences forced the government to resign as members of the ruling family accused each other of embezzlement in advance of parliamentary elections scheduled for next year and a possible succession in which the assembly would have a say.

Achieving protesters’ goal of more equitable and accountable political and economic systems involves not only adherence to the rule of law, including the implementation of international law, and application of the principle of equality before the law of not only individuals and organizations but also states.

It further involves the need to make principles of right and wrong and of respect of human dignity the moral and ethical underpinnings of the architecture of a new world order by which all ranging from an individual to a state are judged.

That is the fundamental message of protests across the globe that denounce a world in which financial or economic benefit justifies violations of rights and civilisationalists have abandoned any pretence of adherence to international law.

Heeding the protesters’ message means ensuring that at least international law provides an effective mechanism to hold accountable security forces that use lethal force against largely peaceful protesters as well as politically responsible officials that authorize unjustified brutality in what often amounts to mass killings.


The need for morals and ethics is gaining momentum with hardline realist proponents of the projection of power as well as some leaders raising the alarm bell.

The rise of artificial intelligence persuaded former US secretary of state and national security advisor Henry A. Kissinger, a symbol of realpolitik and the wielding of power, to recognize the importance of morals and ethics.

Writing in The Atlantic, Mr. Kissinger warned that the consequence of artificial intelligence “may be a world relying on machines powered by data and algorithms and ungoverned by ethical or philosophical norms.”

Threats resulting from the abandonment of international law and the lack of moral and ethical yardsticks were evident in this month’s unilateral recognition by the Trump administration of the legality of Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory long viewed by jurists and the international community as illegal.

The move highlighted the link between protecting individual rights and freedoms and national security.

Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad warned that the administration’s move meant that “we are no longer safe. If a country wants to enter our country and build their settlements, that is legal. We cannot do anything,”

Mr. Mahathir was projecting onto states a sentiment of vulnerability among protesters and minorities across the globe that results from the random, unrestricted employment of power by those in positions of authority.

Similarly, Singapore’s Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon warned last month that "countries increasingly adopt a zero-sum mentality in eschewing multilateral agreements as shackles on sovereignty and a burden on economic growth."

Mr. Menon’s words must have been music in the ears of Norway’s successful US$1 trillion rainy-day oil fund that has proven that growth and profitability are achievable without abandoning norms of moral and ethical investment.

Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund returned three percent or US$28.5 billion to the country’s pension pot during in the second quarter of 2019.

Guided by Norway’s Council of Ethics, which monitors the fund’s investments, GPFG recently

Said New York Times columnist David Brooks: “The world is unsteady and ready to blow… The big job ahead for leaders…is this: Write a new social contract that gives both the educated urban elites and the heartland working classes a piece of what they want most.”

To achieve the kind of social and economic justice as well as live-and-let live environment that Mr. Brooks advocates, leaders, governments and civil society will have to rediscover and readopt the moral and ethical values that are embedded in the world’s multiple cultures and common to much of mankind.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture

Saturday, November 23, 2019

Mending Gulf fences could weaken support for US sanctions against Iran



By James M. Dorsey

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Saudi efforts to negotiate an end to the Yemen war in a bid to open a dialogue with Iran could call into question continued Gulf support for US President Donald J. Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against the Islamic republic.

Saudi officials hope that talks mediated by Oman and Britain between the kingdom and Houthi rebels will lead to a revival of stalled talks between the Yemeni insurgents and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman has tasked his younger brother and Saudi deputy defense minister, Khalid bin Salman, with engineering an end to the Yemeni war as part of a broader revamp of Saudi foreign policy.

The revamp involves a return to a more cautious foreign and defense policy that embraces multilateralism after several years in which the kingdom adopted an assertive and robust go-it alone approach that produced several fiascos, including the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen 4.5 years ago.


The kingdom’s return to a more cautious approach is also intended to allow Saudi Arabia to project itself in 2020 as president of the Group of 20 (G20) and repair its image tarnished by the Yemen War, the killing last year of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and a domestic crackdown on dissent. The G20 groups the world’s twenty largest economies.

Mr. Trump’s response to the September drone and missile attacks for which the Houthis claimed responsibility was the latest, and in some ways clearest indication, that Gulf states may not be able to count on the United States in times of crisis even though the Trump administration insisted that Iran rather than the rebels was to blame for the incident.

That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us. But we would certainly help them. If we decide to do something, they’ll be very much involved, and that includes payment. And they understand that fully,” Mr. Trump said at the time, adopting a transactional attitude towards Gulf security.

A US official involved in Gulf policy said more recently that “the attacks made the Saudis and other Gulf states realize that escalation of US-Iranian tensions would make them targets in an environment in which the United States may not wholeheartedly come to their rescue.”

Another US official suggested that the Saudis’ “prime objective now is to lessen their involvement in Yemen, to get the Houthis to stop being some version of a proxy, so they (the Saudis) can deal directly with Iran.”

United Nations Yemen envoy Martin Griffiths told the UN Security Council this week that the number of air attacks by the Saudi-led coalition had dropped by nearly 80 percent in the last two weeks.

We call this de-escalation, a reduction in the tempo of the war, and perhaps a move towards an overall ceasefire in Yemen," Mr. Griffiths said. He held out the hope that a negotiated end to the war could be achieved early next year.

Saudi efforts to end the war as well as gestures towards Iran in recent months by the United Arab Emirates did not stop senior Saudi and UAE officials from adopting a hard line at this week’s Manama Dialogue.

“Appeasement simply cannot work with Iran. We hold Iran responsible for the attack on Abqaiq. We do not want war, but Iran needs to be held accountable. The question is whether Iran can abandon its ambition to propagate the revolution and respect sovereignty,” Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs Adel al-Jubeir told the Bahrain gathering. By mentioning Abqaiq, Mr. Al-Jubeir was referring to one of the two Saudi oil facilities targeted in September.

Mr. Al-Jubeir’s UAE counterpart, Anwar Gargash, added: “Germany under Hitler, the Soviet Union, Iran today: revisionist states threaten international order. The key to stability is deterrence, and steadfast resolve by the international community that Iran must change. If not, sanctions must be increased, not loosened.”

The US Treasury, expanding harsh sanctions that aim to force Iran to re-negotiate on American terms the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program, sanctioned this week Iranian communications minister Mohammad Javad Azari-Jahromi for blocking access to the Internet as part of a bid to squash anti-government protests.

The blockage made it difficult for protesters to post videos on social media, generate support for their rejection of recent fuel price hikes, and obtain reliable reports on the extent of the unrest. Amnesty International said more than 100 protesters had so far been killed by security forces.

Mr. Al-Jubeir and Mr. Gargash’s tough remarks notwithstanding, winds in the Gulf appear to be blowing in the direction of reduced tension on all fronts, including the 2.5-year old Saudi-UAE-led boycott of Qatar.

Inevitably, reducing tension will only prove sustainable if US-Iranian friction is dialled back.

Sustainability moreover will depend on some sort of regional understanding on non-aggression that would involve Iran and create the basis for a more multilateral security architecture that would embed rather than replace the regional US defence umbrella.

Bahraini foreign minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa appeared to anticipate a more multilateral approach in his remarks at the Manama Dialogue. Rejecting an Iranian call for a security architecture that would exclusively involve regional states, Mr. Al Khalifa asserted that “Iran's regional security proposals are fundamentally flawed, especially because they do not include external powers.”

A series of Saudi and UAE gestures in recent months, beyond the Saudi-Houthi talks, signal moves towards reducing tensions not only on the Yemeni but also the Iranian and Qatari fronts.

In the latest indication, Khaled Al Jarallah, deputy foreign minister of Kuwait, the official mediator in the dispute with Qatar, said a decision this month by the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini national soccer teams to compete in the Gulf Cup in Qatar, despite their boycott of the Gulf state, “provides a clear indication that a breakthrough has taken place.”

Similarly, a Saudi official, in a rare gesture, told reporters in Washington earlier this month that Qatar had taken a step towards resolving the crisis by passing an anti-terrorism funding law, a key demand of the boycotting countries.

Besides withdrawing forces from Yemen, the UAE refrained from blaming Iran for the attacks on the Saudi installations and earlier explosions on vessels off the Emirati coast and sent officials to Iran to discuss maritime security.

Saudi and UAE support for the US’ maximum pressure campaign is certain to weaken if Gulf efforts to reduce tensions progress, particularly with regards to Iran. A peace process in Yemen and a Gulf dialogue with Iran would be significant steps in that direction.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture

Tuesday, November 19, 2019

Middle Eastern protests: A tug of war over who has the longer breath



By James M. Dorsey

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Mass anti-government protests in several Arab countries are turning into competitions to determine who has the longer breath, the protesters or the government.

In Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq, countries in which the leader was either forced to resign or has agreed to step down, authorities appear to be dragging their feet on handovers of power or agreed transitional power sharing arrangements in the hope that protesters, determined to hold on to their street power until a political transition process is firmly in place, either lose their momentum or are racked by internal differences.

So far, protesters are holding their ground, having learnt the lesson that their achievements are likely to be rolled back if they vacate the street before having cemented an agreement on the rules of the transitional game and process.

Algerians remain on the streets, seven months after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was forced to step down, in demand of a complete change of the political system.

Scores of recent arrests on charges that include “harming national unity” and “undermining the morale of the army” have failed to deter Algerians who refuse to accept the military’s proposed December 12 date for elections.

Lebanon enters its second months of protests with the government going through the motions but ultimately failing to respond to demands for a technocratic government, a new non-sectarian electoral law and early elections.

An effort to replace prime minister Saad Hariri with another member of the elite, Mohammad Safadi, a billionaire businessman and former finance minister, was rejected by the protesters.

"We are staying here. We don't know how long - maybe one or two months or one or two years. Maybe it will take 10 years to get the state we are dreaming of, but everything starts with a first step." said filmmaker Perla Joe Maalouli.

Weeks after agreeing to resign in response to popular pressure, Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdul Mehdi appears to be increasingly firm in his saddle.

Much like what prompted US President George H.W.. Bush to first call in 1991 for a popular revolt against Saddam Hussein and then give the Iraqi strongman the tools to crush the uprising, Mr. Mehdi is holding on to power in the absence of a credible candidate acceptable to the political elite to replace him.

Mr. Mehdi’s position is strengthened by the fact that neither the United States nor Iran wants a power vacuum to emerge in Baghdad.

Backtracking on Mr. Mehdi’s resignation and refraining from appointing a prime minister who credibly holds out the promise of real change is likely to harden the battle lines between the protesters and the government.

The tugs of war highlight the pitfalls protesters and governments need to manoeuvre in what amounts to a complex game with governments seeking to pacify demonstrators by seemingly entertaining their demands yet plotting to maintain fundamental political structures that anti-government activists want to uproot.

The risk of a tug of war is that protests turn violent as happened in Hong Kong or in Lebanon where cars of parliamentarians were attacked as they drove this week towards the assembly.

Meeting protesters’ demands and aspirations that drive the demonstrations and figure across the Middle East and North Africa, irrespective of whether grievances have spilled into streets, is what makes economic and social reform tricky business for the region’s autocrats.

Its where what is needed for sustainable reforms bounces up against ever more repressive security states intent on exercising increasingly tight control.

Sustainable reform requires capable and effective institutions rather than bloated, bureaucratic job banks and decentralisation with greater authorities granted to municipalities and regions.

Altering social contracts by introducing or increasing taxes, reducing subsidies for basic goods and narrowing opportunities for government employment will have to be buffered by greater transparency that provides the public insight into how the government ensures that it benefits from the still evolving new social contract. 

To many protesters, Sudan has validated protesters’ resolve to retain street power until transitional arrangements are put in place.

It took five months after the toppling of president Omar al-Bashir and a short-lived security force crackdown in which some 100 people were killed before the military, the protesters and political groups agreed and put in place a transitional power-sharing process.

The process involved the creation of a sovereign council made up of civilians and military officers that is governing the country and managing its democratic transition.

Even so, transitional experiences have yet to prove their mettle. Protesters may have learnt lessons from the 2011 popular Arab revolts that toppled the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

Yet, this time round, protesters lack the broad-based international empathy that 2011 uprisings enjoyed and are up against more than domestic forces backed by conservative Gulf states.

Powers like Russia and China make no bones about their rejection of protest as an expression of popular political will.

So has Iran that has much at stake in Iraq and Lebanon, countries where anti-sectarian sentiment is strong among protesters, even if the Islamic republic was born in one of the 20th century’s epic popular revolts and is confronting protests of its own against fuel price hikes.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture


Friday, November 15, 2019

Strategic Black Sea falls by the wayside in impeachment controversy



By James M. Dorsey

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Presidents Donald J. Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdogan had a plateful of thorny issues on their agenda when they met in the White House this week.

None of the issues, including Turkey’s recent invasion of northern Syria, its acquisition of a Russian anti-missile system and its close ties to Russia and Iran, appear to have been resolved during the meeting between the two men in which five Republican senators critical of Turkey participated.

The failure to narrow differences didn’t stop Mr. Trump from declaring that "we've been friends for a long time, almost from day-one. We understand each other’s country. We understand where we are coming from."

Mr. Trump’s display of empathy for an illiberal leader was however not the only tell-tale sign of the president’s instincts. So was what was not on the two men’s agenda: security in the Black Sea that lies at the crossroads of Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and NATO member Turkey.

The Black Sea is a flashpoint in multiple disputes involving Russia and its civilizationalist definition of a Russian world that stretches far beyond the country’s internationally recognized borders and justifies its interventions in Black Sea littoral states like Ukraine and Georgia.

The significance of the absence of the Black Sea on the White House agenda is magnified by the disclosure days earlier that Mr. Trump had initially cancelled a US freedom of navigation naval mission in the Black Sea after CNN had portrayed it as American pushback in the region.

The disclosure came in a transcript of closed-door testimony in the US House of Representatives’ impeachment inquiry of Mr. Trump’s policy towards Ukraine by Christopher Anderson, a former advisor to Kurt Volker, the US special representative to Ukraine until he resigned in September.

Mr. Anderson testified that Mr. Trump phoned his then national security advisor, John Bolton, at home to complain about the CNN story. He said the story prompted the president to cancel the routine operation of which Turkey had already been notified.

The cancellation occurred at a moment that reports were circulating in the State Department about an effort to review US assistance to Ukraine.

“We met with Ambassador Bolton and discussed this, and he made it clear that the president had called him to complain about that news report… I can't speculate as to why…but that…operation was cancelled, but then we were able to get a second one for later in February. And we had an Arleigh-class destroyer arrive in Odessa on the fifth anniversary of the Crimea invasion,” Mr. Anderson said.

The operation was cancelled weeks after the Russian coast guard fired on Ukrainian vessels transiting the Strait of Kerch that connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov and separates Russian-annexed Crimea from Russian mainland. ‘This was a dramatic escalation,” Mr. Anderson said.

Mr. Trump at the time put a temporary hold on a condemnatory statement similar to ones that had been issued by America’s European allies. Ultimately, statements were issued by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the United Nations ambassador Nikki Haley but not by the White House.

The Black Sea’s absence in Mr. Trump’s talks with the Turkish leader coupled with the initial cancellation of the freedom of navigation operation, the initially meek US response to the Strait of Kerch incident, and the fallout of the impeachment inquiry do little to inspire confidence in US policy in key Black Sea countries that include not only Turkey, Ukraine and Georgia, a strategic gateway to Central Asia, but also NATO members Bulgaria and Romania.

In Georgia, protesters gathered this week outside of parliament after lawmakers failed to pass a constitutional amendment that would have introduced a proportional election system in advance of elections scheduled for next year.

The amendment was one demand of protesters that have taken to the streets in Georgia since June in demonstrations that at times included anti-Russian slogans.

Russia and Georgia fought a brief war in 2008 and Russia has since recognized the self-declared independence of two Georgian regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Some 1500 US troops participated in June in annual joint exercises with the Georgian military that were originally initiated to prepare Georgian units for service in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The absence of the Black Sea in Mr. Trump’s talks with Mr. Erdogan raises the spectre that the region could become a victim of the partisan divide in Washington and/or Mr. Trump’s political priorities.

The Republican-dominated US Senate has yet to consider a bipartisan Georgia Support Act that was last month passed by the House of Representatives. The act would significantly strengthen US defense, economic, and cyber security ties with Georgia.

A Chinese delegation that included representatives of several Chinese-led business associations as well as mobile operator China Unicom visited the breakaway republic of Abkhazia this week to discuss the creation of a special trade zone to manufacture cell phones as well as electric cars.

The Black Sea is one region where the United States cannot afford to sow doubt. The damage, however, may already have been done.

Warned Black Sea security scholar Iulia-Sabina Joja in a recent study: “The region is (already) inhospitable for Western countries as they struggle to provide security… The primary cause of this insecurity is the Russian Federation… Today, Russia uses its enhanced Black Sea capabilities not only to destabilize the region militarily, politically, and economically, but also to move borders, acquire territory, and project power into the Mediterranean.”

Ms. Joja went on to suggest that “a common threat assessment of NATO members and partners is the key to a stable Black Sea. Only by exploring common ground and working towards shared deterrence can they enhance regional security.”

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture

Wednesday, November 13, 2019

Gulf soccer suggests that “The Times They Are a-Changin”



By James M. Dorsey

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Gulf soccer may be giving Bob Dylan’s 1964 hit, ‘The Times They Are a-Changin,’ a new lease on life.

Qatar surrendered its Arabian Gulf Cup hosting rights to Kuwait two years ago, months into the United Arab Emirates-Saudi-led diplomatic and economic boycott of the Gulf state, after the boycotting countries said they would not participate in a Doha-hosted tournament.

The boycott remains in place more than two years later, but this time round squads from the boycotting countries, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, have no problem competing in this year’s Gulf Cup in Qatar.

The decision not to boycott is the latest indication that Gulf states may be gradually moving to a reduction of tensions that have divided the region’s conservative energy-rich monarchies, raised the stakes in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and sparked a devastating Saudi-UAE military intervention in Yemen’s civil war.

The decision also bodes well for Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup irrespective of whether Gulf states can resolve their differences before that tournament kicks off.

If Mr. Dylan’s changing times portend well on the region’s monarchical soccer pitches, they could prove more divisive on its republican fields.

Iraqi anti-government activists hope that this week’s World Cup qualifier between Iran and Iraq will blow new life into mass protests that denounced Iranian influence in their country and the government’s perceived prioritization of Iranian over Iraqi interests.

Protesters blamed Iran and its Iraqi proxies for the harsh response by security forces that has cost the lives of more than 300 people.

The protests persuaded world soccer body FIFA to move the match from the southern Iraqi port city of Basra to the Jordanian capital Amman.

“If our team beats Iran, it will bring more people out onto the streets and lift protesters’ spirits,” said soccer fan Hussein Diaa as he kicked a ball on Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, a focal point of the protests.

One indication of the degree to which a thaw in relations between Gulf monarchies may be on the horizon, is likely to be the way the squads of the boycotting nations handle themselves during the Gulf Cup.

The Saudi and Emirati teams refused to participate in a news conference in Kuwait two years ago because one of the microphones in front of them belonged to BeIN, the Qatari sports television network.

Pro-Qatari and Spanish media reported at the time that Saudi Arabia had offered Bahraini players bonuses if they "defeated the (Qatari) terrorists".

The boycotting countries accuse Qatar of supporting militants and political violence, a charge Qatar has consistently denied. They also demanded that Qatar distance itself from Iran, with whom it shares the world’s largest natural gas field.

The decision to participate in the Qatari tournament came days after UAE minister of state for foreign affairs Anwar Gargash called for a diplomatic resolution to the dispute with the Islamic republic, suggesting that “there could be a path to a deal with Iran that all parties might soon be ready to embark on.”

Mr. Gargash’s remarks followed moves by the UAE to dial down tension in its relations with Iran that included reducing the UAE’s military role in Yemen and visits to Iran by UAE officials to discuss the regional dispute as well as maritime security.

Similarly, a Saudi official, in a rare gesture, told reporters in Washington earlier this month that Qatar had taken a step towards resolving the crisis by passing an anti-terrorism funding law, a key demand of the boycotting countries, but needed to do more.

Saudi Arabia, in a further indication that regional players were seeking to ensure that tensions don’t spin out of control, has scaled back its military operations in the 4.5-year long Yemen war after Iranian-backed Houthi rebels stopped firing ballistic missiles into the kingdom, the official added.

Resolving the Gulf’s monarchical spat may prove easier than addressing differences with Iran over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and its support for militants in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.

The spat has endured for the past 2.5 years because feuding parties appeared unwilling to back away from maximalist positions and search for what would amount to a face-saving formula that would allow for a restoration of diplomatic and economic relations.

If the Gulf Cup is anything to go by, that may be changing.

By the same token, this week’s Iraqi-Iranian soccer clash is likely to highlight the greater complexity involved in managing the Saudi-Iranian rift and the who-blinks-first problem against the backdrop of the US withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program and harsh economic sanctions since imposed by the United States.

Iran has in recent months progressively reduced its adherence to the agreement in a bid to heighten tension to the point that it forces a breaking of the stalemate; pressure the accord’s other signatories, the European Union, China and Russia to provide the sanctions relief Iran needs; and force the Trump administration to return to the accord before it is renegotiated.

Ironically, Gulf states that have gone to great length over the past decade to pre-empt popular revolts or limit, if not reverse their achievements, see a silver lining in the mass anti-government protests in Iraq and Lebanon because they target the foundations of Iranian influence in those two countries.

As a result, Gulf rulers may be rooting for Iraq in this week’s soccer match against Iran, and not just because Iraq is predominantly Arab, and Iran is not.

Yet, unlike the Gulf Cup that could prove to be an initial node in resolving a debilitating dispute, the Iran-Iraq World Cup qualifier’s possible heightening of tensions risks reaffirming the Marxist principle that things have to get worse before they get better.

Indeed, ‘the times they are a changin,’ but reaping the benefits could prove to be a torturous process.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture